April 25, 2019
Reaching a Durable Peace in
the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict
The 2018
“Velvet Revolution” in Armenia raised hopes for a long-lasting peace in the
ongoing Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, but sticking points remain.
The “Velvet Revolution” of
April–May 2018 marked the end of the approximately thirty year-long rule of the
so-called “military generation” in Armenia—those who came into power during or
as a result of participation in the bloody Nagorno-Karabakh conflict of
1991–1994 in the South Caucasus.
That the revolution radically
changed Armenia's power structure and the whole of the ruling elite provoked
multilayer expectations and hopes among those who had considered further
compromise on the status quo of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict to be impossible.
It was clear at that time that
the leader of the “Velvet Revolution,” Nikol Pashinyan (who was later elected
as the prime minister of Armenia), had enough authority and legitimacy to bring
some progress in resolving the conflict.
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Some believed that the new national
leader who was supported by the vast majority of Armenia's population could use
this support to provide concessions to Azerbaijan instead of some economic
advantages as a result of a Nagorno-Karabakh peace settlement.
Others thought that Pashinyan, who
claimed to provide for an “economic revolution” after the political one, will
continue supporting the status quo until the Armenian economy has been
transformed, thus increasing the country's political and military strength, and
leading to a better negotiating position in the international arena.
However, Pashinyan’s rhetoric
made it clear that Armenia as the guarantor of the Artsakh’s (the Armenian name
for Nagorno-Karabakh Republic) security considers it not only impossible make
some territorial concessions, but he also claimed the necessity to return
Artsakh to the negotiations table and suggested that the Azeri government in
Baku directly talk to Stepanakert (the capital of Artsakh).
Pashinyan’s rhetoric allowed many
inside and outside of Armenia to conclude that Yerevan would be tightening its position
on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
The
Internationalization of Ethno-Political Conflicts like Nagorno-Karabakh
Any textbook on international
relations and security studies clearly puts that the globalization of
international relations led to the internationalization of the local and
regional conflicts.
As a result, after the “Velvet
Revolution,” the international community’s reaction of the to those involved in
the resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was not long in coming.
On October 25, 2018, President
Donald Trump's national security adviser, John Bolton, visited Yerevan as part
of a regional tour and said the
following:
It is a fact that
if the predictions come true he (Pashinyan) will have a very strong mandate,
and that is the most opportune moment to take strong action in a number of
different respects. And if, as I appreciated what I learned in the meetings
here today… the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh is the primary issue on the
Armenian political agenda, there is no better time to try and take decisive
action than right after that election.
A week later, the Organization
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Secretary General Thomas
Greminger declared that
all the sides should work constructively to avoid boosting rhetoric and
reducing tensions on the line of contact. Moreover, according to Greminger, the
sides should establish an atmosphere for constructive talks, making it possible
to achieve difficult compromises for long-lasting and comprehensive peace.
At the same time as the OSCE
Ministerial Council Meeting in Milan, the Heads of Delegation of the OSCE Minsk
Group Co-Chair Countries, Armenia and Azerbaijan, published a joint statement,
which particularly stated:
“The Co-Chair countries expressed
hope that an intensive results-oriented high-level dialogue between the leaders
of Azerbaijan and Armenia to promote a just and lasting settlement of the
conflict can resume in the near future.”
Less than a week after the snap
parliamentary elections in Armenia, which finalized the country’s power
transition after the “Velvet Revolution” on December 14, 2018, Russian foreign
minister Sergey Lavrov declared that
Russia expects both Azerbaijan and Armenia to resume talks on the resolution of
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, as soon as Armenia forms a government based on the
results of its recent elections.
Furthermore, in a congratulatory
message to Pashinyan on his appointment as prime minister of Armenia, Trump stated that
The United States
supports a prosperous, democratic Armenia at peace with its neighbors.
Together, we can make progress on deepening trade between our countries,
strengthening global security, and combating corruption. A peaceful solution to
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict will help these efforts.
A month later, Lavrov emphasized that
“the declarations about readiness to search for resolutions, which are coming
from Baku, should be fully supported.” Furthermore, he expressed a hope to see
reciprocity from the Armenian side.
Statements like the above could
be continued, but they show that the international community is looking forward
to decisive action to provide resolution and long-lasting peace in
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Moreover, the impression is that all the “eyes” are
turned towards Armenia.
This is puzzling as Armenia has
declared its commitment towards compromise since early 2000s. Particularly,
during the Paris round of negotiations, the Key West meeting, the Madrid
process, and Russia`s Kazan meeting it was the Azerbaijani authorities who
refused to proceed with the agreed results of negotiations and sign a
“breakthrough” agreement on resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
New Reality, New
Tactics, But Old Strategy
In June 2018 I met an Austrian
professor who was visiting the South Caucasus to develop academic cooperation.
While walking down across one of the central streets in Yerevan, we started
talking about the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (he was in Baku before arriving to
Armenia) and the professor asked me a simple, but strange question: “Why is
Armenia not willing to go to compromise with Azerbaijan,” meaning territorial
secessions from Artsakh Republic as a compromise.
I discussed some reasons to
explain the position of the Armenian side, but further reflection on the
question has raised additional insight. For at least the last twenty years, the
international community was pretty convinced that it was Azerbaijan, and not
Armenia, that is against compromise.
The specialists in the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict still remember how close Robert Kocharyan, the second
president of Armenia, and Heydar Aliyev, the father of the current Azerbaijani
president, were to a breakthrough deal back in Key West in 2001. However, very
soon after the Key West talks, Baku refused to continue the process.
The same happened in Russia`s Kazan
city in 2011, where the Azerbaijani delegation arrived with some new amendments
to an agreement that the two sides had agreed to sign during that meeting.
This confidence was rolling up
with the launch of the so called “April war,” which became the “hottest point”
since the 1994 ceasefire agreement between Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh, and
Armenia.
The examples of the Austrian
professor, as well as Lavrov`s statement of January 16, 2019, clearly
demonstrate that the international community started trusting the Azerbaijani
government’s new peaceful approach.
Another reason to believe
Azerbaijan’s intentions could be Aliyev’s maneuvering between Russia and the West,
promising all the sides what they want to hear.
This could be a potential
membership in the Eurasian Economic Union and Collective Security Treaty
Organization in the case of Russia. When it comes to the European Union and
United States, a wide range of mutual interests can be pursued, including on
energy security, Iran, and Afghanistan.
Interestingly enough, Aliyev
recently even stopped claiming that it was necessary to provide a mandate for
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict to the United Nations as he used to (according to
the Azerbaijani position, the OSCE Minsk Group could not find a solution).
However, the problem is the
complete lack of trust among the sides. As a result, the sides can not rely on
each other’s sincerity, especially given that any concessions could weaken the
negotiating—or even military positions—of either side. Moreover, neither Russia
nor the West wants to lose Armenia.
What of Legitimacy?
Pashinyan came to power in
Armenia with massive public support, which allowed him to overthrow his
predecessor Serzh Sargsyan in April–May 2018. Moreover, Pashinyan’s alliance
won the snap parliamentary elections and received 70.4
percent of the votes. This high degree of legitimacy lent credibility to the
international community’s expectations decisive actions” on Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict resolution.
However, as one insightful
Armenian wrote on Facebook, “nothing is forever, including the legitimacy.
Moreover the land concessor will be conceded to the land.” That means if
Pashinyan agrees to any territorial concessions, then he will witness the end
of his political career, to say the least.
The issue is that starting at
least from early 2010 Azerbaijan was increasing military pressure on Artsakh
and Armenia, which was resulting in multiple casualties on both sides.
Moreover, during the “April war,” the Armenian sides lost more than a hundred
young soldiers and officers, which mostly were under thirty years old.
All these developments led to the rapid radicalization Armenians living in both republics. Any territorial concession will thus be regarded as treason towards those who lost their lives defending Artsakh and human lives in this unrecognized state.
The Strategic
Environment in the South Caucasus
Though all the involved players
are seeking a long-lasting peace and prosperity in the South Caucasus, each has
its own vision of how to provide the new security architecture.
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However, the journey to a
solution could be mutual win for all the sides if the starting point is based
on the recognition that a long-lasting and durable peace is necessary for the
broader region.
For instance, the recent active
meetings between Armenian and Azerbaijani authorities are very welcomed as only
dialogue can develop an atmosphere of trust that can transform into cooperation.
On the other hand, it allows understanding both sides’ positions and red lines,
which must be clarified.
However, only the presence of
officials from Stepanakert at the peace talks can make the negotiations
legitimate and allow for a drafting of a final framework for the peace
settlement. Without the voice of the people of Artsakh, any agreement between
Azerbaijan and Armenia can fail when it comes to the implementation on the
ground.
At the same time, it is worth
mentioning that compromise of some territories from Artsakh (as a concession
for peace to Azerbaijan) will not improve but worsen the security architecture
in the region by simply establishing a new status quo and creating new
temptations for military activities. This would be reasoned by the violation of
the current geostrategic parity and balance of powers on the ground.
The necessity of a long-lasting
peace and durable security architecture should not be sacrificed to a
short-term advantage, as it could prove much more serious security breaches in
the future.
From this point of view, issues
related to the status and recognition of independence of Artsakh is a
cornerstone, as nothing interim, including the issue of the status, would be
durable and long-lasting. As we saw in the past, it could provide a temptation
and window for further manipulations, speculations, and escalations, even if
international peacekeepers are sent in to the conflict zone.
The Armenian sides should make
their objectives and red lines clear to both Azerbaijan and international
community in the peace talks, including the inviolability of the fact that the
people of Artsakh have a right to self-determination after the disintegration
of the Soviet Union.
Still, what remains most puzzling
is how the United States, Russia, and the European Union share the same
approach towards this strategic and controversial region. However, what is more
important is if they envision a collaborative regional security architecture
being created with the participation of all sides, or another era of divisional
geopolitics after “long-lasting” peace is achieved.
Provided the region’s importance
for global stakeholders seeking power-projection capabilities, regional states
should have the decisive word in the final peace configuration. Moreover, the
level of collaboration and strategic thinking between those states will
determine whether their final approach will create a long-term and durable
peace in the South Caucasus, rather than a new status quo.
Ruben
Elamiryan is a Visiting Fulbright Scholar at the Department of Near Eastern
Studies at Princeton University. He is a lecturer at Russian-Armenian
University and Public Administration Academy of Armenia. He holds a Ph.D. in
Political Science
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