The National Interest
December 28, 2023 Topic: Vladimir Putin Region: Russia Tags: RussiaVladimir PutinAuthoritarianismSuccessionWagner GroupThe Kremlin
After Putin, a Putina?
The rising profile of his cousin, Anna Putina, suggests Vladimir Putin may be set on dynastic succession.
by Andrew C. Kuchins Chris Monday
Vladimir Putin confirmed his candidacy for a fifth term as Russian president on December 8 at a medal-awarding ceremony for soldiers returning from Ukraine. He did so in an entirely stage-managed response to a passionate entreaty from Lt. Col. Aytem Zhoga of the renowned Sparta Battalion in Donetsk. In fact, for a man who was reported dead in late October, Putin has been remarkably active: flying to the Middle East to meet with leaders in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates on December 5–6, receiving the Iranian president on the December 7, conducting his annual four-hour-plus press conference on December 14, and speaking before the United Russia Party Congress on December 17. Constitutionally, Putin not only can run in 2024 but also again for another six-year term that would take his leadership to 2036. By this time, he would be eighty-three, three years younger than Joe Biden if the incumbent were to be re-elected in 2024 and serve a full term.
Given this, the reader may ask: Why think about Putin’s successor now? CIA Director William Burns’ assessed in June 2022 that Putin was “entirely too healthy” and that his opponents spread rumors of his ill health. However, anyone’s health in their seventies and eighties is fragile. Accordingly, it would be prudent for Putin and his clan to groom a potential successor. Perhaps more importantly, it behooves any authoritarian leader to introduce new and significant political figures to the public to ensure their sense of the stability of the current system. During the past two years, rumors of Putin’s supposedly terminal health problems and even death may have catalyzed the Kremlin to present a potential successor who is a generation younger than the current president.
The last time Putin faced this question directly was in 2007–8, when his two-term constitutional limit was imminent. To solve this problem, the Kremlin spin doctors came forward with “Putin’s Plan” in the fall of 2007. This boiled down to ensuring the continuity of Putin’s power and policy beyond his presidency—a sort of improvisation in which he eventually traded places with then-Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev. There was much speculation in the Fall of 2007 that the final two candidates were then Deputy Prime Ministers Sergei Ivanov and Dmitry Medvedev. Likely, Medvedev’s advantage in this competition was his relative lack of his own political base, thus making him more malleable for Putin. Few doubted that Putin remained the senior partner in the relationship, but he lost confidence in Medvedev in 2011 and decided to run again for president in 2012. He has since been re-elected for two six-year terms. In neither of these last two electoral rounds has anybody new emerged as a potential successor.
Putin fully understood the reason for his selection as Yeltsin’s successor in December 1999, which was confidence that he would protect the interests of the Yeltsin “family” after his election. We believe that Putin has given this issue deep thought and has concluded that there is no one better to entrust with protecting his family and their vast interests than a member of his own family. We will lay out a case for his cousin, Anna Putina Tsivilyova. Of course, there are other potential candidates, but in this article, we have chosen to focus on her unique prospects. Since she founded the Defenders of the Fatherland Foundation (DFF) in April, her rise to the Russian media spotlight this year has been nothing less than meteoric. Pointedly, Putin spoke highly of Anna and the Foundation at his press conference on December 14:
As for the Defenders of the Fatherland Foundation, it operates well. There is a strong team of people. I met with the director, Anna Evgenievna [Tsivilyova], and visited a regional branch [in Veliky Novgorod]. These people are wonderful and very passionate about this positive work.
Before delving into Anna Putina’s life, it is essential to understand the significance of the task Tsivilyova has taken on in founding The DFF. From the Decembrist Revolt in 1825 to the February Revolution in 1917 to the Soviet-Afghan War, the potential for unhappy veterans of foreign wars stirring trouble is a constant concern in Russian history. U.S. intelligence estimates that Russia has suffered 315,000 casualties since the beginning of the war in February 2022. And then there is the flood of wounded and non-wounded returning veterans. Meeting the needs of these people constitutes a massive challenge for the Russian government.
Who is Anna Putina?
Anna Putina (Tsivilyova) is a first cousin once removed from Vladimir Putin. Vladimir Putin’s grandfather and Anna’s great-grandfather was Spiridon Putin, who served as Stalin’s cook at the highly secured Gorki compound outside of Moscow. Spiridon’s son and Anna Putina’s grandfather, Mikhail, died fighting in World War II. As a result, Anna’s father, Evgenii, born in 1933, was raised by Spiridon, a man he called “old-father,” at Stalin’s residence. Evgenii became a doctor specializing in urology. He worked in the textile town Ivanovo from 1970 to 2000, where he raised his children, Anna (born in 1972) and Mikhail (born in 1967), to be doctors. In 1996, Anna began working as a psychiatrist at a mental institution, Bogorodskoie, well outside the city of Ivanovo.
As a young girl, Anna met Volodya Putin on family trips to Leningrad during the 1980s. When Vladimir became president, family fortunes prospered. In 2002, Anna left Ivanovo for good. In Moscow, she received degrees in management from princeling-friendly institutions, the Patrice Lumumba University of International Friendship and the State University of Management. Together with her brother Mikhail, Anna began the profitable job of ordering medical equipment for state hospitals at the company Medtekhsnab. After divorcing her first husband, Anna married Sergei Tsilovyov in 2007, possibly having been introduced by her cousin Vladimir and almost certainly gaining his approval of the marriage, an arranged marriage reminiscent of feudal times. Asked how she met her fiancé, the well-poised Anna answered evasively, “through people.”
Born in Donetsk, the burly Tsivilyov served as a naval officer in the 1980s and, after the Soviet collapse, in the mid-1990s, found work as a “lead security guard” for Kremlin insider Boris Berezovsky’s Aeroflot Bank in St. Petersburg.In this criminalized town, “security services” was often a euphemism for a protection racket. Putin, as deputy governor of St. Petersburg, had ties to these rackets. Tsivilyov may have crossed paths with the future president. By 2007, he was managing a construction company, Lenexpoinvest, charged with constructing the Len-Expo, a prized project of the Russian president. These and other companies that Tsivilyov worked for have been tied to Putin’s closest associates.
The Tsivilyov family’s interests soon centered on the West Siberian city of Kemerovo, a center for coal mining since the early eighteenth century. The Kremlin fairy dust was heaped on the Tsivilyovs. In 2012, Putin’s alleged bagman, Gennady Timchenko, purchased a major coal-producing enterprise, Kolmar. Despite having no experience in mineral extraction industries, Sergei Tsivilyov was named chairman of its board of directors. In a murky set of incidents in 2018, Tsivilyov became governor of the Kemerovo region and transferred his assets and management responsibilities to Anna. Explaining her surprising move from psychiatrist to coal boss, Anna Putina declared, “In the family, a decision was made.” These machinations were part of Putin’s grand project to replace independent regional elites with trusted lieutenants. In this case, Sergei Tsivilyov supplanted Aman Tuleyev, a strong-willed Kemerovo boss who had repeatedly challenged Boris Yeltsin throughout the 1990s.
With the help of more than 11 billion rubles in subsidies from the federal government, massive tax breaks, and rising global coal prices, Anna’s business performance has been nothing short of stellar. Under her leadership, coal production increased fifteen times in seven years. Kolmar was transformed into a gigantic enterprise that sprawled across Russia. The company claims its Yakutia reserves contain one billion tons of coal. In 2023, it produced 16 million tons. According to Putina, by 2021, she employed 9,000 workers. About 40 percent of her coal is sold domestically. The rest is exported to China. Radio Liberty, in 2022, estimated her net worth at $2.5 billion. Local citizens interviewed in a story on Radio Liberty view Anna as the powerbroker and brains of the Tsivilyov family.
Ascension and Coalition Building
Putina has effectively used her philanthropic work to fortify her political network. For example, she regularly holds “International Women’s Fora” in Kemerovo. Typical topics focus on the “role of women in industrial regions” and “dealing with Covid.” Her conferences attract thousands of participants, among which are the wives of regional leaders. One prominent backer of these forums is St. Petersburg governor Valentina Matvienko, a wily politician with deep roots in Soviet Leningrad.
Anna Putina can count on the Putin dynastic network. Anna’s brother, Mikhail, serves as the president’s overseer at Gazprom. Igor Putin and his son Roman have been involved in various business spheres and money laundering. Putin’s romantic partner and purported common-law wife, Alina Kabaeva, oversees a vast media empire. Putin’s daughter, Katerina Tikhonova, supervises investments in AI and biotechnology.
Vladimir Putin has now entrusted Anna with a critical task dealing with the ocean of returning veterans and bereaved families. She has cited the shabby treatment of Afghan and Chechen veterans as a key motivation for her founding of the Defenders of the Fatherland Foundation (DFF). That Putin would turn to Anna is not surprising. She has displayed a high level of competency in Russia’s rough-and-tumble coal business. A rarity for the Putin elite, she is articulate and charismatic. As head of the DFF, she has forged robust ties with military and regional elites. Sergei Kiriyenko, Putin’s Deputy Chief of Staff responsible for domestic politics, chairs the Foundation’s Board of Directors, a very significant indicator of the Kremlin’s support. The Russian media regularly spots Anna together with the key Kremlin powerbrokers. But she is also careful to be seen with bereaved mothers and maimed soldiers.
Concerning her task, Anna Putina claims, “The main aim of the [Veteran] fund is to help everyone who is returning home from the front to socialize, adapt, and return to a peaceful, creative life. This process must take into account all nuances. Our job is not to miss a single detail in their lives and to help veterans and their families for as long as necessary.” Recently established in April 2023, the organization has already opened eighty-nine centers in nearly all regions of Russia and occupied Ukraine. She has received 445,000 requests and, she boasts, has fulfilled 354,000 of them) On September 22, 2023, the Russian Government allocated over 5 billion rubles ($55 million) to her fund. It’s a safe bet that Russian oligarchs will be obliged to “donate” much more.
In May 2023, Russian national TV launched a carefully calibrated campaign. With great fanfare, nightly news rolled out the Herculean plans for Anna Putin’s organization. At first, Russian national news on May 16, 2023, announced that a “presidential academy” would train over 3,000 people to help families who have lost men in the war. This “academy” would be led by none other than Anna Tsivilyova Putina. “The main goal of the fund’s work,” she declared, “is targeted support for every veteran and every family of a dead soldier, assistance in solving problems and returning to normal life. To do this, it is important to reach each of them, personally communicate, and delve into the features of a particular life situation. To do this, we have begun training social coordinators who will receive the necessary for such work and will be in touch with the wards of the fund 24/7.”
On May 21, the Russian Sunday flagship news, Vesti Nedeli, showcased Anna (Putina) Tsivilyova: for the first time, Russian TV viewers saw mothers grieving for fallen sons.By June 2023, Anna Putina’s “academy” would morph into the Defenders of the Fatherland Foundation. Her TV appearances would soon become a regularity, and her “spontaneous initiative” would receive massive state funding. In a typical scene, on July 20, 2023, Russian TV news spotlighted a speech by Anna Putina given to a hall full of veterans.
During the first year and a half of the war, Russian news censored any coverage of wounded soldiers or grieving mothers. But by July 2023, Anna Putina had wisely broken this taboo. Her social media posts and TV appearances feature stage-managed scenes that, nonetheless, bring home the brutality of war. In a typically theatrical display on November 24, 2023, Russian state TV highlighted Anna Putina in Moscow holding a virtual meeting between Russian soldiers on the front lines and their mothers. In emotional scenes, viewers see soldiers cry. Anna then counsels these mothers. In this meeting, she appeared with Andrey Vorobyov, governor of the Moscow Region and a key figure in the technocrat wing of Russia’s power elite.
Importantly, Anna Putina is the sole political figure publicly confronting the fallout from the Wagner Group insurrection in June. On August 24, 2023, Russian state TV news reported Vladimir Putin offered his brusque condolences to the recently perished Wagner Group leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin. But soon after this jarring scene, Russian TV moved to Anna Putina. She stated that all members of “private military organizations” would receive equal benefits to those serving in the regular army. In this broadcast, Sergei Kirienko and war correspondent Evgeniy Poddubny (two figures associated with Prigozhin) rushed to heap praise on Putina.
While the faint-hearted Russian media avoid the name “Wagner,” Anna Putina has repeatedly celebrated them. For example, on November 11, 2023, Anna Putina (with Father Kiprian) handed out veteran identity cards to the Wagner fighters. She proclaimed, “All veterans of the special operation are heroes of our time. All defenders of the Fatherland should have the same rights, independent of their status.” The Wagner warriors are to be honored and glorified by the state, she declared.
While mainly appearing with members of the Orthodox Church in her photo ops, Anna does not neglect the role of Muslim soldiers. Notably, she has made several trips to Chechnya. On June 3, 2023, Russian state news showed Ramzan Kadyrov opening one of Anna Putina’s veteran centers. In North Ossetia, Anna announced that her centers follow the “one window” principle, where all legal, medical, employment, and psychological issues can be handled without bureaucratic snafus. Veterans, she reiterated, must be provided dignified jobs.
Anna Putina’s main institutional support for her Veteran Fund comes from Valentina Matvienko and Andrei Turchak, the son of one of Putin’s Leningrad judo Partners. In photos, we see clues to her place in the Kremlin hierarchy. For example, she is seen sitting, on equal terms, opposite her mentor, Matvienko. Moreover, Anna is sitting on the side of the office where Putin himself always sits with his interlocutors. This is not likely a coincidence.
Anna Putina is doing what others in the Putin elite cannot: she is forming a wide range of clientelistic bonds throughout all levels of Russian society. By crisscrossing the entire nation to build her veteran centers, she has made sure to showcase her meetings with regional elites. As part of her organization’s social footprint, she is seen with prominent cultural figures, from theater manager Vladimir Kekhman to the widow of celebrated crooner Iosif Kobzon. In one social media post, Anna Putina notes patronage from far-right media magnate Konstantin Malofeev.
Putina ensures her messages always end on an inspiring and hopeful note. She promises that her veteran organization will be “creative and personal.” In a typically upbeat event, on December 6, 2023, she opened a national skiing competition for wounded soldiers. In another example of her “creative and personal” approach, on July 28, 2023, Russian state news covered Anna Putina’s visit to a summer camp for the children of soldiers at the front. She stirred the children with tales of “the history of Russia, the glorious deeds of the heroes of the Fatherland of different eras, which everyone should know about.”
In sum, Anna Putina’s veteran organization provides her with a powerful political springboard. Her growing sway was cemented in December 2023 when Putin confirmed he would run again for president. Notably, Matvienko issued this call for elections in March 2024 from the Senate floor. The next day, Artem Zhoga, the son of a fallen Donetsk fighter and a key figure in the veteran organization, begged Putin to run for office once again. His plea was immediately seconded by Maria Kostiuk, a leader of the Jewish Autonomous Oblast and DFF’s point woman for her veteran organization branches in occupied Luhansk and Donetsk.
A Future President?
Russian media, day after day, present Anna Putina as an effective manager and a consensus unifier of the technocratic, intelligence, and military clans in the Russian power elite. It’s clear that Vladimir’s cousin is a political force. But what exactly is her function?
For a long time, it has been clear to Kremlin watchers that Putin is weary of the day-to-day demands of managing Russia from Moscow. Still, until now, he has not been able to identify anyone both competent and loyal enough to ensure his family’s and his cronies’ personal safety and assets. There are many things to criticize Putin for, but he has displayed uncanny political gifts over twenty-four years in holding onto power. Perhaps he sees these skills in his cousin.
Moreover, Putin is clearly planning for a long war with the West and realizes the dangers. His military and political strategy is premised on causing political chaos abroad while maintaining iron rule at home. His successor can’t be a phony, Dmitry Medvedev-type with no real clout. Looking ahead, the Russian elite must eventually circle around a consensus figure. These elites realize all too well that other pretenders to the throne, such as Nikolai Patrushev or Igor Sechin, for example, represent narrow parochial interests. Ideally, the successor should be of the next generation to ensure continuity of power and policy, the essence of Putin’s plan.
Despite making sure to circumscribe the reach of all his subordinates, Vladimir appears to have made Anna Putina the sole figure allowed to spread her influence over wide realms of politics, the economy, and culture. This is what makes her case so compelling. While increasingly well-known in Russia, she is virtually unknown outside of Russia. Two years before Putin became president, he too was little known in Russia and totally unknown outside the country. Inexperience is not necessarily a deal-breaker.
Indeed, Anna Putina has been actively preparing for such a role. It has become common practice among Kremlin powerbrokers to publish vanity doctoral dissertations. Vladimir Putin published his in 1997 at the Mining Institute in St. Petersburg entitled “Strategic Planning in the Reproduction of the Natural Resource Sector in Market Economic Conditions in the St. Petersburg Region.” In 2022, Putina published her doctoral dissertation on “Management of the Development of the Production-Technological Potential of Coal Industry Enterprises” at the state-affiliated All-Russian Scientific Research Institute in Moscow. The similarity of research topics, natural resource management, is hard to miss.
Many analysts like to conceive of the Kremlin as a mafia organization. There is truth in this metaphor, but it is incomplete. We believe the best way to think about Russian governance is as one enormous intelligence special operation. All of the real insiders were recruited as Soviet intelligence officers in the 1970s and 1980s when then KGB Chairman and Putin’s idol Yuri Andropov was very consciously recruiting the “best and the brightest.” In December 2000, Putin’s then Director of the Federal Security Services (FSB) and current Chair of the National Security Council, Nikolai Patrushev, described Russia’s intelligence officers as Russia’s “new nobility.” The “Higher Police,” described by Clifford Gaddy and Laurence Muravschik in The National Interest in 2002, have viewed themselves for centuries with a special mission to save Russia from traitors within and outside the country. The war in Ukraine is not a war for the Kremlin but a “special military operation.” The plan for Putin’s succession in 2007–8 was called “Operation Successor.” There is no subtlety here. The plan to promote Anna Putina could be just another “special operation.” At this point, it appears that Deputy Chief of Staff to the President (with responsibility for domestic affairs, Sergei Kiriyenko, is the likely curator of the Anna Putina project, but aspects of this subtle stage management recall the work of former Kremlin spin doctor Vladislav Surkov who orchestrated “Operation Successor.”
If we are right about Anna Putina, then the Kremlin seeks to prolong the Putin dynasty for another generation. Putin, as an avid student of Russian history, may find the idea of a hereditary dynasty attractive. However, while it has become a cliche to read of Putin as the “new czar” of Russia, his idea of succession is less neo-Romanov than it may initially appear. The dynastic model has also been deployed in other post-Soviet states like Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, and it appears that Emomali Rahmon, President of Tajikistan, is also looking to place his son as leader in 2024.
For all of these regimes, where electoral and legal norms for an orderly transition do not exist, succession is a continual dilemma. Many dictators aspire to the Deng Xiaoping or Lee Kuan Yew models of exercising power more informally after leaving their formal positions. Both the dynastic and “grey cardinal” models fail as often as they succeed. Just look at Russia’s neighbor Kazakhstan, whose founding President Nursultan Nazarbayev’s effort to remain the power behind the throne was stymied in January 2022. Only time will tell if Putin’s plan is for his cousin Anna to succeed him, and then, more importantly, whether “Operation Putina” will be successful and durable.
Chris Monday is an Associate Professor of Economics at Dongseo University in Busan, South Korea.
