Afghanistan Withdrawal (Model Diplomacy)

 Afghanistan Withdrawal

   

Overview

At the start of a new term in 2021, the U.S. president wrestles with whether to withdraw troops from Afghanistan, even though it would increase the risk of a Taliban takeover.

Students will understand that some foreign policy decisions are challenging because all options involve costs and uncertainties.

The Situation

In October 2001, the United States and its allies invaded Afghanistan with the dual goal of killing or capturing the al-Qaeda leaders behind 9/11 and overthrowing the Taliban, the Islamic fundamentalist group that ruled Afghanistan and was harboring al-Qaeda. U.S. and allied forces, fighting alongside Afghans opposed to the Taliban, quickly gained control of much of the country; however, many terrorists escaped. Over time Taliban militants regrouped in neighboring Pakistan, which they used as a base to mount terrorist attacks and combat operations against the successor Afghan government. The number of U.S. troops inside the country varied, from a peak of over 110,000 during the Barack Obama presidency to just a few thousand when Donald Trump was succeeded by Joe Biden. During this time, the bulk of the U.S. military effort was spent building up the capabilities of the Afghan military and fighting alongside it against the Taliban. The United States also worked to develop democratic institutions, build infrastructure, and advance the rights of girls and women. The United States has spent more than $2 trillion fighting in and rebuilding Afghanistan. The war has already cost the lives of nearly 3,600 U.S. and allied service members, nearly 4,000 military contractors, and an estimated 100,000 Afghan soldiers and civilians. In 2011, U.S. forces killed Osama bin Laden, a primary target of the post-9/11 American intervention. Meanwhile, the Afghan army began to take over the bulk of the fight against the Taliban, with the United States ceasing combat operations and moving to a supporting role of training and providing intelligence. U.S. casualties fell sharply. At the same time, the U.S. government and the Taliban began talks that ultimately led to a February 2020 agreement. The Taliban promised not to harbor terrorists in return for the withdrawal of all U.S. troops by May 2021. The agreement did not include a ceasefire or a requirement the Taliban disarm. It did not include the Afghan government, but did encourage talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government.    

The prospect of withdrawal has generated considerable debate. Proponents of remaining warn that a U.S. withdrawal would lead to the Taliban retaking control of Afghanistan, once again raising the possibility the country would become a base for global terrorism. It would also likely negate much of the rebuilding: observers agree that a Taliban government would be undemocratic and oppress women. They also note that the last few years have been relatively peaceful, with the Afghan army shouldering most of the fighting, supported by a small contingent of U.S. troops. Could a relatively small, continued U.S. and allied presence, they wonder, be sustainable and worth the relatively low cost?

Proponents of withdrawal, however, worry that the Taliban’s recent low level of activity results from their knowledge that U.S. forces are on the way out; there is no guarantee it will last. A continued presence in Afghanistan, they argue, would have no clear endpoint and could require an increasing commitment if Taliban attacks expand. Moreover, if the United States has failed to defeat the Taliban in what is already the longest war in U.S. history, they ask, what would be different should U.S. forces remain in place?

Decision Point: Set in March 2021

As president Biden takes office, he has called a National Security Council (NSC) meeting to decide whether to end America’s longest war and withdraw from Afghanistan. U.S. intelligence has warned that without U.S. support, the Afghan government could fall to the Taliban in eighteen months or less. A withdrawal would put an end to an expensive two-decade commitment, but it could see the return of terrorism to the country and lead to enormous humanitarian suffering. Maintaining a low level of troops could keep the Taliban at bay, but if it is unsuccessful, it could lead to pressure on the president to return significant numbers of troops to combat operations in the country. Domestic politics also play a role: many Americans have tired of the war and have little stomach for continued—much less expanded—U.S. involvement.

NSC members should consider one of the following options:

Withdraw all U.S. troops from Afghanistan. This option would end the U.S. presence in Afghanistan, likely leading to the Taliban overthrow of the Afghan government, raising the possibility of renewed terrorism, the likelihood of refugee flows, and a loss of freedom for most Afghans. However, it would guarantee that no more U.S. lives are lost or money spent on fighting the Taliban.

Maintain a small U.S. force to provide support for the Afghan army. This option could keep the Taliban at bay, perhaps buying additional time to strengthen the Afghan government and army. However, this policy option has no clear endpoint, and if Taliban attacks were to increase, it could force the United States to deepen its commitment..

Significantly increase U.S. troop commitment in order to fight the Taliban directly. This option could have a greater chance at success in changing the calculus on the ground than a limited deployment, but at a significant cost. It is unlikely to be met with public support.

Model  Diplomacy