Turkey launched on 24 August a military action in Syria code-named “Operation Euphrates”. The official statement said that “the operation was aimed at neutralizing the threat posed by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and other terrorist organizations”.
“Other the terrorist organizations” means in this context, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), the strongest Kurdish political party in Syria and its military branch People’s Protection Units (YPG). The PYD has strong links with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a terrorist organization operating in Turkey and threatening the country’s territorial integrity. Actually the PYD is like an extension of the PKK in the Syrian territory.
The foot soldier’s mission in this operation is performed by the members of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) that is composed of Turkmens and Arabs. Turkish army provides air, land and intelligence support to the FSA. The command and control functions are performed by the Turkish army.
First, the ISIL fighters were defeated one week ago in the town of Manbij, a strategically important point on the supply route of the ISIL. They were seen forming long convoys moving north towards Jarablus at the Turkish border. Turkey had to take action before they settled in Jarablus, because this town is only at a stone’s throw distance to the Turkish border and they can easily increase the threat posed by the already existing ISIL fighters in the town.
Second, after the defeat of the ISIL fighters in Manbij, it was an opportune moment to give them another blow before they re-organize themselves in another area.
Third, in the north-eastern Syrian province of Hasakah, Kurds were clashing with the Syrian regime forces. Turkey and the Syrian regime found themselves on the same side of a conflict for the first time since the beginning of the Syrian crisis. Therefore the reaction of the Syrian regime against Turkey’s military operation would be minimized.
Fourth, the reference to the preservation of the territorial integrity of Syria is another element that may conduce the Syrian regime to react more mildly to Turkey’s military operation.
Fifth, the US had promised Turkey that the Kurdish fighters would withdraw to the east of the River Euphrates after they oust ISIL from the town of Manbij. Therefore, if they follow the US advice, there will be no risk, at least theoretically, to be confronted with the PYD/YPG fighters in the west of the Euphrates.
Sixth, Turkey and Russia had made a step in normalizing their relations. Turkish fighter jets could now enter the Syrian air space without fearing that they could be intercepted by the Russian air defence.
Seventh, the Turkish army had suffered humiliating purges as a result of the involvement of many high level officers in the military coup attempt carried out on 15 July. This operation could refresh the self-confidence of the army.
The town of Manbij, which is at the southern border of this pocket, was liberated on 13 August from the ISIL by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The SDF is created by the US in order to satisfy the insistent demands of Turkey who said that it will strike the Kurdish forces if they cross to the west side of the River Euphrates. 60 % of the SDF fighters are Kurds and the remaining 40 % is divided between Arabs, Turkmens, Assyrians, Armenian and Circassians, but the commanding posts are held exclusively by Kurds. Irrespective of its composition, this arrangement did not give full satisfaction to Turkey but it did not object to it either.
The US promised also Turkey that the Kurds will go back to the east of the Euphrates after the town of Manbij is cleared from the ISIL fighters. This promise was reconfirmed by the Vice-President of the US Joe Biden during his visit to Turkey. He said that if the PYD does not withdraw to the east of the Euphrates after Manbij is cleared from the ISIS fighters, the US will stop supporting it. This carefully constructed sentence leaves certain questions unanswered:
The PYD is also trying to persuade the US to a modified interpretation of the concept of the west bank of the Euphrates. While it agrees to withdraw from the regions close to the Turkish border, it wants to maintain its presence in the south, but still on the west bank of the Euphrates. A statement made on 29 August by Pentagon spokesman Peter Cook, is a sign that the PYD/YPG efforts were successful to a great extent. He said that a clash between the Turkish armed forces and the PYD/YPG is unacceptable. Since the US will need PYD/YPG in the future for the ultimate battle against the ISIL in Raqqa, it is not easy for the US to antagonize the Kurds. The more Turkey distances itself from the initial scope of the operation, the more similar remarks are likely from the US and other countries.
A more important reason for Turkey’s objection to the PYD plan is that this political party has a negative record because of its past practices: It tried to change the ethnic composition of the population living in the areas where it seized control. In fact, when Kobane was liberated from the ISIL occupation in April 2015, the PYD committed several war crimes by not allowing the Arab and Turkmen population of the area to return to their homes and fields. It burned their houses and harvests. It created similar difficulties even to the Kurds who do not support the PYD. It tried to justify this attitude by claiming that it was delaying the return of the civilian population in order to clear the booby traps that may have been set by the departing ISIL fighters. But it settled in these houses Kurds that it brought from other regions of Syria. All of these violations are recorded in a report of the Amnesty International published in October 2015. Quoting the statement of a peasant, the report said: “They pulled us out of our homes and began burning the home. They demolished home after home until the entire village was destroyed.”
Sharfan Darwish, the spokesman of the SDF, claimed in mid-August 2016 that the civil registry records in government offices of Manbij were burned by the ISIL militants. Such a claim is not convincing because the ISIL militants have no interest in committing such an act at the moment of their departure from the town. The Kurds are the most likely perpetrators of this act because they want to eliminate all evidences proving that the Kurds were only a small minority in the region. The copy of the civil registry kept by the central authorities in Damascus will prove it when the time comes.
The Kurds committed similar acts in the past, in Erbil in 2006. They brought trucks-load of Kurds from the remote villages of the northern Iraq and claimed that they were forced in the past by the Saddam Hussein regime to leave their houses in Erbil and that they are now returning to their homes. The Turkish newspapers reported at that time that 200 such families brought from the north gave as their former address in Erbil a small house with two rooms.
Turkey is aware that it will be difficult for the US to deny the Kurds the right of holding the control of a town that they liberated but, because of such an unpleasant experience, it does not want the YPG fighters to cross to the western bank of the River Euphrates.
Russia sated that it was worried of the instability in the region and suggested coordination with the Syrian regime. It is also in favour of the preservation of the territorial integrity of Syria. Therefore it will support this part of Turkey’s operation. But, on the other hand, the clash of interests between Turkey and the Kurds will put Russia in front a difficult choice. Russia is historically a strong supporter of the Kurdish cause. Here it will have to compare this historical commitment with the importance that it attributes to its relations with Turkey. Furthermore, there are fighters in the FSA who belong to the Syrian rebel factions that are not considered as moderate opposition by Russia. Therefore as the operation will unfold, the mission that is accomplished by these fighters may come to the agenda between Turkey and Russia.
The US policy will probably be shaped in light of more paradigms: First and foremost of them is defeating the ISIL. The US announced that it supported the operation with their air force. Therefore Turkey can count on the US support as long as the operation remains within its declared scope. Second is the US commitment to the preservation of the territorial integrity of Syria. Third is its obligation to Kurds for their crucial support during the fight against the ISIL. Fourth is its attitude towards the Kurdish cause in general. Fifth is the security of Israel. This last paradigm suggests that the US may be in favour of a dismembered smaller Syria that will constitute a lesser threat to Israel. Furthermore a Kurdish State in the north of Syria will play a favourable balancing role for the security of Israel in the mind of the US.
Iran is in favour of the preservation of the territorial integrity of Syria. Therefore it will agree strongly with Turkey on this important policy line. Iran is also opposed to the establishment of a Kurdish controlled region, because such a step may set an example for Kurds in its own country. Therefore Turkey’s cooperation with Iran has one additional item as compared to the other stake holders.
Masood Barzani, the President of the Kurdish Regional Government in the Northern Iraq, was in Turkey for consultation the day the operation was launched and said that he “has agreed with Turkey on a strategy and methods to fight the ISIL and said that the region was at the threshold of major changes”.
The harshest reaction came, as expected, from the PYD co-chairman Saleh Muslim who said that Turkey will hit the wall in Syria.
The foregoing explanation indicates that at least two areas may be identified as fields of cooperation by all stake holders: The fight against ISIL and the preservation of the territorial integrity of Syria.
Turkey favours the establishment of an administration in the liberated Manbij pocket where all components of the indigenous Syrian society will be represented proportionately with their size. This is a sound ground for cooperation. However the Kurds, having grown over-confident as a result of their success in Kobane and Manbij, may oppose this solution. Many countries will support the Kurds for various reasons but especially because the Kurdish fighters play an important role in the fight against ISIL. Turkey should focus its efforts on the methods of persuasion rather than punitive action and should cooperate with the international community to explain to the Kurds the fairness of this approach. The Kurds have to understand that, if the ethnic and sectarian groups are not represented proportionately in the administration, the resurgence of the clashes will be unavoidable in the future.
A cherished project of President Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey is to establish a security zone in the north of Syria. He said, a few days after the launching of the military operation, that when the security situation in the Manbij pocket will be stabilized, Turkey could construct housings for the Syrians fleeing from violence. The Manbij pocket is an area of 90 km long and 30 km wide. It is a region big enough to accommodate millions of internally displaced persons. Such a solution may slow down considerably the flow of refugees to the EU countries. Therefore it may be supported by the EU both politically and financially. However there are objections to this project. International legitimacy will be required to implement such a project. International legitimacy means the UN Security Council resolution. The US opposed this project in the past. Russia may consider this a violation of Syria’s sovereignty. Therefore, if Turkey wants to secure the support of the international community for this fairly realistic project, it has to be on the same page with them in the fight against ISIL.
There are risks for the operation to run into difficulty if it unfolds in the wrong direction. FSA fighters failed to achieve any appreciable success so far. The way they were running the present campaign was not impressive either. There are also potential difficulties that the Turkish army may run into: The fight both against ISIL and the PKK/YPG are asymmetric. Therefore the number of tanks or fighter jets is not the only criteria for the success. Second disadvantage for the Turkish army is the environment in which the fight will take place. The PKK was able to inflict serious casualties on the Turkish armed forces and police in the more or less friendly environment in Turkey. If they have the capacity to carry out such attacks within Turkey, one may presume that they could carry out more deadly attacks in an unfriendly environment like Syria. The existence of Armenian fighters in the SDF is an added risk for the Turkish army. The PKK and the ISIL were already committing terrorist attacks in Turkey before the operation. An increase in their frequency is likely after the operation. Third, war is an extremely expensive business. Its impact is felt more acutely in the fragile economies. Therefore Turkey has to keep the operation as short as it is necessary. The less Turkey goes beyond the declared scope of the operation, the bigger the chances of success.
Yasar Yakis, the Member of the Group
The authors opinions may not coincide with the position of editorial.
The foot soldier’s mission in this operation is performed by the members of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) that is composed of Turkmens and Arabs. Turkish army provides air, land and intelligence support to the FSA. The command and control functions are performed by the Turkish army.
Why this date is chosen for the operation?
The reasons why Turkey launched the operation at this point in time could be summarized as follows:First, the ISIL fighters were defeated one week ago in the town of Manbij, a strategically important point on the supply route of the ISIL. They were seen forming long convoys moving north towards Jarablus at the Turkish border. Turkey had to take action before they settled in Jarablus, because this town is only at a stone’s throw distance to the Turkish border and they can easily increase the threat posed by the already existing ISIL fighters in the town.
Second, after the defeat of the ISIL fighters in Manbij, it was an opportune moment to give them another blow before they re-organize themselves in another area.
Third, in the north-eastern Syrian province of Hasakah, Kurds were clashing with the Syrian regime forces. Turkey and the Syrian regime found themselves on the same side of a conflict for the first time since the beginning of the Syrian crisis. Therefore the reaction of the Syrian regime against Turkey’s military operation would be minimized.
Fourth, the reference to the preservation of the territorial integrity of Syria is another element that may conduce the Syrian regime to react more mildly to Turkey’s military operation.
Fifth, the US had promised Turkey that the Kurdish fighters would withdraw to the east of the River Euphrates after they oust ISIL from the town of Manbij. Therefore, if they follow the US advice, there will be no risk, at least theoretically, to be confronted with the PYD/YPG fighters in the west of the Euphrates.
Sixth, Turkey and Russia had made a step in normalizing their relations. Turkish fighter jets could now enter the Syrian air space without fearing that they could be intercepted by the Russian air defence.
Seventh, the Turkish army had suffered humiliating purges as a result of the involvement of many high level officers in the military coup attempt carried out on 15 July. This operation could refresh the self-confidence of the army.
Kurdish Designs in Syria
Turkey is worried of Kurdish designs in Syria. PYD is trying to dominate a region where the Kurds constitute only around 30 % of the population, if not less. It is trying to achieve this goal by linking the de facto autonomous region of Rojava in the north-east of Syria to the Afrin canton in the north-west. Turkey is opposed to this plan, because it does not want to be surrounded by a Kurdish belt all along the border with Syria.The town of Manbij, which is at the southern border of this pocket, was liberated on 13 August from the ISIL by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The SDF is created by the US in order to satisfy the insistent demands of Turkey who said that it will strike the Kurdish forces if they cross to the west side of the River Euphrates. 60 % of the SDF fighters are Kurds and the remaining 40 % is divided between Arabs, Turkmens, Assyrians, Armenian and Circassians, but the commanding posts are held exclusively by Kurds. Irrespective of its composition, this arrangement did not give full satisfaction to Turkey but it did not object to it either.
The US promised also Turkey that the Kurds will go back to the east of the Euphrates after the town of Manbij is cleared from the ISIL fighters. This promise was reconfirmed by the Vice-President of the US Joe Biden during his visit to Turkey. He said that if the PYD does not withdraw to the east of the Euphrates after Manbij is cleared from the ISIS fighters, the US will stop supporting it. This carefully constructed sentence leaves certain questions unanswered:
- Will the US continue to support the PYD, which is Turkey’s terrorist list, after it withdraws to the east of Euphrates?
- What will the US do if PYD/YPG does not withdraw to the east of the Euphrates?
The PYD is also trying to persuade the US to a modified interpretation of the concept of the west bank of the Euphrates. While it agrees to withdraw from the regions close to the Turkish border, it wants to maintain its presence in the south, but still on the west bank of the Euphrates. A statement made on 29 August by Pentagon spokesman Peter Cook, is a sign that the PYD/YPG efforts were successful to a great extent. He said that a clash between the Turkish armed forces and the PYD/YPG is unacceptable. Since the US will need PYD/YPG in the future for the ultimate battle against the ISIL in Raqqa, it is not easy for the US to antagonize the Kurds. The more Turkey distances itself from the initial scope of the operation, the more similar remarks are likely from the US and other countries.
A more important reason for Turkey’s objection to the PYD plan is that this political party has a negative record because of its past practices: It tried to change the ethnic composition of the population living in the areas where it seized control. In fact, when Kobane was liberated from the ISIL occupation in April 2015, the PYD committed several war crimes by not allowing the Arab and Turkmen population of the area to return to their homes and fields. It burned their houses and harvests. It created similar difficulties even to the Kurds who do not support the PYD. It tried to justify this attitude by claiming that it was delaying the return of the civilian population in order to clear the booby traps that may have been set by the departing ISIL fighters. But it settled in these houses Kurds that it brought from other regions of Syria. All of these violations are recorded in a report of the Amnesty International published in October 2015. Quoting the statement of a peasant, the report said: “They pulled us out of our homes and began burning the home. They demolished home after home until the entire village was destroyed.”
Sharfan Darwish, the spokesman of the SDF, claimed in mid-August 2016 that the civil registry records in government offices of Manbij were burned by the ISIL militants. Such a claim is not convincing because the ISIL militants have no interest in committing such an act at the moment of their departure from the town. The Kurds are the most likely perpetrators of this act because they want to eliminate all evidences proving that the Kurds were only a small minority in the region. The copy of the civil registry kept by the central authorities in Damascus will prove it when the time comes.
The Kurds committed similar acts in the past, in Erbil in 2006. They brought trucks-load of Kurds from the remote villages of the northern Iraq and claimed that they were forced in the past by the Saddam Hussein regime to leave their houses in Erbil and that they are now returning to their homes. The Turkish newspapers reported at that time that 200 such families brought from the north gave as their former address in Erbil a small house with two rooms.
Turkey is aware that it will be difficult for the US to deny the Kurds the right of holding the control of a town that they liberated but, because of such an unpleasant experience, it does not want the YPG fighters to cross to the western bank of the River Euphrates.
Policies of the main actors of the Syrian crisis in front of the operation
Syria blamed Turkey’s operation as “a blatant violation of its sovereignty”, though this language is milder than many other statements made on other occasions regarding Turkey’s policy on Syria. Apart from Turkey’s reconfirmation of Syria’s territorial integrity and the fight against the ISIL, Syria will probably oppose to any further involvement of Turkey in the Syrian crisis.Russia sated that it was worried of the instability in the region and suggested coordination with the Syrian regime. It is also in favour of the preservation of the territorial integrity of Syria. Therefore it will support this part of Turkey’s operation. But, on the other hand, the clash of interests between Turkey and the Kurds will put Russia in front a difficult choice. Russia is historically a strong supporter of the Kurdish cause. Here it will have to compare this historical commitment with the importance that it attributes to its relations with Turkey. Furthermore, there are fighters in the FSA who belong to the Syrian rebel factions that are not considered as moderate opposition by Russia. Therefore as the operation will unfold, the mission that is accomplished by these fighters may come to the agenda between Turkey and Russia.
The US policy will probably be shaped in light of more paradigms: First and foremost of them is defeating the ISIL. The US announced that it supported the operation with their air force. Therefore Turkey can count on the US support as long as the operation remains within its declared scope. Second is the US commitment to the preservation of the territorial integrity of Syria. Third is its obligation to Kurds for their crucial support during the fight against the ISIL. Fourth is its attitude towards the Kurdish cause in general. Fifth is the security of Israel. This last paradigm suggests that the US may be in favour of a dismembered smaller Syria that will constitute a lesser threat to Israel. Furthermore a Kurdish State in the north of Syria will play a favourable balancing role for the security of Israel in the mind of the US.
Iran is in favour of the preservation of the territorial integrity of Syria. Therefore it will agree strongly with Turkey on this important policy line. Iran is also opposed to the establishment of a Kurdish controlled region, because such a step may set an example for Kurds in its own country. Therefore Turkey’s cooperation with Iran has one additional item as compared to the other stake holders.
Masood Barzani, the President of the Kurdish Regional Government in the Northern Iraq, was in Turkey for consultation the day the operation was launched and said that he “has agreed with Turkey on a strategy and methods to fight the ISIL and said that the region was at the threshold of major changes”.
The harshest reaction came, as expected, from the PYD co-chairman Saleh Muslim who said that Turkey will hit the wall in Syria.
The foregoing explanation indicates that at least two areas may be identified as fields of cooperation by all stake holders: The fight against ISIL and the preservation of the territorial integrity of Syria.
Possible outcome of the operation
This operation may contribute to the return of stability in the Manbij pocket if it evolves in the right direction. In case Turkey confines the scope of the operation to repulsing the ISIL fighters from this pocket, it may count on the support of the international community. If it goes beyond this limit and transforms the operation into an exercise of punishing the PYD, the only country that may still continue to support Turkey will be Iran. Whether other countries could do the same is not certain.Turkey favours the establishment of an administration in the liberated Manbij pocket where all components of the indigenous Syrian society will be represented proportionately with their size. This is a sound ground for cooperation. However the Kurds, having grown over-confident as a result of their success in Kobane and Manbij, may oppose this solution. Many countries will support the Kurds for various reasons but especially because the Kurdish fighters play an important role in the fight against ISIL. Turkey should focus its efforts on the methods of persuasion rather than punitive action and should cooperate with the international community to explain to the Kurds the fairness of this approach. The Kurds have to understand that, if the ethnic and sectarian groups are not represented proportionately in the administration, the resurgence of the clashes will be unavoidable in the future.
A cherished project of President Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey is to establish a security zone in the north of Syria. He said, a few days after the launching of the military operation, that when the security situation in the Manbij pocket will be stabilized, Turkey could construct housings for the Syrians fleeing from violence. The Manbij pocket is an area of 90 km long and 30 km wide. It is a region big enough to accommodate millions of internally displaced persons. Such a solution may slow down considerably the flow of refugees to the EU countries. Therefore it may be supported by the EU both politically and financially. However there are objections to this project. International legitimacy will be required to implement such a project. International legitimacy means the UN Security Council resolution. The US opposed this project in the past. Russia may consider this a violation of Syria’s sovereignty. Therefore, if Turkey wants to secure the support of the international community for this fairly realistic project, it has to be on the same page with them in the fight against ISIL.
Challenges for the Turkish army in Syria
Turkey is aware that it will not be easy to clear the region entirely from the ISIL fighters, because ISIL is an extremely resilient terrorist organization. It enjoys the support of ultra conservative segments of the society both in Syria and in Turkey. It can easily melt and transform itself into a dormant cell. This is what happened in Syria after the operation.There are risks for the operation to run into difficulty if it unfolds in the wrong direction. FSA fighters failed to achieve any appreciable success so far. The way they were running the present campaign was not impressive either. There are also potential difficulties that the Turkish army may run into: The fight both against ISIL and the PKK/YPG are asymmetric. Therefore the number of tanks or fighter jets is not the only criteria for the success. Second disadvantage for the Turkish army is the environment in which the fight will take place. The PKK was able to inflict serious casualties on the Turkish armed forces and police in the more or less friendly environment in Turkey. If they have the capacity to carry out such attacks within Turkey, one may presume that they could carry out more deadly attacks in an unfriendly environment like Syria. The existence of Armenian fighters in the SDF is an added risk for the Turkish army. The PKK and the ISIL were already committing terrorist attacks in Turkey before the operation. An increase in their frequency is likely after the operation. Third, war is an extremely expensive business. Its impact is felt more acutely in the fragile economies. Therefore Turkey has to keep the operation as short as it is necessary. The less Turkey goes beyond the declared scope of the operation, the bigger the chances of success.
Yasar Yakis, the Member of the Group
The authors opinions may not coincide with the position of editorial.
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