China's Belt and Road Initiative

Three ways of looking at the Belt and Road Initiative

My take on an initiative that causes some overreactions.

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese Premier Xi Jinping arrive for the welcome banquet at the Belt and Road Forum at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on Friday. (Nicolas Asfouri/AP)

By Daniel W. Drezner

Daniel W. Drezner is a professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and a regular contributor to PostEverything.

April 30 at 7:00 AM

For reasons having to do with the day job, the hard-working staff here at Spoiler Alerts has been reading up on geoeconomics in general and China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in particular. Belt and Road just started its sixth year with a big honking conference of participants.

BRI has inspired a lot of takes in the foreign policy community about What It All Means. As a public service, I thought it would be a good idea to categorize them. BRI takes can be divided into three camps:

CAMP 1: #OMGChina! The members of this camp believe that China can do no wrong. They therefore look at Belt and Road and see it as a brilliant coherent plan of quasi-coercive economic statecraft that ensnares all its participants into a Chinese web of influence.

As it turns out, an awful lot of official U.S. actors fall into this camp. Both the 2017 National Security Strategy and 2018 National Defense Strategyreference China’s economic statecraft. The Defense Department’s 2018 report on China’s military power warns that the BRI “is intended to develop strong economic ties with other countries, shape their interests to align with China’s, and deter confrontation or criticism of China’s approach to sensitive issues.”

It’s not just official actors. The Council on Foreign Relations describes BRI as “the most ambitious infrastructure investment effort in history” and “an unsettling extension of China’s rising power.” Most of the writers in this camp uses phrases like “debt trap diplomacy” and point to China’s newfound control over Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka as a result of that country’s failure to pay as the paradigmatic example.

CAMP 2: BRI blowback. This camp, which consists of an awful lot of China watchers, points out the myriad ways in which China’s aggressive promotion of BRI has had negative feedback effects. They point to the way that China’s entry into South Asia triggered pushback from India. They highlight the fact that even countries dependent on Chinese foreign direct investment, such as Pakistan or Malaysia, have objected to BRI terms they found rather onerous. Other observers note that BRI investments also have triggered a spike in local protests against China. Still others note that the headline figures announced as BRI investments turn out to not mean much in the actual reality.

This camp also does not think that BRI is the development of some radical alternative order. For them, the top-line figures of BRI funding are mostly a mirage. The branding of BRI has been too haphazard. The funding priorities have been at the mercy of Chinese domestic politics. This is not a recipe for creating alluring investments.

CAMP 3: BRI as a learning curve. And now we arrive at the interesting possibility. This camp thinks of BRI the same way that Americans should think about all of China’s economic statecraft: Beijing is experimenting with how to convert its resources into influence. BRI is one of those experiments. With each failed experiment Beijing learns how to do economic statecraft better.

Camp 2 is correct to point out all of the BRI screw-ups. What is interesting, however, is that Xi Jinping, the leader who coined BRI, is admitting this. According to the New York Times’s Jane Perlez, even Xi is willing to admit error: "[Xi] stressed the importance of ‘high quality’ and ‘reasonably priced’ infrastructure as the way to help developing countries and said China would follow international rules on bidding and procurement for projects. In an apparent nod to past mistakes, Mr. Xi said: ‘Everything should be done in a transparent way, and we should have zero tolerance for corruption.’ ”

Unsurprisingly, BRI is getting a new look on its sixth birthday, with the central government looking to control the brand better. If China is successful in its efforts, then Camp 3 will collapse into Camp 1. If not, Camp 2.

The question about whether China will learn from its mistakes is the known unknown about Belt and Road.

World military spending

World military spending grows to $1.8 trillion, new SIPRI data (Stockholm, 29 April 2019) Total world military expenditure rose to $1822 billion in 2018, representing an increase of 2.6 per cent from 2017, according to new data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). The five biggest spenders in 2018 were the United States, China, Saudi Arabia, India and France, which together accounted for 60 per cent of global military spending. Military spending by the USA increased for the first time since 2010, while spending by China grew for the 24th consecutive year. The comprehensive annual update of the SIPRI Military Expenditure Database is accessible from today at www.sipri.org. Read this press release in Catalan (pdf), Español (pdf), Français (pdf), Russian (pdf) or svenska (pdf). Download the Fact Sheet (pdf).

Total global military spending rose for the second consecutive year in 2018, to the highest level since 1988—the first year for which consistent global data is available. World spending is now 76 per cent higher than the post-cold war low in 1998.* World military spending in 2018 represented 2.1 per cent of global gross domestic product (GDP) or $239 per person. ‘In 2018 the USA and China accounted for half of the world’s military spending,’ says Dr Nan Tian, a researcher with the SIPRI Arms and Military Expenditure (AMEX) programme. ‘The higher level of world military expenditure in 2018 is mainly the result of significant increases in spending by these two countries.’  The USA and China lead increase in world military expenditure US military spending grew—for the first time since 2010—by 4.6 per cent, to reach $649 billion in 2018. The USA remained by far the largest spender in the world, and spent almost as much on its military in 2018 as the next eight largest-spending countries combined. ‘The increase in US spending was driven by the implementation from 2017 of new arms procurement programmes under the Trump administration,’ says Dr Aude Fleurant, the director of the SIPRI AMEX programme. China, the second-largest spender in the world, increased its military expenditure by 5.0 per cent to $250 billion in 2018. This was the 24th consecutive year of increase in Chinese military expenditure. Its spending in 2018 was almost 10 times higher than in 1994, and accounted for 14 per cent of world military spending. ‘Growth in Chinese military spending tracks the country’s overall economic growth,’ says Tian. ‘China has allocated 1.9 per cent of its GDP to the military every year since 2013.’ Three decades of growth in military spending in Asia and Oceania Military expenditure in Asia and Oceania has risen every year since 1988. At $507 billion, military spending in the region accounted for 28 per cent of the global total in 2018, compared with just 9.0 per cent in 1988. In 2018 India increased its military spending by 3.1 per cent to $66.5 billion. Military expenditure by Pakistan grew by 11 per cent (the same level of growth as in 2017), to reach $11.4 billion in 2018. South Korean military expenditure was $43.1 billion in 2018—an increase of 5.1 per cent compared with 2017 and the highest annual increase since 2005. ‘The tensions between countries in Asia as well as between China and the USA are major drivers for the continuing growth of military spending in the region,’ says Siemon Wezeman, a senior researcher with the SIPRI AMEX programme. Increases in Central and East European countries Several countries in Central and Eastern Europe made large increases in their military expenditure in 2018. Spending by Poland rose by 8.9 per cent in 2018 to $11.6 billion, while Ukraine’s spending was up by 21 per cent to $4.8 billion. Spending by Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania also grew (ranging from 18 per cent to 24 per cent) in 2018. ‘The increases in Central and Eastern Europe are largely due to growing perceptions of a threat from Russia,’ said Pieter Wezeman, a senior researcher with the SIPRI AMEX programme. ‘This is despite the fact that Russian military spending has fallen for the past two years.’ At $61.4 billion, Russian military spending was the sixth highest in the world in 2018. Its spending decreased by 3.5 per cent compared with 2017. Other notable developments §  Military spending in South America rose by 3.1 per cent in 2018. This was mainly due to the increase in Brazilianspending (by 5.1 per cent), the second increase in as many years. §  Military expenditure in Africa fell by 8.4 per cent in 2018, the fourth consecutive annual decrease since the peak in spending in 2014. There were major decreases in spending by Algeria (–6.1 per cent), Angola (–18 per cent) andSudan (–49 per cent). §  Military spending by states in the Middle East for which data is available fell by 1.9 per cent in 2018. §  Total military expenditure by all 29 North Atlantic Treaty Organization members was $963 billion in 2018, which accounted for 53 per cent of world spending. §  The largest absolute increase in spending in 2018 was by the USA ($27.8 billion), while the biggest decrease was bySaudi Arabia (–$4.6 billion). §  Military spending in Turkey increased by 24 per cent in 2018 to $19.0 billion, the highest annual percentage increase among the world’s top 15 military spenders. §  Six of the 10 countries with the highest military burden (military spending as a proportion of GDP) in the world in 2018 are in the Middle East: Saudi Arabia (8.8 per cent of GDP), Oman (8.2 per cent), Kuwait (5.1 per cent), Lebanon(5.0 per cent), Jordan (4.7 per cent) and Israel (4.3 per cent). * All percentage changes are expressed in real terms (constant 2017 prices). For editors SIPRI monitors developments in military expenditure worldwide and maintains the most comprehensive, consistent and extensive data source available on military expenditure. Military expenditure refers to all government spending on current military forces and activities, including salaries and benefits, operational expenses, arms and equipment purchases, military construction, research and development, and central administration, command and support. SIPRI therefore discourages the use of terms such as ‘arms spending’ when referring to military expenditure, as spending on armaments is usually only a minority of the total.

Russia and NATO: A dialogue of differences

Russia and NATO: A Dialogue of Differences

25 April 2019

NATO faces a Russia challenge, but lacks unity over its response. A targeted ‘dialogue of differences’ with Moscow and between NATO members themselves could be the way forward to ending the communication failures, which increase the risk of miscalculation and policy errors.

On 14 April, General Curtis Scaparrotti, the outgoing Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) of NATO Allied Command Operations General, deplored the broken communication process with Russia and a lack of understanding of “each other’s signals”. Immediately afterwards, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko denounced the current deadlock with NATO, claiming cooperation had been discontinued and disagreements with the Atlantic Alliance were now “even deeper than before”.

Relations between NATO and the Kremlin have reached a dangerously abrasive stage, as the existing threat-reduction arrangements and confidence-building mechanisms with Russia are not working. Russia and NATO are talking past each other and substantive dialogue is not possible under current conditions.

This relationship breakdown, however, is not due to a collapse of dialogue with Moscow - and a greater volume of dialogue will not improve relations. Instead there has long been a problem with the dialogue itself: a change in its substance is necessary.

Russia claims that NATO is conducting a strategy of encirclement and interprets this as a fundamental threat to its own interests - broadly based on preserving a ‘sphere of influence’ against the expansion of NATO capabilities in the European shared neighbourhood, and to preserve a reported ‘right of ownership’ over Russia’s periphery.

Its agenda is to damage the post-Cold War security architecture in order to achieve its own security and foreign policy objectives in Europe and beyond. Moscow has an incentive to continue its path of sabre-rattling and to test the western pain threshold through both conventional and non-conventional provocation.

NATO disunity over the Russia challenge

This situation only serves to increase the risk of military and political miscalculation. Heightened tension is now the new normal in the relationship between Russia and NATO. As the distinction between peacetime and wartime activity is blurring, a failure to understand each other’s red lines could risk miscommunicating the other’s intentions, and the potential for tactical errors could lead to unintentional provocation and military escalation.

This is more dangerous with the breakdown of Cold War arms control agreements such as the INF treaty, but both sides at least agree that the risk of miscalculation is high and should be eased.

It is wrong, however, to assume dialogue alone and confidence-building measures with Russia will achieve anything concrete. NATO should abandon the assumption that the Kremlin wants to cooperate on reducing tension. Russia does not want war but can deal with tension, whereas NATO wants neither.

However, the lack of unity over the nature of the Russia challenge and what should constitute a common response means NATO members diverge when it comes to the place of Russia in the European security architecture, and how to best engage the Kremlin. As NATO’s internal unity also cannot be taken for granted anymore, this creates incoherence which can strengthen Russia’s willingness to test resolve.

Towards a ‘dialogue of differences’

A ‘dialogue of differences’ could break this impasse by examining new forms of engagement to establish where both sides differ as the basis for a less conflict-prone relationship, rather than seeking dialogue solely for the sake of it, or searching for where the two sides can agree. Two parallel tracks would be required – one with Russia, one without.

The dialogue with Russia should start by exploring the sources of antagonism as a premise to improving relations. This can remove the tendency of either side to be surprised when they encounter the other's red lines or face irreconcilable foreign policy perceptions. It will not solve the differences themselves, but it will help see things more clearly.

The dialogue without Russia means NATO settling its internal differences on what it expects from relations with Moscow. The objective would be to reduce Russian opportunities to harm NATO’s interests and hopefully force the Kremlin to revise its cost-benefit analysis of carrying out hostile action. Simply determining the rules of the game – namely what is (un)acceptable Russian activity – would be a good place to start.

Whatever course of action NATO decides, the Russian leadership is likely to consider it a potential threat to its own national interests. But this should not lead to self-deterrence: when necessary, bolder action against Russia does not automatically mean escalation.

The risk of sleepwalking into a conflict with Russia is real. General Scapparotti is right when he points out communication with Russia has fallen beneath Cold War levels, a time when a failure to communicate was simply not allowed.

Targeted engagement over established red lines is needed to lay the ground on which future dialogue can take place on a sounder basis – ready for a time when Russia finally wants a better relationship with NATO.

Russia - North Korea Summit İ Five Key Questions Answered

Russia-North Korea Summit: Five Key Questions Answered

Chatham House experts analyse the summit meeting between President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, and examine wider contexts for international security.

April 26, 2019

1) Why does Russia want this summit?

James Nixey, Head of Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham House

The opportunity to upstage the US — even its most Russia-friendly president in living memory — is too delicious for the Kremlin to pass up. And while Donald Trump may have wanted to do a deal with Kim Jong-un, the constraints the American president is placed under have dashed his chances.

Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, has far greater freedom of manoeuvre and has eased himself into a win-win situation. Either he will extract a genuine concession from the North Korean leader and achieve rare (and deserved) ‘world statesman points’; or — far more likely — he will achieve little, if anything, of substance but declare a ‘peoples’ friendship’, ‘strategic partnership’ or some similar empty commendation.

Putin has an outstanding record with fellow hard-liners — particularly those in conflict with the US — Maduro, Erdogan, Assad etc. His skill in dealing with them all is aided enormously by the asymmetry of the relationships. Russia is dominant.

But he has also won real admiration from these ‘besieged’ countries’ presidents for what he has achieved (Russia’s ‘resurgence’, ‘indispensable’ Russia…), for standing up to the US, and for his length of stay in power. Kim Jong-un’s fawning praise of Putin in the run-up to the summit, suggests North Korea is no different — another notch in the Russian president’s bedpost.

2) What do the two countries have in common?

James Nixey, Head of Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham House

Lest cynicism rule, it is fair to point out the two countries have genuine issues to discuss. North Korea needs remittance income and direct food aid from Russia. There are approximately 10,000 North Korean labourers working in eastern Russia — what is to be their fate now they are mandated to leave by the end of the year?

Both countries wilt under and bristle up against sanctions imposed mostly by the West (although Russia has gone along with the UN’s toward North Korea and it will be interesting to see if it is willing to undermine the Security Council’s decision. Probably not).

Meanwhile, both countries are mobilized nuclear powers with designs on neighbours to the south (Moscow toward Kyiv primarily, and Pyongyang toward Seoul); Both have lingering concerns over China’s true intentions and will be watching to see how China handles great power politics in the region, even though Russia generally follows China’s lead in the area and Putin is likely to brief Chinese Premier Xi soon afterwards at the Belt and Road Forum. Indeed, it is doubtful how much Russia can achieve over North Korea, without China. Least of all — in terms of priority issues to discuss — Russia and North Korea share an 11-mile land border.

Bet on cynicism though. True love is hard between authoritarian regimes. Putin has no shame in cosying up to dictators, but that doesn’t mean he wants to be seen glued to a failed state like North Korea. A brief fling to humiliate his preferred world stage interlocutor (the US) and to re-establish Russia’s place at the Six Party Talks table, will do nicely.

3) What is North Korea’s strategy for this summit?

Dr. John Nilsson-Wright, Senior Fellow for Northeast Asia, Asia-PacificProgramme, Chatham House

After the failure of the Trump-Kim Hanoi summit at the end of February, Kim Jong-un has been looking for a clear diplomatic win to erase any impression he might have lost out in his earlier talks with Donald Trump.

Simply by showing up and by being seen to engage as an equal in “a very meaningful dialogue” (Kim’s own words) with a fellow international leader, Kim demonstrates his status, agency and independence.

This helps bolster his legitimacy with his public at home while signaling to the international community — and most importantly the US — that the North will not simply wait passively for the US to return to bilateral talks and offer it the relaxation of sanctions and political and security reassurances it was hoping to secure at Hanoi.

In pursuing the “art of the deal”, Kim once again has shown himself, with a little help from his new Russian friend, to be a remarkably agile and astute strategist.

4) Why is Russia important to North Korea?

Dr. John Nilsson-Wright, Senior Fellow for Northeast Asia, Asia-PacificProgramme, Chatham House

In effect, Putin has reiterated and amplified the North’s negotiating position in Hanoi and by extension put pressure on the US to return to talks. Kim’s characterization of the Vladivostok summit as developing “relations (with Russia) in a sound and solid way” underlines the convergence of interests between Pyongyang and Moscow.

Washington will doubtless baulk at the dilution of its control over talks with the North and the potential weakening of international sanctions (a concern that probably explains the decision to send Stephen Biegun, the US special representative to North Korea, to Moscow in advance of the summit).

Putin can present himself as a constructive mediator but in reality he acts more as an irritant and a potential spoiler by complicating already sensitive relations between the US and its allies (most notably South Korea and Japan) in maintaining a unified approach when dealing with the North.

5) Has anything concrete come out of the summit?

Dr. John Nilsson-Wright, Senior Fellow for Northeast Asia, Asia-PacificProgramme, Chatham House

Kim will have been delighted by Putin’s public commitment to “…work…to develop bilateral relations in trade and exchanges of human resources”. Now that he has secured a credible nuclear deterrent and security guarantee, the North Korea’s leader primary goal is economic growth.

The summit discussions regarding a possible trans-Siberian railway connection and future gas pipeline construction are a powerful (for now merely potential) reminder of what Kim is determined to secure and what sympathetic partners in the region such as Russia may be willing to provide, even it risks (or perhaps, mischievously, precisely because) it undermines Trump’s negotiating tactics of pressure and brinkmanship.

While the Vladivostok talks were undersold in advance (perhaps intentionally) with no formal agenda and no anticipated joint statement, the public comments from both leaders reveal the eagerness of both North Korea and Russia to fill the diplomatic vacuum created by Trump’s decision to walk away from the Hanoi talks.

Putin’s post-summit press conference remarks, most notably his stress on providing the North with a security guarantee and the need to restart the Six Party Talks (last convened in 2008) as a means of establishing a multilateral security regime in the region, will have been music to the ears of Kim.

Reaching a durable peace in the Nagorno - Karabakh Conflict

April 25, 2019  

Reaching a Durable Peace in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict

The 2018 “Velvet Revolution” in Armenia raised hopes for a long-lasting peace in the ongoing Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, but sticking points remain.

by Ruben Elamiryan

The “Velvet Revolution” of April–May 2018 marked the end of the approximately thirty year-long rule of the so-called “military generation” in Armenia—those who came into power during or as a result of participation in the bloody Nagorno-Karabakh conflict of 1991–1994 in the South Caucasus.

That the revolution radically changed Armenia's power structure and the whole of the ruling elite  provoked multilayer expectations and hopes among those who had considered further compromise on the status quo of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict to be impossible.

It was clear at that time that the leader of the “Velvet Revolution,” Nikol Pashinyan (who was later elected as the prime minister of Armenia), had enough authority and legitimacy to bring some progress in resolving the conflict.

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Some believed that the new national leader who was supported by the vast majority of Armenia's population could use this support to provide concessions to Azerbaijan instead of some economic advantages as a result of a Nagorno-Karabakh peace settlement.

Others thought that Pashinyan, who claimed to provide for an “economic revolution” after the political one, will continue supporting the status quo until the Armenian economy has been transformed, thus increasing the country's political and military strength, and leading to a better negotiating position in the international arena.

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However, Pashinyan’s rhetoric made it clear that Armenia as the guarantor of the Artsakh’s (the Armenian name for Nagorno-Karabakh Republic) security considers it not only impossible make some territorial concessions, but he also claimed the necessity to return Artsakh to the negotiations table and suggested that the Azeri government in Baku directly talk to Stepanakert (the capital of Artsakh).

Pashinyan’s rhetoric allowed many inside and outside of Armenia to conclude that Yerevan would be tightening its position on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

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The Internationalization of Ethno-Political Conflicts like Nagorno-Karabakh

Any textbook on international relations and security studies clearly puts that the globalization of international relations led to the internationalization of the local and regional conflicts.

As a result, after the “Velvet Revolution,” the international community’s reaction of the to those involved in the resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was not long in coming.

On October 25, 2018, President Donald Trump's national security adviser, John Bolton, visited Yerevan as part of a regional tour and said the following:

It is a fact that if the predictions come true he (Pashinyan) will have a very strong mandate, and that is the most opportune moment to take strong action in a number of different respects. And if, as I appreciated what I learned in the meetings here today… the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh is the primary issue on the Armenian political agenda, there is no better time to try and take decisive action than right after that election.

A week later, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Secretary General Thomas Greminger declared that all the sides should work constructively to avoid boosting rhetoric and reducing tensions on the line of contact. Moreover, according to Greminger, the sides should establish an atmosphere for constructive talks, making it possible to achieve difficult compromises for long-lasting and comprehensive peace.

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At the same time as the OSCE Ministerial Council Meeting in Milan, the Heads of Delegation of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair Countries, Armenia and Azerbaijan, published a joint statement, which particularly stated:

“The Co-Chair countries expressed hope that an intensive results-oriented high-level dialogue between the leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia to promote a just and lasting settlement of the conflict can resume in the near future.”

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Less than a week after the snap parliamentary elections in Armenia, which finalized the country’s power transition after the “Velvet Revolution” on December 14, 2018, Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov declared that Russia expects both Azerbaijan and Armenia to resume talks on the resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, as soon as Armenia forms a government based on the results of its recent elections.

Furthermore, in a congratulatory message to Pashinyan on his appointment as prime minister of Armenia, Trump stated that

The United States supports a prosperous, democratic Armenia at peace with its neighbors. Together, we can make progress on deepening trade between our countries, strengthening global security, and combating corruption. A peaceful solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict will help these efforts.

A month later, Lavrov emphasized that “the declarations about readiness to search for resolutions, which are coming from Baku, should be fully supported.” Furthermore, he expressed a hope to see reciprocity from the Armenian side.

Statements like the above could be continued, but they show that the international community is looking forward to decisive action to provide resolution and long-lasting peace in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Moreover, the impression is that all the “eyes” are turned towards Armenia.

This is puzzling as Armenia has declared its commitment towards compromise since early 2000s. Particularly, during the Paris round of negotiations, the Key West meeting, the Madrid process, and Russia`s Kazan meeting it was the Azerbaijani authorities who refused to proceed with the agreed results of negotiations and sign a “breakthrough” agreement on resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

New Reality, New Tactics, But Old Strategy

In June 2018 I met an Austrian professor who was visiting the South Caucasus to develop academic cooperation. While walking down across one of the central streets in Yerevan, we started talking about the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (he was in Baku before arriving to Armenia) and the professor asked me a simple, but strange question: “Why is Armenia not willing to go to compromise with Azerbaijan,” meaning territorial secessions from Artsakh Republic as a compromise.

I discussed some reasons to explain the position of the Armenian side, but further reflection on the question has raised additional insight. For at least the last twenty years, the international community was pretty convinced that it was Azerbaijan, and not Armenia, that is against compromise.

The specialists in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict still remember how close Robert Kocharyan, the second president of Armenia, and Heydar Aliyev, the father of the current Azerbaijani president, were to a breakthrough deal back in Key West in 2001. However, very soon after the Key West talks, Baku refused to continue the process.

The same happened in Russia`s Kazan city in 2011, where the Azerbaijani delegation arrived with some new amendments to an agreement that the two sides had agreed to sign during that meeting.

This confidence was rolling up with the launch of the so called “April war,” which became the “hottest point” since the 1994 ceasefire agreement between Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Armenia.

The examples of the Austrian professor, as well as Lavrov`s statement of January 16, 2019, clearly demonstrate that the international community started trusting the Azerbaijani government’s new peaceful approach.

Another reason to believe Azerbaijan’s intentions could be Aliyev’s maneuvering between Russia and the West, promising all the sides what they want to hear.

This could be a potential membership in the Eurasian Economic Union and Collective Security Treaty Organization in the case of Russia. When it comes to the European Union and United States, a wide range of mutual interests can be pursued, including on energy security, Iran, and Afghanistan.

Interestingly enough, Aliyev recently even stopped claiming that it was necessary to provide a mandate for the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict to the United Nations as he used to (according to the Azerbaijani position, the OSCE Minsk Group could not find a solution).

However, the problem is the complete lack of trust among the sides. As a result, the sides can not rely on each other’s sincerity, especially given that any concessions could weaken the negotiating—or even military positions—of either side. Moreover, neither Russia nor the West wants to lose Armenia.

What of Legitimacy?

Pashinyan came to power in Armenia with massive public support, which allowed him to overthrow his predecessor Serzh Sargsyan in April–May 2018. Moreover, Pashinyan’s alliance won the snap parliamentary elections and received 70.4 percent of the votes. This high degree of legitimacy lent credibility to the international community’s expectations decisive actions” on Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution.

However, as one insightful Armenian wrote on Facebook, “nothing is forever, including the legitimacy. Moreover the land concessor will be conceded to the land.” That means if Pashinyan agrees to any territorial concessions, then he will witness the end of his political career, to say the least.

The issue is that starting at least from early 2010 Azerbaijan was increasing military pressure on Artsakh and Armenia, which was resulting in multiple casualties on both sides. Moreover, during the “April war,” the Armenian sides lost more than a hundred young soldiers and officers, which mostly were under thirty years old.

All these developments led to the rapid radicalization Armenians living in both republics. Any territorial concession will thus be regarded as treason towards those who lost their lives defending Artsakh and human lives in this unrecognized state.

The Strategic Environment in the South Caucasus

Though all the involved players are seeking a long-lasting peace and prosperity in the South Caucasus, each has its own vision of how to provide the new security architecture.

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However, the journey to a solution could be mutual win for all the sides if the starting point is based on the recognition that a long-lasting and durable peace is necessary for the broader region.

For instance, the recent active meetings between Armenian and Azerbaijani authorities are very welcomed as only dialogue can develop an atmosphere of trust that can transform into cooperation. On the other hand, it allows understanding both sides’ positions and red lines, which must be clarified.

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However, only the presence of officials from Stepanakert at the peace talks can make the negotiations legitimate and allow for a drafting of a final framework for the peace settlement. Without the voice of the people of Artsakh, any agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia can fail when it comes to the implementation on the ground.

At the same time, it is worth mentioning that compromise of some territories from Artsakh (as a concession for peace to Azerbaijan) will not improve but worsen the security architecture in the region by simply establishing a new status quo and creating new temptations for military activities. This would be reasoned by the violation of the current geostrategic parity and balance of powers on the ground.

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The necessity of a long-lasting peace and durable security architecture should not be sacrificed to a short-term advantage, as it could prove much more serious security breaches in the future.

From this point of view, issues related to the status and recognition of independence of Artsakh is a cornerstone, as nothing interim, including the issue of the status, would be durable and long-lasting. As we saw in the past, it could provide a temptation and window for further manipulations, speculations, and escalations, even if international peacekeepers are sent in to the conflict zone.

The Armenian sides should make their objectives and red lines clear to both Azerbaijan and international community in the peace talks, including the inviolability of the fact that the people of Artsakh have a right to self-determination after the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

Still, what remains most puzzling is how the United States, Russia, and the European Union share the same approach towards this strategic and controversial region. However, what is more important is if they envision a collaborative regional security architecture being created with the participation of all sides, or another era of divisional geopolitics after “long-lasting” peace is achieved.

Provided the region’s importance for global stakeholders seeking power-projection capabilities, regional states should have the decisive word in the final peace configuration. Moreover, the level of collaboration and strategic thinking between those states will determine whether their final approach will create a long-term and durable peace in the South Caucasus, rather than a new status quo.

Ruben Elamiryan is a Visiting Fulbright Scholar at the Department of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University. He is a lecturer at Russian-Armenian University and Public Administration Academy of Armenia. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science