The Japan Times
Hamas tests the limits of Japan's Israel-Palestine policy
Tokyo has sought to chart its own course on Middle East policy
Japan faces tough choices amid the outbreak of war between Israel and Hamas. The issue now is how Tokyo will navigate the conflict. | POOL / VIA REUTERS
BY MICHAEL MACARTHUR BOSACK
CONTRIBUTING WRITER
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Oct 12, 2023
PYEONGTAEK, SOUTH KOREA – When Hamas forces executed rocket and ground attacks against Israeli population centers last week, all but one Group of Seven government immediately expressed that Israel had a “right to defend itself.”
Japan was the lone outlier, condemning the Hamas attacks but also expressing concern over the number of casualties in the Gaza Strip caused by the Israel Defense Forces in their militarized response.
This reflects a decadeslong policy approach that Japan has maintained since it first recognized the legitimacy of the Palestinian state in 1973. However, Tokyo’s Israel-Palestine policy has not been tested like this before. In recent years, the Liberal Democratic Party-led government has sought a more active role in global leadership and Japan currently holds the G7 presidency and a nonpermanent seat in the U.N. Security Council. But with leadership comes tough choices, and the Fumio Kishida administration is faced with one here.
How will Japan approach the Israel-Hamas war? What sort of policy decisions might we see and what kind of actions might the government take in response?
To answer those questions, it is useful to review the state-of-play for Japanese relations with Israel and Palestine prior to the Hamas attacks, as well as what the Japanese government has done since hostilities erupted last week. It is impossible to know exactly how Japan might respond to developments in the war that have not happened yet, but there are three factors that will influence the decision making from the Fumio Kishida administration.
Past policy
Although critics of the Japanese government often argue that Japan’s foreign policy is simply a carbon copy of its U.S. ally, one notable area where the Japanese government demonstrated its willingness to go its own way is on Middle East policy. This was most notable in its break from U.S. postures towards Palestine when in 1973, the Japanese government published the so-called Nikaido Statement under then-Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka. This statement recognized the legitimacy of the Palestinian State and called for restraint from Israel.
The Japanese government has maintained this policy position over the past five decades. Whenever there is an escalation of tensions, Japan has called for restraint from both sides and progress on achieving a two-state solution that reflects the needs and desires of the Palestinian people.
Japanese government officials have backed this policy with engagements with Palestine. For example, Prime Minister Kishida himself met with Palestinian counterparts when he traveled to the Middle East as foreign minister in 2013, as did Shinzo Abe when he was prime minister back in 2018.
However, for the most part, the Japanese government has kept political distance from the thornier issues, maintaining a more neutral position in practice. In fact, Tokyo has been slowly but surely building ties with the Israeli government through ministerial— and leader-level contacts. Last year, the two governments signed an updated memorandum of understanding for defense cooperation and decided to launch a “Joint Study Group on the possibility of a Japan-Israel Economic Partnership Agreement.” Up until the Hamas attack, progress in Japan-Israel ties seemed inevitable.
Actions since the “Al-Aqsa Flood”
On Saturday, Hamas militants initiated what they called Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, a complex rocket and ground attack against several Israeli population centers. This prompted Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to issue a public statement in which he declared, “Citizens of Israel, we are at war. Not an operation, not an escalation — this is war and we will win.” The Israel Defense Forces then launched "Operation Swords of Iron," a large-scale military operation to eliminate Hamas forces completely.
In response, the Japanese Foreign Ministry quickly issued a statement condemning Hamas’ actions, expressing condolences for the bereaved and calling for restraint from both sides. The ministry followed this up with a longer statement by Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa in which she added condemnation of Hamas’ kidnapping of Israelis (including civilians) while expressing concern over the number of casualties in the Gaza strip resulting from the Israel Defense Forces’ militarized response.
Already, the language that the Japanese government employed through those statements signaled a different approach to the war from the other G7 members. This was made even more salient on Monday when five G7 members — France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States — issued a joint statement without Japan or Canada to express their resolute support for Israel in defending itself against Hamas.
The Kishida administration’s approach thus far has been to temper responses to this conflict. Kamikawa has spoken to her foreign minister counterparts in both the United Arab Emirates and Jordan. As for concrete actions in response, the Prime Minister’s Office has said that it is not yet considering the provision of aid or other support.
What's next?
While the Kishida administration will likely hope that this conflict ends quickly without imposing too many demands on Japan, three factors will influence what comes next for them.
The first will be the conduct of the two sides with relation to the rules-based international order, particularly as it pertains to international humanitarian law. Hamas’ attacks against civilian targets demonstrated a clear break from the rules. But if the Israel Defense Forces also illustrate a willingness to push the boundaries of the law of armed conflict, it will justify Japan’s decision to distance itself from the war and call for restraint from both sides. However, if there is a clear distinction between the conduct of the two parties, it will be harder for the Kishida administration to temper its responses if it wishes to display global leadership.
Second will be the conduct of other international partners. What sort of support will they give and to whom? Will they provided security assistance or humanitarian aid? Will they attempt to mediate between the warring parties or other potential antagonists? If the Japanese government is keen to play the role of a global leader, it will need to reflect the energy and activity of other leading players in addressing this war.
Third will be the Japanese public’s reaction to the war. With Kishida’s polling numbers already stagnantly low, public sentiments will invariably influence the administration’s decision making so as to avoid any further erosion of support.
More than likely, the Kishida administration will do what it can to stay out of the conflict as much as possible, even though it could be doing more. Although the economy remains a trouble spot for the current government, Japan is still the third-largest economic power in the world, meaning that humanitarian aid and financial assistance for all civilians affected by the conflict is a practical measure. But more importantly, the nation has diplomatic tools at its disposal.
Japan’s long-standing and strong recognition of the right of Palestinians to self-determination separates it from the other G7 members and opens windows for meaningful diplomacy and action. Rather than seeing that as a problem, they should view it as an opportunity to engage in ways that other partners cannot. It is possible that the Japanese government still has scar tissue from Abe’s botched attempt to mediate between Iran and the United States in 2017, but they could take lessons from that past failure and apply them towards addressing an important and devastating conflict today. The Foreign Ministry has already engaged with the UAE and Jordan, but there are many others that could influence outcomes in this war: Iran, Egypt, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia, to name a few.
For decades, Japan has sought to chart its own course on Israel-Palestine policy, and the true significance of that decision is now being tested. Hamas’ surprise attacks triggered a conflict that begs the question of what Japan may do with its unique policy position — now the Kishida administration must decide if they will actually leverage it to pursue positive outcomes amid a horrific war.
Michael MacArthur Bosack is the special adviser for government relations at the Yokosuka Council on Asia-Pacific Studies. He previously served in the Japanese government as a Mansfield fellow.
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