Hukuk Devleti endeksinde Abdülhamid istibdadı düzeyindeyiz. Murat Yetkin - 02 Nisan 2025 çarşamba

Hukuk Devleti endeksinde Abdülhamid istibdadı düzeyindeyiz.

Murat Yetkin - 02 Nisan 2025 çarşamba 

Türkiye’de hukuk devleti düzeyi, hukukun üstünlüğü endeksi TEPAV çalışmasının gösterdiğine göre, İmamoğlu Vakası öncesinde de 120 yıl öncesinin Abdülhamid istibdadı dönemine gerilemişti.

İki yüz yıla hukuk devleti ve hukukun üstünlüğü çabamızda gün itibarıyla geldiğimiz yeri anlatacak en ciddiyetsiz, en traji-komik örnek belki de alışveriş boykotunun da soruşturma konusu yapılması oldu.
Nobel ödüllü romancımız Orhan Pamuk 27 Mart’ta birkaç Avrupa gazetesiyle birlikte T24’te yayınlanan yazısında “Sınırlı demokrasi de halkın en çok sevdiği ve gelecek seçimde en çok oyu alacak olan adayın hapse tıkılmasıyla sona eriyor” diye yazdı. Açıkça Ekrem İmamoğlu’dan bahsediyordu.
Aynı gün CHP Diyarbakır Milletvekili Sezgin Tanrıkulu, İmamoğlu protestolarında gözaltına alınan öğrencilere “düşmanca” işkence yapıldığını örnekleriyle iddia etti. Aynı sıralarda RTÜK İmamoğlu protestolarını canlı yayınlayan TV istasyonlarına görülmemiş ceza yağdırdı.
Bu son süreci başlatan olaylar zinciriyse İstanbul Üniversitesi’nin İstanbul Cumhuriyet Başsavcılığının ısrarlı yanıt talebi ardından İmamoğlu’nun 35 yıllık diplomasını iptal etmesiyle başlamıştı.
Gelişmeler, hukuk devleti düzeyimizin de görülmemiş düzeylere gerilediğini gösteriyor.

Hukuk devleti ölçütü

Vahim durumu Türkiye Ekonomi Politikaları Vakfının (TEPAV) son raporlarıyla ölçülebilir halde görebiliyoruz.
Hukuk devleti düzeyimizi ve bunun hem demokrasi hem ekonomideki etkilerini TEPAV Direktörü Prof. Dr. Güven Sak’ın iki yazısında bulabiliyoruz.
Sak, 25 Şubat 2025’te “Türkiye’de hukuk daha da dip yapar mı?” yazısını yayınladığında henüz az önce saydığım gelişmeler yaşanmamıştı. Ama “Görünen köy kılavuz istemez” atasözümüzde olduğu gibi, İmamoğlu’na peşi sıra soruşturma ve davalar açılmaya başlamıştı.
O yazıda Profesör Sak TEPAV’ın İsveç Merkezli Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) ölçütlerine de bakarak çalıştığı bir grafiği da yayınlamıştı. Bu grafik 1900-2023 yılları arasında Türkiye’de Hukukun Üstünlüğü endeksini gösteriyordu.

Abdülhamid düzeyine gerileme

Bu şekli incelediğimizde bazı dönüm noktalarını görüyoruz.
Türkiye 1900’de İkinci Abdülhamid yönetimindedir. Hukukun Üstünlüğü ölçüsünde ilk sıçramayı 1908 Meşrutiyeti ile görüyoruz.
Birinci Dünya Savaşı ile düşmeye başlayıp 1915’de düşüş gösteren -ama yine de Abdülhamid dönemine göre iyi durumda olan hukuk devleti düzeyi, 1923’te Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’ün Cumhuriyeti ilanıyla birlikte bir sıçrama daha kaydetmiş.
İkinci Dünya Savaşı yılları ve sonrasında, 27 Mayıs 1960 darbesine dek iniş çıkışlar var. Ama 1961 Anayasasıyla bir sıçramaya daha tanık oluyoruz. 12 Mart 1971 ve 12 Eylül 1980 darbelerinde yine keskin düşüşler var.
Grafik 2002’de AK Parti’nin kazandığı seçimle yükselme eğilimine girip 2005’te zirveye ulaşıyor. Bu, Türkiye’de AK Parti’nin girişimi ve CHP’nin desteğiyle Avrupa Birliği uyum reformlarının TBMM tarafından kabul edilip yasalara yansıdığı tarihtir.
Bu tarihten sonra, 2012’ye dek hukuk devleti ölçütünde düşme eğilimi başlıyor. Bunu Ergenekon-Balyoz serisi davalar ve uygulamalarına bağlayabiliriz.
15 Temmuz 2016 askeri darbe girişimi, bastırılması ve sonrasında ülkenin Cumhurbaşkanlığı kararnameleriyle yönetilmeye başlamasından itibaren ise keskin bir düşüş görülüyor. Bu keskin düşüş 2020’de Türkiye 120 yıl önce, Abdülhamid’in “istibdat rejimi” diye eleştirilen düzeyine dek düşerek orada durmuş. Hala da toparlanabilmiş değil.

Hukuk devleti ve sandık kaygısı

Güven Sak, önceki yazısından bir ay, İmamoğlu’nun tutuklanmasının ertesi günü Ekonomim gazetesinde yayınladığı “Şimdi buradan nereye?” yazısındaysa Türkiye’nin çok partili rejime geçtiği 1946’daki kurmaca seçim deneyiminden bu yana ilk kez serbest seçimlerin, iktidarın kaybederse yönetimden ayrılacağı seçimlerin bir daha yapılıp yapılmayacağı endişesine kapıldığını yazdı.
Bu ciddi bir endişedir.
İnsanlar bu endişeye İmamoğlu’na yapılanlara bakarak da kapılıyor.
Örneğin, üniversitelilerin yıllardan sonra ilk kez protesto eylemlerinde başı çekmesinde, İmamoğlu’nun diplomasının onu cumhurbaşkanlığı yarışından düşürmek için yapıldığı algısı ve gençlerin kendi diplomalarının de bir gün iptal edilip edilmeyeceği endişesine kapılmasının payı oldu.
Yine TEPAV’ın şu grafiği ise hukuk devleti, hukukun üstünlüğü göstergelerinin halkın mutluluğu cinsinden ifadesinde Türkiye’nin gerileme içinde olduğunu gösteriyor.

Türkiye’nin özellikle de 2018’den bu yana ekonomik olarak da gerileme göstermesinde hukuk devletinden uzaklaşıyor, 120 yıl önceki Abdülhamid dönemiyle aynı düzeye gerilemiş olmamızın bir payı yok mu sizce?

Muhalifsen teröristsin, darbecisin

Şunu da kayda geçirelim. Bugüne kadar iktidarda ne pahasına olursa olsun kalmak isteyen hiçbir siyasi güç olmamıştır ki kendileri giderse ülkenin batacağını iddia etmemiş olsun.
Buna son -ama muhtemelen sonuncusu olmayacak- örnek ise Cumhurbaşkanı Tayyip Erdoğan’ın neredeyse çeyrek asra dayanan AK Parti yönetimini ayakta tutan müttefiki MHP lideri Devlet Bahçeli’nin 1 Nisan’da Türkgün gazetesinde CHP’nin “Kaos ve kargaşa çıkarma peşinde” olduğunu söyleyen yazısı oldu. Bahçeli, CHP lideri Özgür Özel’in sokak çağrısını, İmamoğlu ve çalışma arkadaşlarının sansasyonel tansiyonu yükseltecek şekilde topluca gözaltına alınmasına tepki değil de çok önceden hükümet darbesine zemin olarak planlanmış bir sabotaj komplosu olarak sunuyor; her normal demokrasinin normu olan hükümetin değişmesi ise MHP’ye göre neredeyse Türkiye’nin sonu olacaktır.
İşin başka boyutu da var: PKK’nın silahları bırakıp kendini feshetme çağrısına yanıtı geciktikçe Cumhur ittifakındaki asabiyet artıyor, bunun acısı ise CHP ve diğer yasal muhalif parti ve hareketlerden çıkartılıyor. Neticede hukuk devleti düzeyimiz Abdülhamid dönemine gerilemiş görünüyor.

ASPI - The Strategist - 2 April 2025 - Robert Wihtol - Bookshelf: ‘Vampire state: The rise and fall of the Chinese economy

 Bookshelf: ‘Vampire state: The rise and fall of the Chinese economy’

2 Apr 2025|Robert Wihtol

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After three decades of record-breaking growth, at about the same time as Xi Jinping rose to power in 2012, China’s economy started the long decline to its current state of stagnation. The Chinese Communist Party would like us to believe that the country’s massive problems are under control and that the economy can easily be kickstarted. But few analysts are convinced.

Ian Williams was a long-time foreign correspondent for Channel 4 News and NBC, based in Moscow, Hong Kong, Bangkok and Beijing, and has written extensively about China. In his latest book, Vampire State: The rise and fall of the Chinese economy, he takes a particularly tough view, suggesting that China’s economic miracle was just a mirage all along.

As Williams sees it, China’s economic reforms were half-hearted from day one and designed first and foremost to ensure that the CCP would remain in power. The West expected economic reform to be followed by political reform and US president Bill Clinton even used this argument with Congress to justify China’s accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001. But political change was never on the CCP’s agenda. Rather, China’s ‘socialist market economy’ was intended to bend economics and business to the party’s will and keep the CCP firmly in the driver’s seat.

With China’s economy now in deep trouble, Williams argues that the party-state is the problem rather than the solution. Like a vampire, the party-driven control structures are draining the life-blood out of the economy. Not satisfied to control the country’s huge state-owned enterprises, in recent years the CCP has tightened its centralised mechanisms and expanded its presence into the boardrooms of private companies.

Williams’s analysis starts from the domestic economy, where an enormous property bubble has deprived local governments of income from the sale of land rights, creating huge industrial surpluses and driving youth unemployment up and consumer prices down.

With limited options for addressing this deflationary spiral, China has resorted to exporting its problems. Casting a wide net, Williams reviews the global reach of China’s economic operators, from the expansive infrastructure lending of state-owned policy banks throughout Africa, Asia and Latin America to Chinese racketeers in the border regions of Laos, Myanmar and Thailand.

For all Beijing’s talk of borrower-friendly policies and no-strings-attached lending, China is an unforgiving creditor. When its massive infrastructure projects run into trouble, it prefers providing rescue loans that tighten its control over the assets it has created to writing down debt, squeezing the poorest borrowers in the process.

Williams takes a particularly dim view of China’s business and investment environment, citing numerous examples of a business-unfriendly public sector, biased legal system and unreliable private partners. The fine line between the voluntary transfer of know-how and technological theft is a major danger zone. Many foreign investors have been trapped into ‘voluntarily’ handing over business secrets only to find themselves edged out by their Chinese partners. Investors have also learned the hard way that the Chinese court system rarely works in their favour.

Overseas cooperation between China’s public sector and its state-owned and private enterprises is exceptionally tight, whether in trade policy, research and development, the ‘borrowing’ of technology or development of human resources. The Chinese army, for example, describes sending scientists to study in Britain as ‘picking flowers in foreign lands to make honey in China’.

Williams has researched his book thoroughly, travelling the length and breadth of China to study local-level problems first-hand. He also visited countries throughout Asia and elsewhere impacted by China’s economic policies. His research included wide-ranging interviews, from the foreign minister of Lithuania and other government leaders, business executives and human rights activists to the manager of a massage parlour operating on the border between Laos and Thailand.

Can China bounce back, or is the miracle over? According to Williams, Xi is not able to implement the reforms needed to get the economy back on track simply because they would threaten the CCP’s grip on power. As a result, the Party is ‘frozen in the headlights’. The cautious balance between stimulating the economy and ensuring stability struck this month by the National People’s Congress is consistent with this diagnosis.

Williams analyses China with his eyes wide open. His refreshing book is a must read for anyone dealing with China’s economy, from public sector trade negotiators to private businesspeople and investors.

Author

Robert Wihtol is an adjunct faculty member at the Asian Institute of Management and former Asian Development Bank country director for China and director general for East Asia.

 

Image of people in the streets of Beijing at nighttime: zhang kaiyv/Unsplash.

ASPI - The Strategist - 2 April 2025 - Joseph S. Nye Jr. - How world order changes

 

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How world order changes

2 Apr 2025|Joseph S Nye Jr

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After the Berlin Wall came down in 1989, and almost a year before the Soviet Union collapsed in late 1991, US President George H W Bush proclaimed a ‘new world order’. Now, just two months into Donald Trump’s second presidency, Kaja Kallas, the European Union’s top diplomat, has declared that ‘the international order is undergoing changes of a magnitude not seen since 1945.’ But what is ‘world order’, and how is it maintained or disrupted?

In everyday language, order refers to a stable arrangement of items, functions, or relations. Thus, in domestic affairs, we speak of an ‘orderly society’ and its government. But in international affairs, there is no overarching government. With arrangements among states always subject to change, the world is, in a sense, ‘anarchic’.

Anarchy is not the same as chaos, though. Order is a matter of degree: it varies over time. In domestic affairs, a stable polity can persist despite a degree of ungoverned violence. After all, organised and unorganised violent crime remain a fact of life in most countries. But when violence reaches too high a level, it is seen as an indication of a failed state. Somalia may have a common language and ethnicity, but it has long been a site of battling clans; the ‘national’ government in Mogadishu has little authority outside the capital.

The German sociologist Max Weber famously defined the modern state as a political institution with a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. But our understanding of legitimate authority rests on ideas and norms that can change. Thus, a legitimate order stems from judgments about the strength of norms, as well as simple descriptions about the amount and nature of violence within a state.

When it comes to world order, we can measure changes in the distribution of power and resources, as well as in adherence to the norms that establish legitimacy. We can also measure the frequency and intensity of violent conflict.

A stable distribution of power among states often involves wars that clarify a perceived balance of power. But views about the legitimacy of war have evolved over time. For example, in 18th-century Europe, when Prussia’s King Frederick the Great wanted to take the province of Silesia from neighboring Austria, he simply took it. But after World War II, states created the United Nations, which defined only wars of self-defense as legitimate (unless otherwise authorised by the Security Council).

To be sure, when Russian President Vladimir Putin invaded Ukraine and occupied its territory, he claimed that he was acting in self-defense against the eastward expansion of NATO. But most UN members voted to condemn his behavior, and those that did not—such as China, North Korea, and Iran—share his interest in counterbalancing American power.

While states can lodge complaints against others in international courts, these tribunals have no capacity to enforce their decisions. Similarly, while the UN Security Council can authorise states to enforce collective security, it has rarely done so. The five permanent members (Britain, China, France, Russia, and the United States) each wield a veto, and they have not wanted to risk a major war. The veto functions like a fuse or circuit-breaker in an electrical system: it is better to have the lights go out than to have the house burn down.

Moreover, a world order may become stronger or weaker because of technological changes that alter the distribution of military and economic power; domestic social and political changes that alter a major state’s foreign policy; or transnational forces like ideas or revolutionary movements, which can spread beyond governments’ control and alter public perceptions of the prevailing order’s legitimacy.

For example, after the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, which ended the European wars of religion, the principle of state sovereignty became enshrined in the normative world order. But in addition to changes in the principles of legitimacy are changes in the distribution of power resources. By the time of World War I, the US had become the world’s largest economy, allowing it to determine the outcome of the war by intervening militarily. Although US President Woodrow Wilson tried to change the normative order with his League of Nations, US domestic politics pushed the country toward isolationism, which allowed the Axis powers to attempt to impose their own order in the 1930s.

After World War II, the US accounted for half of the world economy, but its military power was balanced by the Soviet Union’s, and the UN’s normative power was weak. With the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991, the US enjoyed a brief unipolar moment, only to overextend itself in the Middle East while permitting the financial mismanagement that culminated in the 2008 financial crisis. Believing the US was in decline, Russia and China changed their own policies. Putin ordered an invasion of neighboring Georgia, and China replaced Deng Xiaoping’s cautious foreign policy with a more assertive approach. Meanwhile, China’s robust economic growth allowed it to close the power gap with America.

Relative to China, American power did decline; but its share of the world economy has remained at around 25 percent. As long as the US maintained strong alliances with Japan and Europe, they would represent more than half the world economy, compared to a mere 20 percent for China and Russia.

Will the Trump administration maintain this unique source of America’s continued power, or is Kallas right that we are at a turning point? The years 1945, 1991, and 2008 were also turning points. If future historians add 2025 to the list, it will be a result of US policy—a self-inflicted wound—rather than any inevitable secular development.

Author

Joseph S Nye Jr is a former US assistant secretary of defense and author of the memoir A Life in the American Century (Polity Press, 2024). This article is presented in partnership with Project Syndicate © 2025.

 

Image of the European Union’s high representative for foreign affairs and security policy, Kaja Kallas: Adam Berry/Getty Images.

France -Syrie - Feuille de route pour la Syrie - Réunion du quintet de méditerranée orientale (Paris, 31/03/2025)

 

1. Syrie - Feuille de route pour la Syrie - Réunion du quintet de méditerranée orientale (Paris, 31/03/2025)

Les chefs d'Etat et de gouvernement de Chypre, de la France, de la Grèce et du Liban se sont entretenus par téléphone avec le président par intérim des autorités syriennes de transition à Paris le 28 mars 2025.

Ils ont salué ce nouveau format de discussion sur la situation en Syrie avec la participation des Etats de Méditerranée orientale voisins, qui doit servir à soutenir le processus de transition vers une Syrie unifiée, stable et pacifique. Au cours de leur échange, ils sont convenus des éléments suivants :

1. Sanctions. Les chefs d'Etat et de gouvernement ont soutenu la levée des sanctions imposées à la Syrie, conformément aux conclusions adoptées par le Conseil de l'Union européenne (UE) le 20 mars. L'UE a déjà décidé de lever progressivement certaines sanctions sectorielles, décision entrée en vigueur le 24 février. Dans ce contexte, Chypre, la France et la Grèce sont convenus de continuer leurs efforts au sein de l'UE pour obtenir la levée d'autres sanctions et pour encourager les autres partenaires internationaux à faire de même et ils continueront de suivre attentivement la situation en Syrie.

2. Engagement économique. Dans le prolongement de la neuvième conférence de Bruxelles qui s'est tenue le 17 mars 2025, les chefs d'Etats et de gouvernement se sont engagés à accroître leur aide économique pour la reconstruction de la Syrie.

3. Cet engagement repose sur la mise en oeuvre effective par les autorités de transition syriennes des mesures suivantes :

- s'agissant de la transition politique, la formation d'un Gouvernement inclusif, respectueux et représentatif de toutes les composantes de la société syrienne quelles que soient leurs origines et leurs croyances religieuses ;

- s'agissant de la sécurité, une coordination efficace des forces des autorités syriennes avec les mécanismes internationaux existants en matière de lutte contre le terrorisme, notamment la coalition anti-Daech (opération Inherent Resolve) ; ils ont par ailleurs salué l'accord auquel sont parvenus les autorités de transition et les Forces démocratiques syriennes le 10 mars 2025 ;

- s'agissant de l'obligation de rendre compte, une protection efficace de tous les citoyens syriens quelles que soient leurs origines et leurs croyances religieuses et une obligation de rendre compte efficace et factuelle pour les crimes commis contre les civils, notamment pendant les récentes violences sur la côte ouest de la Syrie. Ils ont noté en particulier qu'une justice transitionnelle complète est essentielle au processus de réconciliation.

4. Réfugiés. Ils ont exprimé leur soutien à une approche régionale réunissant les donateurs internationaux concernés, les pays qui accueillent des réfugiés syriens et des personnes déplacées à l'intérieur de leur pays ainsi que les institutions spécialisées et les banques de développement, intégrant l'aide humanitaire et la reconstruction, la restauration des moyens de subsistance ainsi que le développement économique, pour garantir un environnement approprié au retour des réfugiés syriens chez eux, dans la sécurité et la dignité.

5. Délimitations des frontières. Ils ont soutenu une délimitation des frontières maritimes de la Syrie qui soit fondée sur le droit maritime international, notamment sur la Convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer, et qui prenne en compte les intérêts des Etats européens voisins et ils se sont engagés à mettre en place des comités appropriés à cet effet.

6. Souveraineté syrienne. Ils ont soutenu le plein respect de la souveraineté de la Syrie, notamment concernant les violations et les ingérences de parties prenantes étrangères, et ils ont demandé leur retrait complet du territoire syrien.

(Source : site Internet de la présidence de la République)

T.C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı - 1 Nisan 2025, Sayın Bakanımızın (Hakan Fidan) Fransa’yı Ziyareti Hk.

 T.C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı - 

1 Nisan 2025, Sayın Bakanımızın Fransa’yı Ziyareti Hk.

Sayın Bakanımız (Hakan Fidan) , 2 Nisan 2025 tarihinde Fransa’ya resmi bir ziyaret gerçekleştirecektir.

Reuters - Daily Briefing By Kate Turton - Trump's tariff announcement, Wisconsin votes in a high-profile judicial race after millions spent by Musk - China calls Taiwan's president a 'parasite' as it launches military drills around the island.

 

Daily Briefing

By Kate Turton

Hello. As the world braces for Trump's tariff announcement, our live blog is covering the latest while our graphics team asks, what typically happens when tariffs are applied? Elsewhere, Wisconsin votes in a high-profile judicial race after millions spent by Musk, and China calls Taiwan's president a 'parasite' as it launches military drills around the island. Plus, anime and mascots: Japan hopes 'oshikatsu' rage will open consumer wallets.

Today's Top News   Elon Musk gives a check to an audience member during a rally in support of a conservative state Supreme Court candidate. REUTERS/Vincent Alban United States Wisconsin voters will choose a new justice for the state's top court in a race that offers an early referendum on US President Donald Trump's second term, with abortion rights, labor rights and election rules all potentially in the balance. Senate Republicans will ask their chamber's nonpartisan referee this week to weigh in on a controversial plan to make Trump's expiring 2017 tax cuts permanent, which critics say could lead to trillions of dollars in additional debt. The Trump administration has warned suppliers to US embassies and consulates as well as recipients of US grants worldwide that they must comply with its ban on Diversity, Equity and Inclusion programmes or risk losing payments. In other news China staged military drills off Taiwan's north, south and east coasts as a "stern warning" against separatism and called Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te a "parasite," as Taiwan sent warships to respond to China's navy approaching its shores. China and Russia are "friends forever, never enemies," Chinese's Foreign Minister Wang Yi said in remarks published during a visit to Moscow in which he also welcomed signs of normalising ties between Washington and Moscow. Ukraine will work with the US towards a mutually acceptable text of a minerals deal that the two countries can sign, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha said. Meanwhile, the Kremlin says Russia continues to speak with Americans as Trump threatens secondary sanctions. Greenland will strengthen its ties with Denmark until it can become a sovereign nation, the Arctic island's incoming prime minister told Reuters, noting that the semi-autonomous Danish territory ultimately wants to become independent. An Israeli airstrike killed four people including a Hezbollah official in Beirut's southern suburbs, a Lebanese security source said, further testing a shaky ceasefire between Israel and Iran-backed Hezbollah.

Business & Markets   US M&A volumes tumble 13%, Europe up 7%, Asia-Pacific jumps 92%. REUTERS/File Photo A global trade war kicked off by Trump and the ensuing market turmoil soured bankers' predictions for a robust start to a blockbuster year for deals on Wall Street. First-quarter mergers and acquisitions volume rose 12.6% to $984.38 billion from year-ago period, Dealogic data compiled for Reuters showed.  SoftBank-owned chip tech provider Arm Holdings recently sought to acquire Alphawave, a UK-based supplier of semiconductor intellectual property, to secure a crucial technology that is crucial for building its own artificial-intelligence processors, according to three sources familiar with the matter. Tesla's sales in France and Sweden fell year-on-year for a third consecutive month in March, contributing to the lowest first-quarterly sales figures in the two countries since 2021 for Elon Musk's electric car brand. Britain handed Italian defense company Leonardo a $213 million contract extension to maintain the Royal Navy's fleet of 54 Merlin helicopters, a deal which it said would help support 1,000 jobs across the country. Shares of US drugmakers fell after reports that the Food and Drug Administration's top vaccine official, Peter Marks, had been forced to resign. Listen to Global Health Editor Michele Gershberg on the Reuters World News podcast as she looks at why this FDA shakeup is rattling investors. Drugmakers are lobbying Trump to phase in tariffs on imported pharmaceutical products in hopes of reducing the sting from the charges and to allow time to shift manufacturing, according to four sources familiar with the discussions.

Law firms hire former Tesla lawyer and top conservative litigator for Trump fight   The law firm Jenner & Block LLP in Washington, D.C. REUTERS/Andrew Kelly/File Photo As the Trump administration strikes at US law firms with a wave of executive orders, three firms challenging those orders have retained a former Tesla general counsel, a longtime conservative litigator and other top lawyers to represent them. Read more

And Finally... Momoka Matsui and her co-worker Saki Matsumoto take photos of acrylic stand figure models of their favorite idols with cakes and teas, Tokyo. REUTERS/Kim Kyung-Hoon In Japan, policymakers and economists are paying close attention to the "oshikatsu" phenomenon as a growing driver of consumer spending. Oshikatsu, which entered the mainstream lexicon during the pandemic, has economists and even the Bank of Japan taking note for its potential to prop up Japan's tepid consumption. Read more

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