CEPA ( Center for European Policy Analysis.) Europe Battles to Win Favor in Central Asia The European Union does poorly in the race to win influence in Central Asia, and will need to up its game to rival China, Russia, and the Gulf. By Emil Avdaliani April 15, 2025

 CEPA  ( Center for European Policy Analysis.)

Europe Battles to Win Favor in Central Asia

The European Union does poorly in the race to win influence in Central Asia, and will need to up its game to rival China, Russia, and the Gulf.

By Emil Avdaliani

April 15, 2025

April’s inaugural Central Asia-EU Summit in Samarkand, Uzbekistan, was the first of its kind for the two sides and was seen as a means to elevate the bloc’s influence in the region. Amid growing great power competition over Eurasian connectivity, Brussels was looking to secure a more solid footing.   

The most tangible outcome was the EU’s €12bn ($13.6bn) assistance package, which is intended to support the expansion of commercial routes, the mining sector, and digital connectivity across Central Asia. Specifics around how the funds will be distributed, or how they are linked to the €10bn in development aid pledged at the 2024 Global Gateway Investors Forum, are sparse.  

What is known so far is that out of the €12bn, €3bn will be directed to the transport sector, €6.4bn to energy projects, and €100m for the development of satellite Internet. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) also has a pipeline of €7bn–€8bn worth of projects planned through 2027, though no details were released. 

Central Asia, which includes Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, is vital for the EU as a key partner in the development of the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor (or middle corridor) in competition with China’s massive Belt and Road Initiative.  

The goal is for cargo transportation between Europe and Central Asia, bypassing Russia, to be halved to 15 days. The EU is already the largest foreign investor in Central Asia, accounting for 40% of all foreign direct investment, and Central Asian capitals are interested in closer cooperation.  

At the summit, Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev said an agreement to open a European Investment Bank (EIB) office had been reached and announced the ratification of a project to supply electricity from Central Asia to Europe.  

Tajik President Emomali Rahmon said he was counting on trade preferences and investments from the EU, while Kazakhstan’s Kassym-Jomart Tokayev said his country, which accounts for 13% of EU oil imports, is ready to increase the flow. Kazakhstan also announced the start of joint work with Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan on the construction of a green energy transmission line across the Caspian Sea to improve access to European markets. 

The timing of the summit put a spotlight on rare earth materials, another critical element of cooperation. As the US, Russia, and China scramble to carve up (and politicize) supplies of the coveted resources, the EU is looking to Central Asia as a potential source.  

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Tokayev said Kazakhstan produces 19 of the 34 raw materials needed by the EU, while Mirziyoyev promised to strengthen cooperation between Uzbekistan and the bloc in the development of critical mineral resources. 

Despite these pronouncements, the summit fell short of delivering any further concrete results, and no major announcements were made, making it more of a symbolic starting point than a moment of breakthrough. The leaders’ joint statement ran to 20 points, largely restating existing priorities and shared interests.  

While it included pledges about upgrading relations to a “strategic partnership,” the document lacked specifics on the next steps. It also reaffirmed the importance of a Joint Roadmap for Deepening Ties between the two sides, first adopted in 2023.  

There was an apparent lack of enthusiasm among Central Asian leaders, who are becoming accustomed to being courted by Asian governments and individual European capitals. The money proposed by the EU didn’t seem to impress them either, as China and the Gulf Cooperation Council offer more and act more quickly. 

The effectiveness of the EU’s engagement with Central Asia is also contingent on how it fares in the South Caucasus, which serves as a vital geographic bridge. Brussels’ relations with both Georgia and Azerbaijan are far from good, and while geopolitical imperatives may drive the sides to patch up their differences, agreement is a long way off. 

The overall impression at the summit was that, while it emphasized political will and reaffirmed broader goals, it failed to match those ambitions with deliverable actions.  

Ultimately, the question is whether the EU can become an effective geopolitical actor. Its Geopolitical Commission, instituted in 2019 with a mission to respond to great power competition, has so far produced few results.  

The bloc needs greater speed and dexterity in its foreign policy. 

A new era of great power competition might not be the best time for soft power projection, but to be effective in Central Asia, the EU needs to brandish its strengths as a source of quality investment and trade and energy partner. The inaugural summit showed more work needs to be done. 

Emil Avdaliani is a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia, and a scholar of Silk Roads. He can be reached on Twitter/X at @emilavdaliani. 

Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.