Financial Times NATO's summit cannot disguise Ukraine's plight Without more military aid, Kyıv's situation on the battlefield could deteriorate rapidly Gideon Rachman PublishedYESTERDAY (June 29, 2025)

 Financial Times

NATO's summit cannot disguise Ukraine's plight

Without more military aid, Kyıv's situation on the battlefield could deteriorate rapidly

Gideon Rachman

PublishedYESTERDAY (June 29, 2025)

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“Daddy’s home,” proclaimed the White House, hailing Donald Trump’s return from last week’s Nato summit. That social media post was a reference — at once triumphant and mocking — to the title bestowed on Trump by Mark Rutte, the Nato secretary-general. Rutte might reason that demeaning himself is a small price to pay to keep the alliance together. And European leaders did seem broadly content, after the first Nato summit of Trump’s second term.

Fears of the US president walking out of the summit — or even the alliance itself — did not come to pass. All the European members of Nato have now committed to spending 5 per cent of GDP on defence — broadly defined.

One European leader lists three major achievements from the summit. First, Nato has refocused on its key mission — which is the deterrence of Russia. Second, the alliance is returning to cold war levels of defence spending, in response to Russia’s continuing military build-up. Third, as European defence spending rises, Nato will become a more balanced alliance between the US and Europe.

The fact that the Nato summit took place just after the US military strikes on Iran also changed the atmosphere. Trump arrived in a good mood — and his willingness to bomb Iran’s Fordow nuclear site allayed European fears that he will always shy away from the use of force. Trump also had a friendly meeting with Volodymyr Zelenskyy of Ukraine, repairing some of the damage that was done after the two leaders’ disastrous White House meeting in February.

But while things are going better for Ukraine diplomatically, the war itself seems to be going worse. Some Nato leaders fear that the situation on the frontline could deteriorate seriously by this autumn. That would be far more significant than any paper commitments made in last week’s Nato communiqué. Military assessments suggest that both the Russian and Ukrainian militaries are nearing the point of exhaustion. But while Russia can probably keep up the current level of operations for another year, Ukraine may reach a breaking point within six months — if it does not receive significant new military support.

Following the positive Zelenskyy-Trump meeting, there are hopes that Ukraine may receive fresh supplies from the US of Patriot missile-defence systems, as well as Himars artillery rockets. With Ukraine’s air defences stretched thin, the Patriots are badly needed. But, as ever, Trump was vague about providing new munitions — and could easily change his mind or forget.

There are also some shortfalls — in particular in Ukrainian troop numbers — that the country’s western allies cannot fix. Russia is now thought to have lost more than a million troops, killed or wounded, in the conflict. But Ukrainian losses have also been heavy and Russia’s population is about four times larger than Ukraine’s.

The increased intensity of Russian missile attacks on Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities is also damaging Ukrainian morale. Without a clear vision of victory — or at least of an end to the war — a sense of hopelessness risks descending over the country.

The change in mood inside the Ukrainian government is reflected in the urgency with which it is now privately calling for a ceasefire. A year or two ago, such calls would have been regarded as defeatism. Now they are made with increasing insistence in closed-door meetings between Ukrainian and western leaders.

But there is little belief among European policymakers that Russia is in any mood to agree a ceasefire. One well-placed official thinks that Russia’s central goal now is to capture Odesa — which Vladimir Putin regards as a historically Russian city. Without Odesa, Ukraine would lose access to its main port.

A group of former European leaders — including Carl Bildt of Sweden and Sanna Marin of Finland — visited Ukraine recently and picked up on the deteriorating mood. They wrote afterwards that “while Ukrainians will never stop resisting, without more military support, Ukraine can lose more territory. More cities might be captured.” Off the record, some western officials are even bleaker, warning of a risk of “catastrophic failure”, if the Ukrainian military is stretched to breaking point — and does not receive a significant increase in military and financial aid from its western allies.

Of course, wars are unpredictable and moods can shift. Some in the west argue that Ukraine can hold its own over the coming year. They claim that, despite enormous efforts and losses, Russia has only succeeded in capturing an additional 0.25 per cent of Ukrainian territory over the past year. The optimists argue that Ukrainians’ expertise in drone warfare has made it impossible for large groups of Russian troops to advance en masse. They also argue that — even if Russia breaks through Ukrainian lines — it lacks the mechanised divisions to capitalise on the achievement.

The received wisdom has been proved wrong many times before in this war. But if the growing pessimism among those following the Ukraine war closely is justified, then any feel-good sentiments generated by the Nato summit may soon disappear. Nato’s secretary-general is known for his upbeat nature and permanent smile. But even Rutte could struggle to keep smiling by the end of the year.

gideon.rachman@ft.com

ABD Başkanı Trump, Suriye'ye uygulanan yaptırımları kaldırdı - 30 Haziran 2025

 The White House 

Presidential Actions

PROVIDING FOR THE REVOCATION OF SYRIA SANCTIONS

Executive Orders

June 30, 2025

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.) (NEA), the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003 (Public Law 108-175) (Syria Accountability Act), the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (Public Law 102-182, title III) (CBW Act), the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019, as amended (22 U.S.C. 8791 note) (Caesar Act), the Illicit Captagon Trafficking Suppression Act of 2023 (Public Law 118-50, div. P), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code, it is hereby ordered:

Section 1.  Background.  The United States is committed to supporting a Syria that is stable, unified, and at peace with itself and its neighbors.  A united Syria that does not offer a safe haven for terrorist organizations and ensures the security of its religious and ethnic minorities will support regional security and prosperity.  The Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury have taken initial steps towards this goal through the issuance on May 23, 2025, of General License 25 and a waiver of sanctions under the Caesar Act. 

Sec. 2.  Policy.  It is the policy of the United States to recognize that circumstances that gave rise to the actions taken in the Executive Orders described in section 3(a) of this order, related to the policies and actions of the former regime of Bashar al-Assad, have been transformed by developments over the past 6 months, including the positive actions taken by the new Syrian government under President Ahmed al-Sharaa.  This order supports United States national security and foreign policy goals by directing additional actions, including the removal of sanctions on Syria, the issuance of waivers that permit the relaxation of export controls and other restrictions on Syria, and other actions to be taken by the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary of Commerce, as well as by other executive departments and agencies (agencies) of the United States, without providing relief to ISIS or other terrorist organizations, human rights abusers, those linked to chemical weapons or proliferation-related activities, or other persons that threaten the peace, security, or stability of the United States, Syria, and its neighbors. 

Sec. 3.  Revocation of Syria Sanctions.  (a)  Effective July 1, 2025, I hereby terminate the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13338 of May 11, 2004 (Blocking Property of Certain Persons and Prohibiting the Export of Certain Goods to Syria), and revoke that order, as well as Executive Order 13399 of April 25, 2006 (Blocking Property of Additional Persons in Connection With the National Emergency With Respect to Syria), Executive Order 13460 of February 13, 2008 (Blocking Property of Additional Persons in Connection With the National Emergency With Respect to Syria), Executive Order 13572 of April 29, 2011 (Blocking Property of Certain Persons with Respect to Human Rights Abuses in Syria), Executive Order 13573 of May 18, 2011 (Blocking Property of Senior Officials of the Government of Syria), and Executive Order 13582 of August 17, 2011 (Blocking Property of the Government of Syria and Prohibiting Certain Transactions with Respect to Syria).

     (b)  Pursuant to section 202(a) of the NEA (50 U.S.C. 1622(a)), termination of the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13338, as modified in scope and relied upon for additional steps taken in Executive Order 13399, Executive Order 13460, Executive Order 13572, Executive Order 13573, and Executive Order 13582 shall not affect any action taken or pending proceeding not finally concluded or determined as of July 1, 2025, any action or proceeding based on any act committed prior to July 1, 2025, or any rights or duties that matured or penalties that were incurred prior to July 1, 2025.

Sec. 4.  Accountability for the Former Regime of Bashar al‑Assad.  I find that additional steps must be taken to ensure meaningful accountability for perpetrators of war crimes, human rights violations and abuses, and the proliferation of narcotics trafficking networks in and in relation to Syria during the former regime of Bashar al-Assad and by those associated with it.  Perpetrators of such actions threaten to undermine peace, security, and stability in the region, and thereby constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States.

     (a)  I hereby expand the scope of the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13894 of October 14, 2019 (Blocking Property and Suspending Entry of Certain Persons Contributing to the Situation in Syria), as amended in and relied on for additional steps taken in Executive Order 14142 of January 15, 2025 (Taking Additional Steps With Respect to the Situation in Syria), to deal with that threat, and accordingly further amend Executive Order 13894 by:

        (i)   striking section 1(a) and inserting, in lieu thereof, the following:

     “Section 1.  (a)  All property and interests in property that are in the United States, that hereafter come within the United States, or that are or hereafter come within the possession or control of any United States person of the following persons are blocked and may not be transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn, or otherwise dealt in: 

        (i)  any person determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State:

          (A)  to be responsible for or complicit in, or to have directly or indirectly engaged in, or attempted to engage in, any of the following in or in relation to Syria:

             (1)  actions or policies that further threaten the peace, security, stability, or territorial integrity of Syria; or

             (2)  the commission of serious human rights abuse;

          (B)  to be a former government official of the former regime of Bashar al-Assad or a person who acted for or on behalf of such an official;

          (C)  to have engaged in, or attempted to engage in, activities or transactions that have materially contributed to, or pose a significant risk of materially contributing to, the illicit production and international illicit proliferation of captagon;

          (D)  to be responsible for or complicit in, to have directly or indirectly engaged in, or to be responsible for ordering, controlling, or otherwise directing, instances in which a United States national ((i) as defined in 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(22) or 8 U.S.C. 1408, or (ii) a lawful permanent resident with significant ties to the United States) went missing in Syria during the former regime of Bashar al-Assad; 

          (E)  to have materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of: 

             (1)  the former regime of Bashar al-Assad; 

             (2)  any activity described in subsections (a)(i)(A)–(a)(i)(D) of this section; or 

             (3)  any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this order; 

          (F)  to be owned or controlled by, or to have acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this order; or

          (G)  to be an adult family member of a person designated under subsections (a)(i)(A)–(a)(i)(D) of this section.”; and

        (ii)  striking section 2(a) and inserting, in lieu thereof, the following:  

     “Sec. 2.  (a)  The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and other officials of the United States Government as appropriate, is hereby authorized to impose on a foreign person any of the sanctions described in subsections (b) and (c) of this section, upon determining that the person, on or after the date of this order: 

        (i)    is responsible for or complicit in, has directly or indirectly engaged in, or attempted to engage in, or financed the obstruction, disruption, or prevention of efforts to promote a Syria that is stable, unified, and at peace with itself and its neighbors, including:

          (A)  the convening and conduct of a credible and inclusive Syrian-led constitutional process;

          (B)  the preparation for and conduct of supervised elections, pursuant to the new constitution, that are free and fair and to the highest international standards of transparency and accountability; or

          (C)  the development of a Syrian government that is representative and reflects the will of the Syrian people;

        (ii)   is an adult family member of a person designated under subsection (a)(i) of this section; or

        (iii)  is responsible for or complicit in, or has directly or indirectly engaged in, or attempted to engage in, the expropriation of property, including real property, for personal gain or political purposes in Syria.”

     (b)  I additionally amend Executive Order 13606 of April 22, 2012 (Blocking the Property and Suspending Entry into the United States of Certain Persons With Respect to Grave Human Rights Abuses by the Governments of Iran and Syria Via Information Technology), by removing the following text from the preamble:  “Executive Order 13338 of May 11, 2004, as modified in scope and relied upon for additional steps in subsequent Executive Orders” and replacing it with:  “Executive Order 13894 of October 14, 2019, and relied upon for additional steps and further amended in subsequent Executive Orders.”

Sec. 5.  Caesar Act.  The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, shall examine whether the criteria set forth in section 7431(a) of the Caesar Act have been met, and on the basis of that examination may, pursuant to the Presidential Memorandum of March 31, 2020 (Delegation of Certain Functions and Authorities Under the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020), suspend in whole or in part the imposition of sanctions otherwise required under the Caesar Act.  If the Secretary of State determines to suspend in whole or in part the imposition of such sanctions, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, shall provide the briefing to the appropriate congressional committees required by section 7431(b) of the Caesar Act within 30 days of such determination.  Further, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, shall continue to review the situation in Syria, and if the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, determines that the criteria set forth in section 7431(a) are no longer met, the Secretary of State shall reimpose sanctions. 

Sec. 6.  Syria Accountability Act.  I hereby determine pursuant to section 5(b) of the Syria Accountability Act that it is in the national security interest of the United States to waive the application of subsection (a)(1), with respect to items on the Commerce Control List (supp. No. 1 to 15 C.F.R. part 774) only, and subsection (a)(2)(A) of the Syria Accountability Act only.  The Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees the report required under section 5(b) of that Act.

Sec. 7.  CBW Act.  (a)  Pursuant to section 307(d)(1)(B) of the CBW Act, I hereby determine and certify that there has been a fundamental change in the leadership and policies of the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic.  Accordingly, I hereby waive the following sanctions imposed on Syria for the prior use of chemical weapons under the former regime of Bashar al-Assad:

        (i) the restriction on foreign assistance under section 307(a)(1) of the CBW Act;

        (ii)   the restriction on United States Government credit, credit guarantees, or other financial assistance under section 307(a)(4) of the CBW Act;

        (iii)  the restrictions on the export of national security-sensitive goods and technology under section 307(a)(5) of the CBW Act and on all other goods and technology under section 307(b)(2)(C) of the CBW Act; and

        (iv)   the restriction on United States banks from making any loan or providing any credit to the Government of Syria under section 307(b)(2)(B) of the CBW Act.

     (b)  The Secretary of State shall transmit this waiver determination and report as required by sections 307(d)(1)(B) and (d)(2) of the CBW Act to the appropriate congressional committees.  This waiver shall be effective 20 days after it has been so transmitted.

Sec. 8.  Counterterrorism Designations.  (a)  The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General, shall take all appropriate action with respect to the designation of al-Nusrah Front, also known as Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham and other aliases, as a Foreign Terrorist Organization under 8 U.S.C. 1189 and as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist under 50 U.S.C. 1702 and Executive Order 13224, as well as the designation of Abu Muhammad al Jawlani, commonly known as Ahmed al-Sharaa, as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist.

     (b)  The Secretary of State shall take all appropriate action to review the designation of Syria as a State Sponsor of Terrorism consistent with section 1754(c) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (Public Law 115-232; 50 U.S.C. 4813(c)), section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act (Public Law 90-629, as amended; 22 U.S.C. 2780), and section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (Public Law 87-195, as amended; 22 U.S.C. 2371).

Sec. 9.  United Nations.  The Secretary of State shall take appropriate steps to advance United States policy objectives at the United Nations to support a Syria that is stable and at peace and to support Syrian efforts to counter terrorism and comply with its responsibilities and obligations concerning weapons of mass destruction, including chemical and biological weapons.  The Secretary of State is further directed to explore avenues at the United Nations to provide sanctions relief in support of these objectives.

Sec. 10.  Implementation.  The Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary of Commerce, as appropriate, are hereby authorized to take such actions, including adopting rules and regulations, as may be necessary to implement this order.  The Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary of Commerce may, consistent with applicable law, redelegate any of these functions within their respective agencies.  The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Secretary of Transportation, as appropriate, is authorized to exercise the functions and authorities conferred upon the President in section 5 of the Syria Accountability Act and to redelegate these functions and authorities consistent with applicable law.  All agencies of the United States shall take all appropriate measures within their authority to implement this order, consistent with applicable law.

Sec. 11.  General Provisions.  (a)  Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:

        (i)   the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or

        (ii)  the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.

     (b)  This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.

     (c)  This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

     (d)  The costs for publication of this order shall be borne by the Department of State.

                        DONALD J. TRUMP

THE WHITE HOUSE,

June 30, 2025.

U.S: Secretary Rubio’s Call with Bangladesh Chief Advisor Yunus Readout June 30, 2025

 

Secretary Rubio’s Call with Bangladesh Chief Advisor Yunus

Readout

June 30, 2025

The below is attributable to Spokesperson Tammy Bruce:

Secretary of State Marco Rubio spoke today with the Chief Advisor of Bangladesh’s Interim Government, Dr. Muhammad Yunus. The Secretary and Chief Advisor affirmed their shared commitment to deepening economic ties between the United States and Bangladesh and to enhancing security and stability throughout the Indo-Pacific region

WHY PUTIN WON’T COME TO IRAN’S RESCUE AGAINST ISRAEL by Anna Borshchevskaya National Security Journal June 28, 2025

 WHY PUTIN WON’T COME TO IRAN’S RESCUE AGAINST ISRAEL

by Anna Borshchevskaya

National Security Journal

June 28, 2025

Although Tehran’s current vulnerability presents important 

opportunities to counter Russia’s strategic ambitions, Moscow 

has long retained its influence in the region by purposefully 

avoiding overcommitment to any one partner.

READ THIS ARTICLE ON OUR WEBSITE

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Thus far, Moscow has done little to help Iran beyond 

rhetorical condemnations of Israel and the US and offers to 

mediate. Russian President Vladimir

Putin empowered Iran and its proxies across the Middle East 

for years.

Still, he chose not to come to Iran’s rescue during the Israeli 

military campaign and targeted US strikes against Iranian 

nuclear facilities. His response is consistent with how the 

Kremlin views partnerships: prioritizing its own needs and 

avoiding over-commitment to anyone. Moscow will likely 

stick to this approach as events continue to unfold in the

Middle East.

Vladimir Putin comes from a KGB circle that learned from the 

strategic failure of the Soviet Union. One key lesson from this 

failure was over-investment in any relationship. Russia’s 

agreement with Iran is not a mutual defense 

treaty,a point Putin himself made on June 18. Many 

commentators were quick to point out earlier that Russia and 

Iran have a signed strategic partnership, but unlike the NATO 

treaty, the agreement has no mutual defense clause. 

Observers 

who have tracked the course of Russia’s relationship with Iran 

for decades understand this agreement as one of many 

arrangements that allow Russia to utilize Iran to further its 

interests while avoiding liability and involvement in Iran’s 

more provocative regional actions.

When Moscow intervened militarily in the Syrian civil war in 

late 2015—Russia’s first expeditionary push outside the 

former Soviet Union since the end of the Cold War—it had 

done so only after the Syrian regime formally asked for 

assistance and Tehran convinced Putin that Assad was in 

danger of falling. There were no indications that the United 

States would intervene in Syria to block Moscow’s efforts.

At the time, US President Barack Obama said Russia would 

find itself in a quagmire—meaning Russia would have to 

overinvest its resources and would find itself overextended. 

However, Russia’s Syria intervention was designed precisely 

to avoid overextension while mitigating domestic political 

risk and blowback, a point I explain in detail in my book.

Moscow stuck to this principle of avoiding overextension to 

the very end of Assad’s fall last December. Rather than 

continue to invest in the Assad regime, no longer paying the 

same dividends for the Kremlin as it used to, Moscow 

decided to cut its losses and let him fall. To be sure, Assad’s 

fall was a loss for Russia, but Moscow is prioritizing its war

on Ukraine. Assad’s loss is one the Kremlin could afford,

given the extensive diplomatic, economic, military, and 

informational influence it had built in the region thanks to its 

position in Syria; nor did Russia leave Syria entirely.

There are a number of obvious benefits for Russia in the 

ongoing crisis that I, along with many, have already pointed 

out: distraction from Ukraine (indeed, Moscow’s campaign 

there has only intensified since June 13), potential rise in oil 

prices that help fuel Moscow’s war effort there, and the 

strategic aim to maintain good ties with all actors in the 

Middle East, including the Gulf states and Israel.

Putin would not be upset if the Iranian nuclear program were 

set back because it would only strengthen Russia’s position 

vis-a-vis Iran. Russia has supported Iran’s nuclear 

program since the mid-1990s by providing technical 

assistance and building nuclear power plants. Russia’s 

nuclear agency Rosatom built Iran’s Bushehr nuclear reactor.

Unlike the fall of Syria’s Assad, regime collapse in Tehran 

would seriously damage Russia’s strategic position in the 

Middle East—and broader geostrategic designs. But that has 

not happened. Tehran is weakened but has few supporters to 

turn to, so Moscow and Tehran are not headed for a split. 

Russia would have alienated Arab states and Israel if it had 

done more to support Iran. Russia no longer needs Iran for 

drone technology to support its war in Ukraine, and the 

military-industrial base of Russia and Iran will continue to 

cooperate. At the same time, the rest of the region will still 

want to purchase Russian weapons.

Western analysts may describe Russia’s behavior as short-

term tactical opportunism, but avoiding overcommitment to 

partners is what allows Russia to retain its position in the long 

term. Fundamentally, Moscow’s goals haven’t changed, nor 

have they been deterred. Moscow still wants to remake the 

world order with itself at the center. It requires China and 

Iran to accomplish these goals, and they have not yet lost 

either. It may continue playing a double game by trying to 

have it both ways: supporting Iran but not enough to sacrifice 

relationships with other key states.

Still, a weakened regime in Tehran is a significant setback for 

Russia, and the West needs to capitalize on this moment. It 

could highlight Russia’s failure to help Iran as part of a 

broader informational narrative that Russia’s alternative to a 

liberal world order is a losing one, one where few would be 

safe.

It could highlight past examples of Russia’s failure to support 

its allies. For instance, over the last several years, Armenia has 

distanced itself from Russia, as Yerevan repeatedly felt let 

down by Moscow’s inability to fulfill its military 

commitments to Armenia, which are stronger than those 

between Russia and Iran, to begin with.

In a world where Moscow invades Ukraine, turns it into the 

largest war since World War II, and periodically blackmails 

the West to scare it into doing less to support Ukraine by 

showing everyone Russia’s nuclear scowl, another illiberal 

regime backed by a nuclear deterrent would be more 

dangerous for everyone. If Iran were to possess a nuclear 

weapon, it would increase the likelihood of that regime 

staying in power and, together with Russia and China, 

forming a trans-Asian arc of countries that can mutually 

support each other in their campaigns against the liberal 

world order.

For all its efforts to avoid overextension, the Kremlin could 

not prevent itself from overextending in Ukraine—here, 

Moscow’s imperial impetus overrode restraint. Ukraine is the 

one place where Russia is bogged down. Moscow is engaged 

in a long game against the liberal free world. It is prepared to 

pay a high price for winning. The liberal free world should be 

committed to the same.

Anna Borshchevskaya is the Harold Grinspoon Senior Fellow in The Washington Institute’s Diane and Guilford Glazer Foundation Program on Great Power Competition and the Middle East. This article was originally published on the National Security Journal website.

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THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY

Introducing FP’s new Summer 2025 magazine - Ravi Agrawal, editor in chief - June 30, 2025

 

Introducing FP’s new Summer 2025 magazine. For a limited time, get 50% off your choice of subscription. There is little doubt that if U.S. President Donald Trump’s second term feels like an upheaval, it is by design. As far back as 2018, Steve Bannon, Trump’s onetime top strategist, talked about how the White House would “flood the zone with shit” to overwhelm the media. Trump’s new team has honed the old flood plan into the art of the tsunami. There are more executive orders than ever before, jaw-dropping reality TV moments in the Oval Office, norms busted until one can’t remember they existed, and the upside-down world of allies treated like enemies and dictators like buddies. The mind boggles. How should one make sense of Trump 2.0? Pundits often deploy one of two arguments to think about him. The first is to call Trump unprecedented, as if he is somehow sui generis. Though every leader is unique at some level, I struggle with the idea that Trump alone is without comparison. It is also worth noting that he is as much a creation of our reactionary times as he is the person most shaping it. If ours is the era of backlash—against globalization, against trade and open borders, against racial and gender equality—then Trump is merely the man who told us what’s going wrong, not the person with a better plan. The second school of thought on Trump tends to draw on a historical analogy of some sort. Trump is Julius Caesar, a man who became Rome’s dictator for life two millennia ago, until his assassination. Or Trump is Mao Zedong, who orchestrated China’s wide-scale Cultural Revolution. Closer to our present day, Trump could be a populist strongman like Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan or India’s Narendra Modi. Or he could be the man to usher in a kleptocracy, like Hungary’s Viktor Orban. Trump also echoes across U.S. history: He has praised William McKinley’s late 19th-century tariffs and tried to emulate them, while his foreign policy has often been compared—unsatisfactorily, I think—to Ronald Reagan’s. All of this is terrific fodder for debate, as you’ll see in this issue’s cover package, “The Historical Presidency.” We’ve enlisted nine historians and thinkers to play the game of comparing and contrasting Trump with figures in history, with some surprising results. Ramachandra Guha, a historian and biographer of Mohandas Gandhi, found that the best historical parallel to Trump was a man from our present: former British Prime Minister Boris Johnson. “Through their artful and disingenuous way with words,” Guha writes, “these elitist cosmopolitans were able to effectively seduce people of a very different class.” Kenneth Rogoff, a Harvard University professor and former chief economist at the International Monetary Fund, compares Trump to Richard Nixon, who blew up the global monetary system in the 1970s and thrust Americans into a decade of inflation. Could the uncertainty of Trump’s tariffs create a similar dynamic? And of course, we examine the obligatory references to Caesar, who broke the law limiting his power when he led a legion across the Rubicon. This analogy, historian Donna Zuckerberg writes, “tells you more about the person making the comparison than it does about either of the leaders involved.” When invoked by the left, she argues, it signals unease with Trump’s erosion of norms. But the right can see it as a willingness to destroy a system that isn’t working. I hope you’ll enjoy the collection, which takes in comparisons from around the world and which we hope to continue as a series. Lastly, a special mention of a provocation by historian Christopher Clark, who argues that “modernity is disintegrating before our eyes.” Has civilization peaked? If he’s right, it’s a dispiriting thought. For once, I very much hope you’ll disagree with an essay we’ve published. To gain full access to the magazine and the rest of our geopolitical analysis, consider subscribing today. We sincerely appreciate your readership and support. As ever, Ravi Agrawal, editor in chief Special offer! 50% off your choice of subscription. Unlock the issue and so much more. Highlights from the magazine An American Caesar Comparing two leaders, two millennia apart. By Donna Zuckerberg Ranking the Strongmen In an era defined by vanity, the U.S. president outdoes all his populist peers. By Ramachandra Guha The End of Modernity A crisis is unfolding before our eyes—and also in our heads. By Christopher Clark The Human Rights Presidency Jimmy Carter made foreign policy feel moral again, but that era might be over. By Samuel Moyn Is This an American Cultural Revolution? Liberal critics charge Trump with creating a cult of personality not unlike Mao Zedong’s. By Julia Lovell, Nicholas Guyatt TAKE ME TO THE ISSUE Global Insights, 50% Off. A FP subscription is your global guide to today’s geopolitical landscape. Experts connect the dots on issues from war and diplomacy to tech and climate. Unlock 50% off today. SAVE NOW