Turkish Influence in Sub-Saharan Africa Soner Cagaptay, Spencer Cook, and Amal Soukkarieh

 Turkish Influence in Sub-Saharan Africa

Soner Cagaptay, Spencer Cook, and Amal Soukkarieh 

POLICY NOTES JUNE 2022

NO. 120

THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY

The past decade of Turkish foreign policy has been marked by Ankara’s 

relative isolation in the Middle East. With the exception of Qatar, Turkey 

has had few regional state allies. This has begun to change as Turkey 

pursues rapprochement—with limited results thus far—with the United Arab 

Emirates, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Israel amid an unprecedented economic 

crisis at home.1

In contrast with the Middle East, Turkey has amassed a more impressive 

record of influence building in sub-Saharan Africa. This engagement 

constitutes a relatively new phenomenon, dating to the start of Justice and 

Development Party (AKP) rule in 2002—with Recep Tayyip Erdogan becoming 

prime minister in 2003—and has prospered on multiple fronts, including 

economic ties, military cooperation, and cultural, humanitarian, and religious 

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initiatives. Accordingly, this paper builds on existing 

analyses to provide an overview of the many projects 

pursued by Turkish actors on the African continent, while also seeking to highlight the changing contours of this issue for U.S. policymakers from the 

perspective of regional competition in Africa and the Middle East.

investment in Turkish markets, boost the economy, 

and rebuild his base ahead of the country’s 2023 

scheduled presidential and parliamentary elections.5

It remains to be seen if such rapprochement—particularly with the UAE—will ease either domestic economic 

woes or competition for influence building across 

sub-Saharan Africa, and especially in the Horn of 

Africa, where Turkish-Emirati jostling has been strongest. The United States should stay abreast of TurkishAfrican ties, particularly in the Muslim-majority and Muslim-plurality Sahel, Horn of Africa, and East Africa, 

where Turkish influence appears to be most solid. (For 

a depiction of Turkey’s activities, see figure 1, “Turkey’s 

Influence in Africa on the Rise.”)

Historical Background

In North Africa, Ankara has traditionally had a 

significant presence given that most of the region, 

excepting Morocco, was once part of the Ottoman 

Empire. This has not been the case for sub-Saharan 

Africa, where the Ottoman imprint was minimal, at 

best, beyond Sudan and littoral regions of the Horn of 

Africa. Indeed, until the rise of Erdogan—who served 

as Turkey’s prime minister between 2003 and 2014 

and has been president since—Turkish foreign policy 

decisionmakers have generally neglected subSaharan Africa.

While some past Turkish leaders have tried to 

diversify the longstanding Western orientation of the 

nation’s foreign policy—such as in Prime Minister 

Turgut Ozal’s outreach to the Middle East in the 

1980s and President Suleyman Demirel’s foray into 

Central Asia in the 1990s—the sub-Saharan outreach 

belongs almost completely to Erdogan. At least 

initially, Erdogan’s Africa policy was informed by his 

advisor Ahmet Davutoglu, who served as his foreign 

minister (2009–14) and later prime minister (2014–

16). While Turkey officially launched its “African 

Initiative Policy” process aimed at building soft 

power across the continent in 1998, major headway 

was only made several years later under Erdogan 

and Davutoglu when Turkey became an observer to 

Abbreviations

AKP Justice and Development Party

AMISOM African Union Mission in Somalia

AU African Union

CSO civil society organization

EUTM-S European Training Mission–Somalia

GCC Gulf Cooperation Council

MCC Military Coordination Cell (U.S. 

mission in Somalia)

PKK Kurdistan Workers Party

TIKA Turkish Cooperation and Coordination 

Agency

YEI Yunus Emre Institute

Turkey’s presence in Africa is far from hegemonic. 

As a former Turkish diplomat noted in April 2021, a 

weakened Turkish economy and poor relations with 

its neighbors pose challenges to Ankara’s broader 

Africa policy.2 Turkey’s economic problems have 

only worsened since this comment, with inflation 

hitting a twenty-four-year high in May 2022.3 What 

is more, in countries such as Somalia and Sudan, 

leaders with close ties to Turkish president Erdogan 

have recently been replaced by leaders friendly to 

the UAE and other regional actors.4 Simultaneously, 

however, Erdogan has pursued rapprochement with 

Ankara’s Middle East rivals, partly in an effort to seek 

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These CSOs were often the first Turkish institutions to arrive 

in a sub-Saharan country. In most cases, Turkish Foreign 

Ministry missions and flights on the government-owned Turkish 

Airlines ensued. But following the Erdogan-Gulen split in 2011 

and especially after the 2016 failed coup attempt, in which 

Gulen-aligned officers played a key role, Erdogan has moved 

against the Gulen network—now called FETÖ by Turkey—including its outposts in Africa.8

The Turkish government has successfully convinced many 

of its African counterparts to shut down Gulen-run entities 

or transfer their ownership to Ankara-controlled ones, such as 

the Education Foundation (Maarif Vakfi) in the case of schools.9 In 

consolidating its control over the influence-building process, 

including through official networks such as Maarif Vakfi 

and state religious, cultural, military, and humanitarian 

organizations, Turkey has reinvigorated its influence across the 

continent since 2016.

Today, Turkish activity in Africa is multifaceted and, in the 

words of anthropologist Ezgi Guner, “multiscalar.” 

It involves the state bureaucracy and state-to-state 

interaction, AKP-aligned businesses, NGOs, and 

Islamic groups.10 Bilateral relations are bolstered by 

a growing list of Turkish diplomatic missions across 

the continent, as well as summits with African 

leaders often organized in Turkey.11 The continent 

now hosts forty-four Turkish embassies (the latest, 

in Guinea-Bissau, announced by Turkish Ministry 

of Foreign Affairs official Nur Sagman on June 20, 

2022), compared to a dozen in 2002, many of which 

Figure 1: Turkey’s Influence in Africa on the Rise

Source: Anadolu Agency (2021)

the African Union (in 2005) and eventually an AU 

strategic partner (in 2008).6 Erdogan has been the 

one constant in Turkey’s sub-Saharan initiatives, 

with reports suggesting he has visited more than 

thirty African nations in the past eighteen years, 

sometimes making multiple visits to a country.7

In the first decade of Erdogan’s rule, the movement led by Fethullah Gulen helped build Turkish influence on the continent through its network of 

schools, businesses, and civil society organizations.

 

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were in North Africa.12 Not insignificantly, Turkish 

Airlines reportedly flew to sixty-one African destinations in 2021, up from a mere handful—again mostly in North Africa—when Erdogan became prime 

minister in 2003.13 These dynamics together contribute to Ankara’s commercial, military, and cultural connectivity with Africa.

Economic Ties

Turkey’s economic ties with the continent have 

increased significantly over the last two decades. 

Whereas the total volume of trade between Turkey 

and sub-Saharan Africa was $1.35 billion in 2003, 

Turkey’s semiofficial Anadolu Agency reports that 

in 2021 it had reached $10.7 billion.14 Turkish 

exports have risen at a similar pace, amounting 

to some $7.9 billion in 2021. As of January 2021, 

according to unnamed Turkish officials, more than 

a third of the $6 billion in Turkish investment in the 

sub-Saharan region had gone toward Ethiopia. This 

commitment by Erdogan undoubtedly owes at least 

in part to the country’s 114 million citizens, its status 

as East Africa’s largest economy—on a purchasing 

power parity basis—and its role hosting the African 

Union.15 In Senegal in the west, meanwhile, Turkey’s 

ambassador, Ahmet Kavas, recently suggested that 

Turkey is seeking to grow its trade with the African 

continent to upward of $50 billion over 2022–26.16

Some Turkish initiatives, however, have been 

affected by domestic political changes in African 

countries, with one example involving historic 

Suakin Island on Sudan’s Red Sea coast. Back in 

2017, in the highest-level visit by a Turkish official 

to Sudan since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire 

almost a century earlier, Erdogan signed a $650 

million deal with then president Omar al-Bashir 

aimed at restoring and rebuilding the island’s 

infrastructure.17 At the time, the Sudanese foreign 

minister indicated Turkey would be rebuilding the 

Ottoman-era port and constructing a naval dock 

for civilian and military use.18 Part of the island 

was to be temporarily granted to Turkey during the 

restoration.19 In 2018, the Turkish Cooperation and 

Coordination Agency (TIKA) began restoration work 

with the goal of “turn[ing] the island into a major 

tourism center especially for Hajj-bound pilgrims.”20

Later that year, Turkey and Qatar signed a $4 billion 

deal to collaboratively develop Suakin’s port.21

Turkey’s agreement with Sudan caused controversy 

among some Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 

members concerned that Ankara would be building 

a military base there to expand its regional footprint, 

and also taking into account rising Turkish-Qatari 

influence amid the Gulf rift between Doha and its 

neighbors.22 Erdogan, for his part, denied that Turkey 

was building a naval base on the island.23 After 

Bashir was ousted by a military coup in April 2019, 

however, reports emerged suggesting the TurkeySudan

deal had been canceled, even as a Turkish Defense Ministry 

official denied these claims.24

Nevertheless, the current status of this project 

remains unclear, especially amid the post-Bashir 

eclipse of Turkish influence in Sudan by Egypt and 

the UAE.

Military Ties

Security issues have been another priority for 

Ankara, which seeks to solidify a political presence 

in Africa—and globally—and has thus involved itself 

in several conflicts across the continent. Under 

Erdogan, Turkey has spread its wings militarily 

beyond its immediate neighborhood (e.g., in Iraq, 

where it has maintained a permanent military presence

 since the 1990s to fight the Kurdistan Workers 

Party, or PKK), sending troops overseas to fight 

in wars (e.g., in Libya) and establishing bases and 

training militaries of Turkey-aligned governments 

(e.g., in Somalia).

In this regard, Somalia, which currently hosts the 

world’s largest Turkish embassy,25 has witnessed 

a growing Turkish presence since 2017, when 

Ankara completed a military facility to support the 

central government in its struggle against militant 

groups, including the al-Qaeda–aligned al-Shabab.26

Similarly, in February 2022 Turkey’s parliament 

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green-lighted an extended troop deployment around 

the Indian Ocean, including in Somalia, until 

February 2023.27 Ankara has also signed military 

cooperation and training agreements with Ethiopia, 

Niger, Senegal, and other countries.28 In total, Turkey 

is said to have established thirty-seven military 

offices on the continent.29

Moreover, Turkey clearly sees a market for its 

military exports in Africa—through state-owned 

and private companies alike—including its robust 

drone industry, with drones playing a crucial role 

in Turkish-African ties.30 On the drone front, technology

 innovated by Selcuk Bayraktar, a son-in-law 

to Erdogan, recently drew high-profile attention for 

helping the Ukrainian military contest the Russian 

invasion.31 African nations such as Ethiopia, Nigeria, 

and Niger are reported to have already purchased 

Turkish drones.32 And countries like Angola and 

Rwanda are reportedly part of a growing list of potential buyers.33 Meanwhile, overall Turkish defense 

and aviation exports to Angola, Chad, and Ethiopia 

increased significantly in 2021.34 For example, Niger 

made headlines as “the first foreign customer of 

Turkey’s Hurkus aircraft,” a manned military training aircraft, in November 2021, and Chad was the first African country to purchase the Turkish Yoruk 

4x4 armored vehicle (Senegal has also purchased 

armored vehicles from the producers of the Yoruk).35

Despite significant exports of defense technology, 

Turkey’s military ties with African countries have 

not been without problems. This is especially true 

of Ethiopia, which has used Turkish-made drones in 

its war against rebels in the Tigray region. Turkish 

drones were reportedly used in a January 2022 

Ethiopian attack that killed fifty-eight civilians 

hiding in a school. Overall, Ethiopia’s reliance on 

drones, which it buys from multiple countries, 

including the UAE, China, and Iran, has resulted 

in more than three hundred civilian deaths in the 

Tigray conflict.36 U.S. officials reportedly voiced 

concern to Turkey about weapon sales to Ethiopia.37

Turkey also reportedly moved its Ethiopian embassy 

to Kenya following threats relating to the use of 

Turkish drones in the Tigray conflict.38 Turkish 

The Turkish embassy in Mogadishu. Source: REUTERS/Feisal Omar 

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embassies and consulates in the United States 

even became sites of protest by diaspora Tigrayans 

voicing their anger at Turkey’s arming of Ethiopian 

prime minister Abiy Ahmed.39

Cultural Links, Humanitarianism, and Religion

Beyond economic and military ties, Turkey has 

worked to cultivate its image as a benign partner—

with “no colonial baggage”—seeking mutual benefits 

for Turks and Africans alike.40 Turkey’s soft power 

initiatives accordingly assume that the Turkish 

approach to Africa is not exploitative relative to 

Western European nations—the traditional colonial 

powers on the continent—and others. In an article 

that encapsulates this approach, Turkey’s state 

broadcaster TRT World quoted experts and Turkish 

diplomats who make the following arguments: 

Turkey has emerged as a “strong alternative” to 

Western states—because it does not have a colonial 

history in Africa—and to China, another rising 

self-professed “no colonial baggage” power but 

one whose partnerships often incur sizable debts 

for African states; Turkey’s approach is based on 

“developing and winning together”; and Turkey 

has adopted a “win-win policy that grants fair 

cooperation for mutual development and humanitarian aid.”41 

(Whether or not Turkey is actually and 

completely perceived as such in Africa is another 

matter.)

Ankara has thus sought to establish a cultural 

rapport with sub-Saharan Africa through various 

means. The head of the country’s global cultural 

agency, Yunus Emre Institute (YEI), which is named 

after a medieval Turkish humanist poet, said in 2021 

that the institute is planning to open ten new cultural 

centers in Africa in 2022, and added that YEI needs 

to open centers in at least twenty to twenty-five 

more African countries. YEI, he said, plays the role 

of “cultural ambassador” beyond Turkey’s borders. 

Already, Turkey has ten cultural centers across 

Africa, including in Nigeria and Rwanda, where 

people can study Turkish.42 Relatedly, President 

Erdogan has said that more than 14,000 African 

students have studied in Turkey, including those who 

have received grants from the country’s “Turkiye 

Scholarships” grant program.43

On the humanitarian front, Turkey has established 

“a maternal and child healthcare center in Niger, 

several women’s shelters in Cameroon, and a vocational 

training center in Madagascar,” according to 

Turkish first lady Emine Erdogan, who wrote in a 

2018 op-ed that “women’s empowerment” forms 

a cornerstone of Turkish development in Africa.44

(Interestingly, the first lady also published a book 

in 2021 about her travels to twenty-three African 

countries with the president.45) Turkey has also 

assisted in fields such as water provision, among 

others, in Africa.46

As for Turkish involvement in Africa’s religious 

life, Erdogan has over the years heavily funded and 

deployed Diyanet, the public agency that oversees 

Sunni Islam in Turkey, in hopes of sparking pro-Islamic 

sentiment on the continent and situating Turkey as a leader. 

These efforts extend especially to 

the Horn of Africa. For example, in Djibouti, Diyanet 

completed construction in November 2019 of the 

impressive Abdulhamid II Mosque—named for the 

nineteenth-century Ottoman sultan who took an 

interest in pan-Islamic causes while trying to rebuild 

Ottoman influence globally—and previously, in 2015, 

helped renovate a Somali mosque initially funded 

by Saudi Arabia.47 Similar charitable acts have been 

initiated in other Horn countries such as Ethiopia 

and African states such as Ghana, Burkina Faso, 

Mali, South Africa, and Chad.48 Beyond mosques, 

Turkey’s Islam-related work in Africa includes 

funding educational facilities run by Sufi networks in 

cooperation with the Turkish state.49

Finally, amid the Covid-19 pandemic, Turkey has 

used “vaccine diplomacy” to further improve its ties 

to African countries. In December 2021, Erdogan 

expressed Turkey’s intent to deliver 15 million doses 

of the indigenously developed Turkovac vaccine to

 

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Mehmet Yilmaz said in 2020 that Turkey has trained 

one-third of Somalia’s military forces, including 

special forces, such as the Gorgor and Haramcad 

units.58 Some members of these units were even 

trained in Turkey.59

Somalia researcher Guled Ahmed has commented on 

the associated controversy.60 For example, the Gorgor 

forces have been implicated in using live ammunition 

against civilians demonstrating in Mogadishu 

against election delays.61 The Haramcad units have 

been involved in the arrest of journalists as well as 

alleged attacks against them, and purportedly in 

an attack by former president Mohamed Abdullahi 

Mohamed “Farmajo” on his political adversary, the 

newly elected president Hassan Sheikh Mohamud.62

Farmajo also used them as a means to curb political 

dissent.63 Indeed, the Somali opposition even wrote 

a letter to Turkey requesting that the latter stop 

arming the Haramcad during the election dispute in 

December 2020.64

The Turkish training facility, one must note, is 

not the only training mission in Somalia: the U.S. 

Military Coordination Cell in Somalia (MCC), the 

African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), and the 

European Training Mission–Somalia (EUTM-S) are all 

involved in efforts to enhance security in the country. 

Moreover, all such actors do appear to engage in some 

level of coordination and cooperation.65

Furthermore, Turkey’s cultural impact has been 

significant. In Somalia, nearly 100,000 Somalis 

reportedly have some Turkish-language skills, 

according to Turkey’s semiofficial Anadolu Agency, 

which suggests that Turkish could soon be the 

“number 2 language” in Somalia.66 Indeed, “Istanbul” 

has become one of the most popular female names 

in the country. Also, according to reports, Turkey’s 

state broadcaster TRT is set to boost the Somali 

filmmaking industry.67 And through the “Turkiye 

Scholarships” for international students, Somalia 

has become “one of the top countries in Africa for 

sending students to Turkey for higher education.”68 In 

fact, Somalia’s current justice minister, Abdulkadir 

Mohamed Nur, was educated in Turkey and served at 

the Somali embassy in Ankara.69

the continent pending its authorization for use.50

Three months later, on March 22, 2022, the first 

shipment of vaccines (although not Turkovac) went 

to Somalia,51 whose relationship with Turkey, as the 

next section shows, has been unique.

Somalia as a Case Study

Even in the context of a large Turkish footprint in 

the Horn of Africa, Turkey’s relations with Somalia 

stand out.52 This is not surprising given Somalia’s 

strategic value for Turkey, notably as a gateway to 

the Indian Ocean.

But Turkey’s relationship with Somalia, as successful as it 

has been, also underlines challenges in Ankara’s larger Africa 

policy. For Turkey’s extensive diplomatic relations with 

Somalia, Erdogan deserves credit. He traveled to famine-afflicted 

Mogadishu in 2011, becoming the first non-African 

leader to visit the country since 1991.53 He visited 

again in 2015 and 2016. Specifically, in showing its 

commitment, Turkey has facilitated talks between 

the Somali central government and the leadership 

of breakaway Somaliland, which declared its independence

 in 1991.  54

Beyond diplomatic relations, Turkey has been a major 

provider of aid to Somalia, although Turkish policy 

has moved past humanitarianism alone. Bilateral 

trade volume reached $280 million in 2020, and 

Turkish companies now operate Mogadishu’s main 

port as well as its airport.55 In early 2020, Erdogan 

also claimed the Somali state had invited Turkey to 

search for oil in its territorial waters, although this 

seems not to have happened.56

While Turkish officials hail bilateral military ties 

as contributing to Somalia’s security and fight 

against terrorism, these ties have not been free of 

controversy. As a baseline, in the past decade Turkey 

and Somalia have signed multiple military pacts, 

with Turkey opening a military training facility 

in Somalia (for Somali soldiers) in 2017 known as 

Camp TURKSOM.57 Turkish ambassador to Somalia 

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Cultural concerns about Turkish involvement 

sometimes blend with those relating to the military. 

In remarking on potential Turkish “indoctrination” 

of Somali troops, for example, Guled Ahmed notes 

instances such as Somali troops “singing the Turkish 

national anthem with a background video showing 

Turkish army propaganda commemorating the 

Ottoman Empire.”70

Turkey’s relationship with Somalia embodies 

the image the country is trying to cultivate in 

the region—that of a benefactor lending a helping 

hand—as seen through Erdogan’s 2011 visit to 

Mogadishu and the rhetoric surrounding Turkey’s 

military facility Camp TURKSOM. Indeed, one op-ed 

in the AKP-aligned Daily Sabah referred to Turkey 

as “Somalia’s long-lost brother” who was there to 

“rebuild the country,”71 while another discussed 

the countries’ historical ties dating back to the 

sixteenth century, when the “Ottoman Empire sought 

to prevent Somalia from becoming a Portuguese 

colony.” The piece went on to commend “the Ottoman 

presence in Berbera...[for being] the guarant[or] of 

peace in the region,” just as “the presence of the 

military training center in Somalia [is] today.”72

Yet Turkey’s efforts are not immune to Somali 

domestic politics. The May 2022 election of 

UAE-backed Hassan Sheikh Mohamud as Somalia’s 

new president could potentially cool the rapport, 

given the break it constitutes with Farmajo, who 

maintained very close ties with Turkey and Qatar.73

Turkey’s Challenges in Africa

Among Turkey’s challenges in sub-Saharan Africa 

are its competitors for position. From the Middle 

East alone, the UAE and Israel are making a play,74

as is Qatar, although it tends to align with Turkey. 

Globally, China, the United States, and France are 

perhaps most prominent; Beijing, a clear competitor 

for Washington and Paris, outpaces Ankara in almost 

every category.75 At the same time, some analysts 

have noted a dip in Chinese interest in Africa,76 with 

a recent Economist overview explaining that “Turkish 

[construction] firms are chipping away at the dominance 

of Chinese ones, helped no doubt by a drop in 

lending by China.”77

Global media sources have also published stories 

on Turkish competition with France, particularly 

in Francophone Africa.78 Sahelian popular opinion 

on French involvement in domestic affairs, for 

example, has evidently soured, often favoring 

“Turkey as less overbearing than the European 

Union or France, and as a partner with similar 

interests.”79 Interestingly, during the Turkey-Africa 

Media Summit in May 2022, Fahrettin Altun, who 

heads media and communications for the Turkish 

presidency, said the launch of TRT French in April 

was a “good development” for Turkey’s ties with 

Africa.80 Indeed, while Ankara has sometimes seen 

itself in competition with Paris, experts have noted 

that these narratives may be overblown, particularly 

given that French influence is most significant in West 

Africa, where Turkish influence is relatively 

weaker.81 It is unclear if the recent French-Turkish 

rapprochement, linked to the Russian invasion of 

Ukraine, will affect these dynamics.82

Turkish competition with the UAE, especially in 

Somalia, bears mention here. While Turkey has 

historically partnered with the central government 

in Mogadishu, Abu Dhabi has mostly been building 

influence in Somaliland, the country’s breakaway 

region, and in the semiautonomous region of 

Puntland. Specifically, Turkey built a military 

facility in Mogadishu, where Turkish companies 

operate the capital’s main port and airport, and 

the UAE has sought to establish a military facility 

in Somaliland, where it initially planned to train 

Somaliland forces—although the site is now 

apparently set to be converted to a civilian airport. 

Moreover, Emirati companies have developed and 

operated Somaliland’s Berbera port and Puntland’s 

Bosaso port.83 Yet recently, the central government in 

Mogadishu has changed hands from Turkey-backed 

Farmajo to Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, who was 

reportedly supported in his election campaign by the 

UAE and other regional powers.84 It remains unclear 

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whether potentially improving ties between Turkey 

and the UAE—or the change in Somali leadership—

will lessen or aggravate the countries’ competition in 

Somalia or elsewhere.

It also remains to be seen whether the embrace 

of Ankara by African capitals will stand the test 

of time. Skeptics have asserted that Turkey’s true 

Africa engagement has recently thinned, offering as 

evidence officials’ lip service to flashy installations 

like embassies, new flight routes, and summits. This 

is especially important as Turkey’s economy faces 

its most serious downturn since Erdogan’s rise in 

2003, and it is unclear if Ankara can continue to 

prioritize African relationships as it has thus far.85

Yet notwithstanding the downsides, along with 

the state-to-state interaction, benefits have surely 

accrued to Turkish industry such as construction 

and defense companies.

Conclusion

In late February 2022, the Russian invasion of 

Ukraine interrupted President Erdogan’s visit to 

Africa, and four months later the war persists, even if 

it has ceded preeminence in news headlines. As for 

other leaders, the war has concentrated the Turkish 

leader’s attention.86 This is the case even though 

Turkish foreign policy in Ukraine, and elsewhere, 

faces constraints caused by the country’s economic 

troubles—a situation that could have ripple effects in 

Africa.87 Nevertheless, the Turkish presence in Africa 

is worth watching for U.S. officials, especially given 

the question of China competition. Recent opportunities 

for cooperation with a less isolated Turkey, as in Ukraine, 

could bear fruit for the bilateral relationship 

and should ultimately benefit African governments 

and their people.

Policy Notes June 2022 No: 120 

The Washington Instıtute for Near East Policy