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The Robert Schuman Fondation - Europe and Putin: Should realism prevail over reality? - 11 March 2025

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 > Schuman Papers and Interviews > Schuman Papers n°783 : Europe and Putin: Should realism prevail over reality?

Europe and Putin: Should realism prevail over reality?

Ukraine Russia

Alain Fabre


11 March 2025

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Fabre Alain

Economist and historian


Europe and Putin: Should realism prevail over reality?

PDF | 166 koIn English



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In France in June 1940, the crushing defeat of its army at the hands of the Wehrmacht led to two different interpretations of the situation. One, that of Marshal Pétain and his supporters, based on the overwhelming military superiority of Hitler's forces, argued for an armistice. The other, embodied by General de Gaulle, advocated continuing the fight alongside the United Kingdom, based on their significant assets, mainly the empires of the two Allies. Above all, de Gaulle had grasped the global dimension of the conflict, which would inevitably lead to the entry of the United States into the war, whose ‘immense industry’ would provide the Allies with the means for victory. A gamble that, in the semi-belligerent state of the United States at the time, was not at all improbable. In short, in June 1940, the choice of realism and reality meant nothing less than the tragic alternative of submission to the victor or total war alongside the Allies.


From the Munich Conference in September 1938, the trap of June 1940 was in place, paving the way for a reversal of alliances and culminating, in August 1939, in the German-Soviet Pact: Churchill's formula of the choice ‘between dishonour and war’ expressed it clearly. The dishonour only increased the likelihood and scale of the war. 


What was true yesterday remains true today: the ‘Munich 1938’ moment has returned to Europe. From the outset, Putin has largely followed the Führer's strategy and warlike methods, which started with the reoccupation of the Rhineland in 1936: the annexation of the Sudetenland, ratified by the Munich Conference, was both the culmination and the unveiling of the logic at work from the beginning. In post-Soviet Russia, there have been the two Chechen wars, the war in Georgia in 2008 and the Ukrainian conflict that has been going on for more than ten years, with the ‘Revolution of Dignity’ in Maidan Square, followed by the annexation of Crimea and the conquest of a third of the Donbass, and finally the entry into the war against Ukraine in 2022.


While Putin is not Hitler, he shares with that dictator a revisionist project to abolish the international order in place when he came to power. In both cases, war is not the means of resolving a singular conflict, a territorial dispute having exhausted diplomatic channels. It does not end with its resolution: on the contrary, it systematically results in the acceptance of a reality, the conservation of conquered territories, in exchange for a promise to limit oneself to the gains obtained. But once satisfied, the previous claim gives rise to the next one, as General de Gaulle clearly demonstrated in 1961, after the erection of the Berlin Wall, rendering any form of appeasement futile from the outset:  “[…] At a certain point of threat from ambitious imperialism, any retreat has the effect of overexciting the aggressor, pushing him to double his pressure and, finally, facilitating and hastening his assault. All in all, […], the Western powers have no better way to serve world peace than to stand tall and firm.”


Thus, in a revisionist strategy, war takes on a permanent character. It is coupled with an internal dimension that makes it an ordinary mode of government: it is the justification for the repressive and predatory nature of power over society. Permanent war outside, perpetual autocracy inside. 


Russia, in its successive versions, formerly Tsarist then Soviet, now Putinist, defines itself not as a nation, but as an empire. A nation has borders, an empire does not: it can only be imagined in terms of its indefinite nature and its permanent extension. The nation is based on a principle of unity that organises the limits of its territory but also of the political regime that governs it. Conversely, the empire, which rejects any territorial limits, thus finds the basis for the potential infinity of its power. Much more than nationalism, it was imperialism that triggered the total wars of the 20th century, even if the latter invoked the former to justify their endeavours. 


This is one of the fundamental problems that Europe has faced since the rise of Vladimir Putin. 


In 1945, defeat led Germany to renounce the idea of empire and choose to become a nation. The decisive effects of this option were visible in 1989-1990 when reunified Germany confirmed its acceptance of the Oder-Neisse line and renounced the territories lost beyond it when the Third Reich fell. This was a choice that post-Soviet Russia rejected, and its implications are now being tragically felt. Russia's renunciation of empire in favour of nationhood is probably one of the essential conditions for the resolution of its identity crisis caused by the implosion of the USSR and for lasting peace on the European continent. But without the duty of remembrance that the Germans have fulfilled since Nuremberg in 1946, would the Russians be capable of it, even after Putin? 


In post-Cold War Europe, a quarter of a century of Putinism clearly shows that the question is not one of rectifying borders that were clumsily drawn in the aftermath of the fall of the USSR, but rather the reconstitution of a lost empire on the outside and the sanctification of autocracy on the inside. In the eyes of the Putin regime, the offence committed by Georgia and Ukraine is that they want to be democratic nations and no longer the stepping stones of an autocratic empire. 


So, after three years of war that have led to a stalemate on the front line, and with the withdrawal of military and financial support from the United States to Ukraine taking shape, what can the Europeans do?  The challenge, which has now become impossible to evade, is proving to be of historic importance, unprecedented since the creation of NATO in 1949, with the American schism: It is first and foremost reflected in a break with the traditional policy followed until now, not only under President Biden, but also, to some extent, by the Trump I Administration, whose support for the Ukrainians was demonstrated in 2019 by the supply of military equipment - notably Javelin anti-tank missiles - to President Zelensky. 


Above all, the United States is reversing its alliance with Russia, which, according to observers, is motivated by the desire to detach it from its ‘unlimited friendship’ with China. President Macron's visit to Washington on 24 February, despite its warmth of tone, did not change the new course of American politics: at the very moment it took place, the United States joined Russia at the United Nations to vote against Ukraine and the Europeans, and announced on the same day that it would probably increase tariffs on European imports by 25%. The same happened during the visit of British Prime Minister Keir Starmer on 27 February. But above all, the media lynching of Volodymyr Zelensky on 28 February by Donald Trump and J.D. Vance in the White House, in a scene worthy of Francis Ford Coppola's The Godfather, was intended to express, in the clearest possible terms, the irreversible nature of the new course of US European and international policy. 


The violence of the shock wave caused an indisputable and salutary jolt to the Europeans. At their meeting in London on 2 March, and again in Brussels on 6 March, the Europeans demonstrated their awareness of the new situation and their determination to act together. The emergence of an autonomous European military effort seems to be taking shape around a central core of states formed by the United Kingdom, France, Poland and now Germany, if we are to judge by the statements of the future Chancellor, Friedrich Merz, who said that ‘Europe must achieve independence from the United States’, expressing his wish to include a fund of €200 billion in the future coalition agreement to significantly increase the resources of the Bundeswehr. 


The new strategic imperative to which Europeans are adhering or resigning themselves must now be translated into action, both in the Ukrainian conflict and in the longer term, with regard to Russia: ultimately, the stability of Europe will only be durably assured by driving the Russians back to Russia. Their imperial designs will not cease with the respite of a ceasefire. We must anticipate the risk of seeing them spread, within two to three years, or even sooner, before Europeans have reached the critical threshold of their rearmament, at least to the Baltic States due to the size of the Russian minorities, or even to Poland which, together with Ukraine, is one of the keys to controlling Europe.


Europeans must be aware that, as things currently stand, a cessation of hostilities over the next few months would at best only be a reprieve. From then on, the line to follow imposes itself: should they resign themselves, without being naive, to the realism of the cessation or suspension of fighting, practically sealing a capitulation to the Tsar of the Kremlin, or reject in advance the destiny of a servile Europe by choosing Roman virtue? A course of action that, all in all, results from the reality of the data and the objective trends at work, and that would allow them to stop suffering the waking dreams of Putin's imperialism, as the Polish Prime Minister, Donald Tusk, so clearly pointed out. 


With a power ratio of ten to one, potentially unlimited military and financial resources, indifference to the lives sacrificed, the conversion to a war economy on one side, significant but limited resources provided by the West, anxious to avoid direct military engagement on the other, and finally, a Ukrainian people fighting for survival, exhausted by the conflict, and, especially, the parsimony of the resources granted to it, the Russian army has not succeeded, in thirty-six months, in achieving what the Wehrmacht had obtained in a month and a half of Blitzkrieg in 1940 in France: the country's capitulation and the fall of its political regime. 


Since 2022 and, in fact, since 2014, the Russian army has only managed to consolidate the conquest of 18-20% of the Ukrainian territory that its militias already partly occupied before the ‘special military operation’. In 2023, it was unable to counter the onslaught of the Wagner militias and remains powerless to take back the territories conquered from the Ukrainian army in August 2024 in the Kursk region. The nibbling away of a few square kilometres on the front line does not herald the adversary's imminent collapse. On the contrary, in recent days the Ukrainian army has demonstrated the strength of its resistance. Military experts make no secret of the Russian army's inability to defeat the Ukrainian army, due to the exhaustion of equipment and lack of ammunition. Everything suggests that the Russian economy, which is commonly remembered as no larger than Spain, is incapable of bearing indefinitely the burden imposed on it by the war in Ukraine. 


Since the First World War, warfare has no longer been limited to the clash of armies on the battlefield; it has also involved economies and societies. And in this respect, Europe is far superior to Russia. With 2% of their GDP and without going to war, the Europeans, including the United Kingdom, already spend more than €400 billion on defence. In Russia, military spending is expected to total €130 billion in 2025, or 6 to 7% of GDP, up 23% last year; it is therefore almost three times lower than that of the Europeans. In addition to this quantitative data, the war has continued to weaken the Russian economy, which has been profoundly disrupted by European sanctions and reduced to selling its oil and gas at bargain prices, while its dependence - not to say its subservience - on China, as well as on North Korea and Iran - has continued to grow. In other words, while time has allowed the Russian army to correct the errors and shortcomings of the first months of its involvement, the prolongation of the conflict is mainly to Russia's detriment, contributing to its increasing weakness and, in the long term, its exhaustion. 


This is why a ceasefire, even one guaranteed by the Europeans alone, would mainly benefit Russia, which, more than Ukraine and its supporters, needs time to consolidate its control of the conquered territories and regain its strength. This was already the Russian line of negotiation during the Minsk I and II agreements (2014-2015), which Putin never intended to honour. It would be the same again if the new tsar were to obtain a ‘Minsk III’ from the West, in the hope that President Zelensky would be overthrown in favour of a pro-Russian ‘Gauleiter’. Some have imagined that he could, now that the American disengagement is a done deal, lend himself to the charade of a European guarantee, but this would most likely exclude the presence of NATO military forces in Ukraine. But could we really believe that Putin would accept - something that Gorbachev refused - that soldiers from NATO member countries would be stationed on the same territory as the Russian army? This is what the head of Russian diplomacy, Sergei Lavrov, made very clear to the Europeans gathered in Brussels.


Putin intends to win what he could not win by the unlimited sacrifice demanded of the legions, through the capitulation of the West. The Russian line has been constant since 1994 and the Budapest Memorandum which, in exchange for Ukraine renouncing the nuclear weapons stored on its soil, already provided for the guarantee of its territorial integrity by Russia, the United States, the Europeans and China. 


A new ceasefire in Ukraine would thus produce the same effects as the previous ones. This is why it should not lead to the temptation to interrupt the European military effort: first of all, in its industrial component with the continuation of its rise in power which constitutes, effectively, the real first lever of the construction of a truly European defence, that is to say a credible and operational alternative to equipment acquired off the shelf from American manufacturers. Then, with the continued growth of military spending in national budgets. These should aim for 3 to 3.5% of GDP within two to three years, as the French President expects, because of the imperative at stake. This is the line that seems to be prevailing with the extraordinary European Council on defence in Brussels on 6 March. In advance of the meeting, Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, announced a multiannual plan of 800 billion € in the form of military expenditure included in the authorised threshold of 3% of GDP deficits, i.e. an annual effort by the Member States of 1.5% of GDP, and European loans for the balance. The “Zeitenwende”, announced but not implemented by Chancellor Scholz, seems to be there and is now taking on a European dimension.


But the defence of Europe is, of course, about more than just an accumulation of resources. The never-ending wars of Putin's revisionism not only bring into play the overwhelming difference in resources available to Westerners, even limited to Europe, but also that of strategy and will. Successive conflicts of a sufficient level to secure the territorial gains of the Russian army were contained until 2022 below the threshold that would have triggered a direct military confrontation with the West, which could therefore content itself with a policy of ‘appeasement’. And, while the ‘special military operation’ caused, to Putin's surprise, a new level of confrontation with NATO, the latter did not go beyond semi-belligerence, a policy to which the Biden Administration firmly adhered, despite the urgent appeals of President Zelensky and which the Trump II Administration decided to abandon.


Even deprived of American military support, the Europeans cannot give up on the ultimate goal of wresting Ukraine from conquering Putinism. Brzezinski said it: without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be an empire. In this respect, morality goes hand in hand with strategy: Ukraine quite simply controls the future, security and freedom of Europe. At what price would it recover from its submission, albeit temporary, to the Tsar of Russia? A territorial regime to which it could consent, in return for the territorial sacrifice, could be inspired by that of the status of the FRG after 1945: liberal democracy, sovereignty and freedom for Western Ukraine, enshrined by accession to the European Union and NATO. But would Putin - and his new ally Trump? - accept that Kyiv should now become what Berlin once was, namely the outpost of European freedom and armies? There is good reason to doubt it. 


Faced with Putin's succession of wars, Europeans once again face the dilemma of servitude or all-out war. As Raymond Aron reminded us in 1951[1], To avert the risk of total war, it is necessary to assume the risk of limited wars. In this case, it is less a question of material resources than of ‘courage and faith’. The key to Europe's destiny lies in the steadfastness of spirit and credibility of its leaders, as well as in the deterrence of the adversary, even if this does not absolve them from the duty of facing up to adversity. There is still time for Europeans to convince Putin that he is not facing Chamberlain and Daladier, but Churchill and de Gaulle.



[1] Raymond Aron, Les guerres en chaîne, Paris, Gallimard, 1951


Publishing Director : Pascale Joannin






Fondation Robert Schuman Schuman Papers and Interviews > Schuman Papers n°784 : When sleepwalkers awake: German plea for a new European security architecture - a German point of view Strategy, Security and Defence Stéphane Beemelmans 18 March 2025 null Available versions : FR EN Beemelmans Stéphane Stéphane Beemelmans Seasoned legal and political professional with extensive experience in German government ministries, including the Federal Chancellery and the Ministry of Defense. His text was originally published in German. When sleepwalkers awake: German plea for a new European security architecture - ... PDF | 159 koIn English Download For three years, a war has been raging on Europe's borders between two geographically connected states – a conflict that originated in Russia's occupation of Crimea and Donbass almost 11 years ago. Since then, every political and military decision-maker in our part of Europe should have realized that there is a (great) power on our continent that is ready at any time to put ‘war as a continuation of politics by other means’ (Clausewitz) into practice. The deterrent mechanism between the former blocs, which had been effective for almost 50 years and thus prevented war, has evidently given way to a ‘laissez-faire’ on the part of the European states, which has allowed Russia to attack and partially occupy Ukraine with complete impunity, using a crude mix of historical and political justifications that violate international law. What should not have happened could not be seen and therefore could not be addressed appropriately. Our and NATO's ‘laissez-faire’ was based on the for malistic argument that no NATO member country had been attacked and on the lack of strategic foresight disguised as ‘hope’, the expression of which under international law was the ‘Minsk Peace Agreement’ of 2015. The hope, namely, that this attack could be localized and thus geographically restricted or ‘frozen’. The comparison with the Munich Agreement has been made often enough, but the consequences have never been drawn. Today, just as then, the aggressor makes no effort to limit its belligerence in line with the expectations of the ‘West’. Today, just as then, the ‘West’ is doing far too little to build a plausible counterweight that is also effective. Since the new Trump administration took office and more recently when U.S. Vice President J. D. Vance travelled to Europe this February, we have to fear that the comparison between today and the period immediately following the Munich Agreement of 1938 is true in another respect: at that time, the USA played no role on the European continent; today, it is openly announcing to Europe and NATO that it intends to leave them to deal with continental conflicts on their own. Europe must therefore ensure that it is once again able to guarantee its own defence with its own resources, without American protection, and it must do so convincingly that any potential aggressor would have to fear the predictable consequences of an attack. It is high time for an EU and NATO alliance that has relied on the unwavering commitment of U.S. support and has spent more energy justifying its own inaction than making effective contributions to common security. France, Sweden, Finland, Poland and the Baltic states have recognised this and are working at all levels to ramp up their own capabilities. However, it is to be feared – especially if there are no dramatic changes in the largest economy on our continent – that these efforts will remain piecemeal. What Needs to Be Done Europe’s Prospects in the U.S. Disengagement Scenario In the worst-case scenario of a progressive threat to our continent, or at least parts of it, and a US disengagement, Europe would be left defenceless without a very large, homogenous, and in practically all areas state-of-the-art, experienced and operational army. Without the U.S. Army, but with the armed forces of the United Kingdom, there are 28 armies ready for action. Although they all have common processes, they are distinct in terms of their organisation and equipment, and they are in no position to replace the range and depth of capabilities of the U.S. Army. Without the USA, Europe lacks too much of too many things in the military field, which is not surprising considering that the USA spends more than twice as much on the military as the EU and UK together. This applies to all capabilities for strategic reconnaissance, communication and strategic air transport, which are available only to a very limited extent within the EU. Europe must therefore quickly embark on a common path in two respects: in the U.S. disengagement scenario, the threat of a nuclear strike by an aggressor equipped with nuclear weapons can hardly be countered by conventional means. So, there will be no way to avoid an open and unprejudiced dialogue with France and the UK (with the inclusion of Poland) regarding Europe's nuclear shield. In the conventional sphere, Europe must: • systematically analyze the organization(s), existing capabilities and gaps, • focus on the urgently needed expansion of these capabilities, • define the requirements for this, • assign these in packages to individual states and • provide the equipment with a unified procurement. If individual member states choose to opt out of this process, so be it. No consideration should be given to them — time has become too precious. This does not necessarily have to lead to a European army, although it is not clear what arguments could be put forward against it in the event of defence or an alliance. On the contrary. However, anyone who does not want to talk about a European army must admit that with the current state of a ‘Europe of armies’, we are ultimately only displaying a qualified, but nationally contained, inability. No country in Europe – except for the nuclear powers France and the UK – can claim that its armed forces alone can defend its territory against a strong opponent that is determined to succeed. What is the point of clinging to the sovereignty of the individual armed forces when they are unable to adequately protect that sovereignty? Is sovereignty there to protect the armed forces or isn't it rather the other way around? If this is the case, the defence of Europe must finally be thought of holistically – the mutual assistance obligations under the NATO Treaty and the Treaty on European Union provide the legal framework for this – and not only implemented. The aim must be to combine forces instead of diffusing them or, to put it in a nutshell, to be effective together instead of being ineffective alone. The rejection of a ‘European army’ as a parallel organisation to NATO under unified (American) leadership is understandable, but without a US army (and, arguably, a Turkish army), unified leadership is essential to ensure European security. When Napoleon set up the Grande Armée in 1812, he demanded specific capabilities from the individual allied princes and then combined them into operational units. The first steps are already being taken in Europe (Franco-German Brigade, German-Polish Corps, Air Transport Command, etc.), but the units are not always subordinate to just one purpose, but remain rooted in a dual or even multiple assignment. We no longer just have to establish interoperability but rather invest heavily in complementarity. The individual contributions of the European countries must not only be able to operate with each other, but also close gaps, both in terms of breadth (capability portfolio) and depth (quantity and sustainability) through highly specialised resources. Anyone analysing the course of operations in the war in Ukraine will see that we are not prepared for the kind of back-and-forth between positional warfare of the type seen in the First World War, attempted breakthroughs and high-intensity cyber and drone warfare. Wherever it is not possible to replace personnel or to regularly relieve them – a situation from which the Ukrainian army is currently suffering particularly – investment must be made in the physical and mental stamina of active soldiers and in building up reserves through intensive and even more regular exercises, considering the lessons learned from the war in Ukraine. Furthermore, any mission becomes an irresponsible undertaking if the right offensive and defensive capabilities are not available for a cyber and drone war, which poses an immense threat to deployed soldiers in the field. And if, despite the arms industry's best efforts, the supply of ammunition is just about sufficient to meet Ukraine's needs, but not to provide a relevant stockpile for European armed forces, and in particular the Bundeswehr, then the bells should not only be ringing with alarm, but should also signaling the need for appropriate action. At the December 2010 Council meeting, the EU adopted the concept of ‘pooling and sharing’, which was intended to promote the joint procurement and multinational operation of major equipment (tanker, transport aircraft, ...). This was seen more as an appeal to Member States willing to cooperate and as a mandate to the European Defence Agency than as a common instrument binding and demanding all Member States. This led to pilot projects that took a long time to implement and whose problems discouraged others from emulating them. NATO, for its part, has tried something similar with ‘smart defence’, but has not made significant progress in ‘assigning’ previously regularly defined capability gaps. In a sense, the Trump administration is right: if the presence of a ‘big brother’ prevents the ‘little brothers and sisters’ from making an effort, the ‘big brother’ – if it does not want to remain in this protective role forever – has to withdraw to bring about or at least provoke a change in awareness regarding its own responsibility. In this respect, we are now being forced to ‘grow up’ and take our security into our own hands. In doing so, it must be clear that if we ‘accommodate’ the Trump administration in this respect, we must at the same time make it clear that we are also taking our destiny into our own hands in terms of foreign policy and that we will not allow ourselves to be meddled with. Germany and a “Coalition of the Willing” Europe is already in a “hybrid state of confrontation” with Russia—a situation that in many ways threatens our lives, our infrastructure, and even our environment through interference in elections, cable sabotage, “unfriendly” overflights, and more. It is therefore imperative for Germany to take a leading role in and for Europe – together with France and certainly also the UK, Poland, Italy and Spain, as well as the Nordic and Baltic states – for the not-too-distant day of a possible confrontation. On the one hand, this means entering a dialogue with the USA to cushion the effects of a disengagement scenario, if not to prevent it. This also means entering talks with France and the UK (with Poland included) about our own nuclear shield for our continent for deterrence purposes, without any sense of entitlement or moralising, but with the willingness to take on joint responsibility, be it financially or militarily (nuclear sharing!). This means, finally, taking the lead in a coordinated approach to equipment and procurement with our own contributions and setting a good example, and offering these openly to all partners as an alternative to transatlantic goods that are difficult to supply in an emergency. Anyone who announces or threatens export restrictions and tariffs for everything and anything cannot safely be regarded as the main supplier of essential defence equipment. In this respect, there is no way around strengthening and utilising European industrial defence capacities. There is hardly anything in the defence sector that is not already being or can be produced in Europe. The goal must be to introduce standardised weapon systems at European level as quickly as possible, with delivery and maintenance – without black boxes! – being carried out uniformly across the continent. In doing so, we must finally stop succumbing to the temptation to demand and expect from industry today what can be developed tomorrow at the earliest and produced the day after tomorrow. Ultimately, this only leads to each country supplying itself somehow or, even worse, trying to keep older models in the halls and depots with life-prolonging measures, and new defence equipment is basically only ‘announced’ for the next (or the following) decade. It is precisely this circumstance that results in the disparate equipment of the 28 armies in Europe, with dramatic consequences in an emergency. It is impossible, for example, to set up and maintain a logistics chain for four different types of tank fighting side by side in the field. The tanks will only be in action as long as they do not need spare parts, and this can be measured in days. A multinational armoured division will very quickly see its combat strength melt away, potentially even without enemy action. Europe and a “Coalition of the Willing” The EU should support this process in many ways: on the one hand, by initiating and coordinating the bundling of procurement orders after assessing demand. It does not matter how great the demand is at a particular point in time if it is certain that there will be further demand for the goods to be procured at a later point in time. What is possible in civil aviation – the mix of firm and optional orders – must be mandatory in the defence sector. This allows the defence industry to plan for the longer term and to obtain planning security for continental demand, which automatically leads to the expansion of production capacities called for by the European states. In doing so, the EU should use procurement and competition law in a way that is commensurate with the urgency and scale of the task, so as to enable European champions. These do not necessarily have to result in mergers of defence companies; project-related joint ventures are also sufficient. Most importantly, however, the EU – and above all Germany – should promote the idea of making no delay in considering production sites and their distribution. The urgency of the situation does not allow for a repeat of the A400 M project. Rather, it must be clear to every European state that the important thing now is to quickly acquire the necessary equipment and to not focus on creating industrial jobs. Where these already exist, they must be used and utilised to capacity. In return, appropriate maintenance capacities will be required at all deployment locations at a later date, which will lead to the creation of a sufficient number of decentralised industrial jobs. If the rule of thumb for flying equipment, namely that the purchase price of each item is to be paid once on acquisition and twice in use, also applies to other complex defence equipment, then it is only a matter of time before corresponding industrial jobs have been created in every country. The EU should establish a specific political governance (Permanent Council) of the members of the ‘coalition’ with real ‘power of attorney’ for its contribution. All members of the ‘coalition’ must commit to participating and clarify the domestic caveat in advance on their own responsibility, as is the legal practice in the UK with the preliminary referrals to the House of Commons. This ‘political governance’ should also – for economic reasons, too – take the joint decision on export decisions, and thus replace the restrictive German arms export regime – which makes it unattractive for defence cooperation. Finally, the joint ‘political governance’ should be the ‘coalition's’ organ of communication, to make it clear that the ‘coalition’ is presenting a united front and is using its combined strength to counter any threats. If we don't want to sleepwalk into the next world war, the time for procrastination must come to an end. Europe is threatened by a conventional confrontation as a result of a war with Ukraine that Russia may win by the end of this decade at the latest. This will initially affect Russia's neighbouring countries, which would in turn oblige us to provide assistance if they are NATO or EU members. It may well be taken into account that Russia is likely to come out of a victorious war in Ukraine ‘exhausted’ in many respects (financially, economically, with irreplaceable human losses). This should not and must not deter us from hearing the bell tolling now and taking all necessary action. In Germany, this has many domestic political consequences, in addition to taking on a leadership role in foreign, European and defence policy that has not been seen for years, strengthening the Franco-German relationship, which has been languishing for just as long, and expanding it in the Weimar Triangle with Poland: On the one hand, the necessary financial resources must be made available and, at the same time, the associated parliamentary reservations for the event of defence and for all the necessary preparatory and organisational measures for this purpose must be lifted. If these necessary funds cannot be reallocated in the current financial planning, they must be provided additionally. Politically, it makes no sense to play defence off against pensions. If our country cannot defend itself, pensions, like many other things, will no longer be secure. As the largest economy on the continent with the largest population, we cannot afford to invest less in nominal and relative terms in our defence than France and the UK. If the funds are available in sufficient measure, the procurement processes must be adapted in line with the urgency and magnitude of the task. This requires all those involved in these processes to adopt an attitude that focuses more on the goods now needed for the approaching emergency than on striving for better equipment in the utopia of lasting peace. Incidentally, the latter also applies to defence equipment from the United States, unless it can be delivered at short notice, because delivery commitments are regularly subject to protracted and unpredictable parliamentary proceedings. And finally, everything that is now available on the market but is still missing – such as ammunition, replacements for material handed over to Ukraine, or drone defence for our critical civilian and military infrastructure – must be procured immediately. If a drone, controlled by anyone at all, can shut down our aviation hubs for hours, then it is an unacceptable situation for our economy as well. The same applies if critical military and civilian infrastructure can be flown over with complete impunity. Today they are being scouted out and tomorrow they will be threatened. It is regrettable that it took the Trump administration to make such a clean break. The proposals outlined are far-reaching, but they are the consequence of a decade of geostrategic immobility. If we do not want to sleepwalk into the next world war, the time for procrastination must come to an end. From now on, Germany must lead by example. Only in this way will it live up to its role and responsibility for our country and for peace in Europe. Publishing Director : Pascale Joannin

 Fondation Robert Schuman

Schuman Papers and Interviews > Schuman Papers n°784 : 

When sleepwalkers awake: German plea for a new European security architecture - a German point of view

Strategy, Security and Defence

Stéphane Beemelmans

18 March 2025


Available versions :


FR

EN


Beemelmans Stéphane

Stéphane Beemelmans

Seasoned legal and political professional with extensive experience in German government ministries, including the Federal Chancellery and the Ministry of Defense. His text was originally published in German.


When sleepwalkers awake: German plea for a new European security architecture - ...

PDF | 159 koIn English



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For three years, a war has been raging on Europe's borders between two geographically connected states – a conflict that originated in Russia's occupation of Crimea and Donbass almost 11 years ago. Since then, every political and military decision-maker in our part of Europe should have realized that there is a (great) power on our continent that is ready at any time to put ‘war as a continuation of politics by other means’ (Clausewitz) into practice. The deterrent mechanism between the former blocs, which had been effective for almost 50 years and thus prevented war, has evidently given way to a ‘laissez-faire’ on the part of the European states, which has allowed Russia to attack and partially occupy Ukraine with complete impunity, using a crude mix of historical and political justifications that violate international law. What should not have happened could not be seen and therefore could not be addressed appropriately. Our and NATO's ‘laissez-faire’ was based on the for malistic argument that no NATO member country had been attacked and on the lack of strategic foresight disguised as ‘hope’, the expression of which under international law was the ‘Minsk Peace Agreement’ of 2015. The hope, namely, that this attack could be localized and thus geographically restricted or ‘frozen’.


The comparison with the Munich Agreement has been made often enough, but the consequences have never been drawn. Today, just as then, the aggressor makes no effort to limit its belligerence in line with the expectations of the ‘West’. Today, just as then, the ‘West’ is doing far too little to build a plausible counterweight that is also effective. Since the new Trump administration took office and more recently when U.S. Vice President J. D. Vance travelled to Europe this February, we have to fear that the comparison between today and the period immediately following the Munich Agreement of 1938 is true in another respect: at that time, the USA played no role on the European continent; today, it is openly announcing to Europe and NATO that it intends to leave them to deal with continental conflicts on their own.


Europe must therefore ensure that it is once again able to guarantee its own defence with its own resources, without American protection, and it must do so convincingly that any potential aggressor would have to fear the predictable consequences of an attack.


It is high time for an EU and NATO alliance that has relied on the unwavering commitment of U.S. support and has spent more energy justifying its own inaction than making effective contributions to common security. France, Sweden, Finland, Poland and the Baltic states have recognised this and are working at all levels to ramp up their own capabilities. However, it is to be feared – especially if there are no dramatic changes in the largest economy on our continent – that these efforts will remain piecemeal.


What Needs to Be Done

Europe’s Prospects in the U.S. Disengagement Scenario


In the worst-case scenario of a progressive threat to our continent, or at least parts of it, and a US disengagement, Europe would be left defenceless without a very large, homogenous, and in practically all areas state-of-the-art, experienced and operational army. Without the U.S. Army, but with the armed forces of the United Kingdom, there are 28 armies ready for action. Although they all have common processes, they are distinct in terms of their organisation and equipment, and they are in no position to replace the range and depth of capabilities of the U.S. Army. Without the USA, Europe lacks too much of too many things in the military field, which is not surprising considering that the USA spends more than twice as much on the military as the EU and UK together. This applies to all capabilities for strategic reconnaissance, communication and strategic air transport, which are available only to a very limited extent within the EU.


Europe must therefore quickly embark on a common path in two respects: in the U.S. disengagement scenario, the threat of a nuclear strike by an aggressor equipped with nuclear weapons can hardly be countered by conventional means. So, there will be no way to avoid an open and unprejudiced dialogue with France and the UK (with the inclusion of Poland) regarding Europe's nuclear shield.


In the conventional sphere, Europe must:

• systematically analyze the organization(s), existing capabilities and gaps,

• focus on the urgently needed expansion of these capabilities,

• define the requirements for this,

• assign these in packages to individual states and

• provide the equipment with a unified procurement.


If individual member states choose to opt out of this process, so be it. No consideration should be given to them — time has become too precious.


This does not necessarily have to lead to a European army, although it is not clear what arguments could be put forward against it in the event of defence or an alliance. On the contrary. However, anyone who does not want to talk about a European army must admit that with the current state of a ‘Europe of armies’, we are ultimately only displaying a qualified, but nationally contained, inability. No country in Europe – except for the nuclear powers France and the UK – can claim that its armed forces alone can defend its territory against a strong opponent that is determined to succeed. What is the point of clinging to the sovereignty of the individual armed forces when they are unable to adequately protect that sovereignty? Is sovereignty there to protect the armed forces or isn't it rather the other way around? If this is the case, the defence of Europe must finally be thought of holistically – the mutual assistance obligations under the NATO Treaty and the Treaty on European Union provide the legal framework for this – and not only implemented. The aim must be to combine forces instead of diffusing them or, to put it in a nutshell, to be effective together instead of being ineffective alone. The rejection of a ‘European army’ as a parallel organisation to NATO under unified (American) leadership is understandable, but without a US army (and, arguably, a Turkish army), unified leadership is essential to ensure European security.


When Napoleon set up the Grande Armée in 1812, he demanded specific capabilities from the individual allied princes and then combined them into operational units. The first steps are already being taken in Europe (Franco-German Brigade, German-Polish Corps, Air Transport Command, etc.), but the units are not always subordinate to just one purpose, but remain rooted in a dual or even multiple assignment. We no longer just have to establish interoperability but rather invest heavily in complementarity. The individual contributions of the European countries must not only be able to operate with each other, but also close gaps, both in terms of breadth (capability portfolio) and depth (quantity and sustainability) through highly specialised resources.


Anyone analysing the course of operations in the war in Ukraine will see that we are not prepared for the kind of back-and-forth between positional warfare of the type seen in the First World War, attempted breakthroughs and high-intensity cyber and drone warfare.


Wherever it is not possible to replace personnel or to regularly relieve them – a situation from which the Ukrainian army is currently suffering particularly – investment must be made in the physical and mental stamina of active soldiers and in building up reserves through intensive and even more regular exercises, considering the lessons learned from the war in Ukraine.


Furthermore, any mission becomes an irresponsible undertaking if the right offensive and defensive capabilities are not available for a cyber and drone war, which poses an immense threat to deployed soldiers in the field.


And if, despite the arms industry's best efforts, the supply of ammunition is just about sufficient to meet Ukraine's needs, but not to provide a relevant stockpile for European armed forces, and in particular the Bundeswehr, then the bells should not only be ringing with alarm, but should also signaling the need for appropriate action.

At the December 2010 Council meeting, the EU adopted the concept of ‘pooling and sharing’, which was intended to promote the joint procurement and multinational operation of major equipment (tanker, transport aircraft, ...). This was seen more as an appeal to Member States willing to cooperate and as a mandate to the European Defence Agency than as a common instrument binding and demanding all Member States. This led to pilot projects that took a long time to implement and whose problems discouraged others from emulating them.


NATO, for its part, has tried something similar with ‘smart defence’, but has not made significant progress in ‘assigning’ previously regularly defined capability gaps. In a sense, the Trump administration is right: if the presence of a ‘big brother’ prevents the ‘little brothers and sisters’ from making an effort, the ‘big brother’ – if it does not want to remain in this protective role forever – has to withdraw to bring about or at least provoke a change in awareness regarding its own responsibility. In this respect, we are now being forced to ‘grow up’ and take our security into our own hands. In doing so, it must be clear that if we ‘accommodate’ the Trump administration in this respect, we must at the same time make it clear that we are also taking our destiny into our own hands in terms of foreign policy and that we will not allow ourselves to be meddled with.


Germany and a “Coalition of the Willing”

Europe is already in a “hybrid state of confrontation” with Russia—a situation that in many ways threatens our lives, our infrastructure, and even our environment through interference in elections, cable sabotage, “unfriendly” overflights, and more.


It is therefore imperative for Germany to take a leading role in and for Europe – together with France and certainly also the UK, Poland, Italy and Spain, as well as the Nordic and Baltic states – for the not-too-distant day of a possible confrontation. On the one hand, this means entering a dialogue with the USA to cushion the effects of a disengagement scenario, if not to prevent it. This also means entering talks with France and the UK (with Poland included) about our own nuclear shield for our continent for deterrence purposes, without any sense of entitlement or moralising, but with the willingness to take on joint responsibility, be it financially or militarily (nuclear sharing!). This means, finally, taking the lead in a coordinated approach to equipment and procurement with our own contributions and setting a good example, and offering these openly to all partners as an alternative to transatlantic goods that are difficult to supply in an emergency.


Anyone who announces or threatens export restrictions and tariffs for everything and anything cannot safely be regarded as the main supplier of essential defence equipment. In this respect, there is no way around strengthening and utilising European industrial defence capacities. There is hardly anything in the defence sector that is not already being or can be produced in Europe. The goal must be to introduce standardised weapon systems at European level as quickly as possible, with delivery and maintenance – without black boxes! – being carried out uniformly across the continent. In doing so, we must finally stop succumbing to the temptation to demand and expect from industry today what can be developed tomorrow at the earliest and produced the day after tomorrow. Ultimately, this only leads to each country supplying itself somehow or, even worse, trying to keep older models in the halls and depots with life-prolonging measures, and new defence equipment is basically only ‘announced’ for the next (or the following) decade. It is precisely this circumstance that results in the disparate equipment of the 28 armies in Europe, with dramatic consequences in an emergency. It is impossible, for example, to set up and maintain a logistics chain for four different types of tank fighting side by side in the field. The tanks will only be in action as long as they do not need spare parts, and this can be measured in days. A multinational armoured division will very quickly see its combat strength melt away, potentially even without enemy action.


Europe and a “Coalition of the Willing”


The EU should support this process in many ways: on the one hand, by initiating and coordinating the bundling of procurement orders after assessing demand. It does not matter how great the demand is at a particular point in time if it is certain that there will be further demand for the goods to be procured at a later point in time. What is possible in civil aviation – the mix of firm and optional orders – must be mandatory in the defence sector. This allows the defence industry to plan for the longer term and to obtain planning security for continental demand, which automatically leads to the expansion of production capacities called for by the European states.


In doing so, the EU should use procurement and competition law in a way that is commensurate with the urgency and scale of the task, so as to enable European champions. These do not necessarily have to result in mergers of defence companies; project-related joint ventures are also sufficient. Most importantly, however, the EU – and above all Germany – should promote the idea of making no delay in considering production sites and their distribution. The urgency of the situation does not allow for a repeat of the A400 M project. Rather, it must be clear to every European state that the important thing now is to quickly acquire the necessary equipment and to not focus on creating industrial jobs. Where these already exist, they must be used and utilised to capacity. In return, appropriate maintenance capacities will be required at all deployment locations at a later date, which will lead to the creation of a sufficient number of decentralised industrial jobs. If the rule of thumb for flying equipment, namely that the purchase price of each item is to be paid once on acquisition and twice in use, also applies to other complex defence equipment, then it is only a matter of time before corresponding industrial jobs have been created in every country.


The EU should establish a specific political governance (Permanent Council) of the members of the ‘coalition’ with real ‘power of attorney’ for its contribution. All members of the ‘coalition’ must commit to participating and clarify the domestic caveat in advance on their own responsibility, as is the legal practice in the UK with the preliminary referrals to the House of Commons. This ‘political governance’ should also – for economic reasons, too – take the joint decision on export decisions, and thus replace the restrictive German arms export regime – which makes it unattractive for defence cooperation. Finally, the joint ‘political governance’ should be the ‘coalition's’ organ of communication, to make it clear that the ‘coalition’ is presenting a united front and is using its combined strength to counter any threats.


If we don't want to sleepwalk into the next world war, the time for procrastination must come to an end.


Europe is threatened by a conventional confrontation as a result of a war with Ukraine that Russia may win by the end of this decade at the latest. This will initially affect Russia's neighbouring countries, which would in turn oblige us to provide assistance if they are NATO or EU members. It may well be taken into account that Russia is likely to come out of a victorious war in Ukraine ‘exhausted’ in many respects (financially, economically, with irreplaceable human losses). This should not and must not deter us from hearing the bell tolling now and taking all necessary action. In Germany, this has many domestic political consequences, in addition to taking on a leadership role in foreign, European and defence policy that has not been seen for years, strengthening the Franco-German relationship, which has been languishing for just as long, and expanding it in the Weimar Triangle with Poland: On the one hand, the necessary financial resources must be made available and, at the same time, the associated parliamentary reservations for the event of defence and for all the necessary preparatory and organisational measures for this purpose must be lifted. If these necessary funds cannot be reallocated in the current financial planning, they must be provided additionally.


Politically, it makes no sense to play defence off against pensions. If our country cannot defend itself, pensions, like many other things, will no longer be secure. As the largest economy on the continent with the largest population, we cannot afford to invest less in nominal and relative terms in our defence than France and the UK. If the funds are available in sufficient measure, the procurement processes must be adapted in line with the urgency and magnitude of the task. This requires all those involved in these processes to adopt an attitude that focuses more on the goods now needed for the approaching emergency than on striving for better equipment in the utopia of lasting peace. Incidentally, the latter also applies to defence equipment from the United States, unless it can be delivered at short notice, because delivery commitments are regularly subject to protracted and unpredictable parliamentary proceedings. And finally, everything that is now available on the market but is still missing – such as ammunition, replacements for material handed over to Ukraine, or drone defence for our critical civilian and military infrastructure – must be procured immediately. If a drone, controlled by anyone at all, can shut down our aviation hubs for hours, then it is an unacceptable situation for our economy as well. The same applies if critical military and civilian infrastructure can be flown over with complete impunity. Today they are being scouted out and tomorrow they will be threatened.


It is regrettable that it took the Trump administration to make such a clean break. The proposals outlined are far-reaching, but they are the consequence of a decade of geostrategic immobility. If we do not want to sleepwalk into the next world war, the time for procrastination must come to an end. From now on, Germany must lead by example. Only in this way will it live up to its role and responsibility for our country and for peace in Europe.


Publishing Director : Pascale Joannin










FPIF (Foreign Policy in Focus) - by Loqman Radpey - April 1, 2025 - The Geopolitical Ripples of Turkey’s Power Struggle

 

The political climate in Turkey is reaching a boiling point with the jailing of Ekrem İmamoğlu, the mayor of Istanbul and a key challenger to President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. İmamoğlu, a prominent figure in the opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), has been widely seen as a serious contender for the presidency. His arrest marks yet another episode in Erdoğan’s strategy of consolidating power. At the core of this strategy are two internal objectives—sidelining political opponents and maintaining Kurdish suppression. These domestic goals accompany broader regional ambitions, with geopolitical implications for the United States and Israel.

İmamoğlu has been charged with “establishing and leading a criminal organization, accepting bribes, misconduct in office, unlawfully recording personal data and bid rigging.” Prosecutors have even sought to charge him with “aiding an armed terrorist organization,” a reference to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which has been engaged in a decades-long conflict with the Turkish state over its policies of oppression against the Kurds. Although the court ruled that this particular charge was “not deemed necessary at this stage,” the broader strategy is clear: in Turkey, anyone who challenges the ruling system can easily be accused of terrorism in order to be side-lined from power.

İmamoğlu’s case is particularly ironic given the history of his party. Since the founding of modern Turkey in 1923 by Mustefa Kemal (Atatürk), the CHP institutionalized the denial of Kurdistan and suppression of Kurdish identity—a policy that has been carried forward by every ruling party since. Today, the very tools of repression once used against the Kurds are now being turned against the Kemalists themselves, exposing the cyclical nature of Turkey’s political repression and authoritarianism.

What is unfolding is not a fight for democracy but a conflict among Turks to dominate the state apparatus. Despite their internal rivalry, both the CHP and the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP)—along with their Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) ally—share one common reality: they need the Kurdish vote to win the next general election in 2028 and cement their grip on power. This places the Kurds and the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM) in a precarious position, as both factions seek to manipulate Kurdish political aspirations for their own gain.

Turkey is classified as a “brown country” with both democratic and authoritarian features, but democracy, legality, and citizenship rights have effectively disappeared from the Kurdish regions in southeastern Turkey. Since the 1920s, successive governments have maintained a state of emergency under different guises, all of which have been used to systematically suppress Kurdish rights.

One of Erdoğan’s latest moves is his attempt to co-opt the Kurdish Newroz (New Year)—a significant cultural and political event for Kurds. He plans to propose that Newroz be celebrated collectively by the “Turkic world” under the auspices of the “Organization of Turkic States” in May 2025. This is a calculated attempt to erase Kurdish identity from a festival that was once banned by the Turkish state until 1992, resulting in the loss of many lives, and still leading to the ongoing detention and imprisonment of those who celebrate it.

The effects of Turkey’s Kurdish policy are felt beyond its borders. A day after Erdoğan’s speech on March 21, this erasure mindset became evident in the Kurdistani region of Urmîyeh (Urmia) in western Iran, where Kurds form the majority. Emboldened by Turkish and Azerbaijani-backed Azeri pan-nationalist mobs—with implicit support from the Iranian regime—they gathered in Urmîyeh after a mass Kurdish Newroz celebration, calling for massacres against the Kurds and continuing their campaign of Kurdish denial. To Erdoğan, Turkey’s “spiritual geography” spans “from Syria to Gaza, from Aleppo to Tabriz [in Iran], from Mosul to Jerusalem.”

Erdoğan and the AKP—backed by the ultranationalist Nationalist Movement Party (MHP)—are pursuing a dual strategy: systematically eliminating political rivals while continuing Turkey’s longstanding policy of denying Kurdish rights. This is evident in their hollow “peace” outreach—without any concrete step—toward the Kurds in Turkey, as well as their approach to Abdullah Öcalan, the imprisoned PKK leader, and his call for the disarmament of Kurdish groups including the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Erdoğan manipulates these dynamics to advance his agenda in Syria, aiming to disarm the Kurds and keep the autonomous Kurdish stronghold of Rojava (Western) Kurdistan off the new Middle East map. Simultaneously, he supports the new government in Damascus to further expand Turkey’s influence in the region.

Washington’s continued backing of the SDF—an anti-ISIS coalition led by General Mazloum Abdi—has placed it in direct opposition to Turkey’s expansionist ambitions. However, Turkey views the SDF, and its components YPG and YPJ, as extensions of the PKK and has consistently pressured Washington to withdraw its support. Since 2018, Turkey has launched multiple cross-border aggressions into Syria, occupying and Turkifying Kurdish portions of it. Erdoğan’s strategic goal is clear: to weaken Kurdish political and military strength. By doing so, he aims to eliminate a Kurdish entity with the potential for independence and statehood that could challenge Turkish authority within its borders, which hold the largest Kurdish population—over 25 million—primarily in the southeast.

Beyond Syria, Erdoğan’s maneuvers extend into the broader geopolitical landscape. In the Middle East, he has sought to position Turkey as a dominant power, leveraging historical Ottoman influence to appeal to Sunni populations. This includes escalating tensions with Israel by expanding Turkey’s military presence inside post-Assad Syria, stepping in to fill the void left by Russia and Iran. Amid rising security tensions between Europe and the United States, Turkey seeks to project an image of transformation—not through conventional broad partnerships but by asserting itself as a regional power center. Erdoğan’s rhetoric has shifted toward confrontation, particularly after the October 7 attacks on Israel, as he appeals to his Islamist base and expresses support for Hamas against Israel. This rhetoric has intensified following Israel’s call to support the Kurds as a natural ally in Syria.

Turkey’s political battle exposes a deeper truth about control—both domestically and abroad. For the United States, Turkey’s internal power struggles, broader regional ambitions, and Kurdish policy present a strategic challenge. Washington must carefully navigate the need to counter Erdoğan’s increasingly authoritarian rule while supporting its Kurdish allies in the region and curbing Turkey’s expansionist agenda.

The Washington Post - Trump’s tariffs put India and its struggling economy at a crossroads -- April 4, 2025 at 2:00 a.m. EDTToday at 2:00 a.m. EDT

 The Washington Post 

Trump’s tariffs put India and its struggling economy at a crossroads

The pressure from the Trump administration has reignited a long-standing debate in India over whether to open up its heavily protectionist economy.

April 4, 2025 at 2:00 a.m. EDTToday at 2:00 a.m. EDT

6 min


A screen on the Bombay Stock Exchange in Mumbai airs news Thursday of President Donald Trump unveiling sweeping global tariffs. (Punit Paranjpe/AFP/Getty Images)


By Karishma Mehrotra

NEW DELHI — As President Donald Trump was sworn in for a second term, Indian officials put a plan in motion to sidestep his promised trade war — launching high-level trade talks with their American counterparts, pledging new investments in U.S. energy and defense, and unilaterally slashing tariffs on key goods.


Get concise answers to your questions. Try Ask The Post AI.

In the end, it made no difference.


India will be hit with a 26 percent tariff, Trump announced Wednesday, delivering a sharp blow to a country that relies heavily on U.S. export markets and is already gripped by economic stagnation. As other nations consider retaliatory measures, India has opted for restraint, still hoping to seal a broader trade agreement that might eventually deliver relief.


In a statement Thursday, India’s Commerce Ministry said it was “carefully examining the implications,” while emphasizing ongoing discussions over a “mutually beneficial” deal. Others in the country tried to find a silver lining, noting that some Asian competitors will face even higher rates.


But “there is no denying it — there will be a significant impact,” said Ajay Shah, an Indian economist who previously consulted for the Finance Ministry.


The pressure from Washington has reignited a long-standing debate in India over whether to open up its heavily protectionist economy. Some economists see the tariff squeeze as an opportunity to push through politically fraught trade liberalization. Others warn that India’s midsize and labor-intensive industries can’t afford the shock.


With no immediate respite in sight, exporters here are bracing for the fallout.


Cranes and shipping containers at a port in Chennai, India, on Thursday. (Mahesh Kumar A./AP)

Bad timing

The effects may be most acute in the emerging smartphone market in India, which is home to 15 percent of Apple’s global production. The United States is also a vital market for Indian jewelry and agricultural exports, including shrimp, basmati rice and honey.


Exemptions given to pharmaceuticals offered relief to one of India’s most U.S.-dependent industries, and analysts said higher tariffs on regional rivals including China, Vietnam and Bangladesh could give India new export opportunities.


But the relative advantage will only matter if India institutes structural reforms, economists said. India has struggled to attract manufacturers looking to pivot away from China, partly because of high tariffs on required components. And other peer nations, including Malaysia, the Philippines and Brazil, could cut into any potential competitive edge.


India’s economy is struggling. Private investment and consumer spending are flat, and gross domestic product is predicted to grow at its slowest pace in years. “The timing is bad,” said Rajat Kathuria, an economics professor and dean at Shiv Nadar University. “Really bad.”


President Donald Trump signs executive orders on tariffs during an event in the Rose Garden of the White House on Wednesday. (Jabin Botsford/The Washington Post)

‘Time to do something big’

Until the last moment, India remained hopeful it could stave off the tariff hikes. Commerce Minister Piyush Goyal made multiple visits to Washington to engage with American officials, while assistant U.S. trade representative Brendan Lynch spent several days negotiating in New Delhi.


India unveiled a series of preemptive goodwill measures, reducing tariffs on some cars, motorcycles, electronics, solar components, chemicals and alcohol. It also proposed eliminating what is referred to as the “Google tax” on online advertisements, which Shah called a clear “olive branch.”


“India’s response is the most feeble because it is the weakest economy in the [Group of 20] and has the most to lose,” Kathuria said.


The U.S. is India’s largest trading partner, accounting for almost a fifth of its exports, resulting in a trade surplus of almost $46 billion in 2024.


India has long been one of the world’s most protectionist countries, only opening up its economy in the 1990s to avert a financial crisis. In 2023, India’s average tariff (not accounting for trade deals) stood at 17 percent, nearly six times the average U.S. rate, according to the World Trade Organization.


In 2019, Trump revoked India’s preferential trade status, prompting retaliatory tariffs from New Delhi. Subsequent trade talks faltered, with concessions offered by New Delhi viewed as insufficient by the first Trump administration, according to Mark Linscott, an early U.S. negotiator.


Trump has repeatedly singled out India for its high tariffs, including during a recent news conference with Prime Minister Narendra Modi — underscoring the limits of the nationalist leaders’ ideological alignment.


“Now we have a situation where the leverage being deployed is even more serious,” Linscott said. “A successful bilateral is long overdue.”


Both sides have set a fall deadline for a trade deal. Two people familiar with the situation, speaking on the condition of anonymity to share sensitive details, said Trump’s planned visit to India is contingent on its success.


Washington has made it clear that it expects India to implement sweeping trade liberalization, according to the two people, especially in agriculture.


“It’s time to do something big, something grand,” U.S. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick said last month, speaking virtually at an event in New Delhi. “Not product by product, but rather the whole thing.”


Workers sew garments in a factory in Faridabad, India, on Thursday. (Priyanshu Singh/Reuters)

Reform or retaliate?

For some economists, the U.S. pressure represents a welcome and overdue catalyst for domestic reform.


“We have to reduce tariffs,” Kathuria said. “This is an opportunity for India to do something that it always wants to do, and has wanted to do, but is politically difficult to do. ”


The Modi government has signaled it is inching in this direction. In March, the Commerce Ministry urged Indian businesses to shed their “protectionist mindset.”


The challenge, Kathuria said, is that “the entire government seems to be captured by industry,” and Modi will probably be wary of alienating business leaders.


Shah is more optimistic, saying Modi has a rare opportunity to cast difficult changes as an essential jump-start. “We can’t change the U.S.; it is deeply messed up,” he said. “But a huge pro-globalization economic initiative? There is no better policy package to revitalize an economy that has frankly struggled ever since 2011.”


India is already looking beyond the U.S. as well, advancing trade negotiations with the European Union, Australia and Britain.


Other economists warn that fast, far-reaching policy changes could ultimately backfire, exposing India’s most protected sectors, particularly agriculture, to foreign competitors.


“If you open up the market, most domestic small enterprises will be pushed out,” said Amitendu Palit, an economist at the National University of Singapore. “The benefits will go to U.S. businesses.”


Ajay Srivastava, a former trade official, harked back to 2018, when India lowered trade barriers in response to U.S. tariffs on steel and aluminum and opened the floodgates to Chinese goods.


His advice now is blunt: “Do not look weak.” If Washington rejects India’s trade proposals, Srivastava argues, New Delhi should retaliate, following the lead of China, Canada and the E.U.


Raghav Chadha, a leader of the opposition Aam Aadmi Party, expressed consternation Thursday in Parliament that Trump had gone ahead with the tariffs despite India’s “unflinching loyalty and undying friendship to the U.S.” He suggested the government could withhold approvals for Starlink, Elon Musk’s satellite communications company, as a “bargaining chip” in negotiations.


However India responds, Linscott said, Trump is unlikely to budge on his demands. “The bottom line is that expectations on the U.S. side are not going to change,” he said.



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Thursday, April 3, 2025

Dışişleri Bakanı Hakan Fidan: İsrail istikrarsızlığa sebebiyet verebilir Hikayeyi yazan: Hürriyet • 13 sa. • 2 dk okuma (3 Nisan 2025)

 

Dışişleri Bakanı Hakan Fidan: İsrail istikrarsızlığa sebebiyet verebilir

Hikayeyi yazan: Hürriyet • 13 sa. • 2 dk okuma (3 Nisan 2025)


Dışişleri Bakanı Hakan Fidan, Fransa Avrupa ve Dışişleri Bakanı Jean-Noel Barrot ile dün Paris’te bir araya geldiği görüşmede, İsrail’in artan saldırılarının bölgesel düzeyde istikrarsızlığa sebebiyet verebileceğini belirtti. Filistin halkının anavatanlarından zorla göç ettirilmesine karşı olduğumuzu vurguladı ve Arap Ligi tarafından kabul edilen Gazze Planı’na verilen destek beyan etti.


Dışişleri Bakanı Hakan Fidan, resmi ziyaret kapsamında Fransa’nın başkenti Paris’te dün Fransa Avrupa ve Dışişleri Bakanı Jean-Noel Barrot ile Paris’te bir araya geldi. Görüşmede, ikili ve bölgesel konular ayrıntılı şekilde ele alındı.


Dışişleri Bakanı Fidan, Avrupa’nın yeni güvenlik mimarisinin oluşumunda AB üyesi olmayan ülkelerle olan eşgüdümün artırılmasının önemine değindi. Bakan Fidan, Türkiye - AB ilişkilerinin önündeki yapay engellerin kaldırılması ve AB’nin bu yönde somut adımlar atması konusunda Fransa’dan beklentilerimizi dile getirdi.


Gümrük Birliği'nin güncellenmesi konusunun da ele alındığı görüşmede Bakan Fidan, Rusya-Ukrayna savaşının sona erdirilmesine yönelik diplomatik çabalara olan desteğimizi dile getirdi. Bu süreçte tüm müttefiklerin yakın bir işbirliği içinde çalışması önemine değindi ve muhtemel bir çözümün kalıcı olabilmesi için her iki tarafın da rızasının gerektiğini vurguladı.


Bakan Fidan, Suriye’deki yeni yönetimle angajmanın artırılmasının ve bu doğrultuda yaptırımların tamamen kaldırılmasının bu ülkede istikrar ve huzur tesisi yönündeki çabalar bakımından çok önemli olduğuna dikkat çekti. Bakan Fidan, savunma sanayi işbirliği çerçevesindeki beklentileri aktardı; PKK/YPG ile mücadelenin önemini vurguladı ve Suriye’nin kuzeyindeki hapishane ve kamplardaki DEAŞ mensubu yabancı terörist savaşçıların ülkelerine dönmeleri gerektiğini belirtti.


 

GAZZE PLANI’NA DESTEK


Bakan Fidan, İsrail’in artan saldırılarının bölgesel düzeyde istikrarsızlığa sebebiyet verebileceğini belirtti. Filistin halkının anavatanlarından zorla göç ettirilmesine karşı olduğumuzu vurguladı ve Arap Ligi tarafından kabul edilen Gazze Planı’na verilen destek beyan etti.


İsrail'in Gazze’ye yönelik insani yardım akışını engellemesinin, yaşanan insani krizi daha da derinleştirdiğine dikkat çeken Bakan Fidan, insani yardımların kesintisiz biçimde ulaştırılmasının hayati önemde olduğunu vurguladı.


Ayrıca, Kafkasya'da barış ve istikrarın sağlanmasına yönelik çabalar ele alındı. Ekonomik ilişkilerin güçlendirilmesi için atılabilecek adımlar değerlendirildi. Enerji konularında işbirliği fırsatlarının geliştirilmesine yönelik atılabilecek adımlar değerlendirildi.


Bakan Fidan, Türkiye’de son dönemde yaşanan gelişmeler ele alınırken çifte standart uygulanmasının yanlış olduğunu belirtti. Fransa ve Romanya’da olduğu üzere, yargı süreçlerinin tamamlanmasının beklenmesi gerektiğini vurguladı. Fransa’daki gelişmeleri yakından takip ettiğimizi belirtti.






FPRI (Foreign Policy Research Institute) - Obscurity by Design - Competing Priorities for America's China policy - Tanner Greer March 27,2025

 

FPRI (Foreign Policy Research Institute)

Obscurity by Design - Competing Priorities for America's China policy

Tanner Greer

March 27,2025 

Introduction

Few notes of concord survive contact with Donald Trump. Trump’s election in 2016 upended settled assumptions; one by one he knocked down the pillars of consensus and convention that held up decades of American diplomacy. The strongest and most consequential of these pillars concerned China. For more than forty years, American diplomats and statesmen worked to integrate China into an American-led economic order. By doing so, they hoped to align Beijing’s behavior (and, if lucky, the entire Chinese political regime) with liberal norms. Their hopes proved in vain. China did not moderate or liberalize. The new president, rejecting both the means and ends of engagement, pushed for a less cataleptic strategy.

That was five years ago. Those who see Trump as a champion of the new hawkish “bipartisan consensus on China” have been nonplussed by the first moves of his second administration. Trump invited Xi Jinping—but no other foreign leader—to attend his swearing-in. One of his first acts as president was an executive stay of the TikTok ban. Trump publicly browbeat a dozen countries with threats and blandishments in the week that followed—but not the People’s Republic of China. Contrary to expectation, Trump’s inaugural address barely glanced at China. It does not outline, or even hint at, what Trump’s approach to America’s greatest challenger might be.

This obscurity is by design. Trump sees no advantage in giving advance notice. Quite the opposite: he clearly believes that the more inscrutable and erratic he seems, the better off the United States will be. This attitude was expressed neatly when the editorial board of the Wall Street Journal asked Trump about the approach he would take toward Taiwan if elected president. Trump replied that the Chinese would not dare attack Taiwan under his watch. After all, “[Xi Jinping] knows that I am f—ing crazy.” Like Richard Nixon before him, Trump is ready to play the lunatic.[1]

If this is one reason Trump’s campaign never published or endorsed any detailed policy proposals regarding China, there are others. As one member of Trump’s transition team puts it, “Trump is a pragmatist, not an ideologue. He does not like tying his hands. He prefers to have strong personalities underneath him with conflicting views. He wants them to fight it out. He wants to pick the winner of each battle.” If this risks strategic incoherence, then so be it: “If you want to see what an ideologically unified administration looks like, look back at Bush and Cheney. That is the sort of disaster we want to avoid.”[2]

This leadership style should be considered by any analyst who forecasts the new administration’s future. Trump positions himself as the kingmaker among competing centers of power. He encourages a certain level of disagreement in the ranks. This report provides a framework for thinking about these disagreements—especially in regard to the United States’ relationship with China.

Analytical Approach

Since Trump’s 2020 defeat, Republicans have understood that the contours of their party’s China policy were not frozen in place. The GOP is a party in transition. It is led by a man who gathers blocs otherwise at odds into one large tent. Which ideas and interests should guide their joint enterprise are not (and likely will never be) settled. The best each side can do is lay out their case.

The last four years have seen many Trumpists lay out their cases. Via Twitter thread, essay, roundtable, conference panel, and podcast, their debates see-saw; at each turn, scholars, pundits, politicians, and former officials have unveiled their designs for American relations with China. This report draws on these public discussions to typologize the main positions in these debates and examine the assumptions underlying them. To supplement the public discussions more than thirty off-the-record interviews were conducted with congressional aides, think tankers, former Trump officials, Trump transition figures, and individuals nominated for positions in the second administration. The subjects of these interviews range from cabinet-level officials to the research assistants who are actually responsible for getting things done in Washington.

Drawing on both these private interviews and the public discussions of China policy, this report outlines the fundamental divides that have separated the various camps of argument. These camps are intellectual constructs. Though some arguments are strongly associated with this or that specific individual, the “schools of thought” outlined are not organized coalitions or factions. Many thinkers are located squarely at the intersection of different schools. Likewise, Republican politicians—including Trump himself—often flit between positions, lending rhetorical support to different stances as the situation demands. This is one reason why so many Trump supporters felt betrayed at least once during Trump’s first administration: no man’s vision of Trumpism is endorsed by Trump himself. Trump’s coalition is invariably larger and more varied than his supporters wish.

It is likely that each of the eight schools of thought identified here will have some influence on this administration; the strength of each’s influence will wax and wane as events roll forth. Individuals who champion each of the eight schools are already present in the new administration. Some of these schools have greater strength than others. But in Trumpworld, no win is permanent. Over the course of his first administration, Donald Trump barreled through six Secretaries or acting secretaries of defense, five White House communication directors, four national security advisors, and four White House chiefs of staff. With Donald Trump in power, present strength does not preclude future weakness. Those who lose today may win tomorrow.

This report thus lays out all of the Republican schools of thought on China policy, giving them approximately equal treatment. My purpose is not to take sides in their debates. Instead, it attempts to steelman each case and outline the deeper assumptions each is built upon. My hope is that unearthing these assumptions may prove useful both for the officials tasked with navigating these debates and for the pundits and journalists who will cover them.

Points of Consensus

Amid these debates, one finds several points of consensus. The disputing intellectuals, wonks, and politicians all agree that China is the most significant foreign policy problem the United States now faces. They describe China as a challenge that must be met in many dimensions: military, economic, and technological (some would add “ideological” to this list, but that is a point of debate, not consensus). Trumpists agree that the US armed forces are poorly structured and lack the resources needed to counter the military challenge posed by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). They agree that America’s commercial and financial relationship with China underwrote the rise of a powerful rival while undermining America’s own industrial base. They believe that China has taken advantage of the traditional American commitment to globalization and free markets, and that doubling down on this commitment is foolish. To level the playing field, some mix of tariffs, export controls, capital controls, and industrial policy is necessary. They agree that the Biden administration’s China policy—while an improvement on that of the Obama administration—had nonetheless been feckless. They believe that the Biden administration articulated geopolitical goals that it had not resourced, cared too much about perceptions of amity and too little about perceptions of strength, and had not sold the American people on its foreign policy priorities.

As Alex Wong, principal deputy national security advisor for the new administration, observed last year:

I could present you with multiple articles that call for the United States to bolster military spending, increase allied defense cooperation, implement harder technological and investment strictures, build supply chain resiliency, neutralize Chinese influence operations, and cast a light on the depredations of the [Chinese Communist Party’s] authoritarian and genocidal rule. You would be hard pressed to identify which articles support what general vision for the US-China endgame.[3]

But if those responsible for shaping China policy agree on many of the tactical maneuvers and strategic expedients that the United States must adopt, there are often fundamental disagreements about the purpose of these actions. The official searching for a tool to reshape distorted trade balances might smile on tariffs—but so might the official aiming to protect a strategic industry, the official seeking to weaken the legitimacy of the Chinese government, or the official looking for additional leverage in otherwise unrelated negotiations. These aims cannot all be reconciled. Circumstances will force the administration to prioritize some over others. In that moment of decision, “general visions” will begin to matter.

 The debates Trumpists have over the general vision of China policy can largely be sifted into two buckets: economics and geopolitics. In theory, one’s position on the CHIPS Act or currency devaluation might be tied to one’s position on military aid to Taiwan. In practice, this is not so. The economic and geopolitical debates occur on different planes. It was not unusual for individuals with an economic portfolio to say things like, “Obviously I care about the military balance, but I do not have the time to think in depth about it—I export all of my thinking on that to Bridge Colby.”[4] Those with a national security background, for their part, were just as likely to describe problems of currency, investment, and trade as problems beyond their paygrade.[5]

Elected politicians must work in both modes. It is common for two Republican politicians to be closely allied in the economic sphere but not in the geopolitical sphere—or vice versa. For example, as senators, Marco Rubio and JD Vance were close allies on the economic front. Both senators were deeply committed to reinvigorating American industrial policy. Their staffs worked together closely here. There are few meaningful distinctions between the economic strategy each office endorsed. In contrast, the two senators’ takes on the geopolitical problem posed by China are more difficult to reconcile. It is not easy to imagine JD Vance sponsoring either the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act or the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, bills that Rubio proudly presents as “the greatest turning point in US-China relations in decades.”[6]

The need to separate the economic and geopolitical angles of the China challenge will be revisited later in this report. For now, each will be discussed separately, looking at the two debates as their own participants do. 

The Geopolitical Debate

One way to represent the core principles at play in the geopolitical debate is with a classic two-by-two matrix.

Optimism vs. Pessimism

On the x-axis is the single most important difference between the various geopolitical schools of thought found in Trumpworld: assessments of American power and state capacity. Where one falls in many of the most prominent debates—such as “Can the United States afford to support both Ukraine and Taiwan?” or “Should the ultimate goal of our China policy be victory over the Communist Party of China, or should it be détente?”—has less to do with one’s assessment of China and more to do with one’s assessment of the United States. What resources can be mustered for competition with China? Just how large are stores of money, talent, and political will?

Those on the right quadrants of my diagram provide pessimistic answers to these questions. They buttress their case with measurables: steel produced, ships at sea, interest paid on the federal deficit, or the percentage of an ally’s gross domestic product spent on defense. Against these numbers are fearsome statistics of Chinese industrial capacity and PLA power. Changes in technology, which favor shore-based precision munitions at the expense of more costly planes and ships, further erode the American position. This is a new and uncomfortable circumstance. The last time the United States waged war without overwhelming material superiority was in 1812.[7]

To these material realities, many skeptics of American power point to cultural or institutional obstacles that suggest the US military is less lethal than it once was. Tallied here are the failures of the US military in Afghanistan (and especially the botched 2021 withdrawal), the numerous fires and crashes that have marked the US Navy’s surface fleet, and the diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) initiatives defended by the general brass in the Biden era. As the incoming director of policy planning at the State Department puts it: “The brass is woke and incompetent, and senior officers and civilian leaders tolerate and even encourage wokeness and incompetence; or to say better, they excuse and deny incompetence in furtherance of wokeness.”[8]

To the Trumpists who see American power through this frame, there is only one logical response: the United States must limit its ambitions. This means either radically reprioritizing defense commitments to focus on China or retreating from conflict with China altogether. [9]

Trumpists in the left two quadrants see things differently. Where the pessimists see settled facts, the optimists see possibilities. The optimists recognize many of the same trends as the pessimists,[10] but view them as self-inflicted mistakes that can, and should, be reversed. An inadequate defense budget is not a law of the universe but a political choice. A failing industrial base, DEI defense programs, and reliance on aging weapons platforms are all choices. Trump has won. He will choose otherwise. Implicit in the optimist view is a longer time horizon—there is still time to turn things around.[11] But this window will not be open forever.[12] Optimists fear that pessimistic assessments erode the political will needed to make changes while change is still possible.[13]

The arguments between pessimists and optimists could be reframed as a matter of risk. [However] the pessimists are most worried about the downside risks of a crisis with China in the near future (2025–28).[14] The optimists balance that possibility against the longer-term risks America will face as it withdraws from other regions of the world or abandons defense capabilities that are not needed in the Pacific theater. Optimists believe this second class of risks is large and that the United States should not court them.[15] Even an America in desperate need of defense reform has some capacity to “walk and chew gum at the same time.” This issue is at the crux of their arguments on Ukraine: in material terms, aid to Ukraine is not coming at Taiwan’s expense. It is relatively cheap. What stops America from helping both beleaguered nations?

The pessimists do not view that question purely in material terms. In their debates, the pessimists are quick to highlight the few weapons systems being shipped across the Atlantic that might be used in the Pacific,[16] but their critique reaches higher than this. The costs of the war in Ukraine (and the Middle East) are measured not just in bullets, but in attention and effort: There are only so many minutes the National Security Council may meet. Washington can only have a few items on its agenda at any given time. The executive branch is stodgy, slow, and captive to bureaucratic interests; the legislative branch is rancorous, partisan, and captive to public opinion; the American public does not care about the world abroad. Accomplishing anything meaningful in the United States—much less the drastic defense reforms both sides of the debate agree are necessary—requires singular attention and will. 

If this seems like a pessimistic take on the American system—well, it is one. It is common for Trumpists in the optimistic quadrants to argue that the People’s Republic of China is riddled with internal contradictions. In a long-term competition between the two systems, they are confident that these contradictions will eat China from the inside out, and that America’s free and democratic order will eventually emerge victorious. None of the pessimists interviewed made similar predictions. If they have anything to say about internal contradictions, it is American contradictions they focus on.[17]

Power-Based vs. Values-Based Perspectives

So much for the optimist-pessimist divide. What is the y-axis?

This can be thought of as a pole, with “power-based” perspectives on one hand and “values-based” perspectives on the other.

Trumpists in the top two quadrants ground their arguments in cold calculations of realpolitik. From this perspective, international politics is first and foremost a competition for power. States seek power. The prosperity, freedom, and happiness of any nation depend on how much power its government can wield on the world stage. While states might compete for power in many domains, military power is the most important. A state frustrated by a trade war might escalate to a real war, but a state locked in deadly combat has no outside recourse. The buck stops with the bullet.[18]

From the power-based perspective, then, the goal of American strategy must be the maximization of American power, with military force as the ultimate arbiter of that power. This force does not need to be realized in combat—ideally, its deterrent power will be strong enough that it is never actively used. The ideal means of American strategy is a military posture and alliance system strong enough to deter the Chinese from resorting to war.

The left and right quadrants of this perspective disagree on the best way to build that sort of power. The upper right quadrant—the “Prioritizers”—do not believe America will ever possess power sufficient to compel China into submission; a stable détente between the two countries is the best outcome that America can attain. Even this modest aim will only be possible if the United States prioritizes the threat posed by China above all others.[19]

Trumpists who argue from the upper left quadrant—the “Primacists”—also speak the language of realpolitik. They maintain, however, that the sacrifices the Prioritizers propose will weaken American power. They believe that the existing American alliance system contributes to America’s strength today and will contribute to America’s potential strength in the future. Instead of limiting American aims, the Primacists are more concerned with expanding American means. They are confident this can be done if the American people have the confidence to do so.

The lower two quadrants, whose arguments are labeled “values-based,” operate under a different frame. The people in these quadrants believe that American foreign policy should not be evaluated by a single variable. They see connections between what America does abroad and what America is like at home. They have strong values-based commitments to specific ways of life that are expressed in their vision for American strategy.

Those in the bottom left quadrant are labeled “Crusaders” because of their normative commitments to an American-led order. For this group, the character of the international order is a question not just of national security but moral right. American foreign policy always has been, and always will be, downstream of American ideas of right and wrong—the only question is whether one will admit or obfuscate this reality. This group finds little gain in obfuscation. They argue that America and its allies are knit together not only by shared security interests but also by a shared vision of the good. The values shared by the liberal bloc explain why these countries share security interests in the first place.[20] After all, China is an authoritarian power whose influence operations threaten the integrity of democracies across the world. Many Crusaders view this political-ideological threat as the most dangerous one that China poses.

For these reasons, those in this quadrant are especially skeptical of détente; they do not believe permanent compromise with China is possible. They attribute Chinese belligerence to the communist political system that governs the country.[21] For them, tensions in US-Chinese relations are less the expected clashes between a rising power and the ruling hegemon than a battle between two incompatible social systems. Pointing to the close cooperation that ties Iran, North Korea, Russia, and China together, the Crusaders argue (contra the Prioritizers) that the world is gripped in a general contest between democratic order and a resurgent authoritarianism whose different parts cannot be disentangled from each other. At stake are basic questions of moral right—not just abroad, but at home. An America stripped of its hegemony, humiliated abroad, and economically dependent on authoritarian powers will struggle to preserve freedom and virtue inside its own borders.

Those in the bottom right quadrant—the “Culture Warriors”—also think about foreign affairs through the lens of regime and right. For them, however, the hostile regime is their own. Culture Warriors link the liberal international order to the free trade agreements all Trumpists despise and the administrative “deep state” all Trumpists distrust. They see the liberal international order as an international extension of the progressive order they are trying to tear down at home. As one official tapped for service in the State Department rather pungently puts it: “There is an increasing disconnect between America’s stature on the geopolitical stage and superpower status and the well-being of actual Americans. What good does it do for America to remain globally dominant when all this translates to is preserving the spoils system for Jeffrey Epstein’s buddies?”[22]

There are echoes of the 1960s New Left in the Culture Warrior argument. Both the new left of yesterday and the new right of today are rebellions against “the establishment.” Both reject the pieties of their day; both see a bloated national security state as a symbol of the dehumanizing values they reject. Both groups correctly point out that there is no natural limit to the quest for primacy. Both argue that a totalizing foreign policy will lead to the bureaucratization of American life.[23]  

Only the most radical Culture Warriors are ready for a twenty-first-century march on the Pentagon. Most aim for an easier target: a relatively modest foreign policy. Instead of defending an entire international order, it is enough to defend America. Instead of deterring authoritarianism, it is enough to deter China. China does not need to be defeated—it is enough to convince the Chinese to accept some sort of détente.[24]

This is somewhat similar to the ends sought by the Prioritizers. Little wonder so many of the Primacists and Crusaders interviewed believed the Prioritizers were Restrainers in disguise. Again and again this accusation was made: Prioritizer arguments are just an attempt to make isolationism sexy.[25] The Prioritizers do not actually believe in realpolitikrealpolitik is just a respectable way to attack the existing international order they despise.

There is an irony to this critique. Just as Primacists and Crusaders condemn the false face of the Prioritizers, so the Prioritizers and the Crusaders condemn the false face of the Primacists. Many of those interviewed insisted that their Primacist opponents made such-and-such argument not for the realpolitik reasons they professed, but because of their (hidden) commitment to liberal ideals. Ideals that cannot be defended on their own merits had to be prettied up with talk of hard power.[26]

All of these suspicions of subterfuge are overblown. Both Primacists and Prioritizers believe the arguments they make. Yet their suspicions are revealing. All sides clearly believe there is a political advantage in couching one’s arguments in realpolitik logic. That fact alone tells us something about the likely contours of a Trump presidency—and perhaps the beliefs of Trump himself.

The Economic Debate

As with the geopolitical debate, it is helpful to conceptualize the divisions over economic statecraft among Trump’s followers as taking place on a two-by-two chart. The x-axis of this chart describes the battleground on which economic competition with China must be fought: is this a contest to push forward the frontiers of technology and science, or does competition with China require a broader-based revitalization of American manufacturing capacity writ large? The y-axis, in turn, spans the gap between those who are confident that the administrative state can be used to strengthen the American economy and those skeptical of any bureaucratically administered industrial policy.

There are key tenets all quadrants share. Nearly all Trumpists claim that it is imperative for the United States to “win” economic competition with China. They regularly frame this as in terms of security and sovereignty. “If we want political independence,” one told me, then “we must first have economic independence. Lose that and you lose your country.”[27] Marco Rubio framed the matter in similar terms during his confirmation hearings: “If we stay on the road we’re on right now, in less than ten years virtually everything that matters to us in life will depend on whether China will allow us to have it or not. Everything from the blood pressure medicine we take to what movies we get to watch –and everything in between—will depend on China.”[28]

There is less agreement on what grounds independence must be secured. For some, “winning” the economic competition with China means maintaining American leadership on the bleeding edge of new technology. For others, victory means a renaissance in American manufacturing and industrial capacity.

Those in the right quadrants of the diagram are focused squarely on the promises of high technology. These Trumpists believe that economic dynamism and military power are primarily functions of technological innovation. Some industries matter more than others. To win the future, you must occupy the commanding heights of tomorrow’s economy—today. In its most extreme forms, this translates to a fixation on artificial intelligence (AI), the industry that promises the most total disruption to the existing global economy.[29] Most Trumpists in these quadrants are not this extreme. They seek victory in several battleground industries. The exact list differs from individual to individual, but they often include software, robotics, aerospace, drones and autonomous vehicles, semiconductors, batteries, new energy technologies, and biotech.[30] 

These technologies all have obvious military applications. Many in the technology-oriented quadrants are former national security professionals who have only branched out into the world of economic security over the last decade. These Trumpists are laser-focused on the technologies that might provide the United States with a “third offset” advantage. One frankly admits that when evaluating the US-China competition as a whole, he does not care about the gross domestic product growth numbers of either power—what matters is who is furthest out on the technological edge and who controls the supply lines of critical technology sectors. Whether the Chinese are able to maintain high growth rates does not matter to his calculations.[31]

Other technology-oriented Trumpists come to their position via professional experience in the worlds of finance, venture capital, or engineering. A particularly large subset is associated with defense tech companies such as Palantir, Anduril, and the new band of start-ups operating out of El Segundo.[32] They share the concerns of their national security compatriots but add to them lessons drawn from the last three decades of American history. They describe the story of American economic growth over these decades as the story of Silicon Valley’s rise. Silicon Valley triumphed through disruptive technological change. By these means, upstarts like Facebook and Google—which at the turn of the millennium either did not exist or were not yet publicly traded—transformed into trillion-dollar behemoths. These technologists expect new firms will follow in their footsteps. The question is whether these new firms will be American or Chinese.

Republican technologists believe there are terrible stakes in this race. They often cite the total factor productivity gap that divides the United States from Europe as a warning sign: This is what will happen to America if another country’s tech sector “pulls ahead.”[33] China is the only country whose tech sector can credibly threaten to do so. If America unwisely invests limited resources in inefficient and outmoded industries, the Chinese will race ahead.

The Trumpists who draw on ideas from the left side of the axis find these arguments insufficient. They do not measure American competition with China in terms of blue-chip initial public offerings, patents filed, or new large language models. They point instead to broader measures of American industrial strength—measures like steel production, manufacturing share, and global trade balances. Their goal is not to lead the globe’s next technological revolution so much as to kickstart an industrial renaissance in the American heartland.

Three main arguments are given for this position.

The first is that winning blue-chip firms do not emerge out of a vacuum. Technological revolutions often require an entire “industrial commons” with crosslinked supply chains and shared talent pools.[34] As Oren Cass, the intellectual don of these quadrants, puts it: “Industrial expertise is not something bought off the shelf, it comes embedded deep within an ecosystem of relationships between educational institutions and firms; experienced workers and new hires; and researchers, engineers, and technicians. What a nation can make efficiently tomorrow depends heavily on what it makes today, which is one reason why saying it doesn’t matter what we make in America is so wrong-headed.”[35] 

Many of these ideas are grounded in a close study of China’s economic model. It is common for Chinese firms to pivot from one industry to another. Phone companies become electric battery companies; car companies build semiconductor fabs; software companies start to manufacture drones. This is easy for these Chinese firms to do because each belongs to a group of interlocking industries that share skilled labor pools, domestic suppliers, and industrial know-how.[36] In other words, if China has an advantage in manufacturing solar panels and electric vehicles, it is because they first had an advantage in manufacturing liquid-crystal display screens and iPhones. Those who advocate for a manufacturing renaissance argue that what is true of China will also hold true in the United States.[37]

The second argument of the industrially inclined is more focused on national security. They fear that in times of war, leadership in semiconductors and software applications will not be sufficient for victory. The premise of this point is simple: any violent contest between China and the United States will be a terrible, bloody, protracted affair. If past wars pattern future ones, great power conflict means that both parties will stretch their industrial capacity to its limit. In that day of woe, outmoded industries will matter. Whether a country can smelt steel, refine rare earths, and build ships will decide death or survival. “It is foolish,” one Trump official tells me, “to imagine that the external sources of these goods will not be disrupted or interdicted in a time of global war.”[38] The time to prepare for that possibility is now.

The third argument of those in the left quadrants goes as thus: competition with China is not merely a matter of economic domination. It is also a contest to see which country can better secure the blessings of prosperity and safety for its people. Trump was elected on the promise that his administration would bring wealth to the backwaters—especially the Rust Belt. What does the technological frontier mean to Detroit or to Buffalo? Will American industrial policy restore “dignity” to the majority of American workers—or will it simply make richer those parts of America already rich?[39]

Where technologists see the history of Silicon Valley as a playbook for future success, industrial-minded Trumpists see in its history a cautionary tale.[40] The economic growth that America experienced over the last three decades was not evenly distributed. Its benefits went disproportionately to the class of creative urbanites that Trumpism is a revolt against. Any industrial or trade policy that entrenches the advantages of this class will result in a hollow “victory” over China.

The Trumpists who argue thus doubt that even a hollow victory might be attained. They predict that a hard line against China can only be maintained if their party keeps control of the country—something Republicans will fail to do if they cannot deliver on their basic election promises. But the problem they see is larger than partisanship. Many of those on the left-hand side of this axis describe the American social contract as “strained” or “brittle.” If the Trump administration cannot boost the prospects of working-class Americans or reverse the harms wreaked by globalization on the American people, class resentment and social upheaval. It will be difficult to compete with China, much less “win” any competition with it, if America’s own social order is cracking apart.[41]

Trust vs. Lack Thereof in the Administrative State

The x-axis of the diagram marks out differing visions of the battleground on which the Chinese must be beaten. The y-axis records disagreements on the type of economic weaponry America should bring to battle. Those in the upper quadrants are confident that state subsidies and regulation are the most powerful tools the new administration might draw on. Those in the bottom quadrants are distrustful of bureaucrats, worry about the consequences of creating an administrative leviathan that may not remain in Republican hands, and doubt that even Trump-aligned officials have the skills needed to intervene so directly in the American economy.[42] They prefer policy tools less reliant on congressional appropriation or extensive bureaucratic supervision.

Industrialists skeptical of industrial policy are drawn to tariffs. These “Trade Warriors” see several special advantages in a tariff regime. Like subsidies, tariffs can be used to right unbalanced trade relations and protect industries important to the “industrial commons” of the United States. Unlike industrial policy, tariffs can be implemented cleanly with no additional government outlay.[43] The Office of the US Trade Representative has fewer than 250 employees; no more would need to be hired to institute a far-reaching tariff regime. Tariffs are fully compatible with a nightwatchman state—indeed, tariffs were the primary economic tool of the nightwatchman state that presided over nineteenth-century America’s climb to power.

Trade Warriors tend to look at the American economy through an international lens. They describe American economic realities as a function not of state and market, but of states and market. Unlike subsidies and domestic investment, tariffs provide American leaders with a source of diplomatic leverage that might be used to change the policy of foreign states. At its most elaborate, as in the chair of Trump’s council of economic advisors’ proposal to “restructure the global trading system,” graduated tariffs are seen as a tool by which to restructure the monetary and industrial policies of the entire developed world in America’s favor.[44]

The bottom-right quadrant, labeled the “Dynamists”, share the Trade Warriors’ skepticism about the American administrative state. They accept the need—or at least the political necessity—of new tariffs, but do not see tariffs as central to their program. Many agree with Vivek Ramaswamy’s argument that tariffs should be “focused entirely on eliminating US dependence on China in those critical sectors for US security…[for] if we were really serious about decoupling from China in those critical sectors, that actually means more, not less, trade with allies like Japan, South Korea, India, Vietnam.”[45]

These Dynamists are instead focused squarely on deregulating the American economy and reforming the American state. In their eyes, Chinese drone dominance is less a product of Chinese industrial policy than a result of the Federal Aviation Administration’s “war on technology;”[46] America’s failure to match the stunning new infrastructure of China is best blamed on the National Environmental Policy Act regime;[47] and cutting-edge developments in AI, crypto, and software engineering would have already transformed the American economy if not for the “regulatory capture, special interests, and perverse structural incentives” that have sheltered entrenched incumbents from real competition.[48]

Dynamists believe that many of these deficiencies stem from the outmoded structure and personnel of the US government itself. The DEI programs of the Biden administration are taken as a synecdoche of the structural problems of the federal workforce as a whole: too bureaucratic, too full of make-work, too protected from meaningful competition, and too hostile to meritocracy.[49] For America to become truly competitive with China, it must cut loose all deadweight. Many federal employees should be fired—but those who are not should be given far more freedom of action than is currently the case.

The “Industrialists” and “Techno-nationalists” who occupy the upper two quadrants of the diagram strenuously dispute this framing of America’s failures. Government intervention in the economy can work. Across the Pacific, it is working right now. China did not become such a menacing threat through a commitment to small government. The intellectual centers of this movement—magazines like American Affairs and think tanks like American Compass—regularly publish detailed reports seeking lessons from the Chinese experience.[50] If Beijing is unafraid to use industrial policy, subsidies, and direct intervention to dominate key sectors, Washington should not be afraid to do the same.

This approach assumes that knowledge is the key constraint on effective administrative power. There are wise and unwise ways to use the state. Judicious industrial policy promises a level of finesse that other tools do not. As one researcher well respected in Industrialist circles told me, tariffs and deregulation will never bring about the competitiveness America needs to pull ahead. Tariffs are “blunt instruments…What we need are more targeted tools.”[51] Industrialists see bipartisan efforts like the CHIPS Act as evidence that the American system is not just ready for industrial policy but capable of succeeding in it.[52]

This framework also appeals to the Techno-nationalists, who believe that America’s future rests on a specific set of high-end technologies in desperate need of boosted development. In practice, differences between the Techno-nationalists and the Industrialists are generally papered over; industrial policy’s place in the Republican Party is too tenuous for either side to afford much sniping at the other. But these differences exist. The Techno-nationalists are generally more sensitive than the Industrialists to the fiscal costs of American industrial policy. They realize that there is not money to fund everything, and they have strong preferences as to how the purse should be spent. More importantly, many worry that there is no time to bring about a full-bore manufacturing renaissance: the clock of conflict is ticking. The state of the American defense industrial base and developments in specific American technologies may decide whether China welcomes war or fears it. There may only be a few years to prepare the United States for that point of conflict.[53]

This is profoundly different from how the Industrialists think about the problem of China and the American economy. In a perceptive essay, Micah Meadowcroft describes the two schools of thought as such: on the one hand, there are “[Techno-nationalists who] want to decouple from China and invest here at home because they expect a shooting war” and fear that America has not done enough to deter it. On the other hand, Industrialists like “[JD] Vance, [who are] worried about the defense industrial base because the process of rebalancing trade with China and rebuilding America may heighten tensions to the point of open conflict.”[54]

For the Techno-nationalists with a national security background, China is the central problem—it is the adversary to be outcompeted, contained, and deterred. But often in the arguments emanating from the other three camps, China seems less like an enemy than a rhetorical device. Some will hail Chinese statecraft as an example to emulate. Others will summon a Chinese boogeyman that must be defeated. But in many of these cases, the real problem identified is not China per se, but the economic order that enabled its rise. The real target is a free-market consensus that prioritizes free trade and capital mobility over national resilience. Were the Chinese Communist Party to collapse tomorrow, the essential policies each group advocates would not change.

That China is such a powerful rhetorical weapon is revealing in its own way. Much like the geopolitical debate’s preoccupation with realpolitik, the economic debate’s insistence on foregrounding competition with China says something important about the anxieties of those in Trump’s orbit, as well as the arguments deemed most convincing to Trump himself.

Conclusions

There are several takeaways one might draw from this exercise.

First: Not every dispute has calcified along doctrinaire lines. This report has had little to say about Taiwan because positions on Taiwan policy do not match up neatly with any of the schools identified. There are Prioritizers, Primacists, and Crusaders who believe that extending a formal security guarantee to the Taiwanese is necessary; there are members of each camp who think any move of this sort profoundly unwise. Other disputes that seem to “cross party lines” include chip export controls, the true stakes of the AI race, the strength of the Chinese economy, the ideal US military force structure, and the role of peripheral regions like Africa or South America in the Sino-American rivalry. On issues like these, there may be room for an ambitious policy entrepreneur to have an outsized impact.

Second: The most pressing disputes over geopolitical and economic competition with China often have little to do with China itself. Serious debates about Chinese strengths or intentions are rare; instead, Republican discussions have largely focused on the scope of American power and the broader implications of this competition for both America’s global standing and its domestic economy. Similarly, in debates over economic policy, China is frequently invoked as either a pretext for action or a model to follow, but the underlying arguments stem from deeper ideological divides—disagreements over the nature of economic progress or the proper role of the market and state.

Notably absent from these discussions was serious consideration of how China might respond to American policy. Rarely did any of my interviewees frame their arguments in terms of “if we do X, then Beijing will do Y.” Rarer still were counterarguments voiced against other people’s faulty forecasts. This is not because Trumpists are unwilling to argue with each other—over the last two years, debates over China policy have been quite public. None of those interviewed were unwilling to rip into the perceived errors of rival camps.

The essential problem is that questions over how one should model Chinese perceptions or predict Chinese reactions are simply not central to these debates. Every person interviewed was capable of engaging with these questions when prompted. Some did so quite thoughtfully. But none raised these issues on their own accord.

Third: Policy can collapse under the weight of conflicting aims. This administration may struggle to adjudicate competing aspirations. On many issues—tariffs, revitalizing the defense industrial base, export controls, a rhetorically tough line on China, diplomatic engagement with India, and so forth—groups of officials who subscribe to different schools of thought may support the same policy. This does not mean policy will be able to accomplish everything dreamed of it. Often times one goal will have to win out at the expense of the other.

This will be particularly important when it comes to sequencing the administration’s actions. The administration will have to carefully consider which issues are worth raising tensions over, which are worth raising tensions over (but not now), and which are not worth raised tensions at all. There is no obvious framework for deciding these questions—especially if and when the winning arguments in the economic and geopolitical debates clash. With Republicans out of power, these two debates could proceed in parallel, neither one deeply impacting the other. This will not be true with Republicans in full control of the federal government.

Fourth: At the heart of these disputes lies a fundamental question: What is America capable of? Can it still do great things? For the last four years, Trumpists have answered “no.” They have cast the federal government as a bloated machine run by inept bureaucrats whose culture has been hijacked by “wokeism” and whose institutions have been weaponized against them. Trump has vowed to change all of that. Whether he succeeds will shape America’s approach to China.

These issues will not stay in the background when it comes time to gauge the military strength or economic resilience of the United States. They are important inputs into the Trumpist worldview. The friction these officials encounter in the bureaucracy, the success the administration has in expelling “wokeness” from American institutions, and Trump’s popularity with the broader public will all influence their perception of American strength. Those steeped in the technical intricacies of export controls and nuclear strategy may scoff at the idea that culture war battles will decide the course of world events. Nevertheless, they will. For Trump and his supporters, China is not just an adversary to outmaneuver, but a mirror and a standard. Competition with China cannot be severed from their larger quest to rechart the destiny of the American nation.

Featured Image Credits: Adobe Stock, Flickr (US Department of State, Secretary of Defense, White House), Raytheon, US Strategic Command | Artwork: Leah Pedro | FPRI

 


[1] James Taranto, “Weekend Interview: Trump Tangles with the Journal’s Editors,” Wall Street Journal, October 18, 2024. Trump has expressed similar sentiments many times. For a review, see Daniel Drezner, “Does the Madman Theory Actually Work?” Foreign Policy, January 7, 2025.

[2] I have conducted more than thirty off-the-record interviews with congressional aides, think tankers, former Trump officials, Trump transition figures, and individuals nominated for positions in the second administration. Interview 12.

[3] Alex Wong, “Competition with China: Debating the Endgame,” Ronald Reagan Presidential Foundation and Institute, October 16, 2023.

[4] Interview 28.

[5] Interviews 2, 3.

[6] US Department of State, “Biography: Marco Rubio,” accessed February 2, 2025.

[7] Interview 5. See also Robert Greenway et al., “A Conservative Defense Budget for Fiscal Year 2025,” Heritage Foundation Special Report No. 281 (April 2025).

[8] Michael Anton, “Why It’s Clearly Not in America’s Interest to Go to War Over Taiwan,” The Federalist, December 20, 2021.

[9] Interviews 4, 5. For representative public statements, see Alex Velez-Green and Robert Peters, “The Prioritization Imperative: A Strategy to Defend America’s Interests in a More Dangerous World,” Heritage Foundation Special Report no. 288 (August 2024); and Elbridge Colby’s comments in “The Most Dangerous Moment: A Debate on America’s Role in the Pacific,” Uncommon Knowledge, December 5, 2023.

[10] For two influential statements, see Mackenzie Eaglen, “10 Ways the US Is Falling Behind China in National Security,” American Enterprise Institute, August 9, 2023, and “Keeping Up with the Pacing Threat: Unveiling the True Size of Beijing’s Military Spending,” American Enterprise Institute, April 29, 2024; Jerry Hendrix, “The Age of American Naval Dominance Is Over,” The Atlantic, March 13, 2023.

[11] Interviews 10, 16.

[12] For one influential spokesman’s perception of the window, see Matt Pottinger, “The Stormy Seas of a Major Test,” in The Boiling Point: Urgent Steps to Defend Taiwan (Stanford University Press, 2024), 7–39, esp. 27–28. See also the introduction to Jonathan Ward, The Decisive Decade: American Grand Strategy for Triumph Over China (Diversion Books, 2023).

[13] Interview 21. For a representative statement, see Ivan Kapanathy’s concerns about public opinion in Taiwan and the United States posted in “Should the United States Change Its Policies Toward Taiwan?” Brookings Institution, convening April 16, 2024, and “The Collapse in One China,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 17, 2022.

[14] Interview 4. For a representative public articulation, see Alex Velez-Green, “The Case for Urgency Against China,” The National Interest, September 13, 2023. Contrast this with David Sacks and Ivan Kapanathy’s argument that “a full-blown conflict in the Taiwan Strait is neither imminent nor inevitable. Although the Chinese military is rapidly modernizing and preparing for a conflict over Taiwan, it is not yet ready or willing to go to war with the United States. The PLA is still several years away from achieving the capability to take Taiwan by force (assuming US intervention), and Russia’s struggles in Ukraine have likely induced some short-term caution in Beijing.” Sacks and Kapanathy, “What It Will Take To Deter China in the Taiwan Strait,” Foreign Affairs, June 15, 2023.

[15] Interview 1, 3, 8. For an extreme view, see Mitch McConnell, “The Price of American Retreat,” Foreign Affairs, December 16, 2024; for a version that concedes many of the Prioritizers’ arguments without reaching the same dismal conclusions, see Mike Gallagher, “America Needs a Strategy for China,” Wall Street Journal, August 22, 2024.

[16] See, for example, Alex Velez-Green, “Managing Trade-offs Between Military Aid for Taiwan and Ukraine,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief no. 5328, August 31, 2023. For prototypical Primacist and Internationalist responses, see Eric Sayers, tweet, November 23, 2024; Daniel Kochis, “Seven Things Pacific Prioritizers Get Wrong about Aid to Ukraine,” Hudson Institute policy memo, October 2024.

[17] Interviews 4, 25.

[18] For a thorough rendering of this idea, see Elbridge Colby, The Strategy of Denial: American Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict (Yale University Press, 2021), 1–65. For a Primacist articulation of the same ideas, see “Tom Cotton Maiden Floor Speech,” C-Span, March 16, 2015.

[19] The argument has received its most coherent articulation by Niall Ferguson in “Kissinger and the True Meaning of Détente,” Foreign Affairs, February 20, 2024; see also Elbridge Colby’s endorsement of the piece in an April 6, 2024, Twitter Thread.

[20] Interview 1; for a version of this thesis permissible in Trump world, see Alex Wong’s comments on human rights and national security in Alex Wong, “Balance in the Indo-Pacific: Defining the US Approach,” Hudson Institute, May 30, 2023. See also Mike Walz’s opening statement in “Waltz Hosts Bipartisan Roundtable on CCP Human Rights Abuses and the Beijing,” Rep. Mike Waltz YouTube channel, April 15, 2021; and the points about Marco Rubio and Mike Waltz outlined in Amy Mackinnon, “Trump’s China Hawks Are Also Uyghur Advocates,” Foreign Policy, November 15, 2024.

[21] The most influential statement of this was published by the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff during the first Trump administration: Policy Planning Staff, Office of the Secretary of State, Elements of the China Challenge (November 2020). Miles Yu, who directed that effort, maintains the same position today; see Yu, “China’s Common Destiny Is America’s Uncommon Challenge,” Washington Times, January 5, 2025. For a similar vision of Chinese ambitions from an individual working in the second administration policy office, see Jonathan Ward, China’s Vision of Victory (Atlas Publishing, 2019).

[22] Niccolo Soldo, “The Zürich Interviews—Darren J. Beattie: If Only You Knew How Bad Things Really Are,” Fisted By Foucault, December 14, 2020. See also Beattie’s essay “Meet Norm Eisen: Legal Hatchet Man and Central Operative in the ‘Color Revolution’ Against President Trump,” Revolver News, September 9, 2020, for a more sustained argument that the foreign policy bureaucracy is an extension of the same forces arrayed against Donald Trump.

[23] Interviews 19, 25. The classic statement on the New Left is Carl Olgesby, “Vietnamese Crucible: An Essay on the Meanings of the Cold War,” in Containment and Change: Two Dissenting Views of American Foreign Policy (Macmillan, 1970), 3–176.

[24] For representative statements from two officials tapped to serve in the administration, cf. Andrew Byers and Randall Schweller, “A Cold Peace With China,” The American Conservative, September 14, 2024; Judy Woodruff, “Tulsi Gabbard on Why She Wants to Prioritize Foreign Policy,” PBS Newshour, May 17, 2019.

[25] Interviews 1, 3, 17. One consistent difference between Restrainers and Prioritizers that few Primacists or Crusaders acknowledge: the Culture Warriors genuinely fear the possibility of nuclear war. See, for example, Michael Anton, “Nuclear Autumn,” Claremont Review of Books (Fall 2022); “Tulsi Gabbard on Dick Cheney’s Lust for Nuclear War, and Why She’s on Biden’s ‘Terrorist Watchlist’,” The Tucker Carlson Show, September 7, 2024, and Tulsi Gabbard, “Statement by Tulsi Gabbard on Decision to Continue to Campaign for President and Declining to Seek Re-Election to the House of Representatives,” American Presidency Project, October 24, 2019. In contrast, most Prioritizers do not view nuclear conflict between China and the United States—or for that matter, Russia and the United States—as likely, and are more narrowly focused on deterring conventional conflict.

[26] Interviews 5, 21. This will be familiar to just about anyone logging onto Republican social media spaces, where both Primacists and Internationalists are derided with the smear “neocon.”

[27] Interview 12.

[28] Doug Palmer, “Rubio: US Must Break Its Dependence on China,” Politico, January 15, 2025.

[29] Interviews 19, 20. On this note see also Ivanka Trump, tweet, September 25, 2024.

[30] For a strong public example of this perspective, see Liza Tobin, “Commanding Heights: Ensuring US Leadership

in the Critical and Emerging Technologies of the 21st Century,” Testimony for the US House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party, July 26, 2023.

[31] Interview 27.

[32] Recently, the world views of this group have received a significant media coverage. See, for example, Margaux MacColl, “Rockets, God and Peter Thiel: 36 Hours in the Gundo, Tech’s Latest Startup Haven,” The Information, April 5, 2024; Zoe Bernard, “Inside California’s Freedom-Loving, Bible-Thumping Hub of Hard Tech,” Vanity Fair, July 22, 2024.

[33] Interviews 20, 24. The graph has gone viral in technologist spaces since its appearance in Valentina Romei, William Crofton, and Colby Smith, “Why America’s Economy is Soaring Ahead of its Rivals,” Financial Times, December 3, 2024.

[34] This phrasing comes from interview 23, who draws in turn from Gary P. Pisano and Willy C. Shih, “Restoring American Competitiveness,” Harvard Business Review (July-August 2009).

[35] Oren Cass, “Chips Ahoy! Don’t Look Now, but Industrial Policy Is Doing Its Job,” Understanding America, August 9, 2024.

[36] For a succinct explainer, see Kyle Chan, “China’s Overlapping Tech-Industrial Ecosystems,” High Capacity, January 22, 2025.

[37] For a notable public articulation of these ideas, see “Julius Krein: The Blueprint for an American Manufacturing Renaissance,” The Realignment, episode 527, January 7, 2025.

[38] Interview 28. The same point is made by Robert Lighthizer in “Speech: The Naval War College Foundation Symposium,” America First Policy Institute, August 17, 2023.

[39] “Dignity” is a common byword among the Industrialists and Trade Warriors, often juxtaposed with economic efficiency. For a prominent example, see Robert Lighthizer, “How to Make Trade Work for Workers,” Foreign Affairs (July/August 2020).

[40] Interview 30.

[41] This divide corresponds with, but does not map perfectly onto, other fault lines in the Republican coalition. The recent controversy over H1B1 visas—which pit technologists who believe that steady high-skilled immigration is necessary if America is to maintain its position as a global technological leader stay at the cutting edge against Republicans more sensitive to arguments about the effect H1B1 visa holders have on wages and opportunities for American citizens—echoes many of the same themes covered here.

[42] Interviews 14, 15.

[43] Interview 30.

[44] Stephen Miran, “A User’s Guide to Restructuring the Global Trading System,” Hudson Bay Capital, November 2024.

[45] There are also people whom I would classify as closer to the techno-nationalist side of the equation who make similar arguments about the need to near-shore. See, for example, “Homeland Security and the China Challenge: A Conversation with Congressman Mark Green,” Hudson Institute, December 17, 2024.

[46] This phrasing comes from Marc Andreesen, “Marc Andreessen: It’s Morning Again in America,” Uncommon Knowledge, January 14, 2024.

[47] Mike Lee and David Schweikert, “Unshackling American Infrastructure,” City Journal, October 6, 2021; “How to Prevent Federal Judges from Killing New Energy Projects,” City Journal, January 27, 2025; Jon Askonas and

Jonathan Berry, “How to Free Elon Musk’s SpaceX from Federal Red Tape,” Wall Street Journal, October 29, 2024.

[48] Katherine Boyle, “Building American Dynamism,” a16z, January 14, 2022.

[49] This critique of DEI extends out to American struggles with industrial policy—see, for example, Matt Cole and Chris Nicolson, “DEI Killed the CHIPS Act,” The Hill, March 7, 2024.

[50] Almost every issue of American Affairs includes at least one essay mining the Chinese experience for American advantage. Some notable examples include Stephen Brent, “Disruptive Innovation in America and China,” American Affairs III, no. 4 (Winter 2019); David Adler, “Guiding Finance: China’s Strategy for Funding Advanced Manufacturing,” American Affairs VI, no. 2 (Summer 2022); Nathan Simington, “China is Winning. Now What?” American Affairs VIII, no. 3 (Autumn 2024); Melik C. Demirel and David Adler, “Threading the Innovation Chain: Scaling and Manufacturing Deep Tech in the United States,” American Affairs VIII, no. 4 (Winter 2024). The attitude at the American Compass is neatly summarized in the title of Marshall Auerback’s essay, “Contain China if Necessary, but Emulate Features of its Industrial Policy to Ensure Long Term Economic Prosperity,” American Compass, June 2020. However, compare Rob Atkinson, “No, Adopting an Industrial Policy Doesn’t Mean We’re Emulating China,” American Compass, April 2021.

[51] Interview 23. Similar comments were also made in interviews 20 and 24.

[52] Interview 10; see also note 35.

[53] For a characteristic example, see Ward, Decisive Decade.

[54] Micah Meadowcroft, “Making Sense of the China Problem,” American Compass, August 1, 2024. See also his interview with JD Vance in “The World That We Will Live and Die In,” The American Conservative, March 15, 2023, for a similar typology.