Iran and Russia

Wednesday, November 29, 2017 - 12:00am

Iran and Russia, Growing Apart

Rising Dissent Over the IRGC's Militias

Alex Vatanka

ALEX VATANKA is a Senior Fellow at the Middle East Institute in Washington D.C. He is the author of the forthcoming book, The Making of Iranian Foreign Policy.
 

Today, the latest round of UN-brokered Syria peace talks begins in Geneva, with the goal of bringing President Bashar al-Assad and various armed opposition factions [1] to a political settlement that could put an end to half a decade of civil war in the country.

The Geneva talks come one week after another set of Syria talks, this time in Sochi. The November 22 gathering, which included some of the conflict’s key remaining players—Iran, Turkey, and Russia—was supposed to be a turning point in the issue of Syria’s future. At least that had been Tehran’s hope. Instead, the talks highlighted emerging fissures between Assad’s two main foreign backers, Iran and Russia, and even divisions within Iran between the civilian government of President Hassan Rouhani and the leadership of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) [2].

In short, the IRGC, which over the last seven years has established a strong presence in Syria through its various militias and local proxies, is anxious to preserve its gains [3] against pushback from Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United States. This stance might soon bring it into open conflict with Russia and other actors, including Rouhani, who might be more open to a multilateral political settlement to end the Syrian war. Specifically, the IRGC wishes not only to secure Iranian influence [4] in postwar Syria, but also to transform its allied Syrian militias into an institutionalized military-political force in its own image, one which could become its local abettor similar to the role Hezbollah plays in Lebanon.

SUSPICIONS IN SOCHI

In Sochi, the Iranians, Russians, and Turks ostensibly agreed on one key point: that all parties should respect Syria’s territorial integrity. Other issues were discussed, including how to continue to uphold the process of de-confliction in the zones that had been agreed upon at Astana in May. Sochi was above all a summit intended as a demonstration of the ascendancy of the Iranian-Russian-Turkish partnership [5] on Syria.

In Tehran, though, considerable doubt continues to exist about both Russian and Turkish intentions in Syria. The Iranians are particularly mindful—and resentful—of Moscow’s latitude to work with many different partners in the region. Alone among the three countries that were at Sochi, Russia has a strong and ongoing dialogue with every other state that matters on the question of Syria’s future, from the United States to Israel to the Arab states of the Persian Gulf. In turn, Tehran naturally fears that deals are being cut over its head and to its detriment. The generals from the IRGC are reminding everyone, including Assad and the Russians, of their continued power and influence.

Two days before the Sochi summit, for instance, Russian President Vladimir Putin held a four-hour meeting with Assad, who had flown to the city to consult with the Russian leader. Reports on the visit in the Iranian media indicate that Tehran had had no prior knowledge of it. But it was Putin’s decision to brief U.S. President Donald Trump about Moscow’s plans just before the Sochi summit that seems to have really irked Tehran. The Iranians read this briefing as a Russian attempt to assuage the United States, which is sternly opposed to any settlement in Syria that would institutionalize Iran’s presence there. Mollifying Washington, the Iranians rightfully worry, can only come at the expense of Tehran’s influence and interests in postwar Syria.

It is therefore no coincidence that in the days since the Sochi summit, the IRGC has started to tout its capacity to deploy, maintain, and mobilize pro-Iranian militias in Syria. This is a show of hard power, and Putin and his advisors are no doubt part of the intended audience. 

In other words, with Moscow preparing to turn itself into the ultimate diplomatic kingmaker in these sunset days of the Syrian conflict, the generals from the IRGC are reminding everyone, including Assad and the Russians, of their continued power and influence. And as Iran looks to maximize its relevance in postwar Syria, the country’s hardline faction, represented by the IRGC, is banking that its years of investment in various Syrian and other Arab militias will finally pay off.

Sputnik Photo Agency / Reuters Rouhani, Putin, and Erdogan at a joint press confereSochi, November 2017.               

DIPLOMACY WON'T DO

The head of the IRGC, General Mohammad Ali Jafari, has been increasingly explicit about his intentions to elevate pro-Iranian militias in Syria. On November 23, for instance, Jafari said that Assad knows he is “indebted” [6] to the “people’s militias” and understands that they are critical to his political survival. Jafari also ventured a guess that Assad “will, of course, institutionalize [the militias] so they will remain relevant in the face of future threats.” It goes without saying that for Jafari, it is up to the IRGC to determine the identity of such future threats, and it is a safe bet that the group’s usual targets—notably the United States and Israel—will be on that list. 

The IRGC’s goal is to eventually turn the Syrian militias currently under its control into semi-state actors that will become permanent instruments of Iranian influence in Syria, akin to how Hezbollah operates in Lebanon. This strategy is perhaps not surprising, as the IRGC is itself a product of such an evolution. Back in 1979, immediately after the Iranian Revolution, the IRGC began as a small group of die-hard devotees to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Over the years, this band of Islamist militants morphed from armed servants of the revolutionary clerics to a powerful state-within-the-state that rules over a vast empire of men and money. 

This rhetorical escalation by the IRGC, moreover, is not only aimed at foreign audiences. The future of the pro-Iranian militias in Syria is also part of an intra-regime debate in Tehran. Rouhani has publicly kept his distance from IRGC’s plan to institutionalize its militias, but he has not been overly critical of it either. And yet, IRGC-controlled media outlets constantly hint that the Rouhani government is soft on Western demands for Tehran to abandon or at least disarm the militias. For the IRGC, this is a non-starter.

The IRGC’s goal is to eventually turn the Syrian militias currently under its control into semi-state actors, which will become permanent instruments of Iranian influence in Syria.

In response to Rouhani’s relative dovishness, the IRGC position is twofold: first, that it would be foolish to cut a deal with the West (or Russia) on the future of the Syrian militias. Why give up hard-earned clout [7] on the ground in return for dubious promises of international cooperation on Syria’s future? The prevailing mood in Tehran, which is that Iran was shortchanged by the 2015 nuclear deal, presumably gives the IRGC argument more momentum than would have otherwise been the case. 

Second, the IRGC has also been quick to remind everyone that it is better equipped than the civilian government to lead Iran’s efforts to secure a slice of reconstruction spending [8] in Syria. This is nothing short of a jab at Rouhani. In fact, Jafari has claimed that both Rouhani’s team and Assad’s have agreed that IRGC-controlled economic enterprises, which can work directly under the protection of IRGC-controlled militias, are the best candidates to manage reconstruction projects in Syria. Rouhani has not yet responded to this assertion. 

FORWARD DEFENSE 

Observers inside and outside of Iran will find the IRGC brass’s increasingly hawkish position on militias to be a bad omen. But in Tehran, the IRGC has the upper hand when it comes to Syria policy, and it clearly believes that it possesses a blueprint for success: more Hezbollahs wherever possible. 

As IRGC commanders are keen to repeat, the quickly shifting regional security environment requires that Iran constantly adapt and reinvent its military strategy. In Tehran, this is referred to as “forward defense” and is premised on the idea that Iran should battle its opponents outside its borders to prevent conflict from taking place on Iranian soil. Controlling Arab militias abroad, such as those allied to the IRGC in Syria, is part and parcel of this idea of forward defense, making it unlikely that Iran will shift its stance any time soon.

From a broader Syrian perspective, however, it is hard to see how enduring peace can return to the country if armed local groups answerable to an aggressive, ideological foreign organization such as the IRGC continue to play a critical role in the political process.

The Real Causes of America’s Troubled Relations with Iran

lobelog.com/the-real-causes-of-americas-troubled-relations-with-iran/

Shireen HunterOctober 16, 2017

by Shireen Hunter
     
In his speech describing America’s new approach towards Iran, Donald Trump accused it of responsibility for just about all of the ills of the Middle East and South West Asia. He went as far as accusing Iran of having supported the Taliban and al-Qaeda, sworn enemies of the Shias and Iran.
More seriously, the president refused to certify that Iran had complied with its responsibilities under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), thus opening the way for new sanctions and other pressures on Iran. It would also represent a step toward military confrontation, which might start with a direct U.S. attack on Iran or under the guise of anti-terror actions against Iran’s Revolutionary Guards.
Those who focus only on recent developments in US-Iranian relations tend to attribute the current difficulties to the Islamic Republic’s radical ideology and its destructive and destabilizing policies in the Middle East and South-West Asia. They argue that the United States had no problems with Iran before the Islamic Revolution and will have no difficulties with it in future if the current regime changes.
Clearly, the IRI’s ideological mixture of leftist notions of the 1960s and 70s and some Islamic principles as interpreted in light of those notions has been hostile to America and its regional allies. Like all revolutionary movements, until the mid- 1990s, Iran also tried to export its ideology beyond its borders.
However, in the last 25 years both Iran’s ideology and policies have undergone changes, and more moderate views, policies, and actors have emerged. Yet, during these years, every time Iran has reached out to America it has been rebuffed. The United States, by contrast, has only approached Iran when it has needed its help, such as during the 1991 Persian Gulf War and briefly after 9/11.
The question thus arises why America has not wanted to reach some form of modus vivendi with Iran. The answer lies in the dynamics of the international political system—and Iran and America’s respective places in it.
The Myth of America’s Friendship with the Shah
Those who bemoan the current state of US-Iranian relations wax nostalgic about the halcyon days of the Shah’s rule. Yet in reality, America never considered either Iran or the Shah to be an indispensable ally, like, for instance, Saudi Arabia or Turkey.
For example, despite the Shah’s pleadings, America refused to sign a security treaty with Iran. It gave Iran pitiful amounts of economic aid and was ready to experiment with social and political change in Iran, while it avoided similar policies in Latin America, Asia, and elsewhere in the Middle East. A good example is the Kennedy administration’s pressure on the Shah to implement far-reaching reforms that greatly contributed to the social and cultural upheavals that culminated in the Islamic Revolution. For its part, the Carter administration pushed a human-rights agenda that gave the wrong signal to the Iranian opposition, and thus helped the Shah’s downfall.
Even regional players, like Saudi Arabia and Israel, which now say how much they miss the Shah, became irritated with him and actively contributed to his downfall. For instance, Saudi Arabia used its oil power to undermine Iran’s economy in 1976. Israel, angry about the Shah’s efforts to reach a deal with the PLO and Syria’s Hafiz al-Assad, used its supporters in the United States to warn against the Shah’s ambitions. In the West, complaints were often heard that the Shah “has grown too big for his britches.” This is one reason why Westerners were so complaisant about events that culminated in the 1979 revolution.
This U.S. approach towards Iran has been the result of its lack of an intrinsic interest in the country. The same was true of Britain. The late Sir Denis Right, the UK’s ambassador to Iran in the 1960s, put it best by writing that Britain never considered Iran of sufficient value to colonize it. But it found Iran useful as a buffer against the competing great power, the Russian Empire. Thus, British policy towards Iran was to keep it moribund but not dead, at least not as long as the Russian threat persisted.
America essentially followed the old British approach towards Iran: keep it semi-alive so that it can put up enough resistance to the USSR until America’s more important and intrinsic interests, such as those in the Persian Gulf, were safeguarded. But Washington never wanted to turn Iran into a strong ally that one day might be capable of challenging America.
In the late 1970s nobody thought that the fall of the Shah would result in the kind of government that emerged in 1979, and especially after the fall of the Bazargan government in November 1979. Rather, most observers thought that monarchy would be replaced with a mildly nationalist, secular government that would continue reasonable relations with the West, without the Shah’s grandiose dreams: something like “Mossadegh Light.”
Iran as Middle Power
By changing the international balance of power and removing the risk of Soviet penetration, the USSR’s fall eliminated Iran’s value to the United States even as a buffer state. In fact, the fundamental shift to a US approach based on the principle of no compromise, can be traced to 1987, when Gorbachev’s reforms began. Since then, the United States has refused to accept any solution to the Iran problem that has not involved the country’s absolute capitulation. For instance, in 2003, Iran offered to put all the outstanding issues between the two countries on the table for negotiations, but the US refused.
After 2003, the American approach shifted from regime change in Iran to gradual and eventual disintegration of the country through the application of crippling sanctions. The JCPOA was designed to remove the risk of Iran going nuclear without giving it any real economic reprieve: it was just enough to keep the country moribund. Thus, it is ironic that President Trump thinks that America got a bad deal.
Ultimately, the United States is concerned with Iran’s potential to become a credible middle power. Great powers do not like middle powers. The latter generally want to be treated as allies and not clients and want their share of the spotlight. The Shah, for instance, had the temerity to want to be treated as an ally and not a lackey.

The same is true of Iran’s regional rivals. They want Iran sanctioned and militarily attacked not because Iran is threatening their security in any tangible way, but because they feel uncomfortable with a potentially powerful Iran. The discomfort extends beyond Iran’s military prowess to its cultural appeal. When the Iranian actor, Shahab Hosseini, won the best actor award in Cannes in 2016, Saudi commentators considered him even more dangerous than the dreaded Ghassem Soleimani, the commander of the IRGC’s Quds brigade.

Any government in a unified Iran, irrespective of its ideology and orientation, will want to realize the country’s potential and be treated as a legitimate regional and international player. Of course, for its part, Iran has to behave according to international norms. But if history is any guide, even when Iran has acted as a stabilizing force in the region, as it did during the 1970s with Western approval, it has been accused of imperial designs and of acting as the gendarme of the Persian Gulf.
The dilemma thus facing the United States, beyond the future viability of the JCPOA, is whether it will be prepared to seek some form of compromise and understanding with Iran, or whether it will try to settle the Iran question once and for all. The latter path, however, is very dangerous and costly, and its success is far from guaranteed. The record of America’s adventures in other parts of the region and the world is far from encouraging.
Photo: The Shah of Iran visits the Jimmy Carter White House in 1977.

Trump’s line on Syria prevails – in Washington

orientalreview.org/2017/11/28/trumps-line-syria-prevails-washington/

By M. K. BHADRAKUMAR

Some of the confusion as to who sets the US policies on Syria may be clearing up. It seems Trump plays an influential role.

This first became discernible when despite the shenanigans of state department functionaries to scuttle a meeting between him and Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin in Danang on November 10 (pleading ‘scheduling difficulty’), the two veterans snatched a few minutes together the next day to be able to sign up on a US-Russian joint statement on Syria stressing an inclusive political solution through free and fair elections under a new constitution.

The very next day, however, senior state department officials began fudging the statement by injecting a dose of poison into it – by hinting at a continued US military presence in Syria (echoing an earlier remark by US Defence Secretary James Mattis) and reiterating the archaic demand that President Bashar Al-Assad just cannot be part of even the transition.
Moscow objected promptly to point out that the Trump-Putin statement did not require any annotation. At any rate, Putin touched base with Trump personally exactly 10 days later on November 21 (on the eve of the famous ‘trilateral summit’ in Sochi) where they simply picked up the threads of discussion in Danang.
Once again, they had an amiable conversation. (Kremlin released an unusually detailed press release, here)  Once again, Trump appeared to be clear-headed and purposive about working with Putin to bring the war to an end and to negotiate an inclusive settlement that brought enduring peace. Possibly, Trump senses that there are pockets of resistance within the administration to his line on Syria.
Indeed, on Sunday, the State Department came out with a statement on the upcoming intra-Syrian talks in Geneva. It made no ‘pre-condition’ on Assad and instead acknowledged that the elections under a new constitution “should include the broadest spectrum of Syrian citizens, including all groups with representation and influence on the ground.” Bravo!
Interestingly, it also urged Assad’s government pointedly “to enter into substantive negotiations.” (The Trump-Putin statement in Danang had mentioned Assad by name.) There was absolutely no trace of polemics, rancor or sophistry.
Now the ‘residual’ ambiguity is limited to the US presence in Syria. But here again, a backtracking seems to be under way. The official US position was that 500 American personnel were deployed to Syria to help the Syrian Democratic Forces (read Kurdish militia) to fight the ISIS. But Pentagon is considering how to acknowledge that the actual number could be 2000! (Reuters)
However, the good thing is, again, that Trump in a phone call to Turkish President Recep Erdogan on November 24 pledged to “ensure the stability of a unified Syria” and, more importantly, held out the commitment that US will no longer supply arms to the Syrian Kurdish militia whom Turks regard as terrorists. Prior to that, Trump had tweeted:

Of course, Turkey has now demanded that it expects the US to altogether end its partnership with Syrian Kurds. (Xinhua) To be sure, the US presence in Syria will be wound up, no matter Mattis’ swagger. A commentary today in Jerusalem Post argues persuasively that continued US military presence in Syria really doesn’t make sense – not even for ‘containing’ Iran. (Jerusalem Post)
The point is, unless Turkey, Syria and Iraq allowed the US supply lines to the remote northeastern region of Syria, a presence there is impossible to maintain – and all these three countries (plus of course, Iran and Russia) want the US troops to vacate.
The sobriety of the latest US state department statement is also to be attributed to the dramatic shift in the Saudi stance. The Russian presidential envoy on Syria Alexander Lavrentiev was present in Riyadh last week (and was received by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman) even as Syrian opposition groups congregated there to pick a negotiating team for the Geneva talks. Their new leader Nasr al-Hariri, is a cardiologist by profession. He is a Syrian dissident but not an embittered defector like his predecessor Riyad Hijab, who used to the Syrian prime minister.
Source: Indian Punchline

Amnesty International report on Rohingya

Myanmar Treatment of Rohingya Called Apartheid in New Report

Amnesty International says Myanmar's treatment of Rohingya Muslims amounts to "dehumanizing apartheid," raising questions about what those who've fled a violent military crackdown would face if they returned home.

Nov. 21, 2017, at 2:27 a.m.

•                              
•                              

                             

Myanmar Treatment of Rohingya Called Apartheid in New Report

•                              
•                              
•                              
•                              
•                              
•                              
•                              

             

•                              
•                              
•                              
•                              

             

Share

×

     Plus                 

FILE - In this June 26, 2014 file photo, Rohingya people push a cart loaded with fire-wood during rain in Thet Kabyin village, close to Sittwe, Rakhine state, Myanmar. Amnesty International says Myanmar has subjected Rohingya Muslims to long-term discrimination that amounts to “dehumanizing apartheid,” raising questions about what those who’ve fled a violent military crackdown would face if they returned home. Hundreds of thousands of Rohingya are living in teeming refugee camps in Bangladesh and world leaders have called for the violence to stop and for Myanmar to allow the Rohingya to return home with their safety assured.(AP Photo/Gemunu Amarasinghe, File) The Associated Press

By KAWEEWIT KAEWJINDA, Associated Press

BANGKOK (AP) — Myanmar has subjected Rohingya Muslims to long-term discrimination and persecution that amounts to "dehumanizing apartheid," Amnesty International said Tuesday in a report that raises questions about what those who have fled a violent military crackdown would face if they returned home.

Since late August, more than 620,000 Rohingya have fled Myanmar's Rakhine state into neighboring Bangladesh, seeking safety from what the military described as "clearance operations." The United Nations and others have said the military's actions appeared to be a campaign of "ethnic cleansing," using acts of violence and intimidation and burning down homes to force the Rohingya to leave their communities.

U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres said earlier this month that the world body considered it "an absolutely essential priority" to stop all violence against the Rohingya and allow them to return to their homes. They are now living in teeming refugee camps in a Bangladesh border district, and officials in Dhaka have also urged that Myanmar allow them to return with their safety assured.

Myanmar leader Aung San Suu Kyi said Tuesday the government would follow a formula set in a 1992-93 repatriation agreement between Bangladesh and Myanmar, which are holding bilateral negotiations on the new refugee crisis.

ILAN

inRead invented by Teads

Amnesty International compiled two years' worth of interviews and evidence in its report, detailing how Rohingya lived within Myanmar, where they were subjected to a "vicious system of state-sponsored, institutionalized discrimination that amounts to apartheid," meeting the international legal definition of a crime against humanity.

Rohingya Muslims have faced state-supported discrimination in the predominantly Buddhist country for decades. Though members of the ethnic minority first arrived generations ago, Rohingya were stripped of their citizenship in 1982, denying them almost all rights and rendering them stateless. They cannot travel freely, practice their religion, or work as teachers or doctors, and they have little access to medical care, food or education.

Amnesty's report said the discrimination had worsened considerably in the last five years.

"I wanted to go to Sittwe hospital for medical treatment, but it's forbidden," Abul Kadir, 36, was quoted as telling the human rights group. "The hospital staff told me I couldn't go there for my own safety and said I needed to go to Bangladesh for treatment. It cost a lot of money."

Rohingya have fled en masse to escape persecution before. Hundreds of thousands left in 1978 and again in the early 1990s, though policies subsequently allowed many to return. Communal violence in 2012, as the country was transitioning from a half-century of dictatorship to democracy, sent another 100,000 fleeing by boat. Some 120,000 remain trapped in camps outside Rakhine's capital, Sittwe.

Rohingya were thought to number around 1 million people in Myanmar until late last year. That October, a Rohingya militant group killed several officers in attacks on police posts, and the military retaliation sent 87,000 Rohingya fleeing. A larger militant attack on Aug. 25 killed dozens of security forces, and the military response was swift and comprehensive.

By the tens of thousands, Rohingya began fleeing, their villages set aflame, some of the survivors bearing wounds from gunshots and land mines. Though the waves of refugees are now thinner, people are still crossing the Myanmar border nearly three month later.

Suu Kyi in her remarks Tuesday was hopeful a memorandum of understanding could be agreed upon soon to allow for the safe, voluntary return of people who fled to Bangladesh. She did not call them Rohingya, a name shunned by many in Myanmar who believe they are illegal immigrants.

Amnesty International's report cautioned that economic development of Rakhine should not be a tool of further discrimination. Myanmar has supported an international expert panel's recommendations on developing the impoverished state, but the same report urged Myanmar to grant citizenship and ensure that other rights of Rohingya were protected.

Foreign ministers and representatives of 51 countries began a meeting in Naypyitaw, Myanmar's capital, on Monday in a forum that aims to further political and economic cooperation but takes place against the backdrop of the refugee crisis.

"The international community must wake up to this daily nightmare and face the reality of what has been happening in Rakhine State for years," said Anna Neistat, Amnesty International's Senior Director for Research. "While development is an important part of the solution, it cannot be done in a way which further entrenches discrimination. The international community, and in particular donors, must ensure that their engagement does not make them complicit in these violations."

Copyright 2017 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed.

The Collapse of the Islamic State (The MEİR Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center)

The Collapse of the Islamic State

What Comes Next?

November 18, 2017

           

                        Overview

 

On June 29, 2014, ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declared the establishment of the

Islamic Caliphate by the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. In the summer of 2014, at the height

of its expansion, the Islamic State's territory covered about a third of Iraq and between a quarter and a third of Syria.

That large expanse, from the outskirts of Baghdad to the outskirts of Aleppo, was home to

between five and six million people and had a physical infrastructure that included oil and

gas fields, dams, bridges, power stations and grain stores. At the height of its power (the

second half of 2014), the oil and gas fields provided ISIS with an income of several million

dollars a day. ISIS, which overnight had become the richest terrorist organization in the

world, sought to take control of more territories in Iraq and Syria, the Middle East and

around the globe.

In response to ISIS's dramatic territorial gains in the summer of 2014, an American-led

international coalition was formed to combat the organization (September 2014). One year

later (September 2015) Russia began military intervention in Syria, initially to prevent the

collapse of the Syrian regime and later to support the regime in fighting ISIS and other rebel

organizations, referred to as "terrorist organizations" (among them the Headquarters for the

Liberation of al-Sham, affiliated with al-Qaeda). ISIS found itself under increasing military

pressure from the superpowers (the United States and Russia), Iran and Iranian-backed

forces (Hezbollah and Shi'ite militias), and local armies and militias (the Syrian and Iraqi

armies, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the Kurds and on occasion other rebel

organizations).

ISIS's expansion in Iraq and Syria was halted during the first half of 2015. A continuous

campaign has been waged against the Islamic State for two and a half years and is about

to be completed (November 2017). On the ground, the Islamic State no longer exists as a

functioning territorial entity. It has lost almost all of its territories, including its "capital cities"

of Mosul and Raqqah, as well as its core territories along the Euphrates in Iraq and Syrian leadership and weapons were severely hit, both in ground fighting and by the intensive aerial

attacks carried out by Russia and the coalition countries. Its governmental institutions have

been destroyed and it has lost its economic assets (especially the oil and gas fields).

Apparently, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's vision of an Islamic Caliphate has come to an end, at least for the time being, although ISIS still maintains a presence in Syria and Iraq, and will continue to exist.

This study examines the main stages in the collapse of the Islamic State and the reasons

behind it, and tries to evaluate what the character of the ISIS's post-Islamic State and

activities will be. The key questions and possible answers are the following:

Will ISIS continue to exist after the collapse of the Islamic State? In ITIC

assessment, ISIS will exist but will change its character and the modus operandi of

its activities. It will change from an organization which controlled extensive territories

and administrated the local inhabitants to what it was before, that is, a terroristguerrilla

organization unconnected to a territorial base. Once it collapses, in all

probability ISIS will reorganize, applying lessons learned from the failure of the

establishment of the Islamic State. During that time the organization will try to

continue carrying out terrorist-guerrilla attacks and eventually to upgrade them

to prove it still exists as a leading jihadist organization. Its main targets will

probably be the Iraqi army, the Syrian army, the Russian and American presences in

Syria and Iraq, and governmental targets in Iraq and Syria, Shi'ite-Alawite targets and

targets affiliated Iran and Hezbollah in Syria and Iraq. ISIS's activities may prove

troublesome for the various forces operating in Syria and Lebanon, but will most

likely not pose a strategic regional or international threat, as the Islamic State did

at the height of its expansion.

 

Will the provinces ISIS established beyond Syria and Iraq survive?

• In ITIC assessment the model of the Islamic State lost its attraction and it

is doubtful whether an attempt will be made to repeat it, at least in the

foreseeable future. However, the concept of jihad against the "infidels"

wherever they are found still exists and will lead to the continued existence

of most (if not all) of ISIS's provinces. That will motivate operatives in the

various provinces to continue fighting, possibly in collaboration with local

al-Qaeda networks. The chances of survival and the degree of success of

 

ISIS's activities in the various provinces will depend on four key factors: the

political and societal conditions in each country; the balance of forces

between ISIS operatives and the various local regimes' military and security

forces; the ability of ISIS operatives who fought in Syria and Iraq to return to

their home countries; and the strength of the al-Qaeda branch operating in

the country of the Islamic State province.

• How will the Islamic State influence ISIS's Sinai Province? The Sinai

Province, which operates in a territory where Egyptian governance is weak, will

in all likelihood continue to pose difficult problems for the Egyptian security

forces. In ITIC assessment ISIS's Sinai Province will try to foster cooperation

with jihadist operatives inside Egypt itself, with ISIS operatives in Libya and

with jihadist operatives in the Gaza Strip in order to replace its lost connection

to the Islamic State. At the same time the Sinai Province will look for

alternative sources of funding (such as bank robberies and smuggling1). The

lack of a significant al-Qaeda presence in the Sinai Peninsula may also support

the existence of the Islamic State's Sinai Province in the future. Even after the

collapse of the Islamic State, the Sinai Province will in all probability continue

its campaign against Egyptian security forces. It may even increase its

activities and their complexity to show it is still a factor to be reckoned with.

At the same time, ISIS's Sinai Province may also continue its sporadic attacks

on Israel (rocket fire, border attacks, showcase attacks).

 

Will ISIS move its leadership and central presence and activities from Iraq and

Syria to another country? Most likely it will not, for the following reasons: even

after the collapse of the Islamic State, the central regimes in Baghdad and Damascus

will continue to be weak and the Sunni-Shi'ite schism will remain strong. Unless that

situation changes, ISIS will prefer to continue its activities in Syria and Iraq, in the

heart of the Middle East, to moving to another country despite the blow it suffered.

In addition, moving ISIS and the Islamic State's leadership and senior operatives to the

periphery of the Middle East or even beyond will expose ISIS as a failure and lessen

1 On October 16, 2017, Islamic State's Sinai Province operatives robbed the branch of the Egyptian

National Bank in El-Arish. The Egyptian media reported that they took 17 million Egyptian pounds

(about $1 million). Criminal activity is liable to be the direction taken by the Sinai Province and other

ISIS provinces.

 

its chances of rehabilitating itself and returning to its status as a leading jihadist

organization. In addition, in ITIC assessment it will be difficult for ISIS to get a

strong foothold in its other provinces, to say nothing to repeating the attempt to

establish an Islamic State, because that will mean attacks from local and

international forces (the failure of ISIS's territorial expanse in the Sirte region in Libya

showed how difficult that would be).

What kind of terrorism will ISIS initiate abroad after the collapse of the Islamic

State?

• The collapse of the Islamic State may cause a significant decline of ISIS's

operational capabilities to plan and direct terrorist attacks abroad (attacks

which are complex and deadlier). There are a number of reasons for that: the

loss of operatives who directed attacks abroad, at both the command and

operational level; the loss of headquarters, mainly in Raqqah where external

attacks were planned and directed; the defection of many foreign fighters who

held key positions in planning and directing such attacks; and in addition, in ITIC

assessment ISIS's focus will be on rehabilitating the organization. The ITIC

assumes that at a time when ISIS is fighting for the survival of its core states, it

will not give high preference to carrying out complex attacks abroad, although it

may plan isolated "revenge attacks" for the collapse of the Islamic State.

• However, only a small number of attacks carried out by ISIS abroad were

planned by ISIS headquarters in Syria, and they were preceded by operational,

logistic and intelligence preparations. Most of the attacks in the West were

ISIS-inspired, carried out for the most part by individuals who identified

ideologically with ISIS and its propaganda. In some cases the individuals

underwent rapid radicalization and decided to carry out attacks without the

involvement of ISIS's headquarters. In ITIC assessment, although the idea of an

Islamic State was severely damaged, and despite blow to ISIS's effective

propaganda machine, ISIS-inspired attacks will not come to an end and in the

short term may increase (to avenge the collapse of the Islamic State). In the

future, the extent of ISIS-inspired attacks will be influenced both by the societal

and political conditions in the various countries, by ISIS's ability to reposition

 

itself as an important jihadist organization in Iraq and Syria, and by its to

rehabilitate its propaganda machine.

How will the return of the foreign fighters influence terrorism in their own

countries?

• Several thousand foreign fighters have already returned home and thousands

more are waiting for the opportunity to leave Syria and Iraq. It is reasonable to

assume that their involvement and influence on terrorism in their own

countries will increase as their numbers increase. Their return can be

expected to pose difficult security problems for local governments. The

fighters are trained and experienced, and during the fighting were brainwashed

with Salafi jihadist ideology.

• The foreign fighters are liable to join local Salafi jihadist networks and

encourage Islamist extremism and terrorism. Some of them may return home

with wives and children who were brainwashed by Islamic State ideology, and

witnessed the atrocities carried out in Syria and Iraq. Those children may be the

foundation for a new generation of ISIS supporters in Western countries and

elsewhere. However, it is still difficult to estimate how many of the fighters who

return from Syria and Iraq will continue to follow ISIS ideology, and how many of

them will be motivated to carry out terrorist attacks in their home countries in

ISIS's name.

How will the collapse of the Islamic Caliphate influence ISIS's relations with al-

Qaeda? Its collapse will show that ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's concept of

establishing the Islamic State "here and now" was mistaken, and that Ayman al-

Zawahiri, and Osama bin Laden before him, were correct when they objected to

the establishment of an Islamic State that controlled territory. Given that and the

weakening of ISIS, the charged relations between ISIS and al-Qaeda may change.

The changes may take place in Syria and Iraq as well as in ISIS's provinces in other

countries. ISIS operatives may return and join al-Qaeda, the organization from

which ISIS sprang, or one of the other forces, to present a united front of jihadist

organizations. It is also possible that even if ISIS operatives preserve its separate

organizational frameworks, there will be local collaboration between ISIS and al-

Qaeda in Syria and Iraq as well as in ISIS provinces in other countries.

 

What will be the local, regional and international influence of the collapse of

the Islamic State?

• The United States: In ITIC assessment the United States will not go far

beyond achieving its strategic objective of eliminating the Islamic State and

weakening ISIS. As opposed to Russia and Iran, which will seek to make

political-strategic capital from their support of the Syrian regime, the United

States will be satisfied with achieving its declared objective and not seek a

meaningful military presence or invest significant economic resources in

Syria. One of the reasons for that is American awareness that the genuine

influence of the Syrian regime on most of the rebel organizations and on

future developments in Syria will be very small. An open question is what

American policy will be towards the Kurds in Syria, who proved themselves

as trustworthy allies and made a great contribution to the collapse of the

Islamic State. American support for the region controlled by the Kurds in

northeastern Syria will lead to difficulties in American-Turkish relations, while

abandoning the Kurds in Syria will expose the United States as an unreliable

ally and harm its regional standing.

• Russia: The collapse of the Islamic State and the following rout of the rebel

forces from the region of Idlib may motivate the Russians to limit their forces

in Syria after the victory over the terrorist organizations. According to reports

in the Russian media, Russia is currently examining the possibility of

withdrawing some of its forces (articles published in the Russian daily

Kommersant and the TASS news Agency, October 30, 2017). However, even if the

Russians do reduce their forces in Syria, they will still continue to secure their

strategic interests and seek to maintain the great influence they acquired

with the Syrian regime during the Syrian civil war. That may create friction

between Russia and Iran, which seeks a dominant position in Syria and to

pursue its own strategic interests.

Iran: Iran will probably view the collapse of the Islamic State as an opportunity

to increase its influence in Syria and Iraq. That will enable Iran to promote its

strategic goal of creating an Iranian-Shi'ite sphere of influence from Iran to

Lebanon (and in addition, Yemen). In general, Iran will not use its own military

forces within the sphere of influence but will rather operate through Shi'ite

proxies to secure its local interests in each country. Such a sphere of influence

will make Iran the leading regional power in the Middle East and weaken the

influence of its enemies and rivals, including the United States and the

Sunni Arab states. Regarding Israel, Iran will seek to create an active

terrorist front in the Golan Heights by handling Shi'ite (Hezbollah), Palestinian

and Druze proxies against Israel.