Saturday, December 21, 2024

UANI (United Against Nuclear IRAN) EYE ON IRAN 21 December 2024 TOP STORIES Syria’s Collapse And Israeli Attacks Leave Iran Exposed | The Washington Post

UANI (United Against Nuclear IRAN) EYE ON IRAN

21 December 2024 

TOP STORIES

Syria’s Collapse And Israeli Attacks Leave Iran Exposed | The Washington Post


A week of punishing Israeli airstrikes on Syria after the fall of Bashar al-Assad didn’t just set Syria’s own military back years, experts said, but also peeled away another layer of Iranian defenses in the region, leaving Tehran more exposed than it has been in decades. Iran’s growing vulnerability has generated alarm within the government, stirring fears that its steadily escalating conflict with Israel could soon enter a more dangerous phase. Hard-line supporters of the regime are talking more publicly, and more frequently, about adopting nuclear deterrence to thwart a possible Israeli attack. And among the country’s beleaguered opposition, there is new hope that the crumbling of Iranian power abroad could lead to a loosening of authoritarian rule at home.


Israel's Netanyahu Eyes Iran After Triumphs Over Hamas, Hezbollah, Syria | Reuters


2025 will be a year of reckoning for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his country's arch foe Iran. The veteran Israeli leader is set to cement his strategic goals: tightening his military control over Gaza, thwarting Iran's nuclear ambitions and capitalising on the dismantling of Tehran's allies -- Palestinian Hamas, Lebanon's Hezbollah and the removal of Syrian president Bashar al-Assad. Assad's collapse, the elimination of the top leaders of Hamas and Hezbollah and the destruction of their military structure mark a succession of monumental wins for Netanyahu. Without Syria, the alliances Tehran has nurtured for decades have unraveled. As Iran's influence weakens, Israel is emerging as the dominant power in the region. Netanyahu is poised to zero in on Iran's nuclear ambitions and missile program, applying an unyielding focus to dismantling and neutralising these strategic threats to Israel. Iran, Middle East observers say, faces a stark choice: Either continue its nuclear enrichment program or scale back its atomic activities and agree to negotiations.


Iran's Revolutionary Guards Extend Control Over Tehran's Oil Exports, Sources Say | Reuters 


Iran's Revolutionary Guards have tightened their grip on the country's oil industry and control up to half the exports that generate most of Tehran's revenue and fund its proxies across the Middle East, according to Western officials, security sources and Iranian insiders. All aspects of the oil business have come under the growing influence of the Guards, from the shadow fleet of tankers that secretively ship sanctioned crude, to logistics and the front companies selling the oil, mostly to China, according to more than a dozen people interviewed by Reuters. The extent of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' (IRGC) control over oil exports has not previously been reported. Despite tough Western sanctions designed to choke Iran's energy industry, reimposed by former U.S. President Donald Trump in 2018, Iran generates more than $50 billion a year in oil revenue, by far its largest source of foreign currency and its principal connection to the global economy.  



UANI IN THE NEWS


2024: A Year In The Middle East | Atlantic Council


[…] On January 3, Iran saw the deadliest terror attack on its soil since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, as a bombing in the city of Kerman killed nearly a hundred citizens. The attack was claimed by the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) shortly after the bombings. Iranian officials, however, were quick to shift the blame to Western countries, including the United States and Israel. Blaming Iran’s Western opponents for the terror attack was a clear conscious decision by Iran, writes Jason Brodsky, policy director of United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI). “It seeks to capitalize on the slaughter to score propaganda points against the US and Israeli governments at a time when both are under international criticism for the Gaza war.”


I Spoke To Khamenei’s Footsoldiers. He Is In Trouble. | UANI Director Of IRGC Research Kasra Aarabi For The Jewish Chronicle


“We zealous youth will not forget cowardice of the decision makers [in Syria]”, a young radical from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the Iranian regime’s paramilitary, tells me. Fault lines are emerging in the IRGC over the handling of Syria, which resulted in the collapse of Bashar al-Assad. The younger radicals are enraged at what they see as the “abandonment” of Syria. These divisions within the IRGC are causing Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, major problems. Yet, the internal backlash inside the IRGC over the senior commanders’ handling of Syria has been overlooked in the West. I spent the final 72 hours of the Assad regime talking with the younger radical ranks of the IRGC. From these conversations and recent trends, it’s clear an internal crisis is looming in the IRGC. […] Kasra Aarabi is the director for IRGC Research at United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI).


Doubts Raised Over Bangladeshi Report On LPG Cargo Origins | Lloyd’s List


The Bangladeshi committee that investigated the origins of cargoes on board VLGCs Gaz GMS and Captain Nikolas wrongly determined they came from the UAE and Oman, an analysis shows… Lloyd’s List has analysed vessel tracking data, satellite imagery from Planet Labs and the EU’s space programme, and concluded that the cargoes on board Gaz GMS and Captain Nikolas likely did not come from the UAE and Sohar. The findings are backed by research from tanker trackers at US advocacy group United Against Nuclear Iran, and data from commodities and analytics provider Vortexa… UANI’s research suggests Captain Nikolas loaded in Iran around September 13-15. Vortexa data also indicates the LPG was loaded in Iran.


Nine VLCCs Linked To Iran Trade Blacklisted By US Treasury | Tradewinds


The US has blacklisted nine VLCCs in its latest round of sanctions targeting the tanker fleet hauling Iranian crude. The Treasury said the vessels frequently used deceptive practices that posed dangers to the maritime industry while they hauled oil worth billions of dollars for the Iranian regime… Panama has committed to de-listing ships hit by US sanctions but has been accused by campaign group United Against Nuclear Iran of previously failing to adequately respond to its warnings about ships in the Iran trades. Bloomberg reported this week that the volume of Iranian oil stored on tankers at sea had reached its highest level since July because of the squeeze on Tehran’s exports.


Iran Closes Schools, Gov’t Buildings Amid Energy Crisis | i24 News 


Iran wastes billions propping up Assad's government in Syria, all the while Iranians suffer from ongoing economic crises and energy cuts 'At the end of the day, the preservation of the Islamic Republic is the most important variable for Ayatollah Khamenei,' @JasonMBrodsky says 


Iran’s Brutal Oppression Of Women Has Entered A Dark New Phase | INDEPENDENT 


The fall of the Assad regime in Syria has dealt a devastating blow to the Islamic Republic of Iran. Iran’s clerical leadership has long been concerned that Assad’s collapse could trigger a domino effect and reach the streets of Tehran – with good reason. As the Iranian regime grapples with this psychological setback, there has been a boost in morale among the people. Both regionally and domestically, the regime is looking increasingly fragile. Yet despite (and perhaps even because of) this growing fragility, the Islamic Republic is doubling down on its persecution of domestic dissent, especially women’s rights activists. […] Jemima Shelley is a senior research analyst at United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI) and former senior analyst at the Tony Blair Institute of Global Change (TBI).  


Israel Reportedly Prepares Significant Strike On Yemeni Houthi Rebels After US Hits Terror Command Site | All Israel News


Israel is preparing to launch significant strikes against the Houthi terror group in Yemen, according to sources cited in Israeli media, after the group’s last ballistic missile attack triggered sirens across large parts of central Israel on Monday. […] The strikes mark the first time that the U.S. hit a target in the center of the capital Sana'a. “This is an unusual target for the U.S. to strike in Yemen against the Houthis. Usually the U.S. strikes radar facilities, storage sites, and launchpads. A ‘key command-and-control facility’ is different this time,” stated Jason Brodsky, policy director for the United Against Nuclear Iran think tank. “The Pit in Sana'a is a command center for the Houthis and it focuses the organization's terrorist activities, from where they carry out attacks against ships and vessels in the southern Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden,” Dvori explained. 


Israel Reportedly Prepares Significant Strike On Yemeni Houthi Rebels After US Hits Terror Command Site | All Israel News


Israel is preparing to launch significant strikes against the Houthi terror group in Yemen, according to sources cited in Israeli media, after the group’s last ballistic missile attack triggered sirens across large parts of central Israel on Monday. The IDF later it said it shot down the ballistic missile, which the Houthis claimed was a hypersonic missile, outside the atmosphere with an Arrow-3 interceptor missile… “This is an unusual target for the U.S. to strike in Yemen against the Houthis. Usually the U.S. strikes radar facilities, storage sites, and launchpads. A ‘key command-and-control facility’ is different this time,” commented Jason Brodsky, Policy Director at the United Against Nuclear Iran think tank.


The Sanctions-Busters Funding Iran Bankers Are Fuelling Terror | UnHerd


Donald Trump isn’t yet back in the White House — but his Iranian policy is clear. Like he did in his first term, he’ll pursue a vigorous policy against Tehran, hampering its nuclear programme and backing its rivals across the Middle East… Yet while Republicans are sure to take the Iranian threat more seriously than their Democratic forebears, actually stopping the flow of illicit oil won’t be easy. “This involves more than just consumers,” says Norman Roule, a 35-year CIA veteran and now senior adviser to the campaigning think tank United Against a Nuclear Iran. “It requires clear and stringent standards to ensure international banks aren’t facilitating financial transfers associated with illegal oil sales. ”For that to happen, Roule adds, the US should immediately judge any transaction with Iran as dubious — even as Washington must also push other governments to take their responsibilities seriously. Maximum pressure, it seems, will involve a joint effort.


Ukrainian Intelligence Unveils Data On 238 Tankers Of Russia’s ‘Shadow Fleet’ | Freedom


The Ukrainian Defense Ministry’s Main Intelligence Directorate (HUR) has launched a new section on Russia’s “shadow fleet” on the War & Sanctions portal, unveiling data on the activities of 238 vessels that help Russia and Iran export sanctioned oil. That’s according to the intelligence agency’s press service, Ukrinform reports… Some vessels have been identified by Greenpeace as part of a shadow fleet that endangers ecosystems in the Baltic Sea by transporting Russian oil globally. Others, according to the American human rights group United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI), have been repurposed from carrying Iranian oil to now shipping Russian oil.


NUCLEAR DEAL & NUCLEAR PROGRAM


UN Pushes For Iran Nuclear Deal Talks, Says 'Time Of The Essence' | Reuters 


A top U.N. official on Tuesday pushed world powers and Iran to urgently work to restore a 2015 deal that lifted sanctions on Tehran in return for restrictions on its nuclear program, warning that its "success or failure matters to all of us." Iran's deal with Britain, Germany, France, the United States, Russia and China is known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The U.S. quit the agreement in 2018, during Donald Trump's first term as president, and Iran began moving away from its nuclear-related commitments under the deal. "Though diplomacy is the best option, the United States has also been clear a nuclear Iran can never be an option. We are prepared to use all elements of national power to ensure that outcome," deputy U.S. Ambassador Robert Wood told the council.  


Iran Confirms Increase In IAEA Nuclear Inspections | Barron’s


Iran confirmed Saturday that it has allowed watchdog the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to increase the number of inspections it carries out into Tehran's nuclear programme, state media reported." We have increased capacity -- it is natural that the number of inspections should also increase," the official IRNA news agency quoted the country's nuclear chief Mohammad Eslami as saying. "When we carry out nuclear activities, and where we deal with nuclear materials, changing the scale will naturally change the monitoring level," he added. Eslami's comments came after an IAEA report, seen by AFP on Friday, that Iran had agreed to increased monitoring. "Iran agreed to the agency's request to increase the frequency and intensity of the implementation of safeguards measures at Fordo enrichment plant" south of Tehran, the IAEA report said.


SANCTIONS, BUSINESS RISKS, & OTHER ECONOMIC NEWS


Iran's Rial Hits A Record Low, Battered By Regional Tensions And An Energy Crisis | The Washington Post


The Iranian rial on Wednesday fell to its lowest level in history, losing more than 10% of value since Donald Trump won the U.S. presidential election in November and signaling new challenges for Tehran as it remains locked in the wars raging in the Middle East. The rial traded at 777,000 rials to the dollar, traders in Tehran said, down from 703,000 rials on the day Trump won. Iran’s Central Bank has in the past flooded the market with more hard currencies in an attempt to improve the rate. In an interview with state television Tuesday night, Central Bank Gov. Mohammad Reza Farzin said that the supply of foreign currency would increase and the exchange rate would be stabilized. He said that $220 million had been injected into the currency market.  


Iran Lawmakers To Summon Economy Minister Over Currency Woes | AFP 


Iranian lawmakers will summon the economy minister for questioning over a record slump of the local currency against the dollar, local media reported on Thursday. The Iranian rial was trading at around 770,000 against the US dollar and at roughly 800,000 to the Euro on Thursday, according to local media and the Bonbast website that monitors exchange rates. Iran's currency has never before traded at levels so low. The drop in Iran's currency has worsened since the December 8 fall of Syria's president Bashar al-Assad, a longtime ally of Tehran. The rial had already been steadily falling, hovering near 710,000 against the greenback in the days before Islamist-led rebels toppled him after a lightning offensive. Lawmaker Abbas Goudarzi said the rial's depreciation has contributed to an increase in prices which "ultimately placed an economic pressure on (Iran's) population."  


TERRORISM & EXTREMISM


Mass Grave Unearthed At Iran-Backed Hezbollah Site Near Syrian Shrine | Newsweek 


A mass grave was discovered on Wednesday in Damascus' Sayyida Zeinab suburb, the Syrian Civil Defense group, known as the White Helmets, said. At least 21 corpses and incomplete human remains were found at a site previously used by Hezbollah and Iran-backed militias. It marks one of the most significant finds of its kind since Syria's 13-plus-year civil war ended on December 8 when a 10-day offensive by rebel forces toppled President Bashar al-Assad's regime. The discovery highlights the ongoing toll of Assad's rule, which displaced millions and left vast areas in ruins. The Sayyida Zeinab area, often targeted during the war, was a stronghold for Hezbollah and other militias allied with his regime. Iran and Hezbollah provided crucial support to Assad, bolstering his forces in exchange for strategic control over key regions.


PROTESTS & HUMAN RIGHTS


Iran Pauses The Process To Implement A New, Stricter Headscarf Law For Women, Official Says | Associated Pres


Iran has paused the process of implementing a new, stricter law on women’s mandatory headscarf, or hijab, an official said — a bill that many believe could have reignited the protests that engulfed the Islamic Republic after the 2022 death of Mahsa Amini. The controversial law, which was approved by the parliament in September 2023, will not be sent to the government as planned this week, according to one of the country’s vice presidents. The development effectively means that Iran has halted enacting the legislation. The law levies harsher punishments for women who refuse to wear the hijab and for businesses that serve them, penalties previously rejected by Iran’s reformist President Masoud Pezeshkian as he tries to restart talks with the West over sanctions imposed on Iran over its nuclear program. 


Iran ‘Bows To Pressure’ To Release Singer Who Defied Regime By Performing Solo Without A Hijab | The Telegraph


The Iranian regime released a young female singer who was arrested for a risque performance without the mandatory hijab. Parastoo Ahmadi, 27, was arrested on Saturday in the northern city of Sari, after live-streaming a ‘virtual concert’ wearing a dress that also exposed her shoulders. Her lawyer said Tehran had bowed to calls for her release, in a sign of the regime’s growing nervousness over protests. Milad Panahipour said his client’s arrest was carried without prior notification or judicial summons. He added that she was released at 3am local time on Sunday following widespread outrage over the news. The incident follows similar high-profile protests that have triggered a backlash in recent weeks, including a university student protesting in just her underwear at strict islamic dress codes. It also comes as Iran has been significantly weakened by Israel’s attacks on its proxies and the fall of the Assad regime in Syria.


U.S.-IRAN RELATIONS & NEGOTIATIONS


Two Charged In Connection With Iran-Backed Drone Strike That Killed 3 US Troops In The Middle East | Associated Press


Two men, including a dual Iranian American citizen, have been charged with conspiring to export sensitive technology to Iran that was used in a drone attack in Jordan that killed three American troops early this year and injured dozens of other service members, the Justice Department said Monday. The pair were arrested after FBI specialists who analyzed the drone traced its navigation system to an Iranian company operated by one of the defendants, who relied on parts and technology funneled into the country by his alleged co-conspirator, prosecutors said. “We often cite hypothetical risk when we talk about the dangers of American technology getting into dangerous hands,” U.S. Attorney Joshua Levy, the top federal prosecutor in Massachusetts, said at a news conference announcing the charges. “Unfortunately, in this situation, we are not speculating.”


MILITARY/INTELLIGENCE MATTERS & PROXY WARS


A Diminished Hezbollah Is Made Even Weaker By The Toppling Of Assad In Syria | The Associated Press


A severely hobbled Hezbollah was in no position to help defend former Syrian President Bashar Assad, a longtime ally, from the lightning-fast insurgency that toppled him. With Assad gone, the militant group based in Lebanon is even weaker. Hezbollah was dealt a major blow during 14 months of war with Israel. The toppling of Assad, who had strong ties to Iran, has now crippled its ability to bounce back by cutting off a vital weapons-smuggling route through Syria. Hezbollah officials are deeply concerned but defiant. “What is happening in Syria is a major, dangerous and new change, and to know why this happened needs evaluation,” Hassan Fadlallah, a Lebanese lawmaker who represents Hezbollah’s political wing, said during a speech at a funeral for militants killed by Israel. “Whatever is happening in Syria, despite its dangers, will not weaken us.”


IRANIAN INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS


Iran's President To Make Rare Visit To Egypt For D-8 Summit | Reuters


Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian will take part in a summit of big Muslim countries in Egypt on Thursday, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmaeil Baghaei said, the first visit by an Iranian president to Egypt in more than a decade. Egypt is hosting the summit of the D-8 Organization for Economic Cooperation, which also includes Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan and Turkey. Relations between Egypt and Iran have generally been fraught in recent decades but the two countries have stepped up high-level diplomatic contacts since the eruption of the Gaza crisis last year as Egypt tried to play a mediating role. Iran's Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi travelled to Egypt in October to discuss regional issues with Egyptian officials, while his Egyptian counterpart Badr Abdelatty travelled to Tehran earlier in July to attend Pezeshkian's inauguration.


RUSSIA, SYRIA, ISRAEL, HEZBOLLAH, LEBANON & IRAN


Iran Scrambles To Build Ties With Syrian Leaders As Regional Influence Wanes | The Guardian


The Iranian government is attempting to salvage some influence with Syria’s new leaders, as Tehran reels from its sudden loss of authority in Damascus after the collapse of the regime of Bashar al-Assad. The Iranian president, Masoud Pezeshkian, is already facing multiple domestic and international crises, including power cuts due to a lack of oil supplies, continued tensions over its nuclear programme and a row about a new law that will make wearing the hijab compulsory for women. But it is the sudden loss of influence in Syria after the fall of Assad to rebel groups that is exercising Iranian officials most. In the short term they want to salvage some influence with the rebels in Damascus. Iranian diplomats insist they were not wedded to Assad, and were disillusioned with his refusal to compromise.


Syrian Opposition ‘Set Iranian Project Back 40 Years,’ Ahmad Al-Sharaa Says | Al Arabiya News


Syrian opposition groups that toppled the al-Assad regime “set the Iranian project in the region back by 40 years,” Ahmad al-Sharaa, head of the new government, said in an interview published Friday. Speaking to pan-Arab publication Asharq al-Awsat, the opposition leader, also known as Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, stressed that Syria would no longer be used to “attack or destabilize” any country in the Arab or Gulf region. “Syria had become a platform for Iran to control key Arab capitals, spread wars, and destabilize the Gulf with drugs like Captagon,” he said. “By removing Iranian militias and closing Syria to Iranian influence, we’ve served the region’s interests—achieving what diplomacy and external pressure could not, with minimal losses.”


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The Washington Post - December 17, 2024 - By Susannah George - Syria’s collapse and Israeli attacks leave Iran exposed

 The Washington Post 

Syria’s collapse and Israeli attacks leave Iran exposed

Tehran’s increasingly vulnerable position in the region has energized opposition activists and spurred hardliners to endorse the pursuit of nuclear weapons.

December 17, 2024


A man passes burned Syrian military vehicles on Dec. 10 at the site of an Israeli airstrike in Qamishli, in mainly Kurdish northeastern Syria. (Delil Souleiman/AFP/Getty Images)


By Susannah George

A week of punishing Israeli airstrikes on Syria after the fall of Bashar al-Assad didn’t just set Syria’s own military back years, experts said, but also peeled away another layer of Iranian defenses in the region, leaving Tehran more exposed than it has been in decades.



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Iran’s growing vulnerability has generated alarm within the government, stirring fears that its steadily escalating conflict with Israel could soon enter a more dangerous phase. Hard-line supporters of the regime are talking more publicly, and more frequently, about adopting nuclear deterrence to thwart a possible Israeli attack. And among the country’s beleaguered opposition, there is new hope that the crumbling of Iranian power abroad could lead to a loosening of authoritarian rule at home.


“The fingers of the Islamic Republic are being cut off and are getting weaker,” one activist from eastern Iran said by phone, speaking on the condition of anonymity for fear of reprisals.


After Assad’s ouster by Islamist rebels — preceded by the abrupt departure of Iranian advisers and the withdrawal of allied regional forces — Israel took advantage of the power vacuum to destroy vast amounts of Syrian military infrastructure. Hundreds of strikes destroyed warplanes, helicopters, weapons caches and the bulk of the country’s navy.


Israel said it was launching the strikes to prevent advanced military equipment from falling into the hands of militants, but analysts said the attacks were also aimed at further weakening Iran. Under Assad’s decades-long rule, Tehran installed military officials in the country to prop up his regime, and to protect the land routes it used to send weapons and other support to Hezbollah in Lebanon and armed proxies in Iraq.


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“It was like a root canal,” Yoram Schweitzer, a former Israeli intelligence officer, said of the bombing campaign in Syria. “Iran is always part of the picture.”


Syria’s former radar systems could have provided Iran with early warnings of an Israeli attack, Schweitzer said, while its advanced Russian air defenses were a “constraining factor” for Israel’s maneuverability in the area, according to Gregory Brew, an Iran analyst at the Eurasia Group.


“Israel now has a clear route to Iran and will likely continue to have one for the foreseeable future,” Brew said, explaining that rebuilding or replacing the destroyed equipment could take years.


“Iran was exposed already, and the October strikes proved that,” he added, referring to a wave of Israeli attacks that hit some of the country’s most sensitive military sites. Brew likened Iran’s strategic position to the situation it faced in the 1980s during its brutal cross-border war with Iraq, or in 2003 when the United States invaded Baghdad.


Israeli soldiers cross Saturday from the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights into the buffer zone beyond which Syria lies. (Heidi Levine for The Washington Post).

Even before Assad was toppled, Israel was in the midst of an extensive covert aerial campaign against Iranian assets in Syria, carrying out more than 100 airstrikes on Syrian territory since October 2023 — most publicly unacknowledged — according to a U.N. tally.


A Washington Post analysis of Iranian media reports and statements from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps found at least 24 IRGC officers were killed in Syria over the past 14 months. The strikes were aimed at “gutting the middle of IRGC leadership, designed to get the structure to collapse in on itself,” said Behnam Ben Taleblu, director of the Iran program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a conservative Washington think tank.


On Jan. 20, five Iranian officers were killed in a strike on Damascus. On April 1, seven Iranian officers were killed in a strike on a building adjacent to Iran’s embassy in Damascus, prompting Iran’s first-ever direct attack on Israeli territory.


Iran launched its second direct attack on Israel in October after a series of devastating blows to its ally Hezbollah, including an Israeli strike that killed the group’s leader, Hasan Nasrallah. On Sunday, nearly three weeks into a ceasefire agreement with Israel, Hezbollah acknowledged, and sought to downplay, the reality that it had been cut off from Iran.


“Hezbollah has lost the supply route coming through Syria at the current stage, but this is a small detail and may change with time,” said Naim Qassem, the group’s new leader. He added that Hezbollah was exploring other ways to rearm, possibly seeking an agreement under Syria’s “new regime.”


In the face of mounting losses, Iranian politicians have begun speaking more openly about the possibility of developing nuclear weapons as a deterrent to attacks. Lamenting Assad’s fall, one hard-line member of parliament, Ahmad Naderi, called in a Dec. 8 post on X for Iran to test “an atomic bomb.”


A U.S. intelligence report released this month referenced the public debate in Iran, saying that it reflected “a perception that Iran needs to rectify a strategic imbalance with its adversaries,” and that the country’s position “risks emboldening nuclear weapons advocates within Iran’s decision-making apparatus.”


This photo from the office of Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, shows him addressing supporters last week in Tehran. He said the weakening of the anti-Israel "resistance" after the ouster of Bashar al-Assad in Syria would not diminish Tehran's power. (-/AFP/Getty Images)


Since last year, Iran has increased its stockpile of highly enriched uranium, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency, the United Nations’ nuclear watchdog. In an analysis of the report from the Institute for Science and International Security, researchers concluded that Iran would need roughly one month to further refine that stockpile into weapons-grade fuel.


U.S. administrations have been careful to avoid any direct confrontation with Iran, and the Biden White House warned Israel against hitting nuclear or oil facilities in its October attack. But Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has signaled a desire to capitalize on gains against Hamas and Hezbollah and take on Tehran more aggressively under a new U.S. administration.


Addressing Iran and Hezbollah, Netanyahu said Sunday that Israel “will continue to act against you whenever necessary, in any arena and at any time,” according to a statement from his office after a Saturday call with President-elect Donald Trump. Asked in a Time magazine interview on Nov. 25 about the prospect of war with Iran, Trump replied that “anything can happen.”


In Iran, activists are watching the situation closely, hoping events in Syria and across the region could energize the anti-government movement.


“The fall of Bashar al-Assad didn’t only raise the hopes of the opposition but also raised the spirits of the Iranian nation,” said the activist from the eastern Iran.


The streets have largely been quiet since 2023, when the government violently put down a nationwide uprising sparked by the death in police custody of a young Kurdish woman, who was allegedly detained for violating the country’s dress code for women. But women have continued to challenge the mandatory hijab, which remains a symbol for many of deeper frustrations over state repression.


Last week, singer Parastoo Ahmadi streamed a video on social media that showed her performing without a headscarf. “I am Parastoo, a girl who wants to sing for the people I love. This is a right that I could not ignore,” she wrote in a message to her fans. The concert received hundreds of thousands of views online in a matter of hours. On Saturday, she was briefly arrested, her lawyer said, but has not been informed of the charges against her.


Amid the cautious hope, the activist in eastern Iran said there are new fears, too, that the government could respond to its setbacks abroad by tightening its grip domestically, possibly using some of the same militias that pulled back from Syria as the rebels marched toward Damascus.


These are groups that “committed crimes in Syria for a few bucks,” the activist said, and could now represent “a serious danger” to Iranians.


Middle East conflict

The Israel-Gaza war has gone on for over a year, and tensions have spilled into the surrounding Middle East region.


The war: On Oct. 7, Hamas militants launched an unprecedented cross-border attack on Israel, killing about 1,200 people and taking civilian hostages. We’re tracking how many hostages remain in Gaza. Israel declared war on Hamas in response, launching a ground invasion that fueled the biggest displacement in the region since Israel’s creation in 1948. In July 2024, Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh was killed in an attack Hamas has blamed on Israel.


Cease-fire: Israel and Lebanon’s Hezbollah agreed to a cease-fire deal in November 2024, bringing a tenuous halt to more than a year of hostilities. Here’s what to know about the deal’s terms and how it will be enforced.


Hezbollah: Hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah, a militant organization backed by Iran, have escalated over the past year, leading to an Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon. Israel’s airstrikes into Lebanon have grown more intense and deadly, killing over 1,400 people including Hasan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s longtime leader. The Israel-Lebanon border has a history of violence that dates back to Israel’s founding.


Gaza crisis: In the Gaza Strip, Israel has waged one of this century’s most destructive wars, killing tens of thousands and plunging at least half of the population into “famine-like conditions.” For months, Israel has resisted pressure from Western allies to allow more humanitarian aid into the enclave.


U.S. involvement: Despite tensions between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and some U.S. politicians, including President Biden, the United States supports Israel with weapons, funds aid packages, and has vetoed or abstained from the United Nations’ cease-fire resolutions.


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December 21, 2024 Statement from President Joe Biden on the Bipartisan Government Funding Bill

 December 21, 2024

Statement from President Joe Biden on the Bipartisan Government Funding Bill


The bipartisan funding bill I just signed keeps the government open and delivers the urgently needed disaster relief that I requested for recovering communities as well as the funds needed to rebuild the Francis Scott Key Bridge. 


This agreement represents a compromise, which means neither side got everything it wanted. But it rejects the accelerated pathway to a tax cut for billionaires that Republicans sought, and it ensures the government can continue to operate at full capacity.


That’s good news for the American people, especially as families gather to celebrate this holiday season.


December 21, 2024 Statement from President Joe Biden on Attack on Magdeburg Christmas Market

 December 21, 2024

Statement from President Joe Biden on Attack on Magdeburg Christmas Market


The United States extends our deepest condolences to the people of Germany grieving the terrible attack at a Christmas market yesterday in Magdeburg, Germany.  No community—and no family—should have to endure such a despicable and dark event, especially just days before a holiday of joy and peace.  My team has been in close touch with German officials.  We’ve made it clear that the United States stands ready to offer all available resources and assistance if needed.  And while this situation remains under investigation, make no mistake:  the United States will always stand with our Allies against violent terror.  In the coming days, we will keep all those injured or killed—and their beloved families—close in our hearts.


BROOKINGS Commentary Forecasting China’s strategy in the Middle East over the next four years Yun Sun December 19, 2024

 BROOKINGS 

Commentary

Forecasting China’s strategy in the Middle East over the next four years

Yun Sun

December 19, 2024



Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman receives China's premier, Li Qiang, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, September 11, 2024. (Saudi Press Agency/Handout via REUTERS)

17 min read


Middle East & North Africa

Program

Foreign Policy Global Economy and Development


Center

John L. Thornton China Center

Editor's note: This piece is part of a series titled “The future of U.S.-China policy: Recommendations for the incoming administration” from Brookings’s John L. Thornton China Center.



In the past two decades, China has rapidly emerged as an increasingly consequential economic, political, and security actor in the Middle East. China is the largest consumer of Middle Eastern oil, Chinese trade with the region has more than tripled over the past 20 years, and China is playing an expanding role in regional peace, security, and diplomacy. Beijing’s strategy in the Middle East has emphasized a comprehensive plan to expand its influence in almost all key domains. The next four years will be essential to China’s acceleration of its political, economic, and diplomatic engagement in the Middle East, with a strong focus on diversifying economic ties, involvement in peace and mediation, and managing a regional power equilibrium that has shifted as the result of the war in Gaza.


Continued dependence on Middle Eastern oil

When China assesses the Middle East in its global strategy, its foremost national interest always lies in energy security. As China is heavily dependent on energy imports, the Middle East is an inevitable and indispensable partner for China. In 2022, about 53% of China’s crude oil imports came from the Middle East. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, China’s crude oil imports hit a record high of 11.3 million barrels per day in 2023, growing by 10% compared to the previous year. Middle Eastern countries, including Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Kuwait, Qatar, and Iran (through Malaysia), occupy top positions in China’s energy import portfolio.


To ensure its energy security, China has worked carefully to avoid overdependence on a single country. According to conversations I had with Chinese experts in October 2024, the Chinese foreign policy community’s conventional wisdom is that China should not import more than 20% of its crude oil from any single country, regardless of whether it is Russia or Saudi Arabia. However, the deliberate avoidance of dependence on a single country does not remove China’s dependence on the Middle East as a region.


Despite China’s commitment to carbon neutrality and a green transition, the diversification of China’s energy portfolio is unlikely to affect China’s dependence on Middle Eastern oil for the next four years. China intends to peak carbon emissions by 2030, which means that it will still be expanding its carbon emissions in 2029. As China prioritizes reducing coal in its overall energy consumption, oil and gas are seen as “cleaner” alternatives. In other words, even if China intends to reduce carbon emissions, coal, rather than oil and gas, is the priority for reductions. This is why the percentage of coal in China’s overall energy consumption decreased from 68.5% to 55.3% from 2012 to 2021, while the percentage of oil increased from 17% to 18%.


China’s dependence on Middle Eastern hydrocarbons has two immediate implications: first, China has to protect stable energy production in the region, and second, China has to protect the safe transportation of energy from the region to China. These two priorities ensure that any conflict that affects or disrupts the production or transportation of China’s oil shipments will not be in China’s national interest. China’s strategy in the Middle East during the incoming Trump administration will be heavily vested in the maintenance of oil production and shipment.


Diversifying economic engagement

The final impact of the war in Gaza on the region’s future is unknown, but several trajectories of China’s strategy in the Middle East will accelerate regardless. First, China’s expansion and diversification of economic ties in the region will deepen in non-energy sectors. Contrary to the conventional wisdom that China’s economic relations with the Middle East completely hinge upon the energy trade, China’s exports to the region reached nearly $229 billion in 2022, while imports exceeded $278 billion. The top commodity China exports to the region is machinery and parts, while its imports primarily consist of natural resources. This signifies that the Middle East has become an important market for China, and that China will look to have the region absorb Chinese overcapacity by increasing its exports.


In addition, China is diving into the development of infrastructure, new and clean energy, the digital economy, and artificial intelligence (AI) in the Middle East while aligning China’s own strategies such as the Belt and Road Initiative with local Middle Eastern blueprints like Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030. In the next four years, China will further saturate the Middle East with its economic presence, including not only trade in goods but also in services. In recent years, Chinese AI companies have been actively building partnerships to expand their market access in the Middle East. Digital technology cooperation between China and regional countries is likely to be the most impactful.


Trajectory of relations with key countries

The Gaza crisis has put China’s traditional balancing diplomacy in the region to a serious stress test. Until 2023, China had been able to maintain relationships with all parties in the region, between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and between the Arab world and Israel relatively well. This strategic flexibility was made possible by China’s relatively detached position and lack of entanglement with regional powers. However, the Gaza crisis has demonstrated the limitation of China’s balancing diplomacy. With the shifts and uncertainty associated with the regional power equilibrium, China’s balancing diplomacy will have to adapt.


First, many in China see the Gaza crisis as a temporary setback for the reconciliation process between Israel and the Arab countries, and that eventually, normalization of relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia will occur. China does not necessarily see itself as a benefactor of such normalization because a security pact between the United States and Saudi Arabia, a precondition for Israel-Saudi normalization, will undermine China’s efforts to shape a new regional security architecture with less U.S. involvement and influence. China does not yet have critical influence over Saudi Arabia’s strategic alignment choice. Nevertheless, China is likely to use its energy, economic, and political engagement to neutralize the impact of the Saudi-U.S. defense agreement, particularly if such a pact includes clauses that hinder security and technological cooperation between China and Saudi Arabia. It means China will prioritize building leverage and enhancing ties with Saudi Arabia (as well as other key Arab states) to balance their deepened security ties with the United States. China has been pushing against a U.S.-led regional security organization or mechanism—what the Chinese have termed a “Middle Eastern NATO.” Although China’s nascent and superficial security involvement in the region means that this process is occurring largely independently from China, it does not stop China from working to influence it.


Similarly, it will be important for China to support Iran’s efforts to regain its strength and prestige after the latter has taken a heavy toll from Israel’s attacks on its regional proxies, including Hamas and Hezbollah. China would like to see a regional security architecture anchored on a balance of power, with Iran as a strong pillar and as China’s partner in countering U.S. dominance in the region’s security affairs. Thus, Iran’s weakening is not conducive to this approach. China signed a 25-year blueprint on economic engagement with Iran in 2021, but the progress in investment and economic cooperation has been lacking.


Moving forward, China may prioritize rebuilding Tehran’s strength to preserve the region’s balance of power. That could entail more imports of Iranian crude oil, more investment in Iran’s infrastructure, and support for Iran’s regional approach. China remains concerned about the threat of U.S. sanctions, but such support from Beijing could transpire in a relatively less political manner such as through illicit trade, development aid, and diplomatic support. Beijing denies the existence of an “axis of evil” with Russia, North Korea, and Iran, but privately, Chinese officials recognize that these countries share more convictions and interests in international politics with China than China does with the United States. This sentiment could potentially heighten if U.S.-China relations enter another “freefall” under the second Trump administration. In all, China will not let Tehran fail, particularly because Beijing’s relationship with Tehran would presumably help balance Saudi Arabia’s pursuit of relationships with the United States and Israel.


Navigating a difficult relationship with Israel

China’s relationship with Israel suffered the most from the war in Gaza. China has refused to define Hamas as a terrorist organization and has been almost unequivocally critical of Israel and the “humanitarian disaster” it created in Gaza since the beginning of the crisis. The key caveat is not that China adopted a pro-Palestine position, but rather that China adopted an anti-U.S. position in the Gaza crisis. Because Beijing sees Israel as America’s closest ally in the region, China’s default position is to counter the positions of the United States and its allies. Had Israel’s alliance with the United States not been a factor, China’s position toward the Gaza crisis would likely have followed Beijing’s traditional balancing act. In the Chinese policy community, it is widely acknowledged that Israel is the “victim” of U.S.-China great power competition coming to China’s policy toward the war in Gaza.


The challenge is how Beijing will manage its relationship with Israel beyond the Gaza crisis. Some in Beijing are seriously concerned about some Israeli voices who call for Israel to develop relations with Taiwan as retaliation against China’s pro-Palestine position. An Israeli parliamentary delegation visited Taiwan in April 2024, and Taiwan’s possible role in Israel’s pager attacks against Hezbollah has brought keen attention to the previously quiet military relations between Israel and Taiwan. Few in China actually believe that Israel will pursue diplomatic relations with Taiwan, but the evolving relationship evidently has ramifications for China and its top priority of the “One China” principle.


The trajectory of the China-Israel relationship in the next four years will be a key question for China’s Middle East strategy. China does not have a fundamental conflict of national interests with Israel, and their deteriorating relations today are a consequence of the Israel-Palestine conflict rather than a direct clash between China and Israel. Therefore, given China’s tradition of balancing diplomacy in the Middle East, China will foreseeably want to repair damaged ties with Israel through a diverse range of engagements. This will be particularly true and occur expediently if the Gaza crisis ends and if some level of reconciliation is achieved between Israel and Saudi Arabia.


But there are also counterfactors. The Gaza war has disillusioned Israelis who previously romanticized their country’s relationship with China, as Israel had hoped for China to adopt a more sympathetic and supportive attitude toward Israel’s position. A sense of betrayal, a resentment of China’s position, and emotional reactions to China’s repeated criticisms will make it exceedingly difficult to convince the Israeli people that China is neutral and trustworthy again. Pragmatism might prevail in the end, but it could take more than four years for things to renormalize.


Growing involvement in regional peace and conflict mediation

President Xi Jinping first proposed the concept of a new “common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security” architecture in the Middle East in 2018 during the 8th China-Arab States Cooperation Forum. In 2022, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi built upon Xi’s proposal further by calling for a “new security architecture in the Middle East.” In addition to tendering positions based on principles such as adherence to political and diplomatic dialogues, the centrality of regional countries, and the sacredness of the U.N. Charter, Wang offered two specific overtures on regional peace dialogues: first, an international peace conference on the settlement of Palestine based on a two-state solution; and second, a Gulf security dialogue platform to address the tension between Iran and Arab countries. Based on these visions, China’s goal is not to replace the United States as the security guarantor in the region. Instead, China is trying to displace the United States’ regional dominance by facilitating the creation of a new security structure in the Middle East; a structure in which China could play a more significant role given its growing economic weight and political ties with various powers in the region.


China has had two successes on Middle East peace and conflict issues since its new vision was introduced. In March 2023, Saudi Arabia and Iran reached a peace deal in Beijing that was nominally “brokered” by China. The exact role China played in the deal is a subject of heavy debate, focusing on whether China only facilitated the dialogue or indeed substantively mediated. Still, it was China’s first major success in mediating an international conflict. China’s second success came in July 2024, when 14 different Palestinian factions signed the Beijing Declaration on Ending Division and Strengthening Palestinian National Unity in Beijing. Doubts are rampant over the deal’s practicality and implementation, but the fact that China chaired the process at the minimum demonstrates its growing influence on the issue.


With its newly minted stature as the regional peacemaker, China will undoubtedly enhance its involvement in Middle East peace affairs over the next four years. Chinese diplomats and Middle East scholars appear ready, having been mobilized to contribute ideas and plans toward this end. Beijing foreseeably will be using its diplomatic influence and many channels of communication to assert its role and involvement.


However, it will not be easy for China to mediate on the Israeli-Palestinian issue. Beijing’s striking inability to make any difference in the Gaza war signifies China’s weakness as a peace broker. In fact, the moment that China picked a side by refusing to denounce Hamas’ Oct 7 attack, it lost its impartiality and credibility as a mediator. This dictates that China must increase its relationship-building and influence over the Palestinian movement’s internal dynamics to build up the movement’s strength and enhance Beijing’s ability to mediate the conflict. The post-conflict reconstruction in Gaza, Lebanon, and other conflict-torn areas will offer China a good opportunity to attain such influence, as China specializes in infrastructure construction and has financial resources to support it.


China may also increase its efforts to mediate between Iran and other Gulf countries in the Middle East. Iran’s leadership in the region’s “axis of resistance” has been In the Chinese assessment, Iran’s response through mid-October 2024 has been largely moderate and tailored, which could suggest that Tehran has a bigger appetite for more conciliatory moves vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia, among others. China’s relationship with Iran will foreseeably gain more momentum, as China will want to see the restoration of some type of regional power equilibrium. Enhanced ties with both Iran and the Arab states will offer China an avenue for more influence in political dialogues.


China’s military presence in the Middle East?

The long-standing suspicion that China will sooner or later seek a military presence in the Middle East to protect its energy interests is unlikely to be resolved by 2029. China’s prioritized theater continues to be the Western Pacific and will remain so as long as the Taiwan issue is not resolved. This means that China will have to live with the insecurity of its energy dependence on the Middle East in the meantime. Chinese oil executives have made a distinction between susceptibility and vulnerability, arguing that China’s oil dependence on the Middle East is susceptible but not vulnerable to the volatile regional security situation. The confidence comes from a judgment that no one, the United States and oil-producing countries included, will want to see a major disruption in the global market.


The argument made by Chinese oil executives consciously does not consider extreme situations such as a U.S.-China military conflict and a naval blockade of China’s oil shipments from the Middle East. Beijing does not seem to see a practical solution to that vulnerability. Furthermore, building up China’s regional military presence from scratch is unlikely to protect China’s oil interests for a very long time to come given the U.S. military’s mature and significant presence in the region.


However, this does not mean that China will be absent from developing closer security ties with countries in the region to enhance its influence even short of a direct military presence and deployment. China currently has a number of security cooperation arrangements in the region, including joint exercises and drone production cooperation with Iran, joint training and arms sales to the United Arab Emirates, as well as potentially dual-use port facilities. In this sense, it is unlikely that China will establish a direct military presence in the Middle East in the next four years, even though Beijing’s regional security cooperation and influence will expand through bilateral cooperation, arms sales, and dual-use facilities.


Conclusion

The challenge from China’s strategy and presence in the Middle East will only continue to grow during the Trump administration. By 2029, the region will remain a cornerstone of China’s energy security, which makes it imperative for Beijing to increase its role, presence, and influence in the region to protect its critical national interest. China will continue diversifying its economic ties with the region, going beyond the traditional field of energy by venturing into the energy transition and the digital economy and looking for buyers of advanced technology exports.


As a result of the war in Gaza, China’s relations with key countries in the region will foreseeably go through a period of adjustment. This is particularly true of Israel, as the China-Israel relationship has suffered the most damage due to the Gaza crisis. Following its mantra of having balanced diplomacy, China will be keen to build deeper relationships with both Iran and Saudi Arabia and could contribute toward building up Iran’s capability and restoring Tehran’s tarnished image in the region. China sees itself as a new type of regional peacemaker and likely intends to play a bigger role in the mediation among different Palestinian factions and Gaza’s reconstruction. The “new security architecture in the Middle East” proposal will be a more prominent feature in China’s policy toward the region between 2025 and 2029.


All these have significant implications for the incoming Trump administration. As President-elect Donald Trump is expected to support Israel’s security, push for Saudi-Israel normalization, and pressure Iran with more sanctions, China will be actively working to exploit U.S. policy and advance Chinese interests and influence in the region. The Gaza crisis has been a strong example of how China has leveraged Washington’s position to undermine U.S. regional leadership and credibility. Washington can rest assured that China stands ready to continue to do so for the next four years. This means the Trump administration’s Middle East policy will have to include an answer, or even just propose a future direction, for the inevitable question of Palestine’s status and the issue of the two-state solution. The absence of it will only strengthen China’s ability to act as a supporter and advocate for the Palestinian people, thereby reinforcing Beijing’s influence and ties with the Muslim world.


China’s growing and diversifying economic ties with the Middle East will directly challenge the United States’ traditional role and leadership. A vigorous economic engagement strategy beyond the issue of oil has always been lacking in the United States’ regional policy playbook. As the region envisions its economic future and plans for the diversification of its economic growth, the United States will miss the train and leave the field for China if it is unable to respond to the region’s demand for high-technology industries and new energy resources. China’s technological cooperation with Middle Eastern countries, especially in the fields of digital economy and infrastructure, will pose an immediate challenge to the United States’ ability to advance security and other cooperation in the region. The Trump administration could work with U.S. private sector companies to present the countries of the Middle East with alternative options to Chinese technologies and products.


Author

Yun Sun

Nonresident Fellow - Global Economy and Development, Foreign Policy, John L. Thornton China Center, Africa Growth Initiative











En son haber - ABD, HTŞ lideri Colani hakkında konulan 10 milyon dolarlık ödülü kaldırdı - 20.12.2024 - 22:22 Güncellenme: 21.12.2024 - 08:39

 ABD, HTŞ lideri Colani hakkında konulan 10 milyon dolarlık ödülü kaldırdı

ABD Dışişleri Bakanlığı'ndan yapılan açıklamaya göre (HTŞ)  lideri Muhammed Colani hakkında verilecek bilgi karşılığında sunulan 10 milyon dolarlık ödül kaldırıldı.

20.12.2024 - 22:22 Güncellenme: 21.12.2024 - 08:39

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Haber Merkezi

Heyet Tahrir Şam lideri Muhammed Colani hakkında ABD'den dikkat çeken bir karar geldi.


ABD'nin Suriye'deki geçiş hükümetinin kurulmasının ardından üst düzey görüşmeler yapmak için Şam'a ilk kez gönderdiği heyetin liderliğini üstlenen ABD Dışişleri Bakanlığı Yakın Doğu İşlerinden Sorumlu Müsteşar Yardımcısı Barbara Leaf, Colani ile yapılan görüşmenin detaylarını duyurdu.


Leaf, Colani için konulan 10 milyon dolarlık ödülün kaldırıldığını ve alınan bu yeni kararın Colani'ye iletildiğini bildirdi.


Leaf ayrıca Colani'nin öncelikli hedefinin ekonomik gelişme olduğunu kendisine bildirdiğini belirtti.


"TÜRKİYE'NİN SURİYE'DE CİDDİ BİR AĞIRLIĞI VAR"


Öte yandan Leaf, Türkiye'nin başta Suriye olmak üzere bölgedeki konumu ile ilgili de çarpıcı bir yorumda bulundu.


Leaf, "Türkiye'nin Suriye'de ciddi ağırlığı var, bu Türkiye'nin ulusal güvenliği ile ilgilidir" ifadelerini kullanırken İran'ın Suriye'deki durumunu da değerlendirdi ve İran'ın Suriye'nin geleceğinde olmaması gerektiğini bildirdi.


Görüşmenin olumlu bir havada geçtiğini belirten Leaf, "Suriye'nin kendi ayakları üzerinde durmasını ve gücünü geri kazanmasını istiyoruz" dedi.


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Murat Yetkin -20 Aralık 2024 - Pentagon'dan Trump'a Suriye resti : Asl-ker sayısı 2000'e ( 900 asker idi ) yükselmiş.

 

Pentagon’dan Trump’a Suriye resti: Asker sayısı 2000’e yükselmiş

/ / Siyaset

“ABD Savunma Bakanlığı Pentagon Sözcüsü Pat Ryder Suriye’deki

 Amerikan asker sayısının bilinen 900’ün iki katından

 fazla olduğunu, 2000’e ulaştığını açıkladı.”

ABD ordusu bir kez daha Donald Trump’a Suriye resti çekiyor. Başkanlık görevini 20 Ocak’ta devralacak Trump’ın “Suriye’de ne işimiz var?” demesine karşı ABD Savunma Bakanlığı Pentagon Sözcüsü Pat Ryder Suriye’deki Amerikan asker sayısının bilinen 900’ün iki katından fazla olduğunu, 2000’e ulaştığını açıkladı.  Görevlerinin başındaydılar ve çekilme planları yoktu.

Bu açıklama, SDG’nin başındaki Mazlum “Kobani” Abdi Şahin’in Reuters ajansına “PKK’lılar Irak’a dönsün” türünden -pek de inandırıcı olmayan- açıklamasıyla birlikte okunabilir. Belki de ABD Suriye’deki varlığını kalıcı kılmak için, işte artık SDG’de PKK’lı kalmadı demeye hazırlanıyor, sanki kendi SDG’yi PKK’ya kurdurmamış gibi.

Asker sayısı 2000’e yükseldi

Ankara’yı rahatsız eden bu açıklamanın ilginç yanı, Pentagon sözcüsünün 19 Aralık basın toplantısında yükseltildiğini “öğrendik” gibi bir ifade kullanması.

Pentagon açıklaması Trump’ın bir kaç gün önce resmi verilere dayanarak sayıyı 900 olarak vermesinin ardından geldi. Belli ki Trump gazetecilerin Suriye’den asker çekme sorusunu ustaca Suriye’deki Türkiye etkisine çevirdikten sonra Pentagon bir “güncelleme” ihtiyacı duydu. Ve böylece Katar’da konuşlu ABD Merkezi Komutanlığın (CENTCOM) kendilerine daha önce bildirmeden asker sayısını 2000’e yükselttiğini öğrendiler.

CENTCOM ABD’nin Mısır’dan Kazakistan’a, Pakistan’a dek 21 ülkeyi kapsayan, dünyanın en önemli enerji üretim ve ulaştırma bölgelerini kapsayan 4 milyon kilometrekare alandan sorumlu Katar merkezli gücü. Pentagon nasıl ABD devleti içinde devlet gibi davranıyorsa CENTCOM da ordu içinde ordu; Ortadoğu’da Ortaçağın feodal beylikleri gibi güç kullanıyor. Güç kısmen silah sanayi ve enerji lobilerinden geliyor.

SDG ile işbirliği, Suriye’nin petrol bölgeleri

Son 10 yıldır PKK’nın Suriye kolu PYD/YPG’nin omurgasını oluşturduğu SDG’yle IŞİD’e karşı piyade gücü olarak işbirliği yapan aynı zamanda Suriye’nin petrol bölgelerini denetimde tutup operasyonunu da bedavaya getiren de CENTCOM.

Bunu Trump’ın ilk döneminde kanıtladı.

Trump seçime giderken Suriye’den çekiliyoruz demiş, buna önce CENTCOM, sonra Pentagon karşı çıkmış, sonunda Başkanın değil, CENTCOM’un dediği olmuş, üstelik o şurada 400 küsur olan Suriye’deki Amerikan askeri sayısı iki kat artıp 800-900’e çıkarılmıştı. Şimdi -Esad daha devrilmeden önce bu sayının 2000’e ulaştığını öğreniyoruz.

Trump’ın Türkiye’yi dolduruşa getirmek istemesi boşuna değil. Türkiye’nin Suriye’de yaptığı işlerin yanı sıra yapmadığı işleri de üstlenmesini sağlayıp, işler yolunda gitmez, HTŞ’nin “değiştik” sözleri palavra çıkar, yeniden kan dökülmeye başlarsa faturanın Ankara’ya yıkılmaya çalışılması senaryosunu akılda tutmak gerekiyor.