Sedat Ergin Suriye ile normalleşme güvence meselesine takıldı Ocak 31, 2024 06:29

 Sedat Ergin 

Suriye ile normalleşme güvence meselesine takıldı

Ocak 31, 2024 06:29

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RUSYA Devlet Başkanı Vladimir Putin’in Suriye Özel Temsilcisi Aleksandr Lavrantyev’in, Suriye’nin Türkiye’den topraklarındaki askeri gücünü çekeceği hususunda istediği resmi güvence verilmediği için iki ülke arasındaki normalleşme görüşmelerinin geçen sonbahardan bu yana kesildiği yolundaki açıklaması, gündemimize bu kez “güvence” meselesini sokmuş bulunuyor.

Lavrantyev, önceki gün TASS ajansına verdiği demeçte, “Suriye tarafının toprakları üzerinde bulunan Türk askeri birliklerinin uzun dönemde çekileceği konusunda güvenceler almayı gerekli gördüğünü” belirtmiş.

İlginç olan bir nokta, Lavrantyev’in “Bu birliklerin yakın gelecekte çekileceğini kimse söylemiyor” diyerek, aslında kısa döneme dönük bir çekilme beklentisinin bulunmadığını da hissettirmesidir.

Hatta, Türk tarafının da muhtelif kademelerde “Suriye’de kalmayacakları”, “belli uygun koşullar karşılandığında er ya da geç çekilecekleri” hususunda gayri resmi beyanlarda bulunduğunu da söylüyor.

Rus diplomata göre, mesele “Türk tarafının bunu resmi hale getirmek istemiyor olması.”

Bu ifadeleri, Esad hükümetinin sözlü beyanlar değil, yazılı ve bağlayıcı bir güvence istediği, Türkiye’nin de buna yanaşmadığı şeklinde yorumlayabiliriz.

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Lavrantyev’in Esad rejiminin talebine belli bir anlayışla yaklaştığını belirtmek mümkün. Şöyle ki, Rus diplomat, bugün Türkiye’nin Suriye’de “işgal ettiğini” söylediği toprakların büyüklüğünün “neredeyse Lübnan’ın iki katı kadar” bir alanı kapladığını ifade ediyor. Bu durum sürerken, Suriye hükümetinin Türkiye ile müzakere yapmasına Suriye halkının anlam veremeyeceğini kaydediyor.

Putin’in temsilcisinin Türkiye’nin bulunduğu toprakların genişliği konusunda yaptığı Lübnan benzetmesi dikkat çekicidir. Türkiye, bugün Suriye’de Fırat’ın batısında İdlib ile Zeytin Dalı, Fırat Kalkanı harekât bölgeleri ve doğusunda ise Barış Pınarı harekât bölgesinde olmak üzere dört ayrı sahada değişen derinliklerde askeri birlik bulunduruyor.

Milli Savunma Bakanı Yaşar Güler, geçenlerde “Aljazeera.net”e verdiği mülakatta, “Halihazırda Suriye sınırımızın yüzde 63’ü ileriden kontrol altına alınmıştır” diye konuşmuştu. Güler’in sözlerinden hareketle, 911 kilometre uzunluğundaki sınırın üçte ikisine yakın bir bölümünde TSK’nın Suriye sınırının içinde varlık gösterdiğini belirtmeliyiz.

Anlaşıldığı kadarıyla, Türkiye’nin askeri varlığının geleceğine ilişkin sorular Türkiye ile Suriye arasındaki normalleşme arayışlarında bu aşamada en kritik mesele haline gelmiş bulunuyor.

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Peki, Türkiye Suriye’den ne zaman ve hangi koşullarda çekilecektir?

Aslında Ankara cephesinde bu konuda yapılmış birçok beyan var. Bunlar arasında en kuvvetli açıklamalardan biri, 4 Ekim 2018 tarihinde Cumhurbaşkanı Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’dan gelmişti. Erdoğan, TRT’ye mülakatında Türkiye’nin Suriye’den çekilmesi yönünde yapılan bazı çıkışları eleştirirken, “Biz orayı terk etmeyeceğiz. Ne zaman ki Suriye halkı seçimleri yapar, seçimlerini yaptıktan sonra biz Suriye’yi sahiplerine terk eder ayrılırız” demişti.

Erdoğan, geçen yıl Suriye Devlet Başkanı Beşar Esad’ın Türkiye Suriye’nin kuzeyinden çekilmediği sürece kendisiyle görüşmeyeceğini söylemesi üzerine de 19 Mayıs’ta çekilme konusunda “Öyle bir düşüncemiz yok. Çünkü terör tehdidi devam ediyor” diye konuşmuştu.

Milli Savunma Bakanı Güler de geçen 18 Ağustos’ta Sabah’ta yayımlanan bir mülakatında Türkiye’nin çekilmeye ilişkin koşullarını açıklarken “Bizim hassasiyetlerimiz var. Sınırlarımızın ve halkımızın güvenliği sağlanmadan oraları terk etmemiz düşünülemez. Suriye’ye barış gelebilmesi için en önemli aşama ise yeni anayasanın yapılması ve kabul edilmesi” şeklinde konuşmuştu.

Bu arada, önceki Dışişleri Bakanı Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu da Türkiye’nin Suriye’den çıkmasını “En son adımlardan biri” olarak göstermişti. Çavuşoğlu’nun geçen 3 Mayıs’ta NTV’ye açıklamasında, (çözüm bulunmadan) Türkiye’nin çekilmesinin “rejimin buraya tam hâkimiyet sağlayacağı anlamına gelmeyeceğini” belirtmişti.

Çavuşoğlu, ılımlı muhalefetle rejim arasında diyalog olmadığı takdirde yeniden çatışmaların çıkacağını, “burasının tekrar kan gölüne döneceğini” söylemişti. Çavuşoğlu’na göre, böyle bir durum aynı zamanda yeniden Türkiye sınırlarına çok sayıda göçmen gelmesi riskini de taşıyor.

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Bütün bu açıklamalar, Ankara’nın askerlerini çekme başlığındaki tutumunu Suriye sorununa terör konusundaki kaygılarını giderecek ve yeni bir anayasa yapımını da içerecek nihai bir siyasi çözüm bulunması koşuluna bağladığını gösteriyor.

Tabii bugün Suriye’de sahadaki duruma ve krizin seyrine baktığımızda gözle görülebilir bir gelecekte Suriye meselesine siyasi bir çözümün ufukta görünmediğini belirtmek hata olmaz.

ABD’nin ani bir tutum değişikliğiyle Suriye’den çıkması gibi sürpriz değişiklikler olmadığı sürece bugün sahada ABD, Rusya, Türkiye, İran gibi birden çok aktörün nüfuz bölgelerinin bulunduğu kilitlenme halinin bu şekilde devam etmesi muhtemeldir. İçsavaştan galip çıkan rejim de zamanın lehine çalıştığını düşünüp muhalefetle güç paylaşımına yanaşmadığı sürece bugünkü tablo uzun yıllar devam edebilir Suriye’de.

Peki o zaman Türkiye ile Suriye arasında normalleşme arayışlarının akıbeti ne olacaktır?

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Bu soruya yanıt ararken, Rus diplomasisinin Türkiye ile Suriye arasında normalleşmeyi sağlama çabasını sürdürmesini beklemeliyiz. Zaten Lavrantyev de “Türkiye-Suriye normalleşmesi konusunun Rusya’nın Suriye’de çözüme bakışında en önde yer aldığını” vurguluyor.

Türkiye’nin tutumuna gelince... Dışişleri Bakanı Hakan Fidan’ın 16 Ocak’ta TBMM konuşmasında açıkladığı üzere, “Türkiye PKK’nın Suriye ve Irak’taki mevcudiyetini yok etme gayretlerini bölgesel ilişkilerinin merkezine konumlandırdığına” göre, bu durumda Esad ile normalleşme konusunda istekli davranması beklenir.

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Tam bu noktada dikkat çekmemiz gereken bir yöneliş, Türkiye ile Suriye arasındaki normalleşme arayışının, Türkiye, İran ve Rusya arasındaki Astana sürecinin içine yerleşmekte oluşudur.

Hatırlanacaktır, 2022 sonunda Türkiye ile Suriye arasında normalleşme temasları başladığında önce Türkiye, Rusya ve Suriye’nin savunma bakanları ve istihbarat örgütü başkanları Moskova’da toplanmış, ardından bu format 2023 nisan ayında İranlı mevkidaşların katılımıyla tekrarlanmıştı. Daha sonra mayıs ayı başında yine Moskova’da dörtlü formatta bir de dışişleri bakanları toplantısı düzenlenmişti. Ancak Türkiye’deki seçimlerin öncesinde ortaya çıkan bu hareketliliğin arkası gelmemişti.

Buna karşılık geçen hafta Astana’da Türkiye, İran ve Rusya’nın dışişleri bakan yardımcıları düzeyinde düzenlenen üçlü toplantıdan sonra yayımlanan ortak açıklama geleceğe dönük bazı önemli ipuçları taşıyor. Açıklamaya göre, Türkiye, İran ve Rusya, “Türkiye ile Suriye arasında ilişkilerin onarılması yönündeki çabaların sürdürülmesinin önemini vurgulamış”lar.

Kritik bir ayrıntı, normalleşme ihtiyacının hem Suriyelilerin ülkelerine dönüşü hem de “terörle mücadele” hedeflerine dönük bir bağlamda ortaya konmuş olmasıdır. Aynı zamanda “dörtlü format” çerçevesindeki çabaların da memnuniyetle karşılandığı belirtiliyor bu açıklamada.

Bu yöneliş, Ankara ile Şam arasındaki normalleşmenin ikili düzeyde olmasa da Türkiye, Rusya, İran ve Esad rejimi arasında dörtlü bir zeminde yürüyeceğine işaret ediyor.

Digital Press Briefing on Power of Democracy and the Future of Peacekeeping in Africa After the AU Financing Security Council Resolution 01/31/2024 11:39 AM EST U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield

 Digital Press Briefing on Power of Democracy and the Future of Peacekeeping in Africa After the AU Financing Security Council Resolution

01/31/2024 11:39 AM EST

U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield

Download or listen to the audio file here .

MODERATOR:  Good afternoon and welcome to everyone from the London International Media Hub, teaming up today with our colleagues from the Africa Regional Media Hub.  I’d like to welcome our participants who are logging in from across the African continent and globally to thank all of you for joining this discussion.  Today, we’re very pleased to be joined by U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield.

We’ll begin today’s call with opening remarks from Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield and then we’ll turn to your questions.  We’ll try to get to as many of them as possible during the briefing.

As a reminder, today’s call is on the record.  And with that, I will turn it over to Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield.

AMBASSADOR THOMAS-GREENFIELD:  Thank you very much, Margaret, and thank you all for joining us here today.  As you know, I just returned from an incredibly productive, incredibly meaningful trip to Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea Bissau.  And I’d be remiss not to note that my stop in Guinea Bissau, a country I had never visited before, means that I’ve been to all but three countries on the continent of Africa.  So that’s not too shabby. 

Over the past week, I covered a lot of territory – literally and figuratively.  But there were a few core themes that wove through the entire trip.

The first is democracy. 

Anchoring this trip was the inauguration of President Joseph Boakai in Liberia – marking the country’s successful second peaceful, democratic transition of power since the end of the civil war in 2003.  And I was really honored to lead the President’s delegation for this remarkable celebration of democracy as the former U.S. ambassador to Liberia.

But it’s important to note that my visit to West Africa took place amidst a backdrop of democratic backsliding in the region.

And so during my time in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea Bissau, I met with heads of government, I met with opposition leaders, members of civil society, and people representing the next generation of leaders to emphasize how civilian-led democracies deliver for people – and underscore the importance of preserving and expanding them. 

That was the message of my keynote address at the Liberia Chamber of Commerce on election night: that democracy is a tie that binds our two nations together.  And that both in America and in Liberia, democracy is an unfinished project – a choice we all must make not just on election day or inauguration day, but every single day.

While in Liberia, I visited the historic Providence Baptist Church, where Liberia’s declaration of independence was signed in 1847 – and that continues to be a symbol of liberty and hope for Liberia.

I met with leaders, including outgoing President George Weah, to commend him on his commitment to the peaceful transfer of power – and the new president, President Joseph Boakai, to discuss the importance of combatting corruption, promoting accountability, and remaining a pillar of democracy in a region roiled by threats to it.

Democracy was also the topic of conversations in my meetings with Guinea Bissauan President Embalo, Sierra Leonean President Bio, and Ghanaian President Akufo-Addo, who was also in Liberia to celebrate the inauguration.

And democracy was the basis for the announcement I made in Freetown a few days ago: that the United States is committing $1.5 million to support Sierra Leone’s electoral reform processes.

This funding will help provide the technical and legal assistance needed to strengthen democracy in Sierra Leone – as well as fuel civilian engagement to increase everyday people’s awareness, buy-in, and ownership.

Another key theme of my trip was peace and security – which are, of course, linked with democracy.

This was a focus of all of my conversations with heads of state – including my sit-down with the president of Sierra Leone, whose country joined the Security Council during a particularly turbulent moment in the region – and my meeting with the Ghanaian president, whose country played a critical role in helping pass a UN financing resolution for AU peace operations.

The international community has a responsibility to empower AU missions to respond to Africa’s growing security challenges.

The financing resolution, which the UN unanimously adopted at the end of last year, is a major steppingstone to that end – putting African leaders at the forefront, and African people at the center.

In addition to discussing peace and security with presidents, I visited the Sierra Leone Peace Museum, which honors the victims of the country’s decade-long conflict and works to promote lasting peace.  This visit was incredibly timely, and it was remarkably heart-wrenching to see the important efforts that were being made to ensure that people never forget what happened during that war.  But it was also timely as it immediately preceded my participation in a national dialogue discussion with the Government of Sierra Leone, opposition leaders, and members of the international community working to implement Sierra Leone’s agreement for national unity.

I also visited Tombo Fishing Village, where I learned more about the community’s challenges with illegal fishing, as well as U.S. interventions to address climate, health, food – and food security.

And finally, I had the opportunity to meet with Liberian soldiers who served as international peacekeepers as part of the UN’s mission in Mali. 

This is one of those full-circle moments for me.  I visited Liberia in 2005, near the height of the UN peacekeeping mission following the civil war.  To come back not even two decades later, and see Liberians contributing troops – it’s a testament to the resilience and the dedication of the Liberian people. 

Which brings me to the last theme of the trip, which was investing in the future of Africa – namely, women and young people.

In Sierra Leone, I got to meet with an incredible group of young women leaders at Fourah Bay College, where we discussed the transformative role women play in government, business, and more.

And while in Liberia, I had the opportunity to engage with alumni of the President’s Young Professionals Program and U.S. exchange programs – as well as students from my favorite school in the world. 

And I know that’s a lofty statement: favorite school in the world. But while I love my alma maters, LSU and the University of Wisconsin, these students attend The Linda Thomas-Greenfield Preparatory School.

So: Democracy. Peace and security. Investing in women and young people.

I could talk about these three priorities – and more importantly, the African people realizing them on the ground – forever.  But I want to get to your questions, and I know you want to get to them too.

So let me end by just saying that this is a region that is near and dear to my heart.  I first went to Liberia and Sierra Leone in the late 1970s.  And since then, progress in the region has hardly been a straight line. 

But this visit, this homecoming, nearly five decades after I first touched down in Monrovia, affirmed that there are so many reasons to be hopeful about the years to come.

So with that, I’d be happy to take a few questions.  So over to you, Margaret.  

MODERATOR:  Thank you, Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield.  We’ll now begin the question-and-answer portion of today’s briefing.  

We have a full briefing today.  And so as a courtesy to your fellow journalists, I’d ask that you limit yourself to one question related to the topic of today’s briefing, which is: the Power of Democracy and the Future of Peacekeeping in Africa After the AU Financing Security Council Resolution.

So for our first question, Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield, would you please elaborate on what the AU financing resolution means for peace and security in Africa?

AMBASSADOR THOMAS-GREENFIELD:  Oh, thank you so much for that question.  I am so proud of the fact that we were able to get the AU financing resolution passed.  This is something that I have personally been working on for over a decade when I served as the assistant secretary for Africa.  And so to accomplish that during my presidency – or my period at the Security Council was extremely meaningful.  And I want to take the opportunity to thank Ghana for leading the effort to move that resolution forward and get a unanimous adoption of the resolution in the Security Council.

So you asked what the resolution means.  This resolution underscores the primary – the primacy of politics and the need for coherent political strategy that will guide any peacekeeping operations.  But it also gives support to the African Union, to African leadership of peacekeeping operations.  The resolution emphasizes that operations must include appropriate safeguards to protect civilians, and this was a key accomplishment of the resolution.  It provides for the UN to pay 75 percent of peacekeeping operations for AU missions, and that was something that was truly important, and we will work with the African Union and peacekeeping countries to get the rest of the funding.  But it really is a reflection of African leadership for African solutions.

MODERATOR:  Fantastic.  Thank you for elaborating.

Our first question from a journalist is Ms. – from Ms. Christina Okello of Radio France Internationale.  And the question is:  “Sierra Leone is joining the Security Council at a time of turmoil following a failed coup implicating the former president in a trial the opposition says is politically motivated.  What’s your assessment of the state of democracy in Sierra Leone?”

AMBASSADOR THOMAS-GREENFIELD:  Democracy, as I said in my opening remarks, is not a – it’s not a straight-line process.  It is a process that is always a few steps forward and a few steps back, but we see that it is the one mode of government that provides for the people.  And Sierra Leone has made tremendous progress in moving in that direction.  I met with their commission, the national unity agreement and the commission that was set up for that, and the commission is working very deliberately to develop a process that will allow for free and fair elections that are supported by all parties.  We condemn the attempted coup that took place in Sierra Leone, and we want to work with the government to help establish a path forward, and we express our support to President Bio for his call for national unity, and his efforts to urge Sierra Leone to work together to build a unified country in the national interests of all.

So we will continue to support that effort.  As I noted, we gave $1.5 million to that effort that will help the commission continue to implement their recommendations moving forward.

MODERATOR:  Excellent.  And what does the recent UNSC Resolution 2719 mean for African peacekeeping missions?

AMBASSADOR THOMAS-GREENFIELD:  Well, it means that these missions are going to get the support of the United Nations.  They’re going to get capacity that they may not have.  They are going to – their leadership is going to be boosted in this process.  We’ve seen a number of countries on the continent of Africa who have raised concerns about UN peacekeeping missions.  We saw that happen, unfortunately, in Mali.  We’ve seen it happen as well in Sudan.  So to have African leadership in these missions I think will help to build confidence in peacekeeping, and particularly as it relates to protection of civilians.

MODERATOR:  Thank you.  Our next question is from Mr. Moses Kollie Garzeawu of BBC World Service, Liberia.  The question is:  “What example has Liberia set for the entire region with a smooth democratic transition?  And how committed is the U.S. to helping Liberia survive from what the president said is under stress?”

AMBASSADOR THOMAS-GREENFIELD:  Liberia was and continues to be under stress.  We saw Liberia go through a 14-year civil war that ended in 2003.  They have had since that time successive transitions of power and successful elections.  The first president, President Sirleaf, served for two terms; President Weah – an opposition candidate was elected, and he graciously accepted the results of a free and fair election and allowed for a smooth transition.  And that is truly an example for not just West Africa, but the entire continent of Africa.  And we really should commend Liberians for that success.

The United States is committed to Liberia.  We have – we’re a country that has close historical ties that go back to Liberia’s creation, and we have been a close ally and partner to Liberia throughout.  Liberia has been very supportive and worked closely with us here at the United Nations, and we’re committed to helping President Boakai succeed.

As you know, I served as ambassador in Liberia for four years during the Sirleaf administration, and we committed millions of U.S. dollars to supporting Liberia’s development.  We will continue to do that.  Since 2017, we’ve given them close to $800 million; we’ve worked to build their military.  So our commitment to Liberia is ironclad.

MODERATOR:  Thank you.  Our next question is from Mr. Mouctar Balde of Guinéenews.  He asks:  “You have very vast experience in African affairs, and you know very well the recent history of civil wars, unrest, coup – and coup in the region.  In Guinea, for instance, I have doubts that the current regime is going to transfer power to a democratic elected president.  As you know, civil wars, unrest, and crises start when the military is not playing by the rules.  What strategy can you think of in conflict prevention, or any kind of long-term unrest?”

AMBASSADOR THOMAS-GREENFIELD:  Thank you for that question.  And it is a tough question, because it is something that we have all been grappling with for many, many years.  And we’ve had some – many successes, and Liberia is clearly one of those successes, and we’ve had failures, and Guinea is one of those right now.

We are working to build capacity in countries like Guinea to give support to civil society, to give support to ordinary people so that they can vote and hopefully hold their leaders accountable.  But we’re also working with leadership to encourage them, to push them, to urge them, and sometimes nudge them in the right direction.  And that’s the case across the continent of Africa, and as I said, we have a lot of successes, but we have a lot of work to do to continue to push that effort.  We know that democracy delivers to people, and we know that in order for democracy to deliver, countries have to have strong leadership.  Corruption has to be addressed upfront.  That’s the message that I delivered in – very strongly in Liberia, and it’s the message that we’re delivering across the continent of Africa.  

MODERATOR:  Thank you.  Our next question is for Mr. Aggrey Mutambo, the National Media Group in Kenya:  “I would like to see a comment from the U.S. Government concerning the war in Sudan.  We are hearing reports that Iran may have supplied certain drones and other weapons to the Sudan armed forces to aid their fight against Rapid Support Forces.  Does the U.S. have concerns about this and the potential for Iran becoming a bigger threat in the Horn of Africa, and what efforts are being put in place to de-escalate the situation? 

AMBASSADOR LINDA THOMAS-GREENFIELD:  Look, we’re concerned about any support for these two generals to continue this war against the people of Sudan, and we’ve made that clear across the board.  What the two generals need to do is put down their arms and go back to the negotiating table and find a solution.  There will be no military solution to this war.  We’re seeing thousands of people die on both sides.  We’ve seen 6 million people be forced from their homes.  

I visited Chad last year, went to the border, talked to refugees who were fleeing.  Chad is hosting over a million refugees, many of them from the first war that happened that led to the designation of a genocide.  So to see this happening again is unconscionable.  And so it is incumbent that those who are assisting these two generals to fight this war against the people of Sudan cease those efforts, and the generals go and negotiate a final deal with civilians at the table with them.  

MODERATOR:  Okay.  Our next question is – we’re going to take a turn up to North Africa, Ms. Aya Sayed of Roayah News Network in Egypt.  The question is:  “There are growing concerns that UN peacekeeping operations are increasingly becoming unwelcome in parts of Africa, as countries such as Mali and the DRC requested the withdrawal of UN missions.  Do you expect that African nations would welcome AU-led peacekeeping missions?”

AMBASSADOR LINDA THOMAS-GREENFIELD:  Yeah, we’re very concerned with the – the lack of support for UN peacekeeping missions.  These missions have been important to contributing to peace and security, to protection of civilians across the continent of Africa.  So what happened in the case of Mali and what is currently happening in DRC is really unfortunate.  But I do think, as you noted, that AU peacekeeping missions might be able to fill in the gap.  And that’s why it was so important that we get the AU financing resolution passed so that we are able to provide direct financing to these missions, provide capacity, provide training so that Africans, as I said earlier, can lead in this process.  

MODERATOR:  Okay, we’re coming – we are coming up on time, but I want to give Carol Van Dam Falk of Voice of America an opportunity to ask her question live.  Carol, over to you.  

Carol, you’re on mute.  Can you speak again?

AMBASSADOR LINDA THOMAS-GREENFIELD:  Hi, Carol.  

MODERATOR:  Well, I am not able to hear Carol, so I’m going to go ahead and proceed to the next pre-submitted question.  And that is – let’s see – Mr. Mohamed K. Fofanah of the Gleaner Newspaper in Sierra Leone:  “Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield, you announced that the United States plans to invest 1.5 million to support Sierra Leone’s electoral reform process.  After the announcement, an unconfirmed report has it that the U.S. is pushing for a rerun of the June 24th elections.  Do you have any comment?”

 AMBASSADOR LINDA THOMAS-GREENFIELD:  I’m not aware of that, but what I am aware of is that the $1.5 million will assist Sierra Leone in developing their own plans for how they will conduct elections in the future.  But there are no – as far as I know, there are no plans for an election, and certainly we have not called for that. 

MODERATOR:  Thank you very much.  So we are at time.  Do you have any final thoughts that you would like to share with the group before we wrap?  

AMBASSADOR LINDA THOMAS-GREENFIELD:  Well, let me just say to you that the press in Africa plays an extraordinarily important role in making sure that democracy functions.  You are a key component, you’re a key tool of democracy on the continent of Africa.  I had a number of press engagements when I was on this trip.  I met with your colleague from Front Page Africa and did an interview on radio with him.  I did a press conference in Sierra Leone as well.  And again, I think your role in keeping the public informed, keeping the world informed, and also holding accountable leaders across the continent and holding me and others accountable for what we’re doing is so important.  So I just want to end with a thank you to all of you for what you do, and I look forward to continuing to engage with you in the future.  

MODERATOR:  Thank you, Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield.  That concludes today’s briefing.  I want to thank all of our participating journalists.  A reminder that this briefing has been on the record.  And if you have any questions about today’s briefing, you may contact the London International Media Hub at LondonHub@state.gov.  We will be circulating a transcript to all registered participants.  Thank you.

AMBASSADOR LINDA THOMAS-GREENFIELD:  Thank you.

Financial Times : The Turkish terminal (Dörtyol) helping disguised Russian oil reach Europe - 30 January 2024

 

https://www.ft.com/content/e5be1cac-3901-4066-a036-f78546b55eaf

The Turkish terminal helping disguised Russian oil reach Europe

Dörtyol facility booms as Moscow’s refined fuels are shipped to western buyers despite EU embargo

Tom Wilson in London and Adam Samson in Dörtyol

30 January 2024

Nestled among the orange groves of Turkey’s southern coast stands an unlikely staging post for Moscow’s energy sales, a site from where disguised Russian fuels are shipped to European buyers — and allegedly even the US military. 

For most of its existence, the Dörtyol terminal, based in the Hatay province devastated in last year’s earthquake, had been a relatively sleepy business, focused on exporting Iraqi crude that arrived at the facility by truck. 

But after Russia’s full-blown invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, that all changed. Between March and June the terminal received just three shipments of oil by sea, from Israel, Egypt and Greece, according to ship tracking data from Kpler.  

Then from July of that year, as the first western restrictions on Russian trade began to take effect, seaborne oil deliveries to Dörtyol soared, the data shows — underlining how Vladimir Putin’s war has redrawn global energy flows, creating opportunities for countries and companies still able to trade with Moscow. Most of the oil arriving at the terminal by sea is refined fuel from Russia and much of that has then been shipped to Europe, in contravention of EU sanctions, experts who have reviewed the data said.

US senators have even raised concerns that “masked Russian oil” from Dörtyol, processed into fuel at a Greek refinery it supplies, ended up in US warships. “The mazelike path of the oil from terminals in Russia to the US fleet is almost certainly done intentionally by Russia to evade sanctions,” said US senators Marco Rubio and Maggie Hassan in a letter to the defence secretary. The US military purchases were first reported by the Washington Post. 

In the EU, the importation of refined Russian oil has been banned since February last year, and crude oil since the previous December. But the trade patterns in and out of Dörtyol show how refined products are able to enter the bloc regardless. 

Global Terminal Services AS, the Istanbul-based owner of Dörtyol, said it acts as “an independent storage terminal” and has no involvement in trading. The company said it had neither the “authority or responsibility” to monitor the final destination of oil moving through its facilities. 

Dutch oil trader Niels Troost, who agreed to acquire a 40 per cent stake in GTS from its Turkish owners in July 2022, said he could not comment on the operations of the terminal because he had been a minority shareholder. He formally exited the business in November 2023, returning the stake to GTS, a decision by Turkey’s Competition Board approving the transaction shows. 

Russian oil enters Turkey 

Since the EU and the G7 imposed curbs on Moscow’s oil trade, Turkey has become a key hub for Russian crude and refined products. 

It is now the third-largest recipient of Russian crude after India and China, and the biggest market for Russian refined products. In some cases, Turkey has been able to use imports of discounted Russian fuels, such as diesel, to meet domestic demand, while profitably exporting diesel produced in Turkish refineries to buyers in Europe. 

In other cases, such as at Dörtyol, refined fuels from Russia appeared to have been shipped on to Europe without any significant transformation taking place, in violation of EU sanctions banning such imports. 

The sprawling Dörtyol terminal, first built in 1984, sits on a hazy stretch of coastline dominated by energy and metals businesses, including Turkey’s biggest iron and steel plant.

Most of the oil arriving at Dörtyol terminal by sea is refined fuel from Russia, experts say © Adam Samson/FT

The facility is criss-crossed with a maze of pipes and pumps but has no capacity to refine fuels on site and does not import oil into Turkey. Instead it functions as a trans-shipment hub, storing oil that arrives at the facility by truck or by sea before it is shipped to buyers in other countries. 

Prior to the Ukraine war, it mainly functioned as an export terminal for Iraqi crude that arrived overland. This remains a key part of the GTS business. 

In 2023, between January and November, Iraqi-origin products made up a little over half of the 3.2mn tonnes of oil shipped from the terminal, GTS said in December in a written response to questions. 

The rest, approximately 10.5mn barrels (about 1.5mn tonnes), arrived by sea, and 9.2mn barrels of it, almost 90 per cent, originated in Russia, the Kpler shipping data showed. 

“Historically Dörtyol was always a crude export terminal,” said Viktor Katona, an analyst at Kpler. “You move to 2022 and it suddenly becomes everything.” 

Dörtyol has traditionally received a small amount of oil from Russia but shipments ballooned after the start of the war. Dörtyol received 583,870 barrels (about 87,000 tonnes) of Russian-origin oil by sea in 2021 and 3.7mn barrels (about 513,000 tonnes) in 2022, representing 38 per cent and 67 per cent of all seaborne cargoes unloaded at the terminal in those years, according to the Kpler shipping data.

Turkey has not banned its companies from dealing with Russian oil, so GTS is not breaking any rules by receiving the cargoes. 

But GTS disputed the figures, stating that, based on the origin information provided to the terminal by the Turkish Customs Authority, Russian volumes constituted a fifth of “total loading activity” in 2022 and 10 per cent in 2023, which would mean approximately 300,000 tonnes in each year. 

The discrepancy between the volume of oil arriving at Dörtyol on tankers from Russia, tracked by Kpler, and the Russian volumes recorded by GTS, could mean that some of the terminal’s customers have provided false origin information to the Turkish Customs Authority, said Kpler’s Katona. 

Kpler’s system tracks vessels from the port where they are loaded to the port where they discharge, leaving little doubt over the origin of the cargo on board. 

GTS said it considered the origin information provided by the Turkish customs authority to be “final and binding”. Turkey’s trade ministry, which oversees the country’s customs directorate, did not respond to a request for comment. 

On a recent visit by the Financial Times to the Dörtyol terminal, GTS commercial manager Islam Gümüş said Turkish customs had an office on the site and access to real-time video and data from the facility. “Nothing comes in here and goes out without the knowledge of the customs office,” he said. 

The flow into Europe 

Since there is no prohibition on bringing Russian oil into Turkey the origin information is only relevant because of what happens next: most of the oil is shipped to the EU. 

In 2023, approximately 85 per cent of the oil shipped from Dörtyol went to Europe, mainly to Greece, Belgium and the Netherlands, up from 53 per cent in 2022, the shipping data shows.

For some products, such as vacuum gas oil (VGO) — a partially refined product used to make transportation fuels including petrol or diesel — the flow from Russia to Europe via Dörtyol appears even clearer. In 2023, between January and November, the terminal received 2.7mn barrels (about 412,000 tonnes) of VGO, all from Russia, and exported at least 2.5mn barrels of the product, all to Europe and mainly to Greece, the data shows. 

“If the Greeks are buying this, there surely must exist a document which testifies that this is not Russian. And if there is such a document, who wrote it?” asked Katona. 

GTS confirmed the terminal had shipped approximately 400,000 tonnes of VGO, but less than half had come from Russia, and less than 50,000 tonnes was destined for EU ports, it said, citing Turkish customs declarations.

Gümüş added that when GTS accepts Russian origin fuels it ensures that the shipments have been sold below the G7 price cap, even though, as a Turkish company, it is not compelled to comply with the restrictions. When the FT visited, for example, a vessel carrying Russian oil had been blocked from unloading at the terminal because the owner of the vessel had been sanctioned by the UK government.

The control room in Global Terminal Services’ Dörtyol facility. The group says its officials and customs authorities 

can view cameras and monitor information in real time © Adam Samson/FT

The evidence of Dörtyol’s role in the movement of Russian oil into Europe comes at a time when Turkey’s western allies have grown frustrated over the country’s economic ties with Moscow. 

Trade between Russia and Turkey has increased sharply since Putin’s full invasion of Ukraine. In addition to importing Russian oil, Turkey has become a key supplier and intermediary for some of the goods Moscow needs, exporting to Russia military-linked equipment deemed vital for the Kremlin’s war machine. 

The Troost connection 

GTS is chaired by Ramazan Öztürk, a Turkish businessman, and owned by Öztürk’s GTS Investments BV, registered in the Netherlands, corporate records shows. 

In July 2022, GTS Investments BV agreed to sell a 40 per cent stake in GTS to a Dubai-based company ultimately controlled by Troost, a 30-year veteran of the oil trading industry.

Prior to the Ukraine invasion, Troost was among the largest sellers of crude oil from eastern Russia, which he traded through Paramount Energy & Commodities SA, the company he founded in Switzerland in 2017. The Swiss entity ceased that activity before European sanctions prohibiting such trading started in December 2022, Paramount has said.

Dutch oil trader Niels Troost agreed to acquire a 40% stake in GTS from its Turkish owners in July 2022 but he formally 

exited the business in November 2023 © atlanticcouncil/X

However, the UK government in November imposed sanctions on a Paramount subsidiary in Dubai, accusing that company — Paramount Energy & Commodities DMCC — of employing “deceptive shipping practices as well as opaque ownership structures” to continue trading Russian oil. 

In a written response to questions, Troost told the FT that his investment in GTS had nothing to do with Turkey’s growing trade in Russian refined fuels. 

“I began exploring an opportunity to invest in the GTS terminal in late 2021, well before the Russian invasion of Ukraine,” Troost said. “I believed the terminal was an undervalued asset in a strategic location that could be used to supply oil products to Africa, in line with my long-term interest in African energy and food security, and the potential to develop an export business from Iraq.” 

Troost added that the due diligence process for his investment was already under way in “early February”, before the 24 February invasion. His company signed a memorandum of understanding with GTS on 4 February 2022, documents show. 

GTS said the terminal did not receive any oil from Troost’s Paramount or any related entity while his other company was a GTS shareholder, adding that there was no link between the investment and the increase in activity at the terminal in the past two years.

Troost said he agreed to sell his stake in GTS “in or around June 2023” due to what he described as the “serious reputational harm caused to me by a third party” who has sought “to tie me and my business to Russia on an ongoing basis”. He added that he “never saw any financial gain or benefit from the project”.