U.S: Policy on Iran (Testimony by Michael Singh to the Senate Foreign Relations Ctte.

The View from Congress: U.S. Policy on Iran



Michael Singh

Lane-Swig Senior Fellow, Managing Director, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy

Testimony submitted to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee

March 28, 2017

Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, and Members of the Committee, thank you for this op-portunity to appear before you today to discuss United States policy toward Iran.

Speculation regarding the new U.S. administration’s policy toward Iran often begins with the question of whether it will keep or scrap the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), as the nuclear deal between Iran and the P5+1 countries—the United States, Britain, France, Russia, and China, plus Germany—is formally known. This, however, would be the wrong question with which to begin craft-ing a new Iran policy. To start from this premise would be to perpetuate a central mistake of the Obama administration: for eight years, the United States has viewed Iran policy through the lens of the nuclear negotiations; it should now instead see the nuclear issue through the lens of broader Iran policy. Iran’s nuclear program is so concerning not simply—or even primarily—because of the general U.S. interest in nuclear nonproliferation but because of the broader threats Iran poses. Iran is the Middle East’s leading revisionist state, determined to alter the regional balance of power in its own favor at the expense of the United States and its allies. Although Iran’s policies are far from the only problem confronting America in the Middle East, they are arguably the most important, and contribute in material ways to many oth-ers: Iran’s efforts to project power have destabilized Lebanon, prolonged the Syrian civil war, and fueled resentment among Arab Sunnis and the rise of jihadist groups like the Islamic State.

In response, the United States should pursue a strategy of deterrence—ensuring Iran’s leadership under-stands the costs of challenging American interests and the benefits of accommodating itself to the pre-vailing international and regional order. Yet Washington must also recognize that Tehran is a difficult foe to deter: while it has proven itself to be a rational actor, weighing costs and benefits and choosing the course of action it deems best for regime interests, its anti-Americanism is not a mere indication of prej-udice but rather an ideological pillar with which it will not easily part. This is why better relations with the United States do not entice Iran, although regime officials do appear to debate vigorously how best to manage ties with Washington in light of Iran’s other interests. Nor is Iran’s desire for regional domi-nance a recent flirtation: it has been one of the region’s most influential states for millennia, and its clashes with the region’s other ancient empires predate the rise of Islam. Any Iranian regime—revolutionary or democratic, pro- or anti-Western—would likely aim to play a leading role in the region. It is this mixture of anti-American revisionism and hegemonic ambition that makes the Iranian chal-lenge so difficult.

A strategy of deterrence toward Iran should seek to advance three broad objectives:

1. Nuclear. Prevent Iran from building or acquiring a nuclear weapon, and from meaningfully ad-vancing its nuclear weapons capabilities (fuel fabrication, weaponization, and delivery). In addi-tion, prevent Iran from sharing nuclear weapons technology with other states or nonstate ac-tors.

2. Regional. Counter and defeat Iranian efforts to challenge American interests in the Middle East and South/Central Asia or to undermine U.S. allies in these regions. In addition, limit Iranian malign influence and power-projection capabilities in these regions.

3. Global. Prevent Iran from mounting terrorist attacks or cyberattacks on the United States or U.S. interests, or from supporting states and nonstate actors that seek to challenge U.S. inter-ests.

The following paragraphs lay out a strategy for achieving these objectives, the obstacles facing it, and concrete actions the new administration can take to advance such a strategy.

BACKGROUND

Former president Barack Obama’s legacy on Iran is contentious, to say the least. His admirers consider not just the JCPOA but the establishment of routine U.S.-Iran engagement to be among his foremost foreign policy achievements. Detractors feel quite the opposite. Yet when President Obama took office in 2009, views on Iran were not nearly so polarized. Iran sanctions legislation enjoyed near-unanimous support in Congress, and the American public consistently ranked Iran’s nuclear program as a top threat. Obama himself largely continued the approach toward Iran developed by his predecessor, Presi-dent George W. Bush—unilateral and international sanctions and threats of military force paired with multilateral diplomacy via the P5+1. Obama, however, supplemented this strategy with a strenuous ef-fort to establish direct bilateral talks with Iran (past administrations engaged directly with Iran, but di-rect U.S. contact on the nuclear issue had been predicated on Iran suspending its uranium-enrichment- and plutonium-reprocessing-related activities) and largely ended official U.S. questioning of the legiti-macy of the Iranian regime.

These departures, though perhaps originally intended to support the preexisting strategy, eventually came to overtake it. Direct U.S.-Iran talks largely supplanted the P5+1 negotiating format, and the agreement that eventually emerged from these contacts fell well short of satisfying longstanding interna-tional demands of Iran. Meanwhile, the talks were pitched not only as a way to resolve the nuclear crisis but also as the opening chapter in a hoped-for U.S.-Iran rapprochement. Along the way, the United States largely refrained from challenging Iranian efforts to project power in the Middle East and else-where and even enjoined its traditional allies to “share” the region with Tehran.

As a result, the Trump administration faces a vastly different strategic landscape from that faced by the Obama administration in 2009. The most obvious difference is the JCPOA itself. Iran’s nuclear pro-gram is larger today than it was in 2009, even as its previous rapid expansion has mostly been halted. Still, Iran continues to engage in centrifuge research and development and to advance its missile pro-grams—the former being explicitly permitted by the JCPOA, the latter having been omitted from it entirely. Iran has largely adhered to the agreement, though a substantial reduction in International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reporting on Iranian nuclear activities and various exemptions granted to Iran by the Joint Commission—a body established by the JCPOA to adjudicate problems and dis-putes under the deal—mean that such judgments must be made with caution. The United States and other P5+1 members have also kept their side of the bargain, despite Iranian complaints likely meant in part to extract additional concessions from Washington, in part to deflect blame for Iran’s continuing economic problems, and in part simply reflecting the ambiguous wording of the JCPOA. The reality is

that while Iran’s reintegration into the global economy has been far from smooth, the country has al-ready reaped tremendous economic benefits from the JCPOA, which stand only to increase as time passes.

Meanwhile, Iran’s regional activities have grown inexorably over the past eight years. The control exert-ed by Hezbollah, an Iranian proxy, and its allies over Lebanon has solidified. Iran’s Islamic Revolution-ary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its proxies—a mix of Hezbollah forces, Syrian paramilitaries, and Shiite militants from Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan—are arguably the strongest force on the ground in Syria. Iran-directed or allied militias in Iraq have assumed a prominent role in the fight against the Islamic State, having gained the official sanction of the Iraqi state and the grudging acceptance of the U.S. mili-tary. In both places, Iran has embarked on a distinct strategic shift—from insurgency to counterinsur-gency, and from maintaining plausible deniability to touting its role by acknowledging its support for Hezbollah and others, publishing details of funerals held for Shiite militants and IRGC fighters, and, most prominently, sponsoring well-publicized, on-the-spot visits by IRGC Qods Force commander Qasem Soleimani. Elsewhere, the Iran-supported Houthis in Yemen overthrew the country’s interna-tionally recognized government, have fought Saudi and UAE forces to a stalemate, and appear to be seeking control of the international Bab al-Mandab shipping channel. Iranian support for the Taliban in Afghanistan has reportedly expanded dramatically. And the IRGC has appeared to play a role in fo-menting and sustaining anti-government violence in Bahrain.

This is not to say that Iran has been successful everywhere. Ties between Tehran and its Palestinian al-lies, especially Hamas, appear to have deteriorated in the wake of the 2011 Arab uprisings. The rise of the Islamic State has threatened Iranian interests in Syria and Iraq, despite indications of limited coop-eration between IS and the Assad regime. Russia’s intervention in Syria has been a mixed blessing, saving the Assad regime—upon which Tehran depends as a channel for projecting power in the Levant—but at the risk of reducing Iran to a junior partner in that conflict. And Iran’s stepped-up aggression, combined with American disengagement, has spurred Gulf Cooperation Council unity and joint action, albeit with mixed results.

Internationally, the JCPOA has not provoked the same internal divisions among U.S. allies as it has in Washington. In Europe, the agreement is hailed on the right and left alike as a signal achievement, even by a French government that clashed with the Obama administration over the latter’s readiness to offer concessions and keep its friends in the dark during talks. U.S. allies in Europe simply do not share the American threat perception with regard to Iran; there is almost no appetite in Europe for abandoning the JCPOA or taking concerted action in response to Iranian regional activities. This is the case even though Europe is arguably more threatened than the United States by Iran, given the proximity of Irani-an missiles and spillover from the conflict in Syria, which is sustained by Iranian power. Russia and Chi-na, for their part, see Iran as an ally, both in the Middle East and internationally, as all three share a de-sire to see the U.S. international role diminished.

This is one of the starkest changes facing the new administration. Upon entering office, Presidents Bush and Obama each benefited from a general strategic convergence with Europe, and even Russia and Chi-na, given the priority each placed on nonproliferation as well as on heading off a U.S.-Iran conflict. Be-cause these states largely agreed with U.S. goals, they could eventually overcome disputes over strategy and tactics (e.g., European objections to the use of extraterritorial sanctions). The Trump administra-tion will face the opposite—a strategic divergence between itself and these states, which pay little heed to Iranian nonnuclear misbehavior and are keen to deepen their relations, commercial and otherwise, with Tehran.

In the Middle East, of course, the situation is far different. U.S. allies there—Israel, Turkey, and Sunni Arab countries alike—lacked enthusiasm for the JCPOA. Even so, none currently advocate its abroga-tion, given worries that the alternative—whether the resumption of Iranian nuclear activities or a U.S.-

Iran military conflict—would be worse. However, all want the United States and others to push back against what they see as Iran’s increasing boldness in the region, and none believe the JCPOA should be a brake on such a response. Among these allies, only Israel has proven equal to the task of countering Iran’s regional activities—Tehran is essentially unchallenged by other regional powers in Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq, and has managed in Yemen and Bahrain to effectively play a spoiler role without attracting direct retaliation. And just like U.S. allies elsewhere, some of these states will develop strong post-sanctions economic ties with Iran (e.g., transshipment via Dubai and energy links with Turkey) that may mitigate their support for any coercive measures contemplated in Washington.

As a result of such developments, any new U.S. strategy toward Iran will have to overcome the following obstacles:

1. Issues regarding the JCPOA

• Should the United States choose to walk away from the JCPOA absent a clear Iranian vio-lation, Washington will be diplomatically isolated and experience significant difficulty ral-lying allies around an alternative approach.

• Adhering to the JCPOA—which only partially addressed U.S. concerns about Iran’s nucle-ar program and ignored entirely Iran’s nonnuclear challenges to U.S. interests—means for-going its most effective sanctions instruments, such as blocking Iranian oil exports or sever-ing Iran from the international financial system.

• Even if the United States does continue to adhere to the JCPOA, its allies outside the Middle East will be reluctant to cooperate in any effort to counter Iran’s regional and glob-al nonnuclear activities.

• The JCPOA, if faithfully implemented by all sides, will permit the growth of Iran’s conven-tional and missile forces—on which UN sanctions lapse after five and eight years, respec-tively—and of its economy and international trading links, which taken together will im-prove Iran’s strategic position and erode U.S. leverage.

2. Increasing Russian or Chinese military links with Iran, together with Russia’s expanded military footprint in the region generally, will reduce U.S. freedom of action and undermine the credi-bility of military options against Iran.

3. Deterioration over the past eight years of U.S. strategic and perhaps operational links with re-gional allies.

A NEW IRAN POLICY

To advance the three pillars of its nuclear, regional, and global objectives with respect to Iran, the Unit-ed States should adopt a strategy of deterrence. Such a strategy requires Iran to believe that challenging U.S. interests will be costly and, conversely, that playing by the “rules” of the regional and international order will be beneficial. But before turning to the specific policies that should constitute such a strategy, discussing some general principles will be useful:

• Foster U.S. capability, credibility, and clarity. Harvard’s Graham Allison has observed that de-terrence requires capability, credibility, and clarity. Particularly vital to maintaining deterrence are continuing to maintain a robust forward-deployed military presence in the Middle East, ex-ercising diplomatic leadership in the region, and continuing to cultivate expertise on Iran throughout the executive branch. The United States and our allies should also avoid responding

reflexively to Iran, instead acting patiently and methodically to address Iranian challenges to American interests.

• Strengthen capabilities of U.S. allies. The United States should aim to deter Iran not only through punitive action after, for instance, a missile test or naval provocation but also by strengthening allies’ offensive and especially defensive capabilities so that Iran will judge poten-tial challenges as having little chance of success.

• Wield policy tools in concert. In this case and others, the United States should wield policy tools in concert rather than sequentially and should take no tools off the table, whether military action or diplomatic engagement; historically, the most effective approach to Iran has been that of diplomacy backed by force or the credible threat of force.

• Preserve international unity. Whatever actions the United States takes, it should aim to pre-serve to the extent possible international unity, and should in turn count on Iran to try to split America from its allies.

• Understand policy trade-offs. While the United States will need to balance its efforts to deter Iran against other foreign policy goals, U.S. officials should ensure they properly understand those trade-offs. For example, pushing back against Iran does not contradict but rather com-plements an effort to counter the Islamic State, because Iran’s activities, such as its support for the Assad regime, have fueled the rise of IS.

• Consolidate responsibility. Bureaucratically, the administration should ensure that a single offi-cial at the State Department oversees all aspects of Iran policy, with the aim of ensuring that JCPOA implementation, regional policy, and other matters are integrated into a single coordi-nated strategy rather than treated separately or competitively.

PILLAR 1: ENFORCING AND ENHANCING THE NUCLEAR DEAL

The JCPOA is a flawed agreement—it permits Iran too much nuclear activity, does not address Iran’s past weaponization activities or missile development, and has insufficient provisions for guarding against clandestine Iranian nuclear work. Moreover, its provisions begin to expire within a decade. Nevertheless, it is part of the reality that confronts the new administration, and Iran and U.S. allies alike would resist its renegotiation. In walking away from the deal, Washington would face the difficult task of devising a new strategy to contain Iran’s nuclear program and rallying allied support for such a strategy in the face of intense international skepticism.

The United States should therefore neither scrap the JCPOA nor make an absolute commitment to it, but rather make plain to Iran and to other diplomatic partners that the deal’s survival will depend on the rigor with which it is enforced. Because those partners are eager to preserve the JCPOA, the prospect of continued U.S. adherence will provide leverage to insist on its enforcement and enhancement—not through reopening the P5+1 process, but through strict interpretation of the deal’s terms and side un-derstandings with European and other allies on related issues. Iran also appears eager to preserve the JCPOA, minimizing any risk that more rigorous enforcement alone would prompt Iran to walk away from the agreement.

In “rigorously enforcing” the JCPOA, the Trump administration should bear in mind that if Iran cheats on the deal, it will likely seek to do so clandestinely, using undeclared facilities rather than those under international monitoring. To guard against such an eventuality, the administration should consider tak-ing steps in the following areas:

Boosting Transparency

• Insist that the IAEA provide greater detail in its public reporting on Iran’s nuclear activities, akin to the reports it published prior to the implementation of the JCPOA. While Iran is likely to protest, such a step would help bolster public confidence that Iran is, in fact, complying with its obligations.

• Provide regular, unclassified reports to Congress on Iran’s compliance with the JCPOA, the progress of its nuclear and dual-use procurement efforts, centrifuge R&D, and missile develop-ment, and other states’ compliance with the JCPOA and remaining international sanctions.

• Insist that any decisions of the JCPOA Joint Commission be made public. According to the agreement, this requires consensus of the group, which includes Iran, Russia, and China. How-ever, the United States and the EU3 (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) can predi-cate their support for Joint Commission decisions on these states’ agreement to transparency.

Intelligence Sharing

• Continue to prioritize the allocation of intelligence resources for monitoring Iran’s nuclear ac-tivities, as well as possible related risks (e.g., nuclear procurement from abroad or the establish-ment of clandestine Iranian nuclear facilities in third countries).

• Establish a continuous intelligence-sharing mechanism with European, Asian, and Middle East allies, as well as analytical exchanges.

• Fully fund intelligence collection on Iran, despite the rising priority of other efforts such as the campaign to counter IS.

Inspections and Verification

• Insist that Iran provide initial baseline declarations for all materiel and components applicable to its nuclear program, such as uranium stocks and centrifuge components. This will help avert any discrepancy between, for example, centrifuge inventories and centrifuge component manu-facturing that could point to an undeclared nuclear effort. Push the IAEA to use its inspection authorities to verify these baselines.

• Likewise, press the IAEA to be aggressive in using its inspection authorities under the Addi-tional Protocol, which complements its Safeguards Agreement, and the JCPOA, especially with regard to possible undeclared nuclear activities and end-use verification for nuclear and dual-use procurement. A norm should be established according to which such inspections are not excep-tional but rather part of the ordinary functioning of the JCPOA, and thus need not precipitate crises.

• Fully fund the IAEA to ensure no shortfall in its capacity to implement the JCPOA.

Procurement and Counterproliferation1

• Work to ensure that UN member states and the international private sector understand their responsibilities with respect to nuclear and dual-use exports to Iran.

• Work to bolster the export-control capacity of all states, especially those with a history of in-volvement in illicit Iranian nuclear and missile procurement.

• Restrict use of the procurement channel by Iranian entities with a history of illicit procurement, or—in the case of nuclear procurement—for civilian end users at unmonitored facilities.

• Urge states to maintain a presumption of denial—rather than a presumption of approval—for procurement-channel requests that cannot be adequately vetted within the thirty-day period specified in the JCPOA.

• Urge states—including Iran itself—to make nuclear and dual-use exports to Iran outside the procurement channel a crime under domestic laws.

• Given the JCPOA’s reliance on suppliers to verify end use of dual-use items, press the IAEA to employ its inspection authorities to conduct end-use verifications in suspicious cases or when the supplier has shown signs of being remiss or unreliable.

• Reinstate the UN Panel of Experts—eliminated with the adoption of the JCPOA—or a similar body to independently assess Iran’s nuclear and dual-use procurement efforts.

Sanctions and Responding to Violations

• The United States should continue to strictly meet its obligations, but should resist any de-mand to exceed those obligations unless Iran is willing to add to its own obligations; the U.S. (and P5+1) commitment is to take certain actions, not to ensure certain outcomes for Iran.

• Make clear to other P5+1 members that Washington expects them to enforce not only the JCPOA but also the wider-reaching requirements of UN Security Council Resolution 2231 (e.g., its prohibitions against certain arms- and missile-related exports to Iran) and any other relevant UNSC resolutions.

• Urge states to enact domestic legislation, as the United States has done, that will allow them to quickly reimpose sanctions should Iran violate the JCPOA or should the deal otherwise unrav-el.

• Together with the EU3 and other allies, develop protocols for responding to violations of the JCPOA or UN resolutions, including a menu of penalties short of full snapback for minor in-fringements. Seek agreement with allies to no longer excuse violations such as exceeding agreed limits on low-enriched uranium stockpiles or skirting restrictions on heavy-water production by storing excess quantities in neighboring Oman.

• Emphasize that the military option remains on the table, and maintain a robust presence and schedule of exercises to lend credibility to that option.

Because the JCPOA does not address certain important aspects of Iran’s nuclear program—e.g., its mis-sile program—simply enforcing the deal rigorously is not enough. Rather, the administration will need also to address critical flaws in the agreement that could permit Iran to advance its nuclear weapons ef-forts even while fully complying with the deal’s terms.

• Access Delays: The JCPOA essentially permits Iran to delay IAEA inspector access to suspect-ed undeclared nuclear facilities for twenty-four days. While it would be difficult to fully eradi-cate evidence of work with radioactive materials in this timeframe, nuclear-weapons-related work does not always require the introduction of such materials; in these cases, twenty-four days would be sufficient to destroy evidence. Even in instances where radioactive materials had been introduced, Iran could use the time to eradicate other evidence critical to determining the purpose of the site in question. To address this problem, the United States should insist that

the relevant timeframe for IAEA access to such sites is the twenty-four-hour limit specified in the Additional Protocol and that delays beyond this limit merit penalties and could be grounds for reimposing sanctions.

• Weaponization Efforts—or Possible Military Dimensions (PMDs): The JCPOA does not require Iran to account for its past weaponization work or to give the IAEA access to the sites, personnel, and documents involved in this work. Rather, it simply closes the IAEA’s past PMD investigation in the interest of moving forward. While there is no reason at this stage to seek to penalize Iran for its past weaponization work, U.S. (and P5+1) officials must act to fill any knowledge gaps regarding how far that work progressed and to ensure that weaponization-related sites and personnel have not resumed their work. To that end, the IAEA should use its inspection authorities to request access to the relevant sites and personnel, not to reopen past investigations—which would be inconsistent with the JCPOA—but to ascertain their current activities.

• Missiles: Arguably the biggest omission in the JCPOA concerns Iran’s missile activities. The JCPOA does not address them at all, and UNSC Resolution 2231 scales back the previous ban on missile testing by Iran and extends the prohibition on other states assisting Iran with its mis-sile development efforts only until 2023. Because Iran will likely require international assistance should it seek to develop an intercontinental ballistic missile, this provision represents a signifi-cant achievement for Tehran. The United States should seek allied support for a fourfold re-sponse: (1) stricter enforcement of existing sanctions targeting Iran’s missile activities and the adoption of new ones as needed; (2) a commitment to intercept or otherwise respond to any Iranian missile test that endangers the territory or forces of the United States and its allies; (3) stepped-up efforts to interdict missile-related shipments to and from Iran, as well as to gather and share the intelligence required to engage in such interdictions; and (4) strengthened and better-integrated missile defense in the Middle East and Europe to negate any advantages Iran seeks to gain by improving its missile capabilities.

• Sunset: Whatever the JCPOA’s strengths and weaknesses, it is a temporary accord. Its re-strictions, and those added by UNSC Resolution 2231, begin to phase out as early as 2021 and will expire almost in full by 2026–31. Thus, while the deal arguably buys time for Iran’s adver-saries, it also does so for Iran—affording the Islamic Republic a period to develop its centrifuge and missile capabilities while shielded from the harshest international sanctions. As a result, when Iran eventually resumes the expansion of its enrichment- and reprocessing-related activi-ties, its “breakout time” could be dangerously low and its ability to field a usable nuclear missile could be dangerously advanced. To guard against this eventuality, the United States should seek allied support for a threefold response: (1) declaring as a matter of policy that the United States and others will not passively accept the further expansion of Iran’s nuclear activities when the JCPOA lapses; (2) seeking to negotiate the extension and expansion of the JCPOA’s re-strictions on Iran’s nuclear activities; and (3) seeking to bolster the global nuclear nonprolifera-tion regime to comprehensively restrict states’ fuel-cycle activities and limit Iran’s options when the JCPOA expires.

PILLAR 2: COUNTERING IRAN’S REGIONAL AND GLOBAL ACTIVITIES

While the United States has focused its Iran policy on the nuclear issue, American allies in the Middle East have been far more concerned about what they see as Tehran’s mounting efforts to project power in the region. While Iran continues to operate mainly through proxies such as Lebanese Hezbollah and Shiite militias in Iraq and elsewhere, its regional activities are increasingly direct and overt. Iranian offi-cials, especially those affiliated with the IRGC, make no attempt to hide the purpose of these activities—to project Iranian power to the Mediterranean Sea, deter the United States, and weaken and otherwise

preoccupy its adversaries. Among Iran’s goals is undercutting the monopoly of force and national loyalty in target states by creating alternate security, political, and religious institutions beholden to Tehran. This pursuit not only amplifies Iran’s power, it also undermines already fragile state institutions and fuels sectarianism. For various reasons, Iran relies on asymmetric and strategic power rather than con-ventional power, and it will likely continue to do so even if relaxed sanctions create opportunities for Iran to rebuild its conventional capabilities.

Nevertheless, the United States should avoid the temptation to reflexively oppose every Iranian action in the region—instead, the focus should be on deterring Iran where it clearly challenges U.S. interests and strategy. And because most U.S. allies outside the Middle East do not share the U.S. threat percep-tion with respect to Iran (e.g., on its missile program or support for terrorism) and are leery of reopening the nuclear issue, any effort to push back on the Islamic Republic should emphasize the Iranian role in issues such as instability in Syria and Yemen or human rights violations, which are more likely to garner these allies’ interest and support. In addition, successful deterrence requires that the United States and its allies be prepared to ease off these punitive measures if Iran moderates its policies; otherwise, Tehran will have no incentive to do so.

Syria, Iraq, and Yemen

• In Syria, the United States should seek to magnify differences between Russia and Iran by con-tinuing to emphasize the need for President Bashar al-Assad to step down as part of a political transition, a development Moscow may ultimately find more acceptable than would Tehran.

• Washington must insist, as part of any contacts with Russia regarding Syria, on the withdrawal of Iranian forces and Iran-backed foreign militias—including Hezbollah and Shiite militants from Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan—and assert that the United States and its allies reserve the right to take direct action against these militias if they remain.

• Any discussion of combating terrorist groups in Syria should cover not only Sunni groups but also Iranian proxies such as Hezbollah, which is designated as a terrorist group in the United States and elsewhere.

• Sanctions on the Assad regime and any Iranian or Iran-backed individuals and entities support-ing it should be strictly enforced and, if necessary, enhanced; further, Iran should be sanctioned for the provision of arms and other military support to Syria—and to militias elsewhere in the region—in violation of UNSC Resolution 2231 and other measures.

• Extend the international coalition’s mission in Iraq by at least two years, in order to demon-strate our ongoing (albeit limited) commitment to Baghdad.

• Extend funding to continue building and training the Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service and Ira-qi security forces.

• Push Baghdad to resist undue Iranian influence (e.g., the institutionalization of Iran-backed mi-litias) and to abide by UN resolutions on Iran (e.g., against arms transfers from the Islamic Re-public) and assist it in doing so.

• With respect to Arab states, particularly those of the GCC, Washington should press for great-er outreach to and coordination with Iraq.

• In Yemen, efforts should be intensified to interdict arms, funding, and other forms of support for the Houthis; Washington should likewise increase regional intelligence sharing toward that end.

• The U.S. leadership must rally international partners to respond forcefully to Iranian-backed threats to shipping through the Bab al-Mandab Strait, using patrols, interdictions, and direct action against any personnel threatening freedom of navigation with missiles, mines, or other weapons.

• Finally, Washington should publicize the role that Iran-backed militias play in human rights violations across the region and seek to impose international and unilateral sanctions on them wherever Washington and the UN have not already done so.

Countering Iranian Provocations and Proxy Networks

• Review U.S. Navy procedures for responding to unsafe and provocative conduct by Iranian na-val forces to ensure that Iran is deterred and the risk of inadvertent clashes is minimized.



• Maintain and, if needed, broaden freedom-of-navigation operations to challenge excessive Ira-nian maritime claims in the Gulf.

• Deepen intelligence sharing among U.S. regional allies on Iranian arms shipments and provi-sion of other support for proxies, and interdict such support in concert with allies when intelli-gence merits doing so.

• Engage in discreet discussions with Israel and Arab allies regarding new ways of countering Iran-backed militias, and where this threat might spread next.

• Press the UN to act in response to Iranian violation of the prohibition on arms shipments to groups such as Hezbollah and the Houthis.

• Make clear to Tehran that attacks on U.S. forces or allies by Iranian or Iran-backed forces will merit a firm and direct response against Iranian interests; consider direct action targeting Irani-an proxies where U.S. interests are directly threatened (e.g., safety of shipping through the Bab al-Mandab, safety of U.S. vessels in the Gulf).

• Publicly expose Iranian support for regional proxies through declassification of intelligence and diplomatic and media briefings; likewise, debunk exaggerated Iranian military claims when ap-propriate.

Sanctions

• Bearing in mind that sanctions are an important tool (even if not a silver bullet), recognize that sanctions diplomacy—i.e., gaining the agreement of other countries to act in concert with the United States to both amplify pressure on Iran and ensure its compliance with existing measures—is just as important as Washington’s own adoption and enforcement of sanctions. Strictly enforce existing sanctions on Iran—especially on the IRGC and its proxies and affili-ates—and add to them as needed.2



• Publish more extensive “watch lists” of IRGC-owned or affiliated entities and front companies to help the international private sector avoid doing business inadvertently with the IRGC. Sig-nificantly expand the number of IRGC-related designations and consider lowering the thresh-old of IRGC ownership/control required for designation.

• Conduct a review of Iran Air and other Iranian commercial airlines to ensure that any aircraft sales to them satisfy the JCPOA requirement of strictly civilian end-use.

• Increase sanctions focus on less-traditional areas, such as corruption, money laundering, and human rights, in order to widen international support. Seek international condemnation of Iran for its threats against Israel.

• Press regional states to ensure compliance with sanctions on Iran by boosting intelligence gath-ering, inspection of shipments, and security of maritime and land borders (e.g., the Oman-Yemen border); where needed, bolster their ability to do so.

• Press states outside the region to not only commit to compliance with Iran sanctions but to strengthen their compliance through intelligence collection and steps to ensure that domestic laws support sanctions enforcement.

• Continue actively to educate the international private sector regarding its sanctions compliance obligations with respect to Iran.

Other Arenas

• Step up intelligence gathering and international cooperation aimed at the terrorism- and prolif-eration-related and criminal activities of Iran and its proxies, especially Hezbollah, outside the Middle East.

• Given Iran’s possession of nuclear materials and knowledge, and the spread of nuclear fuel-cycle activities elsewhere in the world, reinvigorate nuclear security efforts in the United States and strengthen the global nonproliferation regime.

• In accordance with any new U.S. “cyber doctrine,” warn Iran against malign cyber activities di-rected at the United States and its allies, and impose costs when Iran engages in such activities.

PILLAR 3: STRENGTHENING U.S. REGIONAL ALLIANCES

While the credibility of punitive measures is important for effective deterrence, a strong defense is argu-ably even more crucial. To that end, bolstering U.S. allies in the Middle East should be a key element of American policy toward Iran. Such an effort should be guided by two principles. First, it should address the actual threats these allies face. These are largely asymmetric in nature; Iran does not challenge U.S. allies conventionally but rather through terrorism, proxy warfare, political warfare, and subversion, simi-lar to the “hybrid” or “gray zone” warfare waged by Russia in Europe. Iran also wields a formidable mis-sile force, putting a premium on theater missile defense in response. Second, to the extent possible, the U.S. goal should be to build a multilateral alliance system in the Middle East, not a series of strong but disconnected bilateral alliances. The Middle East—especially the Gulf—is crowded geographically, mak-ing coordination and interoperability among forces an imperative. A multilateral alliance—even if the region is decades removed from a “Middle East NATO”—could also provide a platform for U.S. allies to solve regional problems with minimal external intervention, a balance that would be welcomed both in the region and in the United States.

Regional Coordination

• As suggested earlier, revive the George W. Bush–era Gulf Security Dialogue, expanded to in-clude Jordan, Egypt, and Morocco. The GSD had six pillars, all of which remain relevant: (1) GCC defensive capabilities and interoperability; (2) regional security issues; (3) counterprolif-eration; (4) counterterrorism and internal security; (5) critical infrastructure protection—to which cyberdefense should now be added; and (6) support for Iraq. Other external powers, such as the European Union, Russia, and China, should be invited to observe and contribute exper-tise.

• Through the GSD+3: (1) Bolster intelligence sharing and intelligence fusion, with a particular focus on Iran and terrorist groups. (2) Foster a dialogue on the coordination of military pro-curement and training, and on increasing the effectiveness of internal and external security in-stitutions—as opposed to merely the acquisition of larger and more powerful arsenals. (3) Fos-ter a dialogue on countering the particular threats posed by Iran—to include antiaccess/area denial, terrorism, cyberattack, missiles, and subversion and political warfare—drawing upon les-sons learned in the European theater.

• Look for opportunities to use the GSD+3 to engage with Israel, particularly on issues of region-al security, counterproliferation, counterterrorism, critical infrastructure protection, and strate-gic planning, with the aim of discerning and preventing future regional threats.

• Increase investments in regional ballistic missile defense.

• Plan for the contingency of greater Russian and/or Chinese cooperation with Iran and the strengthening of Iranian antiaccess/area-denial capabilities that restrict the freedom of action of U.S. and allied forces, drawing upon lessons from the European and Asia-Pacific theaters.3



Bilateral Efforts

• Initiate bilateral dialogue with each U.S. ally in the region to determine its key vulnerabilities, shortfalls in effectiveness, and equipment needs, drawing upon lessons from recent conflicts such as Yemen.

• Urge allies to make political, security, and economic institutions more effective, responsive, and accountable to guard against popular discontent and ensure resilience in the face of subversion by Iran or extremist groups.

• Initiate a high-level dialogue with Israel on regional threats, including Iran and Syria, that con-sists largely of military and intelligence officials but led by the White House and Prime Minis-ter’s Office. Establish a trusted backchannel between the White House and the PMO.

• Work with Israel to prepare a plan for responding to a Hezbollah missile attack on Israel, em-phasizing deterrence not only of Hezbollah but also of Iran.

• Reinvigorate efforts to strengthen the Lebanese government and loosen Hezbollah’s grip on Lebanon, focusing especially on reducing Hezbollah’s arsenal and freedom of action.

Engagement with Iran

• Maintain existing channels of diplomatic engagement with Iran. However, when engaging Iran, do so multilaterally with regional allies whenever possible.

• Encourage U.S. allies to engage with Iran, but ensure they are doing so from a position of strength, with U.S. support.

• Expand the Iranian people’s contact with the United States through increased people-to-people exchanges and visa issuance. Express support for human rights in Iran.

• Avoid transactional engagement with Iran (e.g., on counternarcotics and Afghanistan) that benefits the regime without prompting improvements in Iranian policies on matters of core importance to the United States and its allies.

• Engagement should be seen as just another tool in the policy toolkit, not as absolutely good or bad on its own merits; it should be used as conditions and strategy dictate.

NOTES

1. For a full treatment of this topic, see David Albright and Andrea Stricker, “The Iran Nuclear Deal’s Procurement Channel: Overcoming Post-Implementation Day Issues,” Institute for Sci-ence and International Security, April 21, 2016, http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-re-ports/documents/JCPOA_Procurement_Channel_Post_Implementation_Day_21April2016_Final1_1.pdf.

2. For a full treatment of this issue, see Katherine Bauer, Patrick Clawson, and Matthew Levitt, Reinforcing the Role of Sanctions in Restraining Iran (The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, February 2017), http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/reinforcing-the-role-of-sanctions-in-restraining-iran.

3. For a full treatment of this issue, see Mark Gunzinger with Chris Dougherty, Outside-In: Op-erating from Range to Defeat Iran’s Anti-Access and Area-Denial Threats (Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, posted January 17, 2012), http://csbaonline.org/research/publications/outside-in-operating-from-range-to-defeat-irans-anti-access-and-area-denial.