Iran gets what it wanted; Trump gets what he already had
James discusses on CNA who gets what in the US-Iran memorandum of understanding and what it means.
Transcript
[Anchor] I’ll return to our top story. The MOU signed between the U.S. and Iran, ending war on every front, including in Lebanon, while giving Iran and the U.S. a further 60 days in which much tougher issues need to be addressed, and great hope they’re actually resolved. We’re joined by James Dorsey, Adjunct Senior Fellow at the S.
Rajaram School of International Studies at Namyang Technological University, and he joins us live from Bangkok, Dr. Dorsey. You have been very circumspect about passing any judgement on any kind of deal in the last few days, the last week, in fact, news of this MOU. But now that we have the text of this agreement, how would you assess?
[James M. Dorsey] I think it’s evident that Iran got much of what it wanted, and what Trump got in return is, in effect, what he already had. That is to say, he got a pledge that Iran would not develop, produce, or acquire a nuclear weapon. That’s a pledge that Iran has made repeatedly and longstanding, and is incorporated in the 2015 international agreement that curbed Iran’s nuclear programme, from which Donald Trump withdrew in 2018.
And Trump got the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, which was open before the war. So it’s not quite clear what added value his withdrawal from the 2015 agreement and the war has added to the United States. On the other hand, Iran gets a lifting of sanctions.
It gets a lifting of the U.S. naval blockade of Iranian ports. It gets, in theory, at least a $300 billion reconstruction fund. And as a result of that remains a power in the Middle East that has to be reckoned with.
[Anchor] And part of that reckoning would be the Gulf states needing to recalibrate their relations with Iran and Israel, working out where it now stands with a very valued partner.
[James M. Dorsey]
Well, the Gulf states have geographically a Catholic marriage with Iran. There’s no divorce. They have to come to some understanding across the Persian Gulf.
And Gulf states realise that. So I think on the one hand, you’ll see it will be difficult to bridge the gap of distrust that has evolved from this war and from Iran’s attacks on Gulf states. But nonetheless, we will see engagement with Iran.
At the same time, I think we’re going to see a reconfiguration to a degree of the U.S. presence in the Gulf, the U.S. military bases. Gulf states are going to want much more, want to make that conditional and will want to have that it be much more consultative. As for Israel, Israel is the loser in all of this by far.
It has not gotten the guarantees it thinks it needs to protect it from a nuclear Iran. It has not gotten a military solution, which it believes is the only solution. And it has not gotten the toppling of the Islamic Republic, at least not at this point.
One thing I think that one has to watch out for as we move forward is as the notion of no war and a ceasefire, if not a peace agreement, settles in, the grievances that brought Iranians onto the streets repeatedly the last time in December and January will come back to the surface.
[Anchor] And the U.S., specifically in this MOU, has said it will not interfere in internal Iranian affairs. So what Donald Trump said even just a few months ago, that he would help protesters in Iran, this time he’s duty-bound not to even do that.
[James M. Dorsey] Indeed. So we’re not going to see, or theoretically we shouldn’t see, support for protesters. That’s a domestic Iranian affair.
And we shouldn’t see support for ethnic, rest of ethnic minorities, such as the Kurds or the Baloch.
[Anchor] Well, one area in which Donald Trump can tout some kind of victory, although to be fair, the Strait of Hormuz was open before February the 28th. He can say traffic has now resumed through that vital waterway. But it’s just 60 days in which Iran has promised not to fire on anyone travelling through that strait.
The longer term, the document notes that Iran will work with Oman and other Gulf states to set up a broader agreement on how to manage the Strait of Hormuz. So that has, that stated, that does not return to status quo. The management of the Strait of Hormuz, what everyone took for in the past, free passage, that’s not the default anymore, is it?
[James M. Dorsey] Indeed. So what you have is essentially today a situation in which Iran’s position and grip on the Strait of Hormuz is stronger than it was prior to the war. The ceasefire stipulates that Iran, for the period of 60 days in which the two parties negotiate, will not levy any fees for passage through the Strait of Hormuz.
It’s unclear what happens if, and that is probable, that if the negotiations are extended beyond 60 days, because it’s almost impossible to settle all of these issues within a period of two months, what happens then? Can Iran levy fees on passage through the Strait of Hormuz or not? That’s probably in part going to be a negotiation with Oman, because the territorial waters are shared with Oman, but also a negotiation with the other Gulf states.
And some of those Gulf states, particularly Qatar, have already said that they are not opposed to at least a temporary imposition of fees with a specific purpose, for example, the removal of mines in the waterway.
[Anchor] And a final question, Dr. Dorsey, if Iran is emboldened by these months of war, so too is its proxy Hezbollah. Final question.
[James M. Dorsey] Well, Iran is no doubt emboldened by this agreement and by its performance in survival of the war. Iran’s credibility is now on the line. It has made Lebanon a cornerstone of what it wanted.
It wanted the ceasefire to apply to all fronts, particularly Lebanon besides Iran. It said that it will intervene and attack Israel if Israel continues its attacks in Lebanon. Israel will probably want to put that to the test.
And that’s when Iran’s credibility does come on the line.
[Anchor] Thanks so much for joining us this evening to talk through this MOU between the US and Iran. Dr. James Dorsey, the adjunct senior fellow at the Rajarani School of International Studies, joining us there from Bangkok. Thank you.
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