Kazım Karabekir

Kazım Karabekir'i tanıtma notu
E. KUR. ALB. NUSRET BAYCAN

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Büyük bir asker olan Korgeneral Kâzım Karabekir, koruyucu ve sevecen kişiliği yanında, Türk ahlâk ve karakterinin de seçkin bir siması idi. Bazı eserlerde son rütbesi Orgeneral olarak gösterilmekte ise de Genelkurmay Başkanlığının ilgili şubesinde ve arşivdeki şahsî dosyasında bu rütbeye yükseldiğine dair bir kayıt ve belgeye rastlanamamıştır. Esasen emekli maaşı da Ferik yani Korgeneral rütbesi üzerindendir.

Görüş ve düşüncelerinde vatanseverliği ve milletinin selâmeti her zaman ön plânda yer almıştır.

Mustafa Kemal Paşa (Atatürk) ile, zaman zaman askerî ve siyasî konularda fikir ayrılıkları olmuşsa da, ilişkilerinde her zaman içtenlik ve dürüstlük hâkimdi.

Yurt savunması ile ilgili konularda titizlik göstermesinde, katıldığı harplerdeki maddî ve manevî kayıplarımızın ve şahidi olduğu fecaatin etkisi büyüktür. Kâzım Karabekir, 1910 Arnavutluk Ayaklanmasının bastırılmasında önemli rol oynamış, Balkan Harbinde Edirne Kalesini savunmuş, Birinci Dünya Harbinde çeşitli cephelerde tümen ve kolordulara komuta etmiş, zaferler kazanmış, Türk İstiklâl Harbinin Doğu Cephesi Komutanı olarak ün yapmıştır.


Kâzım Karabekir’in Yaşamı:

1882’de İstanbul’da doğmuş, ilk öğrenimine burada başlamış, babası Emin Paşa’nın görev yaptığı Van, Harput ve Mekke’de sürdürmüştür. Orta öğrenimini, Fatih Askerî Rüştiyesi ve Kuleli Askerî Lisesinde yapmış, 1899’da Harp Okuluna geçmiştir.


Askerî Yaşamı:

6 Aralık 1902’de Harp Okulunu ve 5 Kasım 1905’te Harp Akademisini birincilikle bitiren Kâzım Karabekir, bu başarıları nedeniyle Altın Maarif Madalyasıyla ödüllendirilmiştir.

Kurmay Yüzbaşı olarak 3’ncü Ordu emrine atanmış, kurmay stajını Manastır’da yapmış, iki yıllık staj süresince bulunduğu birliklerin katıldığı çarpışmalarda üstün başarı göstermiştir. 1907’de Kıdemli Yüzbaşı olmuş ve Beşinci Rütbeden Mecidi Nişanı ile ödüllendirilerek İstanbul’daki Harp Okulu Tabiye Öğretmen Yardımcılığına, 1908’de de Edirne’deki 3’üncü Tümen Kurmay Başkanlığına atanmıştır.

31 Mart (13 Nisan 1909) Olayı üzerine Hareket Ordusu Mürettep 2’nci Tümen Kurmay Başkanı olarak İstanbul’a gelmiş, Beyoğlu kışlaları ve Yıldız Sarayı’nın ele geçirilmesinde görev almıştır.

1910’da Arnavutluk Ayaklanmasını bastırmak için teşkil olunan Mürettep Kolordu’nun Harekât Şube Müdürlüğüne atanmış, bir süre Kurmay Başkan Vekilliği de yapmıştır. Bazı çarpışmalarda müfreze komutanı olarak kazandığı başarı nedeniyle Dördüncü Rütbeden Osmanî Nişanı ile ödüllendirilmiştir.

15 Ocak 1911’de io’ncu Tümen Kurmay Başkanlığına atanmış, 27 Nisan 1912’de Binbaşılığa yükseltilmiştir. 22 Haziran 1913’te Edirne savunmasında Bulgarlara esir düşmüş, 29 Eylül 1913’te yapılan İstanbul Antlaşmasından sonra yurda dönmüştür.

9 Aralık 1914’te Yarbay olmuş, Genel Karargâh İstihbarat Şube Müdürlüğünden, i’nci Kuvve-i Seferiye Komutanlığına atanan Kâzım Karabekir Halep’ten ayrılarak, yaralanmış bulunan Süleyman Askeri Bey’den Irak Havalisi Komutanlığını devralmak üzere Bağdat’a gitmiş ise de komuta değişikliğine neden kalmamış ve 6 Mart 1915’te 14’ncü Tümen Komutanlığına atanarak İstanbul’a gelmiştir. Kısa bir süre sonra da tümeniy-le Çanakkale’ye giderek Seddülbahir muharebelerine katılmıştır.

26 Ekim 1915’te 1’nci Ordu, 10 Kasım 1915’te 6’ncı Ordu Kurmay Başkanlıklarına atanan Kâzım Karabekir, 14 Aralık 1915’te Albaylığa yükseltilmiş, Çanakkale’deki başarıları nedeniyle, Harp, Gümüş Muharebe Liyakat ve Gümüş Muharebe imtiyaz Madalyalarıyla ödüllendirilmiştir.

27 Nisan 1916’da 18’nci Kolordu Komutanlığına atanmış, Irak’ta üstün İngiliz kuvvetleriyle muharebe etmiş ve Alman İkinci Demir Salîb Nişanıyla ödüllendirilmiştir.

7 Kasım 1916’da, 6’ncı Ordu Komutanına Dicle doğusundaki birliklerini nehrin batısına almayı önerdiyse de Halil Paşa kabul etmemiş bu yüzden 18’nci Kolordu ağır zayiat vermiştir.

8 Nisan 1917’de 2’nci Kolordu, 27 Aralık 1917’de de 1’nci Kafkas Kolordusu Komutanlıklarına atanmış, Erzincan ve Erzurum’u kurtararak halkın katledilmesini önlemiştir.

Sarıkamış, Kars ve Gümrü’nün alınmasındaki katkı ve başarıları nedeniyle 28 Temmuz 1918’de Mirlivalığa yükseltilmiş, İkinci Rütbeden Kılıçlı Mecidi ve Osmanî Nişanları ve Altın Muharebe Liyakat Madalyası ile ödüllendirilmiştir. Almanya, Avusturya – Macaristan da çeşitli nişan ve madalyalarıyla kendisini onurlandırmışlardır.

Eylül 1918’de Baku ve Tebriz alınmış, hatta daha ilerilere de gidilmiştir. Fakat 30 Ekim 1918’de Mondros Mütarekesi imzalanınca 1877-1878 hattına çekilindi. 24 Aralık 1918’de İngilizler de Batum’u işgal ettiler.

Kâzım Karabekir Paşa, 2 Mart 1919’da 15’nci Kolordu Komutanlığına atanarak Erzurum’a gitti. İzmir’in işgaliyle, millî hareketi hızlandırdı. 9 Haziran 1920’de de Doğu Cephesi Komutanlığı onaylandı

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25 Temmuz 1920’de İngilizlerin boşalttığı Batum’u Gürcülerin işgal etmesini protesto ettik. Kâzım Karabekir Paşa hazırladığı plânı uygulayarak 30 Eylül 1920’de Sarıkamış’ı, 30 Ekimde Kars’ı ele geçirdi. 31 Ekim 1920’de Ferik (Korgeneral)’liğe yükseltildi. 7 Kasım 1920’de Gümrü’yü aldı. Ermeniler ağır zayiata uğratılarak elde edilen silâh, cephane ve malzeme Batı Cephesine gönderildi. Kâzım Karabekir Paşa 2/3 Aralık 1920’de imzalanan Gümrü ve 13 Ekim 1921’de imzalanan Kars Antlaşmalarında Türk Heyetine başkanlık etti.

21 Ekimi923’te Doğu Cephesi lağvedildi. Kâzım Karabekir Paşa da, 1’nci Ordu Müfettişliğine atandı ve İstiklâl Madalyası ile ödüllendirildi.

31 Ekim 1924’te Ordu Müfettişliğinden istifa ederek Milletvekilliği görevine devam etti ve 17 Kasım 1924’te Meclisteki muhaliflerden oluşan Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası (Partisi)’nin liderliğine getirildi.

Kâzım Karabekir Paşa, 1 Kasım 1927’de ordu açığında iken emekliye ayrıldı.

1938’den sonra V ve VIII’nci dönemlerde İstanbul Milletvekili olarak Büyük Millet Meclisinde bulunmuş, 1946-1948 yılları arasında Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Başkanlığı yapmıştır. Bu görevde iken 25 Ocak 1948’de vefat etti.

Kâzım Karabekir, Fransızca, Rusça, Bulgarca ve Almanca bilirdi. Askerî, siyasî, tarihî ve terbiyevî kırktan fazla basılmış eseri bulunmaktadır.1


Kâzım Karabekir Paşa’nın Askerî Nitelikleri:

Kâzım Karabekir Paşa, ciddî, çalışkan, dürüst, bilgili, cesur, kesin karar sahibi, üstün ahlâklı bir askerdi. Gerek kurmay görevlerinde ve gerekse komuta ettiği birliklerde astlarının güvenini kazanmış, onları sevmiş ve kendisini sevdirmişti. Eğitime çok önem verirdi. Sorumluluktan asla yılmaz kanun ve yönetmeliklerin kendisine tanıdığı yetkileri hiç bir etki altında kalmadan kullanırdı.

Yaşadığı dönemde cereyan eden muharebelerin hemen tümüne katılmış, çok tecrübeli bir komutandı. Doğu Cephesi Komutanı olarak kazandığı zaferler, Türk ve yabancı tüm askerî otoriteler tarafından takdir edilmekte, en kritik dönemde Mustafa Kemal Paşa’ya ve davaya bağlılığı, vefakârlığı övülmektedir.

Kâzım Karabekir Paşa, iyi yetişmiş bir asker, başarılı bir komutandı.


Kâzım Karabekir’in Katıldığı Savaşlar:

1 Nisan 1910’daki Arnavutluk Ayaklanması ve Balkan Harbindeki görevlerine yaşamı bölümünde değinilmişti.


BİRİNCİ DÜNYA HARBİNDE:

Birinci Dünya Harbi, 3 Ağustos 1914’te bütün Avrupa’yı sarmış, 29 Ekim 1914’te Alman Amirali Suşon komutasındaki Türk donanmasının Karadeniz’deki harp gemilerini batırması ve limanlarını bombardıman etmesi üzerine Ruslar, doğu sınırlarımıza tecavüz ettiler, İngiliz Deniz Kuvvetleri de Akabe, Basra Körfezlerine ve Çanakkale Boğazındaki hedeflere ateş açarak düşmanca durum takındılar. 3 Kasım 1914’te Üçlü Anlaşma Devletleriyle harbe girmiş bulunuyorduk.

Doğu Cephemizde muharebenin şiddetlenmeye başladığı günlerde, Genel Karargâh İstihbarat Şube Müdürü Kurmay Yarbay Kâzım Karabekir 1’nci Kuvve-i Seferiye (Tümen) Komutanlığına atanmış ve 3 Ocak 1915’te tümeniyle İstanbul’dan ayrılmıştı.

Yarbay Kâzım Karabekir, Halep’e geldiği sırada, Sarıkamış Muharebesi felâketle sonuçlanmış, Irak’ta Rota Muharebesi başlamıştı. 20 Ocak 1915’te Irak ve Havalisi Genel Komutanı Yarbay Süleyman Askeri yaralanmış, yerine Kurmay Yarbay Kâzım Karabekir gönderilmişti. Bağdat’a kadar gittiği halde Yarbay Süleyman Askeri, görevi devretmediği gibi, Kurmay Yarbay Kâzım Karabekir’in harekât plânı üzerindeki önerilerini de dikkate almamıştı; Kâzım Karabekir taarruz istikametinin değiştirilmesini, ikmal teşkilâtının kurulmasını, İngilizleri küçümsememesini, aşiretlere güvenmemesini önermiş, henüz Halep’ten ayrılmamış olan 1’nci Kuvve-i Seferiye’nin Bağdat’a gönderilmesini de Enver Paşa’dan istemişti.

Her iki makamca da önerileri kabul edilmeyen Kâzım Karabekir, 10 Şubat’ta Bağdat’tan ayrılarak İstanbul’a geldi. 14’ncü Tümen Komutanlığına atanmıştı.

Yarbay Süleyman Askeri de, Şuayyibe Muharebesinde birliklerinin % 50’sini kaybederek, intihar etti.


ÇANAKKALE CEPHESİNDE:

Anlaşma Devletleri, 19 Şubat 1915’te Rusların yükünü hafifletmek ve onlara yardım sağlamak amacıyla başlattıkları deniz harekâtı, 18 Mart 1915 günü zaferimizle sonuçlanınca, Boğazları kara harekâtıyla düşürmek için 25 Nisan 1915’te Gelibolu yarımadasına çıkarma yaptılar. (Arıburnu ve Seddülbahir bölgelerine)

Seddülbahir kıyılarına çıkan İngiliz ve Fransız birlikleri, nisan, mayıs, haziran aylarında Kirte, temmuz ayındaki Kerevizdere muharebelerinde yıpranmış, Türk birlikleri de ağır zayiat vermişti. Bu birliklerden Kerevizdere bölgesindeki 4’üncü Tümeni, İstanbul’dan gelen Kurmay Yarbay Kâzım Karabekir Komutasındaki 14’ncü Tümen değiştirdi.

Tümgeneral Fevzi (Mareşal Çakmak) komutasındaki 5’nci Kolordu kuruluşunda muharebeye katılan 14’ncü Tümenin 42 ve 55’nci Alayları cephede, 41’nci Alayı ihtiyatta olmak üzere tertiplenmişti. Karşısında iki tümenli Fransız kolordusu vardı.

6 Ağustos günü başlayan Seddülbahir taarruzu, 7 Ağustos’ta şiddetlendi, 42’nci Alay bölgesine giren Fransız birlikleri, bu alayın karşı taarruzları ve tümen birliklerinin şiddetli ateş desteği karşısında panik halinde çekildiler.

5’nci Kolordu birlikleri, özellikle 14’ncü Tümen de ağır zayiat vermişti.

Kurmay Albay Mustafa Kemal’in yüksek sevk ve idaresindeki Anafartalar Muharebelerini de kaybeden Anlaşma Devletleri birlikleri, 20 Aralık 1915’te Arıburnu kesimini, 9 Ocak 1916’da da Seddülbahir kesimini tamamen tahliye etti.2


IRAK CEPHESİNDE:

Çok geniş yetkilerle 6’ncı Ordu Komutanlığına atanan Von Der Goltz’ün (Alman Mareşali) Kurmay Başkanı olarak 6 Aralık 1915’te Bağdat’a gelen Kâzım Karabekir, 14 Aralık’ta Albaylığa yükseltildi ve 27 Nisan 1916’da da 18’nci Kolordu Komutanlığına atandı. 29 Nisan 1916’da Kütülammare alındı. General Towsend ve 5’nci Tugay Komutanı tutsak edilerek Bursa’daki kampa gönderildiler.

Mareşal Von Der Goltz’ün tifüsten ölmesi üzerine 6’ncı Ordu Komutanlığına Tümgeneral Halil (Korgeneral Kut) atanmıştı. 6’ncı Ordu, 13 ve 18’nci Kolordulardan oluşuyordu. Kurmay Albay Ali İhsan (Tümgeneral Sabis) komutasındaki 13’ncü Kolordu, Bağdat istikametinde ilerleyen Rusların 1’nci Kafkas Kolordusunu Hemedan doğusuna sürmüştü. 22 Aralık 1917’de Ruslarla anlaşma yapılınca, 13’ncü Kolordu Cebeli Hamrin kuzeyine çekildi. (İngilizlerle çarpışarak)

Kurmay Albay Kâzım Karabekir komutasındaki 18’nci Kolordu Süveyce Horu (bataklığı) ile Kütülammare arasındaki Dicle Nehri kuzey kıyılarını ve İmamı Muhammet, Garraf ve Beşare köprübaşı mevzilerini savunmak üzere tertiplenmekteydi.

Kâzım Karabekir, Ordu Komutanına bu köprübaşı mevzilerinde direnmenin sakıncalarını belirtmiş ve buradaki birliklerin de nehrin kuzey kesimine alınarak, kıyı değiştirecek İngiliz birliklerinin karşı taarruzlarla nehre dökülmesini önermişse de Ordu Komutanı köprübaşı mevzilerinin savunulmasında ısrar etmişti.

Taarruza geçen İngiliz birlikleri, önce İmamı Muhammet mevziîne üstün kuvvetlerle yöneldi ve sahra tahkimatıyla berkitilmiş bu mevziî yoğun topçu ateşi altına alarak erlerimizin silâhlarını kullanmasına dahi fırsat vermedi. Muharebe alanını şehitlerimizin cesetleri doldurmuştu. Gönderilen takviyeler de aynı şekilde eriyordu. 18’nci Kolordunun mevcudu 18.000’den 5.000’e düştü. Bağdat, İngilizlerin eline geçti.

Mütareke hükümlerine rağmen İngilizler, kuzeydeki petrol havzasını ele geçirerek Diyarbakır’a kadar ilerlediler. Bununla da yetinmediler; bölgedeki aşiretleri ayaklandırarak Musul ve Kerkük bölgesinin Misak-ı Millî sınırlarımız dışında kalmasını sağladılar. 3 6’ncı Ordu Komutanı, Albay Kâzım Karabekir’in önerisini değerlendirseydi, sonuç değişebilirdi.


KAFKAS CEPHESİNDE:

Kurmay Albay Kâzım Karabekir önce, Diyarbakır bölgesindeki 2’nci Kolordu, 27 Aralık 1917’de de Refahiye bölgesindeki 1’nci Kafkas Kolordu Komutanlığına atandı. 3’ncü Ordu’nun ileri harekâtı sırasında, 13 Şubat 1918’de Erzincan’ı, 12 Mart 1918’de de Erzurum’u, Ermeni birlik ve çetelerinden temizledi (Bu illerdeki Rus birlikleri, 18 Aralık 1917’de yapılan anlaşma gereğince ayrılmış, yerlerini Ermeni birlik ve çetelerine bırakmışlardı). Kâzım Karabekir’in Erzurum’un kurtarılmasında, sorumluluğu üstlenerek durumun gerektirdiği icraatı tereddütsüz uygulamasını anmadan geçemiyeceğim.

3’ncü Ordu Komutanı Korgeneral Vehip (Kaçı) Erzurum yönünde 5 ve 9’ncu Kafkas Tümenlerinden birer alayla taarruzî keşif yapılmasını istemişti. Kâzım Karabekir, bir an evvel Erzurum’u ele geçirip ilerdeki harekât için oradaki olanaklardan yararlanmak ve katliamı önlemek amacıyla, 9’ncu Kafkas Tümeni’nin tamamını muharebeye sokarak Ermenileri püskürttü.

15 Nisan 1918’de Sarıkamış, 26 Nisan’da Kars, 15 Mayıs’ta da Gümrü alındı.

Kâzım Karabekir 28 Temmuz 1918’de Tümgeneralliğe yükseltildi. Eylül 1918’de birliklerimiz kuzeyde Bakü’yü, güneyde Tebriz’i ele geçirmişler, ilerlemeyi sürdürüyorlardı.

30 Ekim 1918’de imzalanan Mondros Müterakesi hükümlerine göre, Şubat 1919’a kadar, 1877-1878’deki sınırlarımıza çekilmek zorunda bırakıldık.4


İSTİKLÂL HARBİNDE:

İtilâf Devletleri, Mondros Mütarekesi’ne dayanarak yurdumuzu parçalayıp bölüşmeye ve stratejik yollara hâkim olmaya başlamışlardı. Kışkırtılan ve desteklenen azınlıklar da, şiddet eylemlerine giriştiler. Halk üzgün ve perişandı. Bölgesel kuruluşlar oluşuyor; fakat toparlanamıyorlardı. Padişah, taç ve tahtını düşünüyor, hükümet işgalci devletleri gücendirmeme-ye çalışıyordu.

Tümgeneral Kâzım Karabekir bu sırada İstanbul’a geldi. O, İstanbul’da bir şey yapılamayacağı kanısındaydı. Mustafa Kemal de kendisine, “Erzurum’a gitmesini ve orada halkı teşkilâtlandırmasını” önerdi. 15’nci Kolordu Komutanlığını kabul ederek Erzurum’a gitti ve Doğu Cephesi Komutanı olarak Kars ve dolaylarını bir kere daha kurtardı.

Ermeniler, Türk ordusunun Kuzeybatı İran’ı ve Kafkasya’yı boşaltmasını fırsat bilmiş, Gümrü (Leninakan) Açmıyaz’ın bölgelerini, Arpaçay ile Araş Nehri kıyılarını ve Iğdır dolaylarını işgal ederek bölgedeki Türklere insanlık dışı davranışlarını sürdürmeye başlamışlardı.

Ermenilerin, Türkler aleyhine giriştikleri bu olaylara ve 19 Haziran 1920’den itibaren Oltu bölgesinde başlattıkları taarruz ve işgal hareketlerine artık bir son vermenin zamanı gelmişti. Ruslar ile başlayan ilişkileri geliştirebilmek için de, direk sınır bağlantısı kurmak gerekliydi. 24 Eylül 1920 Bardız baskını üzerine, 9’ncu Tümen’e, karşı taarruzlarla bu kesimdeki Ermeni mevzilerini ele geçirmesi emredildi. Bu tümenin sağladığı başarıdan yararlanarak 29 Eylül 1920’de genel taarruza geçildi. Harekât başarıyla gelişti ve 30 Eylül sabahı 12’nci Tümen Sarıkamış’a girdi.

Harekâtın ikinci safhası Kars’ın kurtarılmasıydı. Kuvvetli tahkim edilmiş olan bu şehre doğrudan doğruya taarruz ağır zayiata neden olacağından, doğu ve kuzeydoğudan kuşatılarak 30 Ekim 1920’de Kars da ele geçirildi. Ermenilerin Savunma Bakanları ile Genelkurmay Başkanları da esirler arasındaydı.

Bu muharebede iğtinam edilen ikmal maddelerinin büyük kısmı Batı Cephesine gönderilmiş, Kâzım Karabekir de bu başarıları nedeniyle Korgeneralliğe yükseltilmişti.

3 Kasım 1920’de Gümrü istikametinde harekâta devam edildi.6 Kasım akşamı Ermeniler Gümrü batı sırtlarına atıldılar ve barış yapılmasını önerdiler. 7 Kasımda Gümrü ele geçirildi; 2/3 Aralık 1920’de Gümrü Antlaşması yapıldı. Antlaşmanın imzasından bir gün sonra Ermeni Taşnak Hükümeti Kızıl Ordu tarafından ortadan kaldırıldığından, Gümrü Antlaşması onaylanamadı. 13 Ekim ig2i’de Ermenistan, Gürcistan, Azerbaycan Sosyalist Cumhuriyetleri ve Rusya ile Kars Antlaşması imzalanarak yürürlüğe girdi.

Doğu Cephesi birliklerinden 3’ncü Kafkas Tümeni—11’nci Piyade Alayı hariç— Batı Cephesine gönderildi. Sakarya Meydan Muharebesi ve Büyük Taarruza katıldı.

12’nci Tümen de 4 Ağustos 1921 ‘den itibaren şevke başlandı. 28 Eylül 1921’de Ankara’ya varan bu tümen de Büyük Taarruza katıldı.

II’nci Kafkas Tümeni, Mayıs 1922’de Koçhisar dolaylarında lağvedilerek 21’nci Tümenin teşkili ve bazı birliklerin takviyesi sağlandı.3

Görüldüğü gibi, Korgeneral Kâzım Karabekir, Batı Cephesine sadece yiyecek, giyecek, silâh ve cephane göndermekle kalmamış, üç tümeniyle bu cepheyi takviye ederek harbin kazanılmasına da katkıda bulunmuştur.

Edirne ve İstanbul Milletvekilliği yapan Kâzım Karabekir 25 Ocak 1948’de, TBMM Başkanı iken vefat etmiştir. O tarihte Cumhurbaşkanı bulunan İsmet İnönü, 28 Ocak 1948’deki konuşmasını şöyle bitiriyordu:

“… Tarihimiz, Kâzım Karabekir’in Millî Mücadeledeki hizmetlerini vefalı sayfalarında her zaman övünçle anacaktır. Birinci Dünya Harbi’nin felâketli sonucunun ilk gününden başlayarak, hiç sarsılmayan bir inançla meydana atılmış olan pek değerli vatanseverlerinden biriydi. Kâzım Karabekir’in zaferleri, batı ve güney sınırlarımızda ve içeride türlü şekildeki saltanat hareketlerine karşı gerçekten bunalmış olduğumuz bir zamanda yetişmiştir. Ordu ve memlekette oluşan şevk ve sevinç bütün kurtuluş hareketlerimize yepyeni bir atılışın bütün umut ufuklarını açmış, yüreklerimiz taşkın bir minnetin heyecanı ile dolmuştu. Karabekir adı, İstiklâl Harbi’nin büyük abidelerinden biri olarak milletin takdirinde ebedî bir şeref yeri tutacaktır. Büyük komutan, devlet ve siyaset adamı ve kemal sahibi bir insan olarak yüksek nitelikleri ve hiç bir güçlük karşısında yılmayan iman ve iradesi, hafızamızda canlı olarak yaşayacaktır.” Kâzım Karabekir’in Hava Şehitliği’nde bulunan aziz naaşı Devlet Mezarlığı’na nakledilecektir. Ruhu şad olsun.

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1 Türk İstiklâl Harbine Katılan Tümen ve Daha Üst Kademelerdeki Komutanların Biyografileri, Gnkur. Harp Tarihi Başkanlığı Yayını, Ankara, Gnkur. Basımevi, 1972, s. 161, 163. Türk Harp Tarihi Derslerinde Adı Geçen Komutanlar, Harp Akademileri Komutanlığı, İstanbul, Harp Akademileri Basımevi, 1983, s. 397 – 404. Karabekir, Kâzım; Yayınlanmış eserleri. Şahsî dosyası.

2 Birinci Dünya Harbinde Türk Harbi, C.V, 3’ncü Kitap,Çanakkale Cephesi Harekâtı, Gnkur. ATASE Bşk. lığı, Ankara, Gnkur. Basımevi, 1980, s. 223, 419.

3 Birinci Dünya Harbinde Türk Harbi; Irak Cephesi Harekâtı, Gnkur. ATASE Bşk.lığı (Müsvedde halinde).

4 BELEN, Fahri, Birinci Cihan Harbinde Türk Harbi, C. IV, V, 1917-1918 Harekâtları, Gnkur. Basımevi, Ankara 1967. Çakmak, Fevzi; Büyük Harpte Şark Cephesi Harekâtları, Harp Akademileri Matbaası, İstanbul (Konferanslar halinde).

5 Türk İstiklâl Harbi, C. III, Doğu Cephesi (1919-1921) Gnkur. Harp Tarihi Dairesi Başkanlığı, Gnkur. Basımevi, Ankara, 1965.

Tuniisia's Fragile Democracy

Peripheral Vision: How Europe Can Help Preserve Tunisia´s Fragile Democracy

25 Jan 2017

By Hamza Meddeb for European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)

            

So, what can European states do to sustain democratic stability in Tunisia, particularly in the country’s peripheral, politically fraught inland regions? To help sustain the Tunisian public’s faith in their troubled state, Hamza Meddeb recommends that the EU strengthen its bilateral cooperation with the country in key areas (the military, private sector, and civil society, for example) and extend an offer for EEA membership.

This article was originally published by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) in January 2017.

Summary

• Six years since the revolution, the success of democracy in Tunisia depends on those parts of the country where the popular uprising began: its ‘periphery’, whose regions lag far behind the country’s economically more developed coast.
• Tunisia’s periphery regions suffer from weak economic growth and high levels of poverty and unemployment – a legacy of decades of underinvestment.
• Regional conflict, terrorism and organised crime have led the government to crack down on security threats in the periphery regions. This has disrupted the informal and illegal economic networks on which much of the population relies and caused it to lose faith in the government.
• Tunisia has enjoyed extensive support from international partners since 2011 – money is not the problem. Instead, the country must strengthen its regional governance and address fragmentation at the heart of government.
• Europeans can radically alter the terms of debate by offering Tunisia membership of the European Economic Area, galvanising change in support of its journey towards democracy and stability.

Among the countries involved in the Arab uprisings, Tunisia stands out. Its transition to democracy has experienced setbacks, but is still in train. However, for the future success and stability of Tunisia – and Europe’s southern neighbourhood – it is important to understand one simple fact, something approaching a twist of fate: Tunisia’s future lies in the very place where the 2010-2011 popular uprising first erupted. Its inland ‘periphery regions’ are home to Sidi Bouzid, the city where Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on fire in 2011, sparking the chain of events that led to the overthrow of the Ben Ali regime. Away from the economically developed coast familiar to Europeans, Tunisia’s periphery plays host to many of the afflictions that, if left unchecked, could bring to an end Tunisia’s lonely battle to establish a fully fledged democracy.
Six years on from the revolution, Tunisia’s long-neglected hinterland continues to suffer from a rampant informal economy, high unemployment, corruption and an underdeveloped private sector. Recent efforts made by the central government to improve security in the periphery, especially along the border with Libya and Algeria, have resulted in increased securitisation in these areas and upset the cross-border economy that the local population has long relied on for its livelihood. As a result, the legitimacy of post- 2011 democratic governments has withered in the eyes of the people. Meanwhile, long-standing smuggling, jihadi and tribal networks have increasingly overlapped and combined to increase instability and hinder progress towards greater socioeconomic development. The government has in turn done itself no favours thanks to its fragmented central structures, its failure to take advantage of the significant international support and investment made in Tunisia since the revolution, and its possible participation in corruption reaching from the central decision-making level down to regional and local levels.
Tunisia’s 2014 constitution represents an important achievement that seeks to build a pluralistic political system as well as an inclusive and resilient society. It recognises the problem of regional disparities and enshrines the principle of “positive discrimination” to favour disadvantaged regions – the question that sits at the heart of this paper. But how this is to be done has thus far been left ill-defined. Neither the Islamist-led coalition governments between 2011 and 2013, nor the technocrats’ government of 2014, nor the post-2014 coalition government led by Habib Essid were able to resolve these structural problems. A new coalition government led by Youssef Chahed is currently in charge of putting in place a much-needed reform agenda.
Tunisia risks seeing its periphery regions become ‘areas of limited statehood’ – areas where government authorities and institutions become too weak to enforce central decisions and where non-state actors could eventually prevail over the authority of the central government. Moreover, the country risks losing its most precious asset: its youth, which is confronted with fewer and fewer options: emigration, contraband or protest. Finally, failure to kickstart development in the peripheries will only further foster the conditions in which radical groups thrive, so proficient are they at harnessing social anger.
Europe, in turn, risks losing one of the few islands of relative stability in the Middle East and North Africa region. It is important that Europeans grasp the economic, political and social dynamics at play in the country’s peripheries and these dynamics’ relationship with the political centre. Europeans should reflect on the ways in which they can better use existing policy tools to support much-needed integration efforts. The road ahead is all the more gruelling thanks to strong vested interests that will attempt to defend the current, deficient, economic policy. And yet the endeavour remains worthwhile, because strengthening Tunisia’s national resilience is key to diminishing the risks of conflict spillover, ensuring a stable neighbourhood for Europe, and building a genuine Arab democracy.
Tunisia’s regional asymmetries
Tunisia’s interior and border regions were the hotbed of the uprising that took place in 2010-2011. They have been a major source of political instability ever since, acting as a stark reminder that regional inequality can be a potent source of nationwide tension. Conscious decisions made by successive governments since Tunisian independence have resulted in a substantial development gap between the coast and the periphery. Post-revolution governments have struggled to address these disparities, and have failed to counter ongoing corruption and meet the demands of the country’s youth population.

The legacy of history
That the revolution started in the peripheries is no accident. Since Tunisia gained independence in 1956, coastal regions have consistently been promoted at the expense of the interior and border regions. This pattern of marginalisation only worsened under Ben Ali, who took power in 1987 and under whom two-thirds of public investment came to be allocated to the coastal regions. Tunisia developed as an export-orientated economy focused on tourism and low-cost outsourcing, with the bulk of infrastructure investment targeted on these regions. Investment incentives were orientated to the need to maintain competitiveness and access to international markets by tolerating low wages at the expense of agriculture and of rural areas. This deficit in infrastructure and private investment progressively reduced Tunisia’s peripheries to reservoirs of cheap labour, agrarian products and raw materials for the more developed industries and service sectors operating in the coastal regions. Approximately 56 percent of the population and 92 percent of all industrial firms are located within an hour’s drive of Tunisia’s three largest cities: Tunis, Sfax and Sousse. Economic activity in these three coastal cities accounts for 85 percent of Tunisia’s GDP. On the eve of the fall of Ben Ali, poverty was estimated at 42 percent in the Centre West and 36 percent in the North West, whereas it was at the much lower rate of 11 percent in Tunis and the Centre East.
Under Ben Ali, there was no strategy of inclusive development to redress these regional imbalances. In fact, the gap between the coast and peripheries was less the result of neglect than a consequence of deliberate political decisions. The low-cost and pragmatic mode of governing adopted by the regime was part of a bigger strategy designed to cope with fiscal and budgetary constraints. This included the deployment of patronage and intermediation mechanisms involving tribal and local elites through the Tunisian General Labour Union and the former ruling party, the Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique. Clientelist networks and the security forces controlled the job market, social benefits, and the informal economy through protection from law enforcement. For instance, jobs at the Gafsa Phosphates Company (CPG) would be distributed among local patrons and regional administrations according to a quota system. In turn, the latter would redistribute these jobs among their clients on a tribal or partisan basis, or even sell them to the highest bidder. These clientelist resource distribution systems maintained a minimal and fragile stability over two decades in the Tunisian periphery while fuelling the fragmentation of local society and helping consolidate tribal identities.

After the revolution
After the fall of the Ben Ali regime, many residents in the periphery regions hoped the central state would recognise its own shortcomings and would finally reverse the trajectory of marginalisation, deliver better governance, meet social and economic needs, and tackle inequality. However, the solution of successive post-2011 governments was to create a large number of public sector jobs and to roll out temporary mass employment programmes such as ‘les chantiers’. In this way, for example, CPG’s labour force grew from 5,000 in 2010 to 27,000 in 2015 and the number of workers hired through the programme leapt from 62,875 in 2010 to 125,000 in 2011. With approximately 100,000 workers in 2015, the ‘les chantiers’ is a crucial instrument in addressing the lack of economic opportunities and to manage social anger in the periphery. Centres of the popular uprising, the regions of Sidi Bouzid and Kasserine represent a total of 37 percent of people hired through it. In total, 77 percent of the workers hired through this programme are from the periphery regions.
Far from supplying sustainable economic opportunities, employment schemes offering temporary jobs contribute to ongoing patterns of subordination and marginalisation. The anaemic nature of the private sector in Tunisia has proved a great hindrance, exacerbating the economic marginality of the periphery regions’ inhabitants and reducing the new ruling elites’ options. Nonetheless, ceasing these employment schemes would likely provoke social unrest in these regions. Because government jobs are often the only hope for job security, competition rages between networks, tribes and political parties to secure these positions.
Meanwhile, 85 percent of the enterprises that provide 92 percent of private sector jobs are clustered in the coast regions: 44 percent are to be found in the Great Tunis area alone. Enterprises operating inland provide only 8 percent of private sector jobs. Foreign companies in the interior regions account for less than 13 percent of the total of foreign firms established in Tunisia. Together, public investment choices and the weakness of the private sector explain the high unemployment in the peripheries: as high as 27 percent in Tataouine, 26 percent in Jendouba, and 22 percent in Kasserine. The average national unemployment rate in 2015 stood at 15 percent. These economic inequalities have exerted a negative social impact in terms of poverty rates, which follow a similar centre-periphery divide, and in some places, particularly the Centre West, are double the national average.
In addition, corruption remains a major challenge. Since 2011, the issue has gone largely unaddressed at all levels of government – local, regional and national. Bribes remain necessary in order to get a licence to start a small business, obtain a job in an employment programme, or receive social assistance from the state. Moreover, according to some entrepreneurs, the corruption currently hindering the much-needed investment in the interior regions can be traced back to the central decision-making level. State officials, bankers and business owners participate in networks that bind them together and facilitate corrupt practices, including even securing the foreclosure of competitors’ businesses. These networks exercise control over state resources, especially bank credit and licences, and are influential within the public administration. Corruption is also a widespread feature of the state administrations at the local and regional level. Municipal and regional elections have been postponed several times, and these delays are increasing the sense of impunity among local and regional bureaucrats, which in turn creates a sort of systemic and decentralised corruption.
Finally, the post-2011 governments have so far failed to meet the demands of the increasingly frustrated youth in parts of Tunisia where socioeconomic protests remain a persistent problem. In January 2016, a wave of social unrest and violent demonstrations began in Kasserine and spread through 16 other governorates. The protests sought to condemn unemployment and denounce the corruption plaguing the regional administration. It eventually destabilised the government of the then prime minister Habib Essid. In September 2016, in the mining region of Gafsa, and the Jendouba governorate adjacent to the Algerian border, one protest against economic marginalisation and local corruption lasted several weeks. In response, the proposed short-term approaches to managing the crisis of the peripheries appear only to have increased the fault lines both within local society and between the regions, and to have fed a sense of dispossession among young people.

Sources of destabilisation
Since 2011 the government has adopted a security-heavy approach in the peripheries in an attempt to contain threats from jihadi groups and to crack down on smuggling. But security forces have themselves been drawn in to illegal activity and local populations feel let down by the government’s emphasis on security over development. A thoroughgoing rethink is needed about the connections between security and the economy in order to advance the socioeconomic situation in the periphery regions.

New conflict dynamics on old fault lines
Since 2011, the turbulent regional environment has aggravated the economic and security situation for the local population in the peripheries. Chaos in Libya, persistent pockets of terrorism in Algeria, and terrorist groups affiliated with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and the Islamic State group (ISIS) have exploited the Tunisia-Algeria-Libya triangle to traffic weapons and jihadis. This has led the Tunisian government to adopt a heavy security-centred approach in the peripheries, the impact of which has been negative, causing the central state to lose rather than gain legitimacy. In fact, the spillover from the Libyan conflict is less of a threat to Tunisia than a reactive, security-centred approach that ensures a semblance of stability while feeding disenfranchisement.
There is a complex relationship between jihad and contraband which is important to understand in this context. It is a legacy of both the dictatorship era and of the ways in which these areas have been governed since 2011. It is also a consequence of the internal fractures inside the communities living in the borderlands.

Source: IMF

Before the revolution, both the Ben Ali and the Gaddafi regimes allowed illicit practices to take place in order to help them control the border regions. On the Tunisian side, participation in the border economy used to be a prerogative of both the clientele of the hegemonic party and the various protégés of the security services: the police, the National Guard and the customs services. On the Libyan side, the Gaddafi regime used the border resources to consolidate its power through a politics of clientelism and co-optation of tribes. Only loyal tribes were permitted to participate in this border economy. An implicit arrangement was established between regimes on the one hand and loyal tribal and smuggling networks on the other, preventing the latter from getting involved in the trafficking of weapons, drugs and jihadis in exchange for turning a blind eye to other forms of contraband.
The fall of Ben Ali and Gaddafi put an end to the arrangements that once regulated this activity, and opened up the game to new players: organised crime that sought to turn Tunisia into a staging-post between Algeria and Libya; jihadi groups looking to secure the crossing of fighters and arms between Tunisia, Algeria and Libya; and ambitious smugglers who took more risks and challenged the previously co-opted smugglers through taking advantage of the security vacuum in the border regions from 2011 onwards.
In addition to this, since 2013 attacks on the Tunisian army and security services in the border regions have shifted the debate about periphery regions from a focus on their development to one around security. This has resulted in a crackdown on the smuggling networks and cross-border trade which had been essential economic resources for the population of these regions. Since August 2013, a military-enforced buffer zone has also been in place along Tunisia’s borders. In parallel, the Algerian authorities dug a trench along the border, swiftly followed by the Tunisian government, which, in the aftermath of the terrorist attack in Bardo in February 2015, dug its own trench along the Tunisia-Libya border.

Source: FTDES

In response to these multifaceted security threats, the securitisation of the borders has impacted on the peripheries’ economy and society in many ways. First, it has led to uneasy relations between the army and the security services on the one hand and the local population on the other. As local populations depend on the border economy for their living, restrictions made against cross-border trade have resulted in periodic conflict with the security services and the military.
Simultaneously, state authorities are concerned about the risk of social protest if they repress smugglers. The army has succeeded in maintaining – relatively speaking – its credibility, focusing mainly on its task of border policing (in spite of cases of soldiers’ involvement in corruption). But the interior security forces enjoy much less trust than the army does, having become “entrepreneurs of insecurity” as they extended their role beyond law enforcement to deal with social protest through negotiating bribes and selling protection. This has negatively impacted on the legitimacy of the security forces, as smugglers and traders perceived it as a way to reinvent the old arrangements through the co-optation of a happy few and the exclusion of others.
Second, the outbreak of armed conflict in neighbouring Libya in 2014 generated new uncertainty in Tunisia’s periphery regions, as competition grew between smuggling networks looking for protection in Libya. Indeed, cities in the west of Libya have always played a major “city-entrepot” role for the border economy, connecting southern Tunisian cities to the global illicit economy and ensuring supply to the Tunisian market. The border economy exerts a magnetic pull on militias attracted by the prospect of controlling and benefiting from illicit flows: approximately 15 Libyan militias are positioning along the border with Tunisia. This greatly complicates Tunisian authorities’ efforts to coordinate with their Libyan counterparts on border security.
Finally, the situation was complicated further in 2014 when jihadi groups affiliated to ISIS sought to replicate what al- Qaeda did at the Tunisia-Algeria border and establish a foothold in the Libyan city of Sabratha. The jihadi group tried to attract Tunisian jihadis who sought to flee the country, especially after the crackdown on Ansar al-Sharia, a Tunisian Salafi jihadi group, labelled a terrorist organisation by the Ennahda-led government in August 2013. These jihadi groups affiliated to ISIS tried to find an anchor in the Tunisia-Libya borderland through taking advantage of the rivalry between tribes and smuggling networks in a context of economic hardship. A review of the 26 assailants from Ben Guerdane who tried to capture this border town on 7 March 2016 revealed an overrepresentation of youth originating from the R’baya’ tribe. Historically dominated by the powerful tribe of Twazine which is in control of the cross-border trade around Ben Guerdane, the marginalisation of the R’baya’ was exacerbated by an unresolved and a long-lasting conflict over land ownership. R’baya’ smugglers, traffickers and individuals ousted from the border economy following heavy-handed security measures found in jihad a narrative that allows them to resist the state and to pursue these old tribal rivalries.
Security in the peripheries is therefore directly threatened by the exacerbation of pre-existing fault lines that feed on the dynamics of the jihadisation of local conflicts, in a context of a weak central state, economic hardship, and an emerging violence-shaped economic order.

Solving the security-economy conundrum
The tightening of controls at the Algerian and Libyan borders has resulted in the exclusion of many operators from the border economy. According to a survey by International Alert, 80 percent of the respondents living in Ben Guerdane and Dhehiba, near the Libyan border, believe that being able to cross the border is now linked to corruption more than ever. A World Bank report on the informal economy in the Tunisian peripheries highlighted the risks of increasing securitisation since 2013, noting that in the absence of concrete measures to address the economic and regulatory differences in terms of tariffs, tax levels and subsidies on either side of the border, tighter controls would increase corruption among state agents over time, and eventually undermine government control.
At the time of the popular uprisings, a number of joint projects were in train that would have helped regulate and legalise cross-border trade. But a planned free trade zone between Ben Guerdane and the border crossing of Ras Jedir, as well as the convertibility of national currencies, have never materialised. The securitisation of the borders and particularly the frequent closure of the border crossings at the Tunisia-Libya border has resulted in the suspension of cross-border trade and negatively impacted on the social and economic conditions in the periphery. Informal trade represents an important part of bilateral trade with neighbouring Libya and Algeria, accounting for more than half of official trade with Libya and for more than the total official trade with Algeria. Informal trade is one of the most important activities in the border regions. For example, a large part of the fuel consumed in Tunisia is imported from Algeria and Libya. In the governorate of Medenine, 20 percent of the working-age population works in the informal trade, approximately 83 percent of which are from Ben Guerdane.
The importance of the informal economy has increased since 2011, given the diminution of economic opportunities and the end of migration to Libya. Since the fall of Gaddafi and the deterioration of the security situation, 40,000 Tunisian workers have left Libya. For more than four decades Libya was a major destination for Tunisian seasonal workers from the periphery regions who helped meet the demand for labour in their oil-producing neighbour. The loss of these incomes has increased poverty and dissatisfaction among large swathes of the population: 10,000-15,000 families have received no income since 2011 because of the crisis in Libya.
The securitisation of cross-border trade has reinforced the prevalent perception that protest and migration are two of the dwindling options left to disenfranchised youth. In November 2016, a general strike was organised under the banner of ‘Let Ben Guerdane survive’. This protest lasted several months and received the support of neighbouring border towns. The lack of economic development leads to increased emigration, often illegal, as sadly exemplified by one of the many tragic boat capsizings that killed 12 young people from Ben Guerdane off the Libyan coast in July 2016. Meanwhile, negotiations are taking place between a Tunisian civil society delegation and the representatives of Libyan border towns in order to reach an agreement on reopening the border crossing of Ras Jedir. This follows a series of protests throughout 2016 in Ben Guerdane against the interruption of cross-border trade as well as the killing of several smugglers by the military.
The security-centred approach to ensuring stability is not a durable solution. Inhabitants of the peripheries have come to conclude that the central state views these regions as mere ‘buffer zones’ and their inhabitants as second-class citizens. They consider that calls for security are used to justify the security forces’ heavy-handedness and that they stigmatise the peripheries as hotbeds of jihadism. Many of those who feel alienated turn to Libya and Algeria for subsistence, rather than their own country of Tunisia. The experience of one young smuggler who was cut out of the border economy captures the bind many people find themselves in: “I went to the capital, Tunis, to look for a job. There, a policeman asked for my documentation. He took my ID card and told me: ‘You are from Kasserine. What are you doing here?’ I replied: ‘Do I need a visa to come to Tunis?’ It is as if we are living in two different countries.”

Reforming regional governance
The failure of the post-2011 governments to successfully implement projects and improve the economic conditions of Tunisians living in the peripheries is less to do with the support available from international partners and more to do with how Tunisia’s internal state apparatus operates. At one and the same time, Tunisia’s government is centralised yet riven by fragmentation. This, combined with its emphasis on security over socioeconomic development, has led to little progress in assisting the peripheries.

Money’s not too tight to mention
But the problem is not one of money – Tunisia has been able to rely on its international partners for support since 2011. Instead, the country needs to do several things to get its house in order: rethink its governance processes in order to implement a more coherent and coordinated development strategy; deliver the pre-existing projects which have earmarked funding; develop stronger political will to implement reforms; and introduce a new social contract that includes the population in the peripheries.
Between 2011 and 2015, Tunisia was the recipient of generous capital inflows from all the major international financial institutions, development banks, and international partners, amounting to almost $7 billion in various forms. Capital inflows received by 2015 came to almost 15 percent of GDP. In 2016, international partners reaffirmed their support: the World Bank established a new country partnership framework that will provide Tunisia with up to $5 billion in loans to help restore economic growth, create jobs for young people, and reduce the disparities between the coastal centres and the underdeveloped regions.
Also in 2016, the International Monetary Fund approved an extended fund facility of $2.8 billion across four years to support economic reform in Tunisia. Finally, during the most recent international conference to support the five-year development plan (2016-2020), Tunisia signed $4.3 billion in project-finance deals. The total financial support pledged to Tunisia by participating countries and financial institutions which took part in the conference therefore totals $14 billion, equivalent to 35 percent of GDP. The European Union and its member states remain Tunisia’s most prominent partners: the EU pledged $860 million by 2020, and the European Investment Bank promised loans of $3.1 billion by 2020.
Despite this flow of money and these cooperation mechanisms, Tunisian governments have so far failed to achieve the much-needed regional development that would considerably improve daily life and economic conditions in the peripheries. The post-revolution governments have prioritised underdeveloped regions, conferring on them 60 percent of the total of TND 1,547 million allocated to the Regional Development Programme (RDP) between 2011 and 2015. Particular attention has been given to the eight least developed regions: Jendouba, Kasserine, Kairouan, Siliana, Sidi Bouzid, Kef, Tataouine and Béja, which received 30 percent of the investment allocated to the RDP over the same period. Despite attempts to improve the completion rates for funded public projects, these have remained low and failed to meet popular expectations. In Kasserine completions stand at 47 percent, in Kairouan at 41 percent, in Sidi Bouzid at 41 percent and in Medenine at 28 percent. Meanwhile, private investments have remained targeted at the coastal regions, perpetuating the existing imbalances. The end result is that the socioeconomic situation in the peripheries has remained roughly unchanged since 2011.
Many factors explain the limited absorptive capacities of these regions. Among them are: lack of skilled and empowered staff at the local level able to manage and to follow up a large number of projects and large amounts of money; failure of the current regional development governance system to manage large budgets; unclear land tenure and property rights; a weak private sector in these regions which is uncompetitive and unable to win public contracts; security challenges and social instability that deter companies from investing in these regions and implementing local development projects; a degraded rule of law environment that limits the attractiveness of these regions to business.

Let down by the system
In March 2013 the Tunisian government set up a ‘general authority’ for the follow-up of public programmes to better ensure the delivery of public projects. This delivery unit, funded by the World Bank, is to work on the removal of administrative barriers and cutting long procedural delays. However, Tunisia needs more than a simple unit to deal with impediments to investment. It needs a development strategy for the peripheries, deploying innovative governance instruments that would improve inter-ministerial cooperation.
The long legacy of inefficient inter-ministerial cooperation has hampered the emergence of a coherent vision for regional development. As long as all the ministries and every national and regional administration fail to align or coordinate a multi-sectorial development strategy, regional development will lag. Regional administrations themselves are under dual supervision: under the supervision of the relevant national sectorial administration, and also under the control of governors – state representatives holding power at the regional level. The governors’ mission has historically been to supervise coordination between regional administrations, facilitate development and ensure security. But this mission has proved difficult to achieve. Experience instead shows that, worried about their careers, governors tend to favour security over development.
A senior state official explains the situation thus: “In Tunisia, the central level is predominant in decision-making. The problem is that there is no strategy for regional development, only sectorial policies for each region”. This view is corroborated by a European expert working on regional development: “The balance of power between the coastal regions and peripheries is so off-balance. Tunisian regions don’t have advocates who speak on their behalf. We should start from there and help these advocates emerge.”
Illustrative of this is the conflict that has pitted the state against the Association for the Protection of Jemna’s Oasis. In 2011, the residents of Jemna, a small town in the south of Tunisia, took control of state-owned land that the central government used to lease at low prices to private operators, who had formerly capitalised unfairly on their political connections. Indeed, under the Bourguiba and Ben Ali regimes, state-owned lands were regularly used to establish clientelist relationships and co-opt economic elites and prominent local figures. Operating under a cooperative economy model, without public support, investment incentives or tax deductions, the Association has developed the land, hired local workers, and reinvested revenues back into the community. However, under Youssef Chahed the government has refused to acknowledge the experiment, and is instead trying to end it. In this context, land reform, and a legislative framework that would encourage similar cooperative experiments, could promote development and job creation in these regions.

Strengthening EU-Tunisia mechanisms
Since 2011, Tunisia’s international partners have demonstrated their support for the country by pledging funding to sustain future regional development projects in Tunisia. What is required now are both reforms and the political will to back them up, as well as a genuine effort on the Tunisian side to coordinate international partners.

Improving coordination
The lack of coordination within the Tunisian authorities has been regularly noted by European diplomats who have participated in the sessions of the international coordination mechanisms. Tunisian officials frequently arrive at meetings with what one European expert called “shopping lists” in lieu of well-defined and budgeted strategies, without prior consultation or coordination of work among themselves.
Internationally, current mechanisms include the G7+ partnership, and a prospective Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) agreement with the EU. The G7 together with EU and international financial institutions (IFI) in June 2016 launched a partnership for coordinating economic assistance to Tunisia focusing on economic and governance reform. The G7+ partnership emphasises the European Parliament resolution which called for the “adoption of regulatory frameworks aimed at facilitating the absorption of European support and of all international financial institutions”.

Source: EEAS

The G7+ and IFI partnership is a Tunisian-led mechanism that aims to manage compromise on structural reforms and to coordinate international partners who will, in return, encourage this process and offer financial support. Working groups dedicated to governance and economic reforms have been created, one of which, co-chaired by Tunisia and Italy, is to concentrate on regional development and decentralisation. The EU is co-chairing the working group on economic reform and governance and Germany and France are also strongly involved in this mechanism.
Coordinating international partners is all the more important for a regional development strategy given that this is a cross-sectorial issue. In 2015 bilateral aid amounted to €186.6 million and supported several programmes. Among other programmes, Tunisia received €43 million from the ‘CAP2D’ programme on decentralisation, which focuses on both territorial integration and decentralisation. Tunisia also received €32 million in December 2015 for a programme designed to enhance the employability of the inhabitants of the periphery regions. The securitisation of the borders also reflects the engagement of the EU itself and the shared commitment to border management: in addition to the bilateral engagement of European states, the EU has earmarked €23 million for the delivery of equipment, infrastructure and training for security forces.
The Tunisian government should take advantage of the support of its international partners and the existed coordination mechanisms to elaborate a long-term vision, design a regional development policy and reform governance of the periphery. But this still remains merely an aspiration. The finger is often pointed at: political divisions (within and between the parties that comprise the ruling coalition, Nidaa Tounes and Ennahda); the lack of ‘stability’ in the country due to labour mobilisation; and the ‘inexperience’ and shortcomings of new political parties and politicians. Governing parties blame ‘Hizb al-Idara’ – what they semi-jokingly refer to as the ‘party of the bureaucracy’ – for blocking reform. As one member of the ruling coalition put it: ‘Nowadays Tunisia is governed by a party coalition and a party formed by the bureaucracy. The administration is slow and conservative … it’s because there is no long-term political vision that the bureaucracy can take charge.’ High-level officials point to the absence of a clear reform agenda, a situation which allows them to choose how to sequence decisions and to put off deep reforms that could alleviate regional disparities.
In the absence of any central coordinating unit in charge of strategic thinking and action there is little to tip the balance in favour of the provisions in the constitution. Measures are needed to help coordinate the efforts of the new political elites, high-level bureaucrats and international partners on designing and implementing a cross-sectorial strategy for regional development.

Free trade is not enough
The DCFTA is currently the subject of negotiation between the European Commission and the Tunisian government. It is often presented by European officials as more of a reform-incentive tool than a simple free-trade agreement (FTA). The agreement is supposed to be more than a classic FTA, as it goes beyond simply liberalising most goods and services by also gradually integrating Tunisia into the EU internal market through convergence with EU legislation. Thus, the DCFTA is considered by European officials and decision-makers to be an instrument of the European Neighbourhood Policy whose political objectives include stability, security and prosperity beyond the EU’s borders.
The most important question is the extent to which the DCFTA could reduce regional disparities, ensure a convergence of living standards between coastal regions and the hinterland and help consolidate Tunisian democracy. This question remains unanswered and such ambiguity feeds resistance from trade unions, political parties and civil society. The European Commission argues that the implementation of the DCFTA would improve the legal environment, introduce stability for businesses and attract more foreign investment. However, there is no guarantee that these investments would benefit the interior regions and reduce regional disparities. Because of the cost of transport, coastal regions have mostly attracted industrial firms. While the EU-Tunisia Action Plan emphasises the need for greater social and economic integration with the EU in order to build a common economic area, the DCFTA does not address the matter of regional development.

Recommendations
Together with the Tunisian government, the EU and its member states can make a real difference to strengthening the resilience of the Tunisian state and society, through implementing economic, security and governance reforms. To achieve this, economic development and security, which are mutually reinforcing, need to be provided together in the peripheries, strengthening territorial integration and social cohesion overall. The EU can play a major role in encouraging the Tunisian government to concentrate on achieving this goal, bringing Tunisia more deeply into its economic orbit by helping ensure external finance and economic development are better channelled and targeted, and that government effectiveness is radically improved.

Offer European Economic Area membership
Offering Tunisia membership of the European Economic Area (EEA) could be a game-changer that helps to consolidate democracy and embed the rule of law. Critics have portrayed the DCFTA as an asymmetric deal between what could be perceived as the “giant from the north” and “poor” Tunisia. But membership of EEA, on the same footing as Norway, would emphasise the EU-Tunisia Action Plan recommendation of creating a common economic area with Tunisia and provide a framework for Tunisians to implement a transformative strategy for economic, social and regional development.
EEA membership could help Tunisia tackle its structural problems by giving impetus to the Tunisian government’s structural reforms, and, in the longer term, helping Tunisia obtain the ‘social acquis’ of the EU (thereby addressing concerns expressed by trade unions and the more left-leaning parts of the political spectrum).
Tunisia’s peripheries could take advantage of the EEA cohesion fund, which plays an important role in developing the internal market’s poorest regions. Tunisia could eventually, after negotiating this with the EEA members, benefit from the mechanisms of the so-called ‘EEA and Norway Grants’ designed to strengthen equality of opportunity, security and decent standards of living throughout the EEA. As recommended in the EU-Tunisia Action Plan, Tunisia can rely on EU expertise in the field of regional funds and the reduction of regional disparities to address the problem of regional development. A partnership should be established between the European Fund for Regional Development and the Tunisian Ministry of Development, Investment and International Cooperation. Gradual integration into the internal market would help bring about more accountable and transparent governance in Tunisian institutions, offering a democratic horizon of cooperation and helping reformist forces overcome political, administrative and bureaucratic resistance.

Help formalise the informal
Security cooperation between the EU and Tunisia, coupled with concrete measures to promote economic development and incentivise participation in the legal economy, form the key to development in the peripheries. Creating free trade zones will help ensure that development leads to lasting security, in part by proposing alternative livelihoods for smugglers, but, at worst, by finding ways to control illegal activities. The Tunisian authorities should seriously examine granting fiscal amnesty to smugglers, who would pay a fine and then switch to legal economic activity. Meanwhile, the EU can assist by using the financial support it provides to border security to reduce or, better, eradicate resistance within the parts of the security system that profit from illegal cross-border activity. EU support to the security sector must emphasise the implementation of governance and citizens’ oversight mechanisms.

Promote the private sector
The recent EU-Tunisia Action Plan is an excellent starting point for promoting the development of the private sector in the periphery – and it should be a major objective for the EU. For example, a partnership between local banks and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) would provide powerful leverage for economic development. The local banks participating in this partnership should comprise the deposits and consignments fund (Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations – CDC) and the ‘bank of the regions’ (whose creation was announced in the 2016-2020 development plan but which has still not yet been established). The CDC’s mission should be extended to include an investment fund role to promote the private sector.
Meanwhile, the EBRD would play an important role as a strategic partner in the transfer of knowledge and the promotion of the private sector in agriculture, the agro-food industry, and the green economy. The presence of the massive informal sector in these regions means that micro-projects funded by micro-loans are not viable, and so funding mechanisms are needed that promote the private sector, attract big firms and investment as well as implementing infrastructure development. Alongside this, cooperative systems to run state-owned domaines and help develop agriculture should be a priority. Legislation should be introduced to protect such partnerships.

Implement an effective mechanism for positive discrimination
The 2014 constitution established the principle of “positive discrimination” towards disadvantaged regions. But no criteria have yet been defined to identify the regions that would benefit. The EBRD and European development agencies like GIZ and AFD can help formulate criteria that would favour the periphery regions without hampering the dynamism of the coast.
However, to achieve this, the absence of reliable statistics needs to be addressed. Without statistics broken down by region and locality, those disparities which have a geographical character are consistently underestimated. It will remain impossible to produce economic indicators on the wellbeing of households and local populations. EUROSTAT and other European organisations such as the Territorial Observatory (Observatoire des Territoires, France) could play a major role in advising bodies such as the Institut National de Statistiques and the Institut Tunisien de la Compétitivité et des Etudes Quantitatives.

Strengthen civil society in the peripheries
The Tunisia-EU Civil Society Support Programme covers 24 regions. But it fails to empower the civil society organisations in the periphery, which struggle to apply to EU grant programmes. A sub-granting system channelling money to smaller civil society organisations via larger organisations with more capacity could help the former play a more prominent role in local affairs. In parallel, programmes should be established for training and mentoring young entrepreneurs in order to promote entrepreneurship and for empowering local elites.

Promote the social role of the Tunisian army
It is important that the Tunisian army reconsider the terms of its presence in the peripheries. It should combine its primary mission of defending the territory with its role as a social actor. The EU should support the Tunisian army’s social role through programmes of vocational training for young people that promote employability and prevent radicalisation in the peripheries. It should also encourage the construction of military hospitals that provide care to local populations.

Encourage the creation of a policy unit to improve cross-sectorial policy planning and coordination with EU and international partners
Coordination between Tunisia and its international partners, mainly European partners, must be strengthened. A policy unit that reports directly to the head of government would help achieve this, acting as the privileged interlocutor for EU partners. It would comprise a multi-sectorial planning function and coordinate cooperation with the G7+ mechanism and with European partners, addressing the fragmentation at the heart of government.
The policy unit should include politicians, senior public officials, academics, and experts from civil society. Working as a platform, the unit would: ‘technicise’ politicians, meaning it would provide technical skills, knowledge and expertise on policy planning and cross-sectorial coordination; and it would ‘politicise’ senior public officials, meaning it would provide expert input into decision-making, organise consultations, and lead negotiations with social and economic stakeholders.

Strengthen the new European coordination mechanism
Conducting bilateral relations may seem advantageous to both Tunisia and some member states. But pooling together money and coordinating efforts would dramatically increase impact and bring greater benefit to Tunisia’s peripheries. A joint programming mechanism between European representations has been recently created. European countries should consider strengthening and expanding it to coordinate financial support. It could build in periodic contact between head of mission meetings to coordinate assistance programmes, discuss the implementation of the EU-Tunisia Action Plan, and coordinate political actions in support of the country’s transition.
About the Author
Hamza Meddeb is a visiting fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations. He is also a research fellow at the European University Institute. His research focuses on the political economy of democratic transition in Tunisia as well as the political economy of conflicts in North Africa

Turkey's Charm Offensive

Friday, January 27, 2017
Turkey's Charm Offensive
Erdogan Makes Nice
Nussaibah Younis
NUSSAIBAH YOUNIS is Senior Resident Fellow at the Atlantic Council, where she directs the Task Force on the Future of Iraq.


On January 7, Turkish Prime Minister Binali Yildirim visited Baghdad, marking a milestone in its warming relations with Iraq. Four months ago, Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi had warned that Turkey's deployment of troops to the Iraqi town of Bashiqa [1] threatened to trigger a regional war [2]. Turkey, which claimed for its troops the consent of the Kurdistan Regional Government, shot back that Iraq's sudden concern with Bashiqa had malicious [3 intent. An escalating war of words led to the mutual summoning of ambassadors and an Iraqi call, in October, for an emergency meeting [4] of the UN Security Council. But during the January visit, the prime ministers of Iraq and Turkey stood together and declared that they would solve the issue [5]of Bashiqa, in addition to strengthening bilateral trade, security, and economic cooperation.
Ankara's about-face follows a dramatic year for the country, in which an attempted military coup [6], escalating attacks by the Islamic State (or ISIS) on Turkish soil, and a deepening war with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) brought about a fundamental reexamination of the country's foreign policy priorities. (Turkey maintains good relations with the government of Iraqi Kurdistan, but considers the PKK a terrorist group.) As a result of the multiple domestic crises [7] that buffeted the Turkish state in 2016, Ankara is in the process of overhauling its foreign policy, increasingly pursuing stable neighborly relations and reigning in its impulse to project power regionally.

DO UNTO THY NEIGHBOR
Turkey's ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), in power since 2002 [8], initially pursued a policy of zero problems with neighbors [9], which sought to establish the country as the economic heart of an increasingly interconnected Middle East. But the developments of the Arab Spring led Turkey toward a more assertive foreign policy. The AKP decried the removal of Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi in a 2013 coup, threatened to topple Syrian President Bashar al-Assad over his campaign of mass slaughter against Syrian rebels, and railed against former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki for mistreating Iraq's Sunni population. Although these moves had a certain moral strength, especially among the region’s Sunnis, they led Turkey into the midst of regional turmoil, which the government is now attempting to back away from.
The first signs of Turkey's changing approach came in June 2016 when it normalized relations [10] with Russia, apologizing for the 2015 downing of a Russian fighter jet that had strayed into Turkish airspace from northern Syria. That same month, Turkey reached a settlement [11] with Israel resuming diplomatic ties [12] after a six-year freeze in relations, following Israel's 2010 attack on a Gaza-bound aid flotilla that resulted in the deaths of several Turkish activists.
Turkey also moved away [13] from its staunch opposition to the Assad regime in Syria. Recently, its policy in the country has focused on preventing an autonomous and unified Kurdish region from forming in northern Syria rather than, as before, helping anti-Assad rebels to maintain a foothold in Aleppo [14]. In its recent effort to retake the Syrian town of al-Bab [15] from ISIS, moreover, Turkey has accepted air support from key Assad ally Russia, while publicly excoriating its traditional ally in Syria, the United States, for its lack of assistance.
Most dramatically of all, Turkey, along with Russian and Iran, helped forge a ceasefire in Syria without U.S. involvement in the final days of 2016, and brokered talks between opposition fighters and the Syrian government in the Kazakh capital, Astana. Although the ceasefire has collapsed [16] in numerous areas, and the talks made little substantive progress [17], the moves represent a new Turkish acceptance of Russia's authority in the Syrian conflict.

GETTING IT TOGETHER
The timing of this new strategy is no coincidence. As Turkey faces growing violence, instability, and economic turmoil at home, Erdogan has come to the conclusion that now is the time to revert to the policy of zero problems with neighbors [18]. Today, with a plummeting lira [19] and a contracting economy [20], there is little support among Turks for such adventurism. Even before economic woes began to take their toll, a 2012 poll found that two-thirds [21] of Turks did not support Turkish intervention in Syria.
Erdogan can little afford to face any popular unrest: he is currently locked in a tense political battle to transfer substantial power to his office by changing the Turkish constitution [22]. In foreign policy, he has therefore sought to prioritize efforts to undermine Turkey's substantial Kurdish minority, enabling him to tap into deep anti-Kurdish sentiment among the Turkish majority. For instance, after the Kurdish HDP party threatened the AKP's grip on power with a shock election result in June 2016 [23], the AKP escalated its war against the PKK [24], while seeking to conflate the terrorist group with the non-violent parliamentary party. Since then, focusing the Turkish public’s attention on the supposed threat of Kurdish violence has been a crucial part of the AKP's electoral strategy.
Yildirim's visit to Iraq last week was a reflection of this new logic. The Turks main goal is to convince Baghdad to drive the PKK out of Iraqi territory. [25] The PKK has been present in Sinjar, a Yezidi town in northern Iraq, since the expulsion of ISIS in late 2015. Indeed, local Yezidis have developed a close relationship with the PKK after the Kurds helped them escape from Mount Sinjar, where they had been trapped after other Iraqi Kurdish forces retreated in the face of ISIS onslaught. Since then, PKK forces have helped to train Yezidi militias and have received support from Baghdad.
Yet now it seems that Turkey has persuaded Baghdad to stop supporting the PKK, through diplomatic overtures and with the help of repeated mediation efforts by U.S. counter-ISIS envoy Brett McGurk. Ankara has also hinted that it may discuss withdrawing its troops from Bashiqa in exchange for the Iraqis ejecting the PKK from Sinjar. Turkey has, furthermore, co-operated with Baghdad in enabling a Turkish-trained Iraqi paramilitary force, known as the Hashd al-Watany, to merge [26] with the Baghdad-backed popular mobilization units. Ankara's strategy may be working: in the joint press conference on January 7, Abadi announced that [27] no force beyond the frame of the security forces or the formal Iraqi security forces will be allowed to work in Sinjar a clear condemnation of the PKK presence. Yildirim in turn thanked Abadi for Baghdad's seriousness in expelling terrorist organizations from the region.
The rapprochement with Baghdad also demonstrates a new willingness on the part of Ankara to move beyond its traditional partnerships in Iraq. In recent years, Turkey has invested heavily in its relationship with Iraqi Kurdistan's governing Kurdish Democratic Party, with which it has forged independent economic and energy agreements, but these have damaged Turkish relations with Baghdad. Any rapprochement between Iraq and Turkey would thus be nerve-racking for the Iraqi Kurds, who are economically dependent on the Turks and remain embroiled in disputes with the federal government over energy exports, revenue sharing, and the status of disputed territories. But there is tremendous scope for Turkey to expand its diplomatic and economic ties with the rest of Iraq growth that has thus far been stymied by poor political relations.
It remains to be seen whether recent positive steps will develop into a new era of Iraq-Turkish cooperation. Turkey will remain wary of withdrawing from Bashiqa before the PKK has withdrawn from Iraq, and it still expresses concern about the presence of Iraqi Shiite paramilitary forces to the west of Mosul and around the Turkmen town of Tel Afar. It must be emphasized, moreover, that Turkey's outreach stems from a growing domestic authoritarianism and a hyper-hostility to Turkish and Syrian Kurds that is ultimately damaging to Turkey's stability. A rapprochement with Baghdad would nonetheless herald a new era of economic and diplomatic co-operation that would likely prove a financial and strategic boon to two of the most vulnerable states in today's Middle East.

Who will rule Trump's foreign policy

Published on January 25th, 2017 | by Jim Lobe                 

Who Will Rule Trump Foreign Policy?

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by Jim Lobe
The most frightening commentary I’ve read in the run-up to the inauguration—and there have been many—appeared in a column identifying the four people whose foreign policy ideas were likely to be most influential with the then-president-elect. It was written by The Washington Post’s Josh Rogin and entitled “Inside Trump’s Shadow National Security Council.”
Those four people, according to Rogin, are chief strategist Stephen Bannon, who “has been working on the long-term strategic vision that will shape the Trump administration’s overall foreign policy approach;” chief of staff Reince Priebus; Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner; and his national security adviser, Gen. Michael Flynn (ret.).
What is particularly striking about these four men is their collective lack of foreign-policy-making experience. I can’t see any in Bannon’s resume. Priebus, until he took over the Republican National Committee six years ago, was essentially a local Wisconsin political operative. Aside from occasional visits to Israel and his family foundation’s philanthropy for Israeli and settler institutions, Kushner has never, to my knowledge, expressed any particular interest in foreign policy although, according to Rogin, he has recently been meeting with “leading representatives from countries including Israel, Germany and Britain.” Although Flynn undoubtedly gained a lot of experience overseas, his entire career was devoted to military intelligence, not policy making. And, despite her lengthy resume compiled in the national security bureaucracies under various Republican presidents, Flynn’s hand-picked deputy, K.T. McFarland, worked virtually exclusively in communications and speechwriting — never in a policy-making role.
Is there any modern precedent for this total lack of experience in the top echelons of the White House, including the National Security Council?

No Experience, Lots of Opinions
The absence of foreign-policy-making experience however, does not mean that these individuals lack foreign-policy opinions. And, of course, in Washington, as a hoary, inside-the-Beltway maxim puts it: “Personnel is policy.”
Aside from his overseas business interests, Trump himself also has no foreign-policy experience. Nor, it seems, does he have much curiosity about the subject. Aside from the fairly consistent Islamophobia and aggressive nationalism expressed in various ways and degrees over the past couple of decades, he also doesn’t seem to have much in the way of fixed foreign-policy ideas or principles other than self-glorification, a desperate need to gain and retain public and media attention, and possibly the repayment of any debts he feels he may have incurred to foreign interests that helped— Putin? The Adelsons on behalf of Bibi?—put him in the presidency. Certainly, his often-contradictory utterances during the election campaign bolstered the impression that he is not grounded in any firm beliefs about Washington’s role in the world. So it seems relatively safe to assume that the worldviews of the same individuals cited by Rogin as the most influential—and closest to the Oval Office—are those that will at least initially guide Trump.
Of the five individuals mentioned above, only three have particularly strong publicly expressed foreign-policy worldviews: Bannon, Flynn, and McFarland.
Of these, Bannon appears pre-eminent, at least for the moment. That became clear not only in the content and dark, almost apocalyptic tone of Trump’s “America First” inaugural address—which, according to the Wall Street Journal, was actually drafted by Bannon and alt-right fellow-traveller Stephen Miller—but also in Trump’s controversial interview last week with The Times of London and Das Bild.
The most comprehensive account of Bannon’s worldview is contained in his 50-minute interview at a conference held at the Vatican in 2014. In addition to the kind of populist ethno-nationalism with which his name and Breitbart News (of which he was former CEO) have now been associated, Bannon sees the world as a true “clash of civilizations” that pits “Islamic Fascism” against the “Judeo-Christian West.” His remarkable invocation in that interview of the “church militant” and the battles of Tours against the Arabs in 732 and Vienna against the Ottomans in 1638 as historical models to which the Judeo-Christian world should now aspire suggests a certain grandiosity (that would naturally appeal to Trump, too). To Bannon, global or other kinds of supra-national institutions that espouse universalist ideals and that get in the way of “strong nationalist movements …[that are] really the building blocks that built Western Europe and the United States,” are anathema. (You have to wonder how much modern European history Bannon has studied.) In the entire text, he never mentions human rights or democracy or other liberal values.
Along with his ideas about capitalism, Ayn Randism, traditionalism, and populism, it’s fair to say that Bannon thinks deep—if somewhat contradictory—thoughts. He’s also very, very far to the right—although he identifies as “center right”—and has what I would call proto-fascist inclinations. It’s no wonder that he’s fascinated by and identifies with Europe’s far-right nationalist and anti-European Union (EU) movements. But he also finds common ground with Putin and his promotion of the Russian Orthodox Church and Israel’s Likud Party. The latter’s roots, after all, lie in Ze’ev Jabotinsky’s Betar movement, which, despite its founder’s liberal convictions, has always harbored messianic nationalist, if not fascist tendencies.
The degree to which Trump has apparently absorbed and now echoes these ideas is reflected in his most recent public remarks. Compare, for example, Bannon’s defense of Putin—that “people …want to see the sovereignty for their country, they want to see nationalism for their country”—with what Trump said in defending Brexit in his interview with The Times and Bild. “People, countries want their own identity, and the U.K. wanted its own identity,” Trump stressed as he effectively urged other EU members to emulate Brexit, presumably as part of the Judeo-Christian civilizational struggle against Islam. He reiterated this theme in his inaugural speech Friday in the kind of messianic vision favored by Bannon: “We will reinforce old alliances and form new ones and unite the civilized world against radical Islamic terrorism, which we will eradicate from the face of the Earth” (emphasis added). In the same Times/Bild interview, Trump clearly tried to undermine confidence in German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s leadership, saying that he trusted her as much as Putin, at least for the time being—a rather striking assertion that must have sent blood pressures soaring in various foreign ministries, including the State Department. Trump also questioned the current relevance of NATO to similar effect in European defense ministries and the Pentagon.
Of course, these statements were presaged by Trump’s enthusiasm over Brexit itself and the fact that the first foreign “leader” to personally celebrate his election victory with him was none other than Nigel Farage. Farage, who Trump subsequently recommended as UK ambassador here much to the discomfort of the British prime minister, was subsequently seated in the special VIP section at Friday’s inauguration, along with leaders of the Israeli settlement movement. Bannon has made little secret of his admiration—and support—for the French National Front’s Marine Le Pen, another anti-EU European, pro-Putin leader (whose visit to Trump Tower two weeks ago likely included a tete-a-tete with Trump’s chief strategist). We’ll see whether the far-right, Islamophobic Dutch politician, Geert Wilders, shows up at the Tower at some point before this year’s elections in the Netherlands, while Czech President Milos Zeman, another Islamophobic Putin admirer, is set to visit the White House in April. Can Hungary’s Viktor Orban be far behind?
Bannon and Putin—and probably Netanyahu, too—clearly have Angela Merkel and the EU in their crosshairs as part of a larger effort to create what The Daily Beast’s called a “worldwide ultra-right” movement, or, perhaps more bluntly, a Proto-Fascist International. Aside from exterminating “radical Islamic terrorism,” such a coalition appears to be a central goal of Bannon’s “long-term strategic vision.” That makes Rogin’s final observation about Bannon’s role in the White House especially chilling. According to Rogin, Bannon’s mandate includes “connecting the Trump apparatus to leaders of populist movements around the world, especially in Europe.” Whatever is meant by “the Trump apparatus,” its intellectual leader is now sitting in the White House, just a few steps from the Oval Office.
As for the two senior advisers with actual foreign policy—if not policy-making—experience, Flynn and McFarland are far more likely to embrace Bannon’s vision than to oppose it. What unifies all three is an intense Islamophobia and Manichaeism befitting Fox News, as well as Breitbart. We have covered Flynn’s wacky worldview, particularly as expressed in his 2016 book, Field of Fight, co-authored by serial intriguer Michael Ledeen, at considerable length. Suffice to recall Flynn’s belief in the existence of “an international alliance of evil countries and movements that is working to destroy us,” an alliance that includes North Korea, China, Russia, Iran, Syria, Cuba, Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Bolivia (whose government, incidentally, just hosted the former First Daughter, Malia Obama on a lengthy trek through the Andes). The same alliance also includes al-Qaeda, Hezbollah, the Islamic State, and “countless other terrorist groups.” As Rogin reported Sunday, Flynn, who, like Bannon, also appears to admire Putin, is filling senior NSC positions with a phalanx of former military intelligence officers with whom he has worked closely in the past. The White House’s in-house foreign-policy shop will thus see the world rather narrowly—in Flynn’s words, through the sights of a “rifle scope.” Neither Flynn nor McFarland are likely to challenge Bannon’s broader strategic agenda. If anything, they may reinforce it.

Will Anyone Challenge Bannon?
Defense Secretary Gen. James Mattis (ret.), who obviously enjoys the support of the foreign-policy establishment, has already made it very clear that he strongly opposes key elements of Bannon’s radical worldview, particularly anything that would threaten NATO, the EU, and other multilateral institutions that have underpinned the post-World War II order. According to various accounts, Mattis has already clashed with the White House—meaning Bannon, Kushner, and Flynn—over appointments to key Pentagon positions. Tillerson’s views are much less well known, but the fact that his nomination was championed by Republican establishment stalwarts, including Robert Gates, Condoleezza Rice, Stephen Hadley, and James Baker, suggests that they believe he will exert a moderating influence, a notion bolstered by reports that he rejected the choice of far-right and Adelson favorite John Bolton as his deputy. Gen. John Kelly, the new head of Homeland Security, and UN Amb. Nikki Haley are also considered unlikely to support the White House’s far-right, Islamophobic agenda. All four cabinet members, as well as CIA director Mike Pompeo (a leading Iranophobe during his Congressional career), testified that they disagreed with at least some of the more controversial positions, ranging from torture to the Israel-Palestinian conflict and to Putin, espoused by Trump during the election campaign.
But none of these officials has so far gotten anywhere nearly as much face time with Trump himself as his White House aides. This despite the potentially momentous foreign-policy decisions already taken by the White House, including the abandonment of the Trans Pacific Partnership, the visa and immigration ban on seven predominantly Muslim countries, and the apparent green light Trump has given to Netanyahu for vast new settlement construction in East Jerusalem and the West Bank, thus overturning more than four decades of U.S. opposition. Proximity often translates into power.
Post columnist Ruth Marcus put the situation in a nutshell in a piece entitled “Can Trump’s Cabinet Save Him From Himself?”:

For every Mattis and Pompeo, for every John F. Kelly (the retired Marine general tapped to head the Department of Homeland Security, who testified that a border wall with Mexico “in and of itself will not do the job’’) and even Rex Tillerson (the former ExxonMobil chief executive nominated to be secretary of state, who testified that “the risk of climate change does exist”), there will be, in the West Wing, a Stephen K. Bannon as chief strategist and senior counselor and Michael T. Flynn as national security adviser. Their records suggest they will inflame Trump’s worst instincts, not restrain them.
Bannon and Flynn have been politically closer to Trump longer; they will be physically closer to him at the White House. Trump could continue to be swayed by the last person whispering in his ear. Or the stature, knowledge and experience at bureaucratic maneuvering of some Cabinet secretaries could, at least at times, avert bad decisions. How all this plays out will shape the course of the Trump presidency.

Of course, Priebus, whose job appears centered on reconciling differences between the Republican congressional leadership and Trump, could also exert a moderating influence. Kushner could as well, though the nomination of David Friedman as U.S. ambassador to Israel, his encouragement of the settlement movement in the West Bank, and the presence of settlement leaders as honored guests at the inauguration, as well as his own family’s history of philanthropic support for the settlement movement, suggests that, on Israel-related questions, Kushner is no moderate. And with no real background, let alone expertise, in foreign policy, both Priebus and Kushner are more likely to acquiesce in Bannon’s strategic designs than oppose them …unless other powerful figures in the administration and Congress—not to mention foreign leaders—make it very clear that the political and popularity costs to Trump will be “yuge.”
Photo of Steve Bannon by Don Irvine via Wikimedia Commons