The Collapse of the Islamic State (The MEİR Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center)

The Collapse of the Islamic State

What Comes Next?

November 18, 2017

           

                        Overview

 

On June 29, 2014, ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declared the establishment of the

Islamic Caliphate by the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. In the summer of 2014, at the height

of its expansion, the Islamic State's territory covered about a third of Iraq and between a quarter and a third of Syria.

That large expanse, from the outskirts of Baghdad to the outskirts of Aleppo, was home to

between five and six million people and had a physical infrastructure that included oil and

gas fields, dams, bridges, power stations and grain stores. At the height of its power (the

second half of 2014), the oil and gas fields provided ISIS with an income of several million

dollars a day. ISIS, which overnight had become the richest terrorist organization in the

world, sought to take control of more territories in Iraq and Syria, the Middle East and

around the globe.

In response to ISIS's dramatic territorial gains in the summer of 2014, an American-led

international coalition was formed to combat the organization (September 2014). One year

later (September 2015) Russia began military intervention in Syria, initially to prevent the

collapse of the Syrian regime and later to support the regime in fighting ISIS and other rebel

organizations, referred to as "terrorist organizations" (among them the Headquarters for the

Liberation of al-Sham, affiliated with al-Qaeda). ISIS found itself under increasing military

pressure from the superpowers (the United States and Russia), Iran and Iranian-backed

forces (Hezbollah and Shi'ite militias), and local armies and militias (the Syrian and Iraqi

armies, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the Kurds and on occasion other rebel

organizations).

ISIS's expansion in Iraq and Syria was halted during the first half of 2015. A continuous

campaign has been waged against the Islamic State for two and a half years and is about

to be completed (November 2017). On the ground, the Islamic State no longer exists as a

functioning territorial entity. It has lost almost all of its territories, including its "capital cities"

of Mosul and Raqqah, as well as its core territories along the Euphrates in Iraq and Syrian leadership and weapons were severely hit, both in ground fighting and by the intensive aerial

attacks carried out by Russia and the coalition countries. Its governmental institutions have

been destroyed and it has lost its economic assets (especially the oil and gas fields).

Apparently, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's vision of an Islamic Caliphate has come to an end, at least for the time being, although ISIS still maintains a presence in Syria and Iraq, and will continue to exist.

This study examines the main stages in the collapse of the Islamic State and the reasons

behind it, and tries to evaluate what the character of the ISIS's post-Islamic State and

activities will be. The key questions and possible answers are the following:

Will ISIS continue to exist after the collapse of the Islamic State? In ITIC

assessment, ISIS will exist but will change its character and the modus operandi of

its activities. It will change from an organization which controlled extensive territories

and administrated the local inhabitants to what it was before, that is, a terroristguerrilla

organization unconnected to a territorial base. Once it collapses, in all

probability ISIS will reorganize, applying lessons learned from the failure of the

establishment of the Islamic State. During that time the organization will try to

continue carrying out terrorist-guerrilla attacks and eventually to upgrade them

to prove it still exists as a leading jihadist organization. Its main targets will

probably be the Iraqi army, the Syrian army, the Russian and American presences in

Syria and Iraq, and governmental targets in Iraq and Syria, Shi'ite-Alawite targets and

targets affiliated Iran and Hezbollah in Syria and Iraq. ISIS's activities may prove

troublesome for the various forces operating in Syria and Lebanon, but will most

likely not pose a strategic regional or international threat, as the Islamic State did

at the height of its expansion.

 

Will the provinces ISIS established beyond Syria and Iraq survive?

• In ITIC assessment the model of the Islamic State lost its attraction and it

is doubtful whether an attempt will be made to repeat it, at least in the

foreseeable future. However, the concept of jihad against the "infidels"

wherever they are found still exists and will lead to the continued existence

of most (if not all) of ISIS's provinces. That will motivate operatives in the

various provinces to continue fighting, possibly in collaboration with local

al-Qaeda networks. The chances of survival and the degree of success of

 

ISIS's activities in the various provinces will depend on four key factors: the

political and societal conditions in each country; the balance of forces

between ISIS operatives and the various local regimes' military and security

forces; the ability of ISIS operatives who fought in Syria and Iraq to return to

their home countries; and the strength of the al-Qaeda branch operating in

the country of the Islamic State province.

• How will the Islamic State influence ISIS's Sinai Province? The Sinai

Province, which operates in a territory where Egyptian governance is weak, will

in all likelihood continue to pose difficult problems for the Egyptian security

forces. In ITIC assessment ISIS's Sinai Province will try to foster cooperation

with jihadist operatives inside Egypt itself, with ISIS operatives in Libya and

with jihadist operatives in the Gaza Strip in order to replace its lost connection

to the Islamic State. At the same time the Sinai Province will look for

alternative sources of funding (such as bank robberies and smuggling1). The

lack of a significant al-Qaeda presence in the Sinai Peninsula may also support

the existence of the Islamic State's Sinai Province in the future. Even after the

collapse of the Islamic State, the Sinai Province will in all probability continue

its campaign against Egyptian security forces. It may even increase its

activities and their complexity to show it is still a factor to be reckoned with.

At the same time, ISIS's Sinai Province may also continue its sporadic attacks

on Israel (rocket fire, border attacks, showcase attacks).

 

Will ISIS move its leadership and central presence and activities from Iraq and

Syria to another country? Most likely it will not, for the following reasons: even

after the collapse of the Islamic State, the central regimes in Baghdad and Damascus

will continue to be weak and the Sunni-Shi'ite schism will remain strong. Unless that

situation changes, ISIS will prefer to continue its activities in Syria and Iraq, in the

heart of the Middle East, to moving to another country despite the blow it suffered.

In addition, moving ISIS and the Islamic State's leadership and senior operatives to the

periphery of the Middle East or even beyond will expose ISIS as a failure and lessen

1 On October 16, 2017, Islamic State's Sinai Province operatives robbed the branch of the Egyptian

National Bank in El-Arish. The Egyptian media reported that they took 17 million Egyptian pounds

(about $1 million). Criminal activity is liable to be the direction taken by the Sinai Province and other

ISIS provinces.

 

its chances of rehabilitating itself and returning to its status as a leading jihadist

organization. In addition, in ITIC assessment it will be difficult for ISIS to get a

strong foothold in its other provinces, to say nothing to repeating the attempt to

establish an Islamic State, because that will mean attacks from local and

international forces (the failure of ISIS's territorial expanse in the Sirte region in Libya

showed how difficult that would be).

What kind of terrorism will ISIS initiate abroad after the collapse of the Islamic

State?

• The collapse of the Islamic State may cause a significant decline of ISIS's

operational capabilities to plan and direct terrorist attacks abroad (attacks

which are complex and deadlier). There are a number of reasons for that: the

loss of operatives who directed attacks abroad, at both the command and

operational level; the loss of headquarters, mainly in Raqqah where external

attacks were planned and directed; the defection of many foreign fighters who

held key positions in planning and directing such attacks; and in addition, in ITIC

assessment ISIS's focus will be on rehabilitating the organization. The ITIC

assumes that at a time when ISIS is fighting for the survival of its core states, it

will not give high preference to carrying out complex attacks abroad, although it

may plan isolated "revenge attacks" for the collapse of the Islamic State.

• However, only a small number of attacks carried out by ISIS abroad were

planned by ISIS headquarters in Syria, and they were preceded by operational,

logistic and intelligence preparations. Most of the attacks in the West were

ISIS-inspired, carried out for the most part by individuals who identified

ideologically with ISIS and its propaganda. In some cases the individuals

underwent rapid radicalization and decided to carry out attacks without the

involvement of ISIS's headquarters. In ITIC assessment, although the idea of an

Islamic State was severely damaged, and despite blow to ISIS's effective

propaganda machine, ISIS-inspired attacks will not come to an end and in the

short term may increase (to avenge the collapse of the Islamic State). In the

future, the extent of ISIS-inspired attacks will be influenced both by the societal

and political conditions in the various countries, by ISIS's ability to reposition

 

itself as an important jihadist organization in Iraq and Syria, and by its to

rehabilitate its propaganda machine.

How will the return of the foreign fighters influence terrorism in their own

countries?

• Several thousand foreign fighters have already returned home and thousands

more are waiting for the opportunity to leave Syria and Iraq. It is reasonable to

assume that their involvement and influence on terrorism in their own

countries will increase as their numbers increase. Their return can be

expected to pose difficult security problems for local governments. The

fighters are trained and experienced, and during the fighting were brainwashed

with Salafi jihadist ideology.

• The foreign fighters are liable to join local Salafi jihadist networks and

encourage Islamist extremism and terrorism. Some of them may return home

with wives and children who were brainwashed by Islamic State ideology, and

witnessed the atrocities carried out in Syria and Iraq. Those children may be the

foundation for a new generation of ISIS supporters in Western countries and

elsewhere. However, it is still difficult to estimate how many of the fighters who

return from Syria and Iraq will continue to follow ISIS ideology, and how many of

them will be motivated to carry out terrorist attacks in their home countries in

ISIS's name.

How will the collapse of the Islamic Caliphate influence ISIS's relations with al-

Qaeda? Its collapse will show that ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's concept of

establishing the Islamic State "here and now" was mistaken, and that Ayman al-

Zawahiri, and Osama bin Laden before him, were correct when they objected to

the establishment of an Islamic State that controlled territory. Given that and the

weakening of ISIS, the charged relations between ISIS and al-Qaeda may change.

The changes may take place in Syria and Iraq as well as in ISIS's provinces in other

countries. ISIS operatives may return and join al-Qaeda, the organization from

which ISIS sprang, or one of the other forces, to present a united front of jihadist

organizations. It is also possible that even if ISIS operatives preserve its separate

organizational frameworks, there will be local collaboration between ISIS and al-

Qaeda in Syria and Iraq as well as in ISIS provinces in other countries.

 

What will be the local, regional and international influence of the collapse of

the Islamic State?

• The United States: In ITIC assessment the United States will not go far

beyond achieving its strategic objective of eliminating the Islamic State and

weakening ISIS. As opposed to Russia and Iran, which will seek to make

political-strategic capital from their support of the Syrian regime, the United

States will be satisfied with achieving its declared objective and not seek a

meaningful military presence or invest significant economic resources in

Syria. One of the reasons for that is American awareness that the genuine

influence of the Syrian regime on most of the rebel organizations and on

future developments in Syria will be very small. An open question is what

American policy will be towards the Kurds in Syria, who proved themselves

as trustworthy allies and made a great contribution to the collapse of the

Islamic State. American support for the region controlled by the Kurds in

northeastern Syria will lead to difficulties in American-Turkish relations, while

abandoning the Kurds in Syria will expose the United States as an unreliable

ally and harm its regional standing.

• Russia: The collapse of the Islamic State and the following rout of the rebel

forces from the region of Idlib may motivate the Russians to limit their forces

in Syria after the victory over the terrorist organizations. According to reports

in the Russian media, Russia is currently examining the possibility of

withdrawing some of its forces (articles published in the Russian daily

Kommersant and the TASS news Agency, October 30, 2017). However, even if the

Russians do reduce their forces in Syria, they will still continue to secure their

strategic interests and seek to maintain the great influence they acquired

with the Syrian regime during the Syrian civil war. That may create friction

between Russia and Iran, which seeks a dominant position in Syria and to

pursue its own strategic interests.

Iran: Iran will probably view the collapse of the Islamic State as an opportunity

to increase its influence in Syria and Iraq. That will enable Iran to promote its

strategic goal of creating an Iranian-Shi'ite sphere of influence from Iran to

Lebanon (and in addition, Yemen). In general, Iran will not use its own military

forces within the sphere of influence but will rather operate through Shi'ite

proxies to secure its local interests in each country. Such a sphere of influence

will make Iran the leading regional power in the Middle East and weaken the

influence of its enemies and rivals, including the United States and the

Sunni Arab states. Regarding Israel, Iran will seek to create an active

terrorist front in the Golan Heights by handling Shi'ite (Hezbollah), Palestinian

and Druze proxies against Israel.