China makes billion-dose pledge to Africa to help overcome the coronavirus pandemic

 

China / Diplomacy

China makes billion-dose pledge to Africa to help overcome the coronavirus pandemic

Chinese President Xi Jinping tells Africa forum that Beijing will also advance billions of dollars for trade and infrastructure

In addition, Chinese medical teams and experts will be sent to help the continent

Jevans Nyabiage

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Published: 10:30pm, 29 Nov, 2021

Chinese President Xi Jinping addresses the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, in Dakar, Senegal, via video link on Monday. Photo: Reuters

China has promised to donate a billion coronavirus vaccines, advance billions of dollars for African trade and infrastructure, and write off interest-free loans to African countries to help the continent heal from the coronavirus pandemic.

Speaking via a video link from Beijing during the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), Chinese President Xi Jinping said China would supply a billion doses to help Africa vaccinate 60 per cent of its population by next year.

Of those, 600 million would be via donations and the rest would be produced jointly by African countries and Chinese companies.

In addition, China would send medical teams to help the continent deal with the pandemic, Xi said, to the forum, which is being hosted by Senegal.

“China will undertake 10 medical and health projects for African countries and send 1,500 medical personnel to Africa,” Xi said.

What do we know about the new coronavirus variant Omicron?

Most countries in Africa have not vaccinated their citizens. The World Health Organization says while many high-income countries reported more than 60 per cent vaccine coverage, just over 7 per cent of Africa’s population is fully vaccinated – despite a recent rise in shipments to the continent.

The low coverage was likely because of limited vaccination services, especially in rural areas, as well as vaccine hesitancy, the WHO said.

China had provided more than 1.7 billion doses of Covid-19 vaccines as of November 12 to more than 110 countries and organisations, including 50 African countries and the African Union Commission.

Xi said Beijing would pump US$10 billion into African financial institutions for onward lending to small and medium enterprises. He promised to extend another US$10 billion of its International Monetary Fund allocation of special drawing rights, which would help stabilise foreign exchange reserves.

Further, China will write-off interest-free loans due this year, to help the economies that had been ravaged by the pandemic. Last year, China also promised to write off interest-free loans due at the end of 2020.

Beijing pledged US$60 billion to finance Africa’s infrastructure at the forum in Johannesburg in 2015, and a similar amount when the gathering was held in the Chinese capital in 2018. But in the past few years, Chinese lenders, including the policy banks – Exim Bank of China and China Development Bank – have become more cautious and are now demanding bankable feasibility studies amid debt distress in the continent.

China still committed to Africa despite Covid-19 disruption, minister says

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However, the Dakar meeting is happening amid turbulence caused by Covid-19 which has hit African countries hard.

Besides seeking more money for projects, African countries are pushing to grow exports of agricultural products into China.

Xi said China would encourage more imports of African agricultural products, and increase the range of zero-tariff goods, aiming for US$300 billion of total imports from Africa in the next three years.

China would also advance US$10 billion of trade financing to support African exports into China. He said the country would also advance another US$10 billion to promote agriculture in Africa, send 500 experts and establish China-Africa joint agro-technology centres and demonstration villages.

Currently, Beijing maintains a massive trade surplus over the continent. African imports from China include machinery, electronics, construction equipment, textiles and footwear.

China sources a substantial amount of raw materials such as oil, cobalt and copper, and also buys some agricultural products such as chillies, cashews, sesame seeds and spices from Africa.

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China overtook the United States in 2009 to be the largest trading partner with the continent.

In 2019, two-way trade reached US$208.7 billion before it slightly fell to US$186.97 billion due to the impact of the coronavirus pandemic after countries imposed restrictions to prevent the spread of coronavirus.

However, trade rose in the first nine months of 2021, growing by 38.2 per cent year on year to a high of US$185.2 billion, which according to Chinese vice commerce minister Qian Keming.

Further, China’s direct investment in all industries in Africa amounted to US$2.59 billion, increasing 9.9 per cent year on year. The growth rate was 3 percentage points higher than that of China’s total outbound investment, and above the level of the same period in 2019 before the Covid-19 outbreak.

Chinese companies signed US$53.5 billion worth of new contracts in Africa, and posted a turnover of US$26.9 billion, up 22.2 per cent and 11.6 per cent, respectively.

China-Africa forum: Covid-19 vaccine deals tipped to be on the table

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On climate change, Xi said China would support green development projects. “We need to advocate green initiatives, promote solar, wind and other sources of renewable energy and work for effective implementation of the Paris Agreement on climate change,” he said.

Senegalese President Macky Sall, the co-chair of the forum and host, called on FOCAC to focus on strengthening Africa’s pharmaceutical and medical sovereignty, including by developing local skills, research and production capacity.

He hailed China’s support for helping Africa to develop infrastructure.

He also urged African countries to develop industrial capacity to enable production of products that could be exported into China. “We encourage Chinese enterprises to invest in Africa,” Sall said.

Jevans Nyabiage

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Kenyan journalist Jevans Nyabiage is South China Morning Post's first Africa correspondent. Based in Nairobi, Jevans keeps an eye on China-Africa relations and also Chinese investments, ranging from infrastructure to energy and metal, on the continent.

President Biden addressed several areas of concern at the ASEAN summit.

 The ASEAN Summit: ASEAN and the United States

President Biden addressed several areas of concern at the ASEAN summit.

U.S. President Joe Biden participates virtually with the ASEAN summit from an auditorium at the White House in Washington, DC, on October 26, 2021.

Jonathan Ernst/Reuters

Blog Post by Joshua Kurlantzick

October 26, 2021 4:18 pm (EST)

   

Recognition

President Joe Biden today became the first U.S. president to (at least virtually) attend the Association of Southeast Asian Nations summit in four years. That in itself was a minor win for U.S. relations with ASEAN, which has felt ignored by U.S. administrations at times going back to the Trump, Obama, and George W. Bush eras at the very least. (Some Southeast Asian leaders were probably angry that Biden had not personally contacted them in the months after his inauguration.)

More on:

Southeast Asia COVID-19 Myanmar  China

Biden told the summit that leaders should expect he and other top U.S. leaders to be more present in Southeast Asia going forward, and announced that the United States would provide $100 million to strengthen ties with ASEAN and bolster the United States’ Strategic Partnership with ASEAN. “I want you all to hear directly from me the importance the United States places on its relationship with ASEAN,” Biden said, according to reporting. “You can expect to see me showing up and reaching out to you.” He also emphasized that the United States would refocus on climate change in the region, one of the regions most affected by global warming.

CFR fellows and other experts assess the latest issues emerging in Asia today. 1-3 times weekly.

Besides a sense of recognition, which does matter in ASEAN, what did Biden bring to the table, and what more could be done?

Myanmar

ASEAN, an organization that usually is reluctant to criticize any member, excluded Myanmar’s junta leader from the summit, a significant step in some ways for ASEAN — a step taken because of foreign pressure and the junta thumbing its nose at ASEAN. Yet ASEAN is unlikely to take too many more tough actions against the junta. The ASEAN summit chairman’s statement, as Aaron Connelly has noted, does mention that ASEAN is supposedly devoted to democracy and the rule of law, but many ASEAN members seem ready to welcome Myanmar back to participation in the organization, since quite a few ASEAN states are themselves autocracies. Brunei’s leader (an autocratic monarch himself), at the summit, noted that “Myanmar should be given space to return to normalcy in line with ASEAN's principle of non-interference,” according to Reuters.

The Biden administration did send its highest-ever official, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, to meet with representatives of Myanmar’s parallel government. But the United States should move toward recognizing the National Unity Government (NUG) as the government of Myanmar, as the junta continues to mismanage Myanmar into chaos, and as the junta prepares what seems to be a massive offensive in the coming months, which will surely lead to enormous bloodshed. Such a move by the United States would put other democracies in a position to possibly recognize the NUG, some of which already have taken strides in this direction.

U.S.-China

Wisely, Biden chose not to emphasize the deteriorating U.S.-China relationship at the ASEAN summit, while emphasizing that ASEAN — even in the era of the Quad — remains vital to U.S. security. ASEAN members are, among countries in the world, some of the most knowledgeable about China’s actions and more recent aggressive diplomacy, and very few want to be publicly seen at a summit taking a harsh line toward China. However, not a few, including Singapore and Vietnam, do have a hardening view toward China; yet the ASEAN summit is not the venue for hashing out such views in public. At the same time, because the United States is essentially absent from trade integration in East Asia, including Southeast Asia, it essentially has ceded this area to China — and even at a time when China is alienating some Southeast Asian states with its assertive diplomacy.

COVID-19

While most ASEAN states handled COVID-19 very well in 2020, many have struggled in 2021, with high levels of domestic transmission and (with exceptions) relatively low rates of full vaccination. Many of the poorer Southeast Asian states also are angry at global inequalities in vaccine access. Biden promised to help Southeast Asian states address the pandemic, and the new spending — at least $40 million of it — is supposed to be in part to address COVID-19. It remains a relatively small sum, given the enormous nature of the pandemic and the huge needs in many poorer Southeast Asian states.  

I’ll have more on the ASEAN summit later in the week.

A New Era In Indo-Pacific Security Biden takes a huge step to counter and contain China.

 Published by the Berggruen  Institute

The Royal Australian Navy submarine HMAS Rankin near Darwin on Sept. 5. Subs like this will be phased out as a result of the new AUKUS defense partnership. (Yuri Ramsey/Australian Defense Force via Getty Images)

A New Era In Indo-Pacific Security

Biden takes a huge step to counter and contain China.

BY BRUCE JONES

SEPTEMBER 21, 2021

Bruce Jones is a senior fellow in the Center for Security, Strategy and Technology at the Brookings Institution, and the author of the “To Rule the Waves: How Control of the World’s Oceans Shapes the Fate of the Superpowers” (Scribner, 2021).

President Joe Biden’s announcement last week of an “enhanced trilateral security partnership” with Australia and the United Kingdom is arguably the most significant strategic U.S. move in Asia in a generation. It’s also the latest turn in an absorbing reality of our time: an ongoing and escalating global naval arms race.  

For the previous two months, the world media and foreign policy communities were gripped by the last act of the long American war in Afghanistan. Quite apart from the national and human tragedies unfolding in Central Asia, commentators depicted the U.S. withdrawal as the dying act of a fading power: incompetent in execution, redolent of isolationism and a betrayal of allies. The “special relationship” between the U.S. and U.K. was reliably reported to be dead, along with America’s credibility with her allies. 

That helps explain the sense of surprise when news began to leak that Biden had been working in absolute secrecy for months with Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison and U.K. Prime Minister Boris Johnson on the most important new defense partnership arrangement since the end of the Cold War. The Australia-U.K.-U.S. agreement (or “AUKUS”) launched three members of the Five Eyes into a sustained, multi-decade defense production arrangement that encompasses several of the most critical military technologies of our time. It is a serious bid to contain and confront the growing naval challenge from China. There’s been a decade-long bipartisan agreement about the need to “pivot to Asia,” but more rhetoric than action; AUKUS represents a decisive shift towards operationalization.  

The agreement incorporates the crown jewel of U.S. advanced military technology: nuclear propulsion for submarines. Only once before had the U.S. agreed to share this most sensitive and complex technology (in the late 1950s, at the height of the Cold War, with the U.K.) But the agreement is also designed to foster deeper integration of supply chains, defense industrial bases and leading-edge technologies: quantum computing, artificial intelligence and “undersea domains,” a reference both to undersea cables (which carry nearly all the world’s data and are vulnerable to disruption) and to anti-submarine detection. In a parallel bilateral agreement that got less attention, the U.S. agreed to Australia’s proposal that they should cooperate on hypersonic missiles and acquire several other long-range strike systems, including Tomahawks (also a closely guarded U.S. military technology). 

The naval and technological components of the agreement are tightly interlinked. Modern naval warfare is not about ship-to-ship combat, or even naval patrolling. It is inextricably enmeshed in the global network of ships, satellites and land-based stations for radar, communications and missile-targeting systems, powered by some of the world’s most advanced software. The Chinese call this “informatized warfare,” while the U.S. armed services call it “systems warfare” — which conveys something of the scale, reach and importance of the naval theater to contemporary geopolitical rivalry. Quantum technologies may become critical for the security of those systems. 

“AUKUS is the most important new defense partnership arrangement since the end of the Cold War.”

The naval and information technology domains, both together and separately, are the real front line in the mounting competition with China. In geographical terms, that line stretches across the vast waters of the western Pacific (encompassing such near-to-China bodies of water as the South China Sea, the East China Sea, the Yellow Sea, the Philippines Sea and, critically, the Taiwan Strait) and the eastern reaches of the Indian Ocean. This “Indo-Pacific” terrain is to the new global naval arms race what Eastern Europe was to the Cold War: both the front lines of the rivalry and the most likely locale for an outbreak of active hostilities. There are huge stakes here: around 90% of all global trade moves by sea, as does roughly 60% of the world’s oil and gas. The connected Malacca and Singapore Straits are the world’s most vital commercial and energy chokepoints.

Which helps explain why we are in a naval arms race at all. China is the world’s largest source of sea-based trade, which its economic growth has long been dependent on. It is hugely vulnerable to being choked off by the U.S. Navy, which, with its Asian allies, has controlled the Pacific’s critical waterways since the end of World War II. That vulnerability was a key factor in China’s recent expansion and modernization of its navy (the People’s Liberation Army Navy, or PLAN), which in the space of two short decades has gone from being a minor player in global naval terms to the most powerful in Asia, second only to the U.S. worldwide. The coast guard and merchant marine extends China’s reach even further. And they’ve made giant leaps in anti-ship missile technology, surpassing the U.S. in a critical area of naval warfare. China is also frantically investing in the cognate technologies: space-based communications, high-end computing and software, undersea detection and anti-submarine warfare.

All of this directly threatens Taiwan and challenges America’s longstanding naval dominance in Asia, perhaps eventually globally. America’s control of the sea has been central to its conception of its own global standing since the end of World War II. And it’s vital for Washington’s capacity to project hard power anywhere in the world, as well as to more benign missions like protecting trade and guaranteeing the free flow of energy across the high seas. You might think China and the U.S. share an interest in keeping the sea secure, but such is the reality of great power politics that any potential comity of this type has been rapidly eroded by a spiral of distrust over the Chinese naval buildup, the threat that poses to Taiwan and the broader deterioration in the relationship over issues like Hong Kong, human rights, intellectual-property theft and bilateral trade. What’s more, China has increasingly used its position of strength in Asia to pressure neighbors and near-neighbors like Australia, often in quite forceful terms. And China’s future intentions, though unknowable, are by all signs worrying. 

Against the mounting China naval challenge, America’s vital edge is not its aircraft carriers, nor its guided-missile destroyers, nor even its advanced radar systems. It’s the nuclear submarine fleet. Able to patrol for months at a time without surfacing, the submarine fleet gives the U.S. an ability to sustain its presence in Asian waters that can’t be matched by surface ships. Nuclear submarines are also extremely quiet — very hard to detect. China’s rapidly improving satellite and radar systems are increasingly able to detect and deter America’s surface fleet, but not its nuclear submarines. 

Faced with a navy emerging as a near-rival (at least in the Indo-Pacific region), the U.S. had three choices: cede the terrain with the near-certain result of amplifying China’s ability to pressure its East Asian neighbors into economic and diplomatic arrangements in China’s interest (and not America’s); confront China’s navy by embarking on an extensive naval build up; or deepen maritime alliances in the region and around the world to share the burden of confrontation.

“AUKUS represents a decisive shift towards operationalization of the ‘pivot to Asia.'”

In a recent study of global maritime competition, I concluded that the right posture was to embark on a new naval and computational alliance, building on but not limited to its existing partnerships, like the Quad. Ultimately, if China’s reach and ambition continues to grow, the U.S. is likely to look toward forging a wider alliance of alliances that link the maritime and technological assets of the Quad and NATO. Some of this is already underway, for example a 2019 agreement between Japan, the U.K. and the U.S. for enhanced naval coordination. 

The best way to understand AUKUS is as a major new step in that direction. However, it was a step with a stumble: France was furious at being cut out of the arrangement. 

Shortly before the arrangement with the U.K. and the U.S. was announced, Australia canceled a huge submarine deal with France that had been underway for several years. The French foreign minister, Jean-Yves Le Drian, had called it the “deal of a century”: A 10-year, €50 billion agreement for high-quality diesel submarines for the Royal Australian Navy, with dozens of Australian engineers relocating to France to work with France’s state-owned Naval Group. 

Le Drian called AUKUS “a stab in the back,” and said Biden was behaving like Donald Trump. President Emmanuel Macron recalled the French ambassadors from Washington and Canberra, a rare and dramatic diplomatic slap. (In a supremely Gallic snub, the ambassador to London remained there, an insinuation that the U.K. was merely acting as America’s bag-carrier and did not rise to the level of the insult.) 

To many, France’s reaction seemed over the top. France has signed defense production arrangements without informing other European allies (including one to sell destroyers to Russia) numerous times in the past. The outrage seemed to be more about defense contracts than any principle of allied consultation.

“The AUKUS deal will add a hefty degree of solidity to the naval wall that limits PLAN ambition beyond its bordering waters.”

To be fair to Paris, the submarine deal was a vital contract for an entire system of defense technology firms, and canceling it is a major blow to French industry and the science sector. It also dealt a serious blow to Macron’s signature foreign policy effort to solidify France’s presence and influence in the Indo-Pacific region. 

But Australia had important reasons to make the switch. There were sustained delivery issues on the Australia-France contract. But more important, ever since that contract was signed (in 2016), the rapid pace of Chinese naval developments had altered the playing field. Back then, acquiring diesel submarines seemed not only likely to be Australia’s only option, but also an option equal to the task. Not anymore. Canberra was worried that it would end up with a fleet of expensive submarines not up to the challenge. 

What’s most important now is China’s next actions. The initial diplomatic reaction was unsurprisingly one of fury. Beijing already sees America’s Indo-Pacific presence as an encirclement. China recently deployed four new nuclear-powered submarines, bringing its total to 15. It’s stated ambitions are to expand its capacity out to “the far seas” — including the wider reaches of the Pacific, the Arctic and the Indian Oceans. Tighter collaboration among America’s allies in Asia is a serious obstacle. 

Already, China must contend with a Taiwanese navy actively equipped and supported by the U.S., a powerful Japanese navy and an Indian navy with extensive plans for expansion and an enviable set of basing and partnership arrangements across the breadth of the Indian Ocean. The AUKUS deal will add a hefty degree of solidity to the naval wall that limits PLAN ambition beyond its bordering waters. At the very least, it will mean that the U.S. plus core allies keep pace with China’s rapid naval expansion. 

“Biden’s long game is to find a series of mechanisms to link America’s Asian and European allies in a bid to counter and contain China.”

There are risks here, of course. Australia wants to acquire the technological capacity to build at least part of the boats itself, rather than simply buying U.S. Virginia class subs or the U.K. equivalent, which will delay the point when Canberra can actually deploy the new boats until roughly 2036. That’s a wide window during which China can further build up its naval capacity and increase pressure on Australia without Australia having any new capacity to push back. 

Against that, though, the U.S. gains a more powerful ally in the region and additional options in its effort to contain China’s naval reach, even before Canberra acquires a single boat. The agreement will likely be complemented by joint U.S.-Australian patrols, possibly new basing agreements for the U.S. Navy in Australia and much faster progress on issues like the Tomahawk missiles. 

There are still many details to be ironed out over the next 18 months, like how to foster collaboration among university labs and the private sector, which has the lead in many key technologies like quantum computing. Work on mapping out supply chain options in critical technologies is underway, but many implementation steps will have to be established, and some legislated. Things can go wrong or be delayed. 

But for now, the significance of the deal is that it centers Western attention on the present fact of a global naval arms race; adds to Western deterrence of China without more provocative measures; and kickstarts what is likely to emerge as a deep partnership on the world’s most critical advanced military technologies, from quantum computing to undersea monitoring. The decision to launch a process leading to a shared defense, science and industrial base will also help protect the deal against the warps and woofs of domestic politics in the three capitals. 

Biden’s long game is to find a mechanism — or more likely, a series of mechanisms — to link America’s Asian and European allies in a bid to counter and contain China. Despite the fracas with France (which the U.S. should endeavor quickly to overcome), the launch of AUKUS is a vital next step in that direction. 

Secretary Antony J. Blinken And Latvian Foreign Minister Edgars Rinkēvičs At a Joint Press Availability 11/30/2021 10:43 AM EST

 

You are subscribed to Press Releases for U.S. Department of State. This information has recently been updated, and is now available. Secretary Antony J. Blinken And Latvian Foreign Minister Edgars Rinkēvičs At a Joint Press Availability 11/30/2021 10:43 AM EST Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State Riga, Latvia Ministry of Foreign Affairs MODERATOR:  (In progress) (Via interpreter) and today foreign minister of the Republic of Latvia received his counterpart from the United States, the Secretary of State Mr. Antony J. Blinken.  We’ll start with the statement from foreign affairs minister of Latvia. FOREIGN MINISTER RINKEVICS:  (Via interpreter)  Good afternoon, everybody.  We’ve just concluded a very productive meeting with Secretary of the State Joe Blinken.  The distance between us doesn’t mean that we have any differences.  Unfortunately, due to the precautionary measures we have to keep social distancing.  But on a more serious note, we’d like to underline that we had indeed a very productive meeting.  We had a very constructive discussion on regional security.  We are extremely grateful to the United States for its contribution to regional security and the national security of Latvia and developing them both on the practical and political level.  And we, of course, discussed the Lukashenka regime’s orchestrated hybrid attack on our border, Lithuanian border, Polish border, which are also at the same time the EU and NATO external borders as well.  We are very happy that U.S. shares our understanding of how to deflect these hybrid attacks. The Secretary of State and I also talked about the current situation in Ukraine and around Ukraine, and we came to a consensus that the Russian military buildup and movement of military are highly concerning.  NATO and the European Union should send a clear signal and should clearly indicate to which point the threats to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine will become our political and military concern, and we will respond appropriately. We also discussed our bilateral relations at great length.  Next year we’re celebrating the centenary since the establishment of diplomatic relations between our two countries.  I do suppose that next year we will also have a high-level event marking the centenary.  We also discussed to a great extent the overhaul of the financial sector.  We are thankful for the U.S. – to the U.S. side for its support in overhauling the sector.  We are also grateful for the cooperation in the sector of IT.  As we come up to the Three Seas Initiative, next year Latvia will host the summit, the Three Seas Summit and Business Forum, and we hope that the United States representatives will take an active part in the summit and the business forum.  We also discussed about the agenda of the forthcoming ministerial, NATO ministerial. (In English) So here I’ll continue in English.  But one more time, Antony, it’s great to have you here, and thank you for the great discussion that we have had this morning. SECRETARY BLINKEN:  Thank you very, very much.  Good afternoon, everyone.  And Foreign Minister, Edgars, thank you so much for your both warm welcome, for your leadership, and for your partnership these many months and particularly today in hosting the NATO foreign ministerial, which comes I think at an important time. You noted that next year our nations will commemorate 100 years of diplomatic relations.  During that time, the United States commitment to Latvia’s right to self-determination never wavered, and we are proud now to be allies and partners.  This year indeed, 2021, marks three decades since brave Latvians peacefully restored their nation’s independence, and it really is remarkable to see how far this nation has come and our bilateral relationship along with it, a relationship rooted above all in a shared commitment to democracy, to human rights, to the rule of law, to mutual respect and prosperity. Now, these issues can feel a little bit abstract at times.  We throw these words around, but I think today we see the challenge in serious ways from autocratic governments that seek to erode the international rules-based order, to the COVID-19 pandemic, to the climate crisis.  And in each of these areas, the United States and Latvia are closely aligned.  We know that no one nation alone can confront these challenges, and it’s really why President Biden has made it his mission to revitalize our alliances and partnerships and reaffirm our commitment to NATO.  That’s very much the message that I shared in meetings today with President Levits, with Prime Minister Kariņš, and with my friend the foreign minister. Our commitment to Baltic security and to Article 5 – an attack on one is an attack on all – is ironclad.  We know that when our allies are stronger and more secure, we are too, and we applaud Latvia for not only meeting the Wales commitment of spending 2 percent of GDP on defense by 2024 but actually exceeding that commitment.  We’ve been proud to support that effort.  We’ve provided more than $400 million in security assistance to Latvia since 2015 to strengthen its military and also to enhance its capacity to operate side by side with NATO Allies.  Additionally, NATO has deployed four multinational battle groups to Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Poland to bolster deterrence in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014. This cooperation is vital, and it remains vital in the face of ongoing Russian actions in Ukraine, its increasingly belligerent rhetoric, its recent buildup of forces, its unusual troop movements along Ukraine’s border.  I’ll have a lot more to say about that tomorrow after I’ve had a chance to consult with our Allies in the NATO meetings that start this afternoon, but for now let me just reiterate that any escalatory actions by Russia would be of great concern to the United States, as they would to Latvia, and any renewed aggression would trigger serious consequences. We go into this NATO ministerial knowing that it’s not enough to simply recommit to NATO but to reimagine the alliance and other tools of the transatlantic partnership so that we can defend ourselves against 21st century threats and seize 21st century opportunity.  And here again, Latvia is playing a vital role.  Consider, for example, the leadership that Latvia has demonstrated in the NATO Strategic Communications Centers of Excellence, which brings together the civilian, military, private sector, and academic experts to collaborate effectively on countering disinformation.  This is crucial, as autocracies are increasingly using disinformation to foment division and erode trust in our democracies.  Latvia has hosted the center since 2014.  It’s its biggest contributor; it’s been a leading innovator on this issue.  That’s something we talked about in our meeting, and that includes Latvia’s efforts to launch a more coordinated response to beat back disinformation on COVID-19, something that both of us are seeing. As Edgars noted, Latvia will host the Three Seas Initiative Summit and Business Forum next summer.  At its core, this forum is about demonstrating how democratic values can put governments in a stronger place to deliver inclusive, sustainable growth that all of our people are looking for, whether that’s by expanding trade, fighting corruption, or investing in infrastructure to create jobs, to connect people with communities, and to increase resilience to a warming climate. Another area where Latvia’s leadership has been indispensable is in addressing the challenges posed by Belarus and the Lukashenka regime.  Latvia has been a very strong voice in the European Union for holding the Lukashenka regime accountable for its violent repression of the Belarusian people.  At the same time, Latvia’s government and its civil society have stood with Belarusians as they have expressed their democratic aspirations and demanded respect for human rights.  That includes providing support to Belarusian journalists and other members of civil society and offering safe haven for many democracy advocates that have been targeted by the regime. We join Latvia in condemning the cynical and inhumane way that the Lukashenka regime has exploited vulnerable people to orchestrate irregular migration flows across its borders, and we recognize the right of the Latvian Government and others in the region to secure their borders consistent with international law and the humane approach that’s needed. Finally, today marks the 80th anniversary of the beginning of the Rumbula massacre.  From November 30 to December 8th, 1941, an estimated 25,000 Jewish men, women, and children, most of them Latvians, were murdered by the Nazis in the forest near here.  Most of them were executed in just two days.  We welcome Latvia’s efforts to remember all of the victims of the Holocaust, including those killed in Rumbula, and to ensure that its people know the dark history of that time.  And we’re grateful as well for the country’s ongoing efforts to combat anti-Semitism in all its forms, and we’re encouraged by the recent momentum in Latvia to provide a measure of justice for Holocaust victims and their families by addressing property stolen during that time. In closing, let me just say that we are profoundly grateful to Latvia for its partnership, for its friendship, for its leadership in addressing challenges that we face in the region and around the world, strengthening the alliances that we’re part of, in defending the values that unite us and that we care about most.  Edgars, thank you.  It’s always great to be with you and wonderful to be in Latvia. MODERATOR:  Many thanks, Mr. Secretary.  (Inaudible.)  (Via interpreter) Thank you.  And we will now open the floor for questions.  We’ll start with Ieva Vārna from TV3. QUESTION:  (Via interpreter) Good afternoon.  I have a question to U.S. Secretary of State, Mr. Blinken.  Mr. Blinken, considering the current security environment and the Lukashenka’s orchestrated hybrid attack and Russia’s military movement, and so on, so forth, would the U.S. consider in the light of such developments changing its presence, strengthening presence in the region? SECRETARY BLINKEN:  Let me say a couple things to that.  First, I think as you know, President Biden is deeply committed to our NATO alliance, deeply committed to Article 5, and equally committed to Baltic security.  And we’ve manifested that not only rhetorically but also practically.  We’ve been a participant in the NATO Baltic Air Policing mission.  As I noted earlier, we’ve contributed significantly to the rotational deployments on the eastern flank of NATO.  And we will be consulting closely with NATO Allies and partners in the days ahead, particularly in the context of concerns raised by Russia’s actions along Ukraine borders, about whether there are other steps that we should take as an alliance to strengthen our defense, to strengthen our resilience, to strengthen our capacity. I’d mention also that the Pentagon, which has the lead on these questions, just put out its global posture review.  And I would note that this is a framework for what we’re doing, for our approach.  It’s not dispositive of each and every element, and those are constantly under review by our colleagues at the Defense Department, both within the context of NATO and, of course, as we look at this directly ourselves.  Thank you. MODERATOR:  Thank you much.  Andrea Mitchell, NBC. QUESTION:  Thank you, Mr. Secretary. SECRETARY BLINKEN:  Andrea. QUESTION:  Mr. Secretary, how do you assess Ukraine’s claim of an attempted Russian coup against Ukraine?  Could the U.S. – what steps could the U.S. take, if you could be more specific, to deter possible Russian invasion of Ukraine?  Will the U.S. help Latvia with U.S. troop deployments on the border?  Lots of Russian threats there.  And if you could speak about Omicron – you’ve just come from Africa where the vaccination rate is less than 10 percent. SECRETARY BLINKEN:  Yeah. QUESTION:  What more should the wealthy nations be doing to help vaccinate the rest of the world, to prevent future mutations and variants? SECRETARY BLINKEN:  Andrea, thank you very much. QUESTION:  (Inaudible) just — SECRETARY BLINKEN:  Oh, I’m sorry.  Go ahead, please. QUESTION:  Sorry.  Mr. Foreign Minister, could I ask you as well:  Do you have any new commitments from the Secretary about ways to deter the Russian threat?  Thank you so much. SECRETARY BLINKEN:  Andrea, thanks very much.  So at the risk of disappointing, let me just say that with regard to Ukraine, Russia, et cetera, I’m going have a lot more to say tomorrow. So I don’t want to get ahead of that.  The reason I say that is because it is particularly important to the President and to me that we have an opportunity to consult closely with our NATO Allies and partners.  That’s what we’re going to be doing this afternoon and through the course of tomorrow.  So when we have a chance to speak again tomorrow, I think after the NATO session, I’ll have a lot more to say about this. QUESTION:  (Off-mike.) SECRETARY BLINKEN:  So here’s one thing I can tell you is that we have seen the Russians’ playbook many times over. And part of that playbook is to attempt to create and manufacture a so-called provocation as justification for something that Russia was planning to do all along.  And so whether what’s been reported fits into that playbook, I don’t know, but as I’ve already said on a couple of occasions – and again, we’ll have a lot more to say about it tomorrow – we are very concerned about the movements we’ve seen along Ukraine’s border.  We know that Russia often combines those efforts with internal efforts to destabilize a country.  That’s part of the playbook.  And we’re looking at it very closely.  But I want to make sure that we have a chance to continue our consultations, which have been ongoing, with our allies.  And as I said, more to be said about this tomorrow. On the pandemic and on COVID-19, a few things here.  First, I really want to applaud and express a – real gratitude to South Africa and its government for its extraordinary transparency, and also the very important work it did in detecting this new variant and in making it known to the world.  That’s exactly, I think, a model of responsibility that South Africa has exhibited that we would hope everyone in the world would show, because we are all in this together.  And South Africa has performed a vital service to the world in identifying this new variant and making it known. There are three really important questions that we have to get answers to in the coming weeks to understand exactly what we are dealing with.  And as the President said, I think just yesterday, this is a cause for concern but not a cause for panic.  And the three questions we have to get answers to are these:  How transmittable is this new variant?  We don’t yet know that. Second, to what extent do the existing vaccines effectively guard against it, both in terms of becoming symptomatic and then, of course, whether it presents a grave danger that defeats the vaccines? And third, how dangerous is it in terms of hospitalization, in terms of death?  And we don’t have the answers to those questions.  They’re being studied very actively and aggressively by our scientists and by other scientists. And so depending on the answers to those questions, we will – we’ll take the necessary steps.  Meanwhile, as a measure of extra precaution, we’ve taken the steps that we’ve taken, including on the travel restrictions.  And again, this is based on one metric and one metric alone, and that is public health and making sure that we’re doing everything possible to protect public health as we get answers to these key questions. To your larger question, which I think is so important, it’s something we’ve been trying to put a spotlight on for many months.  And we keep repeating it, but I think what’s emerged in Southern Africa just underscores the point.  We know, we know, we know that none of us will be fully safe until everyone is.  And we’ve been saying that as long as the virus is replicating somewhere, it could be mutating, and if it’s mutating, we might wind up with a variant that poses a new threat and that can defeat the existing vaccines or induce greater illness or be more transmissible, all the questions we’re looking at right now when it comes to Omicron. But we also know two things, one of which you pointed to: that there is a real disparity in vaccinations throughout the world, and particularly a disparity between vaccinations in Africa and, for example, the United States and Europe.  We have vaccination rates in the United States and Europe of 50, 60, 70 percent depending on exactly who you’re counting.  And in Africa, it’s more like 14, 15 percent or less.  So we have been working very aggressively to deal with that gap.  As you know, the United States has committed to provide and is in the midst of providing well over a billion vaccines – principally through COVAX, or in the case of Africa, through the African Union – with no political strings attached and donated free of charge. But – that’s part of the solution, but there’s another part that is equally important, and that’s actually getting shots in arms.  Because one of the things we’re finding, including in Africa – and we’ve seen this in South Africa – is that the supply of vaccines may actually be sufficient, but the ability to get shots in arms is deficient.  There are last mile challenges when it comes to logistics, when it comes to cold storage and things like that.  This too we are very actively working on.  We announced an initiative a few weeks ago at the foreign ministerials meeting that we hosted on COVID-19 to stand up a global COVID corps which brings the private sector into the game to help solve these last mile problems of getting shots into arms.  We’re putting that into motion now; USAID is working on other initiatives to deal with the logistical challenges. So we’re bringing all of this together.  Foreign ministers are going to be meeting on a very regular basis on this to drive this from our perspective.  Development ministers, USAID will be doing the same thing.  And so we want to close the gap both in terms of the vaccines delivered and the vaccines actually administered.  That is ultimately the solution to this challenge. Edgars. FOREIGN MINISTER RINKEVICS:  Just a really quick word.  Let me say that there is a very strong commitment by the United States towards our defense and security, and frankly, we don’t need any new commitments because the one we have is already very strong – rotational presence.  The Secretary mentioned also the U.S.-led battle group in Poland.  What we had agreed that we will continue working closer together not only on military, but also on cyber security issues, including 5G networks, including countering cyber attacks, and also disinformation, because we are a country that is quite affected by that. But I’m also very pleased to see that the global posture review that has been published by the Defense Department is actually, from our point of view, the good news, because we see that the commitment to Europe by the United States is there.  And we do believe that in due course, also assessing risks and threats that we are facing, we will be able to adjust through bilateral and also NATO channels. And a very quick word on vaccines, because that’s – it is really important.  Also, Latvia, we are not probably the richest country in the world, but we understand that it is very important to provide vaccines to countries in Africa.  We have done it already through COVAX mechanism and also bilaterally to Kenya, to Tunisia.  And I think that what we are seeing right now – it is important, of course, to fight COVID in our countries, but if we don’t address also countries where the vaccination rate is very low, then those mutations will come back and we will be fighting that pandemic more and more, and we will have to restrict movement, we will have to restrict our daily life.  And I think that the realization that this is the global effort is slowly coming to everyone. MODERATOR:  (Via interpreter) Thank you, and now the floor’s given to Ugis Libietis from the Radio of Latvia. QUESTION:  (In progress) speak in English and – to Mr. Secretary.  But first I would like to express my sadness and disappointment that our face-to-face interview was not – was canceled.  And so I am very grateful that I have a chance to speak to you right now. And I would like to continue with the subject you just mentioned about the U.S. commitment to NATO, to European allies.  And we know that for a couple of years during the previous administration, there have been quite intense discussions about the relations and the commitment of U.S. administration to Europe especially.  After that, we saw the quite messy withdrawal from Afghanistan, which again intensified those discussions.  Right now when we speak about challenges on our eastern borders, these discussions have again risen, and there are still a lot of skeptics who will say that there are worries and there are doubts about ironclad, rock-solid U.S. commitments to its allies – and especially to smallest allies – in a case when national interest faces, like, aggression from or counter actions from Russian side. So I would like to ask you:  What would be your message to those who are quite skeptical?  And how to reach those who are skeptical, and also in such countries like Ukraine and Georgia, which is also very important for that?  Thank you. SECRETARY BLINKEN:  Thank you very much.  Two things.  First, I would say that President Biden has a long and strong track record when it comes to a commitment to NATO, to Article 5, to our alliance.  And so there’s a deep history there that people can refer to.  But ultimately what I would say to you and say to anyone else is don’t judge us by what we say, judge us by what we do.  That’s the ultimate test, so let’s see what emerges from the meetings that we’re having this week.  I think you’ve already seen, based on the NATO summit that took place at the leaders level, a strong recommitment to NATO, not just rhetorically but in the work that we’re doing to modernize the alliance to be able to deal with the challenges that we face now, including many of the challenges that Edgars referred to in gray zones and in hybrid tactics of one kind or another. There’s a determination to do that and a program to do that through a revised Strategic Concept.  The last time NATO published a Strategic Concept was in 2010 when Russia was considered a partner, China wasn’t mentioned, and most of these hybrid methods of aggression didn’t exist or were not known.  So this is very important work, and I would focus on that and making sure that we do the work, as well as the commitments that countries are making – including the United States – to defense and to deterrents, and finally the actions that we take to stand up to aggression or the threat of aggression, renewed aggression from Russia when it comes to Ukraine or, for that matter, the situation in Belarus. But bottom line is this:  We will be judged by what we do, and I would focus on that and invite people to focus on that.  Thank you. MODERATOR:  (Inaudible.)  We have time just for one more question.  Alexander Yanevskyy, Voice of America. QUESTION:  Thank you, Mr. Secretary.  Talking about China – so recently China and Belarus signed a memorandum on military cooperation, and I would like to know what’s the United States take on that.  And following up on Ukraine, also Belarus is now conducting military drills with the – with Russia on southern border, and what’s your take on that as well?  Thank you. SECRETARY BLINKEN:  Thank you.  I guess my first reflection is to say we’re extremely fortunate to be here in Latvia today, a member of the NATO Alliance, a member of the European Union – both voluntary groupings of countries, more than two dozen in each, that are united by shared interests, by shared values, something that really stands out.  Whether Belarus or other countries may have marriages of convenience if not conviction with other countries is something for them to decide, not for us.  We’re focused on the actions, unfortunately, that Belarus has been taking, both in terms of repressing its own people and their democratic aspirations as well as, as we were talking about earlier, using migration as a weapon to try to sow division and destabilization in Europe. We are, in close coordination with the European Union, preparing follow-on sanctions that will hold the regime accountable for these hybrid operations and its ongoing attacks on democracy, on human rights, on international norms.  And the bottom line is this:  As long as the regime in Belarus refuses to respect its international commitments, undermines peace and security in Europe, continues to repress and abuse its own people who are simply seeking to live in freedom, we will continue to put pressure on the regime.  And we will not lessen our calls for accountability.  That’s our focus.  Thank you. MODERATOR:  Thank you very much, Mr. Minister, Secretary of State.  That concludes our press conference.

BAE 10 milyar da İsrail’e ayırmış: Orta Doğu’da Soğuk Barış Namık Tan (E.Büyükelçi)

 BAE 10 milyar da İsrail’e ayırmış: Orta Doğu’da Soğuk Barış

Namık  Tan (E.Büyükelçi)

Abu Dabi Veliaht Prensi Şeyh Muhammed bin Zayed El Nahyan’ın (MBZ) 24 Kasım’da Türkiye’ye yaptığı resmî ziyaret, Türkiye’de daha çok ticari ve ekonomik perspektiften değerlendirildi. Ziyaretin, siyasi anlamı pek irdelenmedi. Orta Doğu’da bir nevi karşılıklı nefret ilişkisi içinde olan Türkiye ve Birleşik Arap Emirlikleri’nin (BAE) neden birden barışma kararına vardıkları sorgulanmadı.

Bunu anlayabilmek için Orta Doğu'da  yaşanmakta olan değişime göz atmamız gerekiyor. Özellikle, Arap Baharı sonrasında bölgede köklü değişiklikler oldu; kartlar adeta yeniden karılıp, dağıtılmaya başlandı.

Örneğin, bölgedeki Arap ülkelerinin İsrail ile ilişkileri dramatik değişikliğe uğradı. İsrail, önceki yıl ABD öncülüğünde BAE ile imzalanan İbrahim Anlaşmasının yarattığı ivme sayesinde, neredeyse yarım düzine Arap ülkesiyle diplomatik ilişki kurdu.

İsrail, geçen hafta Fas ile istihbarat ve savunma sanayii alanlarında işbirliğini, ortak tatbikat ve silah alımını öngören bir anlaşma imzaladı. İsrail’in, 1993 Oslo anlaşmalarından bu yana Fas ile resmî ilişkileri mevcuttu. Ancak, ilk defa bir Arap ülkesiyle böylesine kapsamlı bir anlaşma imzalıyordu.

BAE İsrail’e de 10 milyar dolar fon ayırdı

Fas’ın yanı sıra, anlaşmanın imzacıları BAE ve Bahreyn’in İsrail ile ilişkileri de önemli ölçüde gelişme kaydetti. Abu Dhabi ve Dubai’den iş insanları, özellikle yüksek teknoloji alanında, İsrailli girişimcilerin projelerine önemli yatırımda bulunmaya başladılar. İsrailliler için, şimdilerde, Dubai ve Abu Dhabi turizm cennetine dönüşmüş bulunuyor. BAE, İsrail’e yönelik yatırımlar için, aynı Türkiye’ye yaptığı gibi, 10 milyar dolarlık bir fon ayırdı. Bahreyn ve İsrail, aralarındaki ticari engelleri bütünüyle kaldırdı.

En önemlisi, kısa bir zaman önce, İsrail, BAE ve Bahreyn deniz kuvvetleri, ABD’nin 5 inci filo unsurların da katılımıyla Kızıldeniz’de bir ortak tatbikat icra ettiler. Bu tatbikatın, bölge ülkelerinin İran tehdidinden duydukları endişe çerçevesinde düzenlendiği aşikârdı.

İsrail’in, İbrahim Anlaşması bağlamında, BAE ve Bahreyn ile geliştirdiği işbirliğini (Hindistan’ı da katarak) Orta Doğu QUAD’ı olarak adlandıralar var. ABD’nin Çin’i çevreleme siyaseti çerçevesinde Hindistan, Avustralya ve Japonya ile uzak Asya’da oluşturduğu QUAD’ın bir benzeri bu defa İran’ı çevrelemek üzere Orta Doğu’da şekillenmeye başladı.

Mutfakta biri mi var?

İsrail’in, Ürdün ve Mısır ile eskilere dayanan ilişkileri de düşünüldüğünde, bölgedeki Arap ülkelerinin İsrail ile ilişkilerinin ABD öncülüğünde yeniden yapılandırılmaya çalışıldığını söylemek yanlış görülmemeli.

BAE ve Bahreyn’i izleyebilecek en az üç bölge ülkesinin olduğu konuşulmakta. Bunlardan birinin Umman olması şaşırtıcı olmaz. Suudi Arabistan (SA) ise biraz daha beklemek istiyor gibi görünüyor. Ancak İsrail’e karşı eskisine göre çok daha ılımlı davranıyor.  Suudi Arabistan’daki liderliğini tam anlamıyla kabul ettirememiş olan Veliaht Prens Muhammed bin Salman (MBS), önümüzdeki dönemde, ABD ve İngiltere’nin de baskılarıyla İsrail ile ilişki tesis etmek konusunda adım atabilir.

Bütün bu gelişmeler, kendiliğinden olmuyor, elbette. Küresel güçler arasında Orta Doğu’da nüfuz alanlarını genişletmek amacıyla sürdürülen kıyasıya rekabetin de bu gelişmelerde belirleyici rolü var.

Avrupa Birliği’nden (AB) ayrılan İngiltere’nin, Orta Doğu’da oluşturulmaya çalışılan yeni düzenin şekillenmesine öncülük ettiği anlaşılıyor. İngiltere-Amerika stratejik yakınlaşmasının da bu hususta önemli rol oynadığı görülüyor.

İngiltere, Müslüman Kardeşler ve Türkiye

Öyle ki, Çin-Rusya aksına karşı yürütülen küresel rekabeti öncelemesi sebebiyle bir süredir Orta Doğu’ya ilgisini kaybetmiş görünen ABD’nin Orta Doğu siyasetini de İngiltere’nin yönlendirdiği yorumları yapılıyor. Bu da, ABD’de Demokratların sol kanadının baskısı sebebiyle İsrail konusunda ön planda gözükmek istemeyen Biden yönetiminin işine geliyor.

İngiltere’nin, özellikle Körfez ülkeleri üzerindeki tarihi ağırlığını ve bu çerçevede kurmuş olduğu sağlam ilişkileri de not etmekte yarar var. İngiltere, bölgedeki siyasi etki gücünü daha da artırmak amacıyla geçen hafta Hamas’ı resmen terörist örgüt olarak kabul etti. Böylece, Hamas ve muadili Müslüman Kardeşler ile ilişkilerini tamamen sona erdirdi. Bu da, hem İsrail’i hem Müslüman Kardeşler’den rahatsızlık duyan Körfez ülkelerini ziyadesiyle memnun etti. Orta Doğu’da ağırlıklı role sahip, Mısır ve Ürdün, hatta Suriye yönetimince olumlu karşılandı.

Bölgesel güç olan Türkiye, bilhassa son on yılda izlediği yanlış politikalar sebebiyle, Orta Doğu’da çok ciddi bir zemin kaybı yaşadı. Bu çerçevede Suriye, İsrail ve Mısır başta olmak üzere birçok bölge ülkesiyle diplomatik ilişkileri sekteye uğradı. Bu, Türkiye’nin, yeniden şekillenmekte olan Orta Doğu’da ve Doğu Akdeniz’de oyun kurucu ve yönlendirici olarak rol almasına engel oldu. Ayrıca, hesap hatası yaparak, İbrahim Anlaşmalarına baştan karşı çıkmasıyla hem Orta Doğu’da hem Doğu Akdeniz’de Türkiye’ye karşı cepheler oluştu.

Orta Doğu’da İngiltere ağırlığı

Türkiye’nin, inişli çıkışlı ve öngörülebilir olmaktan uzak politikalarıyla adeta bir oyun bozucu olarak görülmeye başlanması, bölgede İran etkisini dengelemeye çalışan ABD ve İngiltere ikilisini de rahatsız etti. Diğer taraftan, küresel planda ABD ile Çin arasında başlamış olan, AB’nin ABD’yi, Rusya’nın da Çin’i desteklediği yeni nesil soğuk savaşta Türkiye’nin tutumunun ne olacağı da büyük önem taşıyor.

ABD ve İngiltere, sert gücünü kullanmakta tereddüt etmeyen Türkiye’nin, bölgeye iyice yerleşen Rusya ile daha çok yakınlaşmasının önüne geçmek istiyor. Türkiye’nin batı aksının içinde yer alması, Çin ve Rusya ile ABD ve AB cepheleşmesi bakımından da çok önem taşıyor. Bu çerçevede, ABD ve AB, Türkiye’nin bir süredir izlediği özerk politikalara göz yummaya, hatta uyum sağlamaya başladılar. Nitekim, ABD ve İngiltere, demokrasi ve insan hakları konularındaki iletişimi AB üzerinden yürütmeye tercih ettiler.

ABD, Orta Doğu’da yumuşamanın konsolide edilmesi sürecini yönetmek hususundaki sorumluluğu tamamen İngiltere’ye bıraktı. Bölgeye ilişkin tarihi birikimi ve tecrübesi çerçevesinde, İngiltere, bence üstlendiği görevi başarıyla yerine getiriyor.

Soğuk Barışı oluşturan koşullar

BAE’nin, devlet kapasitesinin çok üstünde rollere soyunması üzerine, bölgenin ağırlıklı ülkeleri İran, Mısır ve Suudi Arabistan’ın yanı sıra Türkiye ve diğer bazı Arap ülkelerinde yarattığı rahatsızlık, İngiltere’nin kurguladığı bölgeye ilişkin yeni düzeni tehdit etmeye başladı. BAE’nin, Suudi Arabistan ile ilişkileri de belli ölçüde gerginleşti. MBZ ile MBS arasındaki işbirliği yara aldı. BAE, son zamanlarda Körfezde sahip olduğu ağırlığı kaybetmeye, bir anlamda yalnızlaşmaya başladı.

Erdoğan yönetimi, bölgede bir süredir yaşamakta olduğu, hatta bir zamanlar övündüğü yalnızlığı kırmak istiyor. Ancak, Mısır, İsrail gibi arasının bozuk olduğu bölge ülkeleriyle ilişkilerini düzeltme girişimleri bir türlü istenen sonucu vermiyor. Buna, bir de giderek derinleşen ekonomik kriz ve dış kaynak arayışı eklendi. Dolayısıyla, bölge ülkeleriyle ilişkileri yeniden kurma ihtiyacı öne çıktı.

Bu durumu fırsat olarak değerlendiren İngiltere, ABD’nin de desteğiyle, iki ülke arasında yaptığı arabuluculuğu başarıyla sonlandırdı. İki ülkeyi “soğuk barış” için ikna etti. İçinde bulundukları siyasi yalnızlıktan kurtulmaları için alan açtı. Artık, top Türkiye ve BAE ikilisinin sahasında. Bu hayli kırılgan yakınlaşmanın içini doldurarak, sıcak ve verimli bir işbirliğine dönüştürmek iki ülke yönetimlerinin elinde. Bunu başarıp, başaramayacaklarını zaman gösterecek.

Speech by President Charles Michel at the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Assembly

 30/11/2021 12:29 | Speech |

Speech by President Charles Michel at the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Assembly

 

It’s a pleasure to address this Eastern Partnership Civil Society Assembly today.

Your meeting takes place two weeks ahead of our Eastern Partnership Summit in Brussels - an opportunity for political leaders and governments to boost reform efforts and drive forward the recovery and resilience of our societies.

When I say ‘society’, I mean all of you working in ‘civil society’.

You - representing hundreds of civil society organisations - will devote the coming days to scrutinising the proposals for the post-2020 agenda of our Eastern Partnership. And your commitment is crucial to delivering on the necessary and expected progress in many critical areas. Political cooperation, economic recovery, and, of course, democratic reforms. This must generate concrete benefits for all citizens in all our countries and in our Partnership as a whole.

Neighbours are always important. If we want peace, stability and prosperity, we must work with our neighbours. History has taught us this lesson. And our Eastern Partnership has been a testament to this simple truth for over 12 years. We have advanced our partnership in spite of challenges ranging from economic crises to armed conflicts and the COVID pandemic. And important progress has been made - improving electoral frameworks, reforming administrations, fostering the independence of the judiciary, and prosecuting corruption.

But we all know, challenges remain. In tackling those, we insist and we persist. Strengthening democracy, fighting corruption, defending the rule of law, guaranteeing a free media, and countering disinformation - this is an uphill battle, but an essential and a worthy battle.

It’s all our responsibility. And you - civil society - have played, and are playing, a crucial role. You must continue to step forward and make your voices heard.

Today, Belarus is of particular concern, where so many people suffer from oppression and where civil society is under enormous pressure. The EU has stood steadfast, united in our support for the Belarusian population and their desire for democratic change. We have provided substantial financial support to civil society, journalists, independent media and we are imposing sanctions on those responsible for falsifying elections, spreading violence and repression.

Most recently, the Belarus regime has also taken steps to instrumentalise the most vulnerable in every society - migrants - under horrific conditions. We are responding firmly. The EU’s fifth package of sanctions is about to be agreed and we are considering further action. Our message to the Belarusian people is clear: we will not let you down. Our comprehensive economic support for a democratic Belarus - up to three billion euro - is our strong European commitment to support a better future and the democratic choice of the Belarusian people.

Prolonged conflicts in the region remain a fundamental challenge. They require renewed efforts in line with the principles and norms of international law. The EU stands ready to play its role to help prevent and resolve conflict. This includes building confidence and contributing to lasting and comprehensive settlements - including support for post-conflict rehabilitation measures.

The relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan show the fragility of the situation. I am totally convinced that only political dialogue can lead to a sustainable settlement. It will also require civil society in Armenia and Azerbaijan to come together, to build bridges and to help in reconciliation efforts.

In Georgia, we need to follow through with the identified reforms with coherence and credibility and in respect of fundamental values and in support of credible institutions. If we lose ground in these key areas, we risk losing it elsewhere, too.

Our Eastern Partnership must live up to the unique challenges of our time - most of all climate change. And we need to tackle these challenges together - including through deeper sectoral and regional cooperation. The EU will support all initiatives to create more synergies and cooperation between partners - including the three associated partners; Georgia, the Republic of Moldova, and Ukraine.

This will help address the common challenges and pave the way for sustainable growth and political stability, using all existing instruments to support their societies, as they pursue their European aspirations, and foster coordination between the partners and Brussels. This also includes the respective association agendas with the European Union, and this should lead to the sharing of best practices on reforms and on a broader agenda for the future.

Civil society has a critical role in holding governments accountable and clearing the way towards this European future. The new proposed agenda for our post-2020 Eastern Partnership focuses on recovery, resilience and reform. It is underpinned by an ambitious economic and investment plan, mobilising over two billion euro to support the post-pandemic recovery.

Our fundamental values, human rights, rule of law and democratic accountability, gender equality, and support to youth will remain cornerstones of our future partnership. EU support will remain conditional on these fundamental principles. And of course I would like to thank you, the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum and all of you for your valuable contributions to this renewed agenda.

Civil society is a crucial link between governments and citizens. Civil society - all of you in this room - promotes with deep commitment citizens’ rights and aspirations for our societies, respecting human rights and the rule of law, fighting corruption, overcoming discrimination, and celebrating the freedom of expression and assembly. These values define who we are. They are the best investment for a prosperous, just, and sustainable future.

The Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum will continue to be a vital partner on this path and I count on your commitment, in the interests of our citizens and in the interests of our societies. And I look forward to your recommendations from this Assembly in the run-up to our Summit. Thank you.

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Threat of Russian invasion of Ukraine tests Biden administration

 Threat of Russian invasion of Ukraine tests Biden administration

A serviceman of the Ukrainian Armed Forces takes part in military drills at a training ground near the border with Crimea this month.

A serviceman of the Ukrainian Armed Forces takes part in military drills at a training ground near the border with Crimea this month. (Armed Forces of Ukraine/Reuters)

By Paul Sonne, Ellen Nakashima and Missy Ryan 

Today at 4:00 p.m. EST

The White House is reviewing options to deter a feared Russian invasion of Ukraine, including providing more military aid to Kyiv and threatening sanctions, to dissuade Russian President Vladimir Putin from escalating the simmering conflict into a full-blown transatlantic crisis.

The deliberations come as President Biden and his aides prepare for a virtual call with Putin next month, a moment that analysts see as an opportunity to signal the costs of an invasion to the Kremlin but also present a path for reducing tension.

Amid spiking U.S. concern over unusual movements by Russian troops on the Ukrainian border, Secretary of State Antony Blinken embarked Monday on a trip to Europe, where Washington is looking to consolidate a position among allies at a summit with NATO foreign ministers in Latvia. Blinken will then go to Sweden for a meeting of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, also scheduled to be attended by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov.

“We will talk about our assessment of what’s happening on Russia’s border with Ukraine, and we will begin that conversation of what are the options that are on the table, and what is it that NATO as an alliance would like to do together?” Karen Donfried, the State Department’s top official for Europe, said ahead of the trip.

Administration officials are trying to craft an approach that neither appeases Russia nor provokes significant escalation, which is harder now than it was nearly eight years ago, when Moscow annexed Crimea and fueled a separatist war in Ukraine’s east that has left more than 13,000 people dead.

The Russian and Ukrainian militaries are more advanced, the West remains divided on how tough to be on Moscow, and Putin has grown increasingly bold about pressing Russia’s claims on Ukraine.

“There has never been a more propitious moment for Putin if he wants to invade Ukraine,” said Fiona Hill, who served as a top Russia adviser in the Trump administration.

What you need to know on tensions between Ukraine and Russia

The Kremlin denies it is planning an offensive. For weeks, however, U.S. officials have warned publicly and in discussions with allies that they are alarmed about Russian troops near the Ukrainian border. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg on Thursday said Russia had massed a “large and unusual concentration of forces in the region,” including tanks, artillery, armored units, drones and electronic warfare systems, as well as combat-ready troops. Ukraine says Russia has about 94,000 troops near the border.

The intelligence that worried senior Biden administration officials goes beyond the Russian troop buildup, according to U.S. officials, who declined to be more specific and who, like others, spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive matters.

The administration is considering enhanced military aid to Ukraine and weighing potential sanctions or other measures that could be taken before or after an invasion, in addition to reviewing military contingency plans, U.S. officials said.

Washington has also floated the possibility of an in-person summit between Biden and Putin in the first half of 2022, according to people familiar with the matter, a move that might buy time to build unity among allies or revitalize a moribund political process to resolve the military conflict in Ukraine’s east.

The potential meeting was broached by CIA Director William J. Burns in his visit to Moscow earlier this month, they said. The possible in-person meeting was first reported by the Russian newspaper Kommersant. The White House said it had nothing to announce about a meeting.

Ukraine has shored up its defenses since 2014 with Western help. But Ukrainian Brig. Gen. Kyrylo Budanov, the country’s top military intelligence official, this month told the Military Times that Kyiv is seeking additional air, missile and drone defense systems, as well as electronic jamming devices, to help counter rocket and artillery fire.

U.S. officials have said they aren’t sure if Putin is going to attack, or even whether he has reached a decision, noting he could be moving forces near the Ukrainian border as a bargaining strategy with Western powers. After surprising Washington with a similar buildup last spring, Putin landed his first high-profile summit with Biden.

But comments by Putin and other top Russian officials about Ukraine have sharpened in recent months, and that more aggressive rhetoric, combined with the second military buildup, have raised fears the Russian leader may not be bluffing.

“When you say things like, ‘Ukraine does not now and has never had a right to exist as a sovereign state, there is no such thing as the Ukrainian people,’ where does your rhetoric go from there?” a senior Western intelligence officer said. “And where has rhetoric like that led in the past? It has pretty consistently been a prelude to conflict.”

The dilemma, said Andrea Kendall-Taylor, a Russia expert at the Center for a New American Security, “is Putin fundamentally cares more about Ukraine than even the United States does. So how do you deter an adversary when there’s such an asymmetry of interests?’’

Andrew S. Weiss, a Russia analyst at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said Putin has failed to achieve his goals in Ukraine, and in fact his aggression has worsened the security situation on Russia’s western border, revitalized NATO and strengthened anti-Russian sentiment in Ukrainian society.

“For a whole host of reasons, he’ll never admit that, of course, which is part of the reason he continues to see restoring Ukraine to the Kremlin’s sphere of influence as the single most important piece of unfinished business for Russia’s security and his own legacy,” Weiss said.

On Friday, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky alleged a group of Russians and Ukrainians were found plotting a coup against him, accusations the Kremlin rejected.

The deteriorating situation presents a new test for the transatlantic alliance, which has embraced Ukraine as a partner rather than an ally. It has provided Kyiv with weaponry, training and support, but stopped short of extending a guarantee of defense that formal NATO membership affords.

Ukraine wants to show it is serious about ending oligarch era

Ukrainian officials have warned Moscow could mount a simultaneous multifront invasion from the north, south and east to force a retreat and capitulation by Kyiv. Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov told The Washington Post that a new Russian invasion would be far bloodier and more costly to Europe than the 2014 operation.

The ambiguity about how far NATO would go to defend Ukraine against Russian military action already has sparked debate in Washington and exacerbated divides within the alliance that the Kremlin has sought to exploit.

Samuel Charap, a Russia analyst at the Rand Corporation, argued the United States, faced with limited ability to coerce Putin, should pressure Ukraine into further implementing the moribund 2015 peace deal known as the Minsk II agreement as a symbolic first move to “put the onus on Moscow to de-escalate.”

Ben Hodges, the former commanding general of U.S. Army Europe, said Washington should do the opposite, and apply diplomatic, economic and military pressure on Moscow.

“Nothing in Russia’s history should cause anybody to think for one second that giving in to them will cause them to say, ‘okay, we’re good,’ ” Hodges said. “I believe they really do only respect strength.”

The top Republicans on the House and Senate Armed Services Committees sent a letter to the Pentagon last week urging the administration to do more to shore up Ukraine’s military and expressing concern that the United States hasn’t taken more aggressive action.

Kendall-Taylor said the upcoming call is a chance to convey the costs of an invasion and emphasize that it would change the security situation in Europe. “The U.S. would have no choice but to position more forces in Europe,” Kendall-Taylor said.

U.S. officials say they realize meetings alone are not offramps.

“There’s this tension between getting rid of the crisis in the near term — let’s throw another summit at Putin — and the longer-term imperative,” said one official. “If you offer concessions, what do you teach them and China? You teach them to manufacture crises because you get concessions.”

The Biden administration’s response is also sure to be watched closely elsewhere around the world, perhaps most notably in China, where Beijing’s stance on Taiwan in many ways mirrors Russia’s approach to Ukraine.

The latest challenge over Ukraine comes as Europe grapples with an energy crisis that has highlighted its dependency on Russian gas, and as the continent faces a leadership transition in Germany. Outgoing Chancellor Angela Merkel for years took the lead on European diplomacy toward Ukraine.

Hill, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, said Europe must “step up to meet this challenge.” Any further incursion by Russia into Ukraine, which has been established as an independent nation for 30 years, she said, poses a “massive challenge to the territorial integrity of every other European state.”

Karoun Demirjian contributed to this report.

AUKUS and Its Potential Implications for the MENA Region

AUKUS and Its Potential Implications for the MENA Region

MIDDLE EAST

BY FURKAN HALIT YOLCU

November 24, 2021

The most significant impact of AUKUS on the MENA security complex is expected to be observed in the Eastern Mediterranean.

      

(L-R) Prime Minister of Australia Scott Morrison and U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin walk past a military honor guard as they walk inside for a meeting at the Pentagon on September 22, 2021 in Arlington, Virginia. Last week, Australia, the United States and the United Kingdom announced a security pact (AUKUS) to help Australia develop and deploy nuclear-powered submarines, in addition to other military cooperation. Photo by Drew Angerer/Getty Images.

Since September 15, 2021 the global security agenda has been occupied with a security pact designed to pave the way for a technology transfer by the U.S. to Australia, replacing France as a supplier of nuclear-powered submarines. The argument goes that this strategic initiative is only the beginning of a much larger cooperation plan regarding the future of the Indo-Pacific security complex.

Global security analysts and scholars directly focused their attention on the Indo-Pacific Ocean and the South China Sea looking into possible implications. The pivotal argument is that world security is going to shift towards the East, and the U.S.-China competition will broaden itself into another dimension with this strategic step.

This claim holds certain validity as the U.S. retreat from Afghanistan and Syria should lead to the accumulation of a certain amount of tangible sources that will need another direction to flow into.

Read: Will AUKUS Be Able to Encircle China?

Thus, several scholars have been supporting the literature that hypothesizes a global U.S. channeling into the Indo-Pacific security complex. An alternative approach advocates that the U.S. is not entirely eager to interfere with China due to the potential implications of such a move, yet its partners are forcing a U.S. presence in the region.

This approach is an alternative that derives its legitimacy from the middle and great powers that cooperate with the U.S. – the superpower. This argument also has its merits as international relations are not solely the enforcement of the interests of a superpower but an interaction between the latter and its partnering countries.

The global understanding of such events represented in pacts such as the AUKUS Pact is vital. However, a regionalist approach is required to better present the impact on the regional and state-level dimensions. The French involvement in the pact is the part of AUKUS that is going to cause major implications for the MENA region.

Read: Will the United States Contain Russia or China, or Both?

The Australian government has made several procurement deals with France regarding nuclear-powered submarines which are the most up to date of their kind. The defense export and technology transfer contracts were argued to be over $60 billion – an impactful boost to the French defense industry.

However, the procurement deals did not reach their potential as the production processes succumbed to the Australian inability to adapt to such a large procurement deal. Since this deal required a production process that would take at least 8 years, it also required commitment in the political and strategic spheres from both sides.

It became evident during the COVID-19 outbreak that global security was broadening into other sectors and dimensions, which escalated the current security risks. These new risks led to higher expectations from security partners and eventually more impactful technology transfers, which will create more sustainable gains. All these parameters forced Australia’s hand to play it safe and collaborate with the superpower instead of searching for alternative and less binding sources of power.

Read: The Gang’s All Here: New Western Imperialism in the South China Sea

Partnerships like AUKUS that will direct interstate partnerships and even enforce them to align. Recent military procurement deals such as the Turkish S-400 acquisition, the Pakistani JF-17 fighter aircraft production contract with China, Saudi-UAE procurements of F-35 aircraft, and THAAD air defense systems from the U.S. are recent comparable cases.

These procurements created different levels of leverage and tensions for the buyer countries as they were forced to choose a side. Despite the balancing literature and the conceptual history of the practice, it becomes more apparent that a bipolar system is very antagonistic in its buildup process.

Partnerships like AUKUS that will direct interstate partnerships and even enforce them to align.

Remembering the two world wars that created the Cold War structure, it is plausible that the “playmaker” states force certain great and middle powers with strategic geopolitical significance to align with them. In this sense, AUKUS might have created a rift between the U.S. and France (and the EU in a larger context, considering the UK also left the organization) that will have certain implications for the MENA region.

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For the last 30 years, the U.S. was able to embark on its Middle Eastern policy vis-à-vis its European partners, but strategic gains that directly hinder EU profitability will cause certain fractions in this practice.

The most significant impact of AUKUS on the MENA security complex is expected to be observed in the Eastern Mediterranean. Since the EU has practically perceived the Turkish pivot for energy resources towards this area and North African interests in this area as threats, the U.S. has supported European interests in securing the energy routes and protecting the integrity of South European shores. However, a political dissemination process that was potentially started with AUKUS might divide this unification in foreign policy.

The Eastern Mediterranean is a quagmire of competing interests, and a transatlantic fracture will only escalate the situation.

The Eastern Mediterranean is a quagmire of competing interests, and a transatlantic fracture will only escalate the situation. This escalation might give middle powers like Turkey broader room for maneuver. If the U.S. stops supporting these interests in the region, the EU backlash and the hawkish French position will lose a certain share of their influence and capacity. A significant shift towards the Indo-Pacific Ocean might reduce the pressure on great and middle powers competing for interests.

VIDEO: AUKUS: Why Are France and China so Angry About This Pact?

An alternative power-centered approach might suggest that the void left by a U.S. strategic shift towards the East would trigger a great power to take responsibility and fill the vacuum. The current power balance propounds a Russian pivot towards the Eastern Mediterranean; however, Russia’s aircraft carriers are quite worn, and its only ship, Admiral Kuznetsov, is on the maintenance deck.

This does not mean Russia cannot control this area – it holds a submarine force of 58 known units which can only be challenged by the U.S. and maybe China in the next decade. Both scenarios imply that Turkey might have more room for maneuver with less focus and escalation from rival powers.

Meanwhile the possibility that France might become even more hawkish and hyper-emphasize its interests in the Eastern Mediterranean must not be excluded. Yet, this is less likely since if France and Germany plan to keep the union together, they have to align in foreign policy following Brexit. When push comes to shove, Germany will most likely balance the French hawkish reactionary stance towards these events and prioritize economic growth in the next decade.

Furkan Halit Yolcu

Furkan Halit Yolcu graduated from the Political Science and International Relations department at Bahcesehir University. Currently a research assistant and a PhD Candidate at the Middle East Institute/Sakarya University, Yolcu’s research interests include security studies, public management and governance in Turkey.

Frans Timmermans : "Les jeux sont faits sur le sort du charbon"

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Frans Timmermans : "Les jeux sont faits sur le sort du charbon" 

Par Méabh Mc Mahon  •  Mise à jour: 26/11/2021

Frans Timmermans   -   Tous droits réservés  euronews

Visage du Pacte vert européen, le vice-président exécutif de la Commission européenne en charge du climat Frans Timmermans salue dans une interview pour euronews, les avancées de la COP26 tout en reconnaissant les reculs opérés pour obtenir un accord final.

Méabh Mc Mahon, euronews :

"À la COP26 à Glasgow, vous avez montré la photo de votre petit-fils Kees âgé d'un an. Vous avez touché la corde sensible, semble-t-il, car votre initiative est devenue virale. Je suppose que vous essayiez de montrer que les technocrates peuvent être humains eux aussi. Lors de votre intervention à la session plénière de la COP26, vous avez indiqué : "Kees aura 31 ans en 2050. Si nous échouons aujourd'hui ou dans les deux ans qui viennent, il devra se battre avec d'autres êtres humains pour avoir de l'eau et de la nourriture. C'est la dure réalité à laquelle nous sommes confrontés." Kees sera-t-il satisfait du résultat de la COP26 selon vous ?"

Frans Timmermans, vice-président exécutif de la Commission européenne en charge du climat :

"Je ne crois pas. Nous avons encore énormément de travail qui nous attend. Mais ce que j'ai essayé de faire, c'était de montrer que c'est personnel pour chacun d'entre nous. Ce n'est pas uniquement personnel pour moi et mon petit-fils. Nous avons tous des êtres chers, des enfants ou des membres de notre famille qui subiront les conséquences de la crise climatique si nous ne la réglons pas."

"Nous avons été plus ambitieux que ce à quoi de nombreux pays s'attendaient"

Méabh Mc Mahon :

"Lors de la COP26, il n'y avait pas encore d'accord le samedi. Dites-nous ce qui se passait réellement en coulisses à ce moment-là."

Frans Timmermans :

"Je crois qu'il est toujours difficile de parvenir à un accord global lors d'une COP. Mais cette fois-ci, nous avons été plus ambitieux que ce à quoi de nombreux pays s'attendaient et il a fallu un peu de temps pour que tout le monde franchisse le pas. En particulier, les termes utilisés par la présidence britannique sur le charbon étaient un peu trop forts pour certains pays producteurs. Nous avons donc dû les reformuler en maintenant un haut niveau d'ambition, mais en utilisant des mots différents. Mais il n'en reste pas moins que les jeux sont faits sur le sort du charbon. Et c'est le plus important."

Méabh Mc Mahon :

"Nous avons vu le président de la COP26, Alok Sharma ému quand il a parlé d'une "victoire fragile"."

Frans Timmermans :

"Oui, il était ému à cause des surprises de dernière minute de la part de plusieurs pays qui tout d'un coup, ne voulaient plus approuver le résultat final. Donc très vite, nous avons dû en travaillant avec ces pays, trouver des solutions et heureusement, nous avons réussi."

"L'UE a mis davantage d'argent sur la table pour l'adaptation et les pertes et préjudices"

Méabh Mc Mahon :

"Pourquoi l'Union européenne est-elle réticente à créer un système de financement des pertes et préjudices pour les pays qui seront frappés par le changement climatique, mais ne l'ont pas causé ?"

Frans Timmermans :

"Parmi les pays développés, personne ne fait plus pour l'adaptation et les pertes et préjudices que l'Union européenne. Nous avons poussé d'autres pays développés à mettre davantage d'argent sur la table. De notre côté, nous le faisons déjà pour les pertes et préjudices et nous l'avons fait pour le fonds d'adaptation. Donc nous sommes leaders sur cette question, mais nous devons encore faire beaucoup plus car on parle de milliers de milliards nécessaires pour préparer la planète à ce qui en réalité, est déjà en cours, à savoir le changement climatique."

"Nous avons un plan pour réduire nos émissions d'au moins 55% d'ici à 2030"

Méabh Mc Mahon :

"Pendant que vous étiez dans le bâtiment de la COP26, des activistes étaient à l'extérieur pour demander à l'UE dans quel camp elle est, à savoir dans celui des énergies fossiles ou dans celui de la justice climatique. Que leur répondez-vous ?"

Frans Timmermans :

"Nous sommes dans le camp de la justice climatique, mais aussi dans celui de l'abandon progressif des énergies fossiles. L'objectif de réduction de ces énergies a été inclus dans la déclaration finale. Ce qui n'était jamais arrivé auparavant. De plus, nous avons les politiques pour aller dans ce sens. Nous sommes la seule entité au monde à avoir un plan pour réduire nos émissions d'au moins 55% d'ici à 2030. De nombreux autres pays ont à présent, déclaré qu'ils allaient atteindre la neutralité carbone en 2050, mais ils n'ont pas encore de plans concrets pour y parvenir. Nous, si."

Méabh Mc Mahon :

"Votre plan d'action est-il réellement soutenu ? Pensez vous que votre paquet législatif "Ajustement à l'objectif 55" sera adopté avant la COP27 à Charm el-Cheikh ?"

Frans Timmermans :

"Je l'espère. Nous avons encore beaucoup de travail devant nous. L'ensemble des propositions ne sera pas totalement adopté d'ici là, mais j'espère que nous aurons alors atteint le point de non-retour. Nous aurons l'adhésion du Parlement européen et du Conseil où sont présents tous les États membres au paquet dans son ensemble. Ce serait extrêmement important de parvenir à cela avant la COP 27."

"Certains pays ont besoin du gaz naturel comme source d'énergie transitoire"

Méabh Mc Mahon :

"Sur euronews, nous avons parlé de la hausse des prix de l'énergie. Or des entreprises qui produisent du gaz annoncent faire des milliards de bénéfices supplémentaires. Permettez-moi de vous demander pourquoi la Commission européenne encourage ce qu'elle appelle "de nouveaux projets gaziers d'intérêt commun". Et donnerez-vous votre accord à Nord Stream 2 ?"

Frans Timmermans :

"Ce que nous devons faire, c'est aider les pays à passer du charbon aux énergies renouvelables. Mais certains pays ne peuvent pas le faire d'un seul coup. Ils auront besoin du gaz naturel comme source d'énergie transitoire. C'est pour cela que nous soutenons certains de ces projets. Mais nous ne voulons pas que ces pays s'enferment dans le gaz naturel. Il s'agit donc d'une solution temporaire. Nous veillerons à ce que notre législation soit adaptée pour permettre cette transition du charbon via le gaz naturel vers les énergies renouvelables dans les pays qui en ont besoin."

Méabh Mc Mahon :

"Peut-on vraiment qualifié le gaz naturel d'énergie verte ?"

Frans Timmermans :

"Non, c'est une énergie fossile, mais c'est en même temps, un intermédiaire énergétique qui est nécessaire dans cette transition verte."

"Le nucléaire a l'immense avantage de ne pas générer d'émissions"

Méabh Mc Mahon :

"Qu'en est-il du nucléaire ?"

Frans Timmermans :

"Le nucléaire a l'immense avantage de ne pas générer d'émissions. C'est un immense avantage ! Mais dans le même temps, il repose sur une ressource minière et son coût est extrêmement élevé."

Méabh Mc Mahon :

"Que dirait Kees des déchets radioactifs du nucléaire ?"

Frans Timmermans :

"Effectivement. Le coût est énorme. Le coût de la construction de centrales nucléaires ne fait qu'augmenter alors que celui lié à la mise en place d'équipements d'énergies renouvelables baisse considérablement. Vous n'avez pratiquement pas besoin de fonds publics pour investir dans les énergies renouvelables alors qu'il en faut énormément pour investir dans le nucléaire."

Méabh Mc Mahon :

"L'UE devrait-elle interdire aux entreprises productrices de combustibles fossiles de parrainer des événements médiatiques, culturels et sportifs ?"

Frans Timmermans :

"Je pense que nous devrions dire clairement que nous voulons que les investissements se détournent des combustibles fossiles pour aller vers les énergies renouvelables et ce peut être les mêmes entreprises qui passent de l'un à l'autre. Pourquoi pas ? Mais aujourd'hui, le FMI a calculé que chaque minute, on investit environ 11 millions de dollars dans les combustibles fossiles. Il faut que cela change et vite !"

"Il faut informer les citoyens sur le coût de la non-transition"

Méabh Mc Mahon :

"La semaine dernière, nous avons vu des personnes descendre dans la rue en Belgique, mais aussi aux Pays-Bas et en Autriche pour dénoncer les mesures prises pour lutter contre la propagation du Covid-19. Ces rassemblements ont dégénéré. Ils ont été très violents. D'où ma question : les Européens sont-ils vraiment prêts à affronter une crise climatique ?"

Frans Timmermans :

"L'important, c'est d'informer nos citoyens non seulement sur le coût de la transition, mais surtout sur le coût de la non-transition qui sera énorme. La souffrance humaine sera incommensurable si nous ne changeons pas nos habitudes. Donc, bien sûr, cette transition sera difficile, mais nous devons nous assurer qu'elle soit juste et que nous ne laissons personne de côté. Nous devons montrer à nos citoyens que quand nous leur demandons de faire leur part, notre demande est juste et que nous veillons à ce que ceux qui peuvent contribuer davantage le fassent effectivement, mais aussi à ce que ceux qui ne peuvent pas faire plus soient protégés, par exemple, contre la précarité énergétique."

"Nous n'aurions pas eu le Pacte vert sans Greta Thunberg"

Méabh Mc Mahon :

"Avez-vous l'impression que la pandémie de Covid 19 a quelque peu saboté votre Pacte vert ?"

Frans Timmermans :

"Évidemment, la pandémie occupe aujourd'hui, une place importante dans les préoccupations des gens. Mais il est intéressant de noter que dans toutes les enquêtes, quand on demande aux Européens quelle est leur principale préoccupation, une majorité d'entre eux répond la crise climatique et non le Covid."

Méabh Mc Mahon :

"Enfin, Greta Thunberg, est-elle une héroïne ?"

Frans Timmermans :

"C'est une héroïne, absolument. Nous n'aurions pas eu de Pacte vert européen sans elle et sans le mouvement Fridays for Future."

Journaliste • Méabh Mc Mahon