FP - Argument
There Are Only Four Great Powers
An era of great-power competition has started—but not all would-be competitors qualify.
June 2, 2026, 4:28 AM
By Brendan Simms, the director of the Centre for Geopolitics at the University of Cambridge and the author of The Return of the Great Powers.
A stylized grid composition of 12 squares in a three-by-four layout, alternating with solid red and blue blocks, split photographic images, and flags. On the left, parts of a dark flag fly against a red and blue background. In the center columns, a close-up black-and-white portrait of a man's face is split horizontally across two squares, and a profile view of another man in a collared shirt looks to the right against a red backdrop. On the far right, a close-up black-and-white portrait shows a man looking directly forward.
A stylized grid composition of 12 squares in a three-by-four layout, alternating with solid red and blue blocks, split photographic images, and flags. On the left, parts of a dark flag fly against a red and blue background. In the center columns, a close-up black-and-white portrait of a man's face is split horizontally across two squares, and a profile view of another man in a collared shirt looks to the right against a red backdrop. On the far right, a close-up black-and-white portrait shows a man looking directly forward.
In our new era of great-power competition, it’s important to identify the competitors. But it has always been easier to speak about the great powers than to define them. Disagreement over great-power status, and especially over which power is the “greatest,” characterizes today’s system, as it did in times past. There is neither a commonly accepted definition of what constitutes a great power, nor any consensus over such basic questions as how many powers there are.
Nevertheless, we can distinguish the great powers by a set of common characteristics, which reveal that there are only four great powers that exist today—and they are not necessarily the ones you would expect.
Great powers, first of all, have a set of behaviors in common. They always expect to shape or at least be consulted on the main global issues of the day. They make their presence felt, and their absence creates a vacuum to be filled. Often, great powers will insist on their own absolute sovereignty but admit only the qualified sovereignty of lesser powers, especially if they are nearby. In extremis, they reserve the right to change regimes that threaten or displease them but are able to deny any such right with respect to themselves.
At times, the great powers will claim to be above international law. At other times, they will make a virtue of vindicating that law or claim to defend international norms. In other words, the great powers have the power to make the rules and to break them; they are never just rule-takers. They are the orderers, not the ordered.
What enables the great powers to behave this way are their superior capabilities compared to the middling and smaller states. The first such capability is resources. Does the state in question have the military capacity to impose its will or to resist that of others? There is no entirely satisfactory way of assessing military strength, but how much the state spends on its military and how effectively is a rough measure of its defense capabilities.
Deployable nuclear weapons are also an indispensable component of great-power status today. The guaranteed ability to deliver an atomic bomb and thus to deter a nuclear attack gives a state a special position in the world. This is why the great powers take on the immense burdens of planning, researching, maintaining, storing, training, and safeguarding associated with those weapons. Not all nuclear powers are great powers, but all great powers are nuclear.
Then there is the economy. Is the state strong enough to survive the financial headwinds of geopolitical competition and to sustain a substantial military effort? Usually, economic strength is measured by GDP, which covers everything produced within a state’s borders. The alternative metric of purchasing power parity takes into account how far a sum of money goes in the domestic economy. It privileges non-Western countries with lower standards of living and production costs.
Very important—and difficult to assess—is the question how national these resources are. Peacetime GDP, GDP in a conflictual situation, and wartime GDP are three very different things. Cut a state off from its markets, sources of credit, raw materials, and food supply through tariffs, sanctions, or a blockade, and its economy will soon take on a completely different aspect. This is where command of the global commons outside the jurisdiction of any one state—particularly the world’s sea lanes—is so important to determining great-power status, or at least the hierarchy among the great powers.
A low-angle shot looking up past the backs of several individuals dressed in formal white military uniforms. They are looking up at a cloudy gray sky, where six dark fighter jets fly in a tight delta formation, leaving faint white vapor trails behind them.
A side view profile of a long, precise row of military personnel standing at attention in uniforms with gold accents, white gloves, and peaked caps, each holding a rifle vertically. In the background, a single officer in a green uniform is captured midstride running along the asphalt in front of them.
Left: U.S. Naval Academy graduates watch as the Blue Angels do a flyover salute during a graduation and commissioning ceremony in Annapolis, Maryland, on May 22. Heather Diehl/Getty Images Right: An officer runs back to his position after correcting soldiers from the People’s Liberation Army during practice for a military parade in Beijing on Aug. 20, 2025. Kevin Frayer/Getty Images
Economic power is thus important, but it is not conclusive in determining great-power status. The strongest militaries of the world measured in terms of capabilities and spending over the past 20 years are the United States, which comfortably leads the pack, and China, followed at some distance by the United Kingdom and Russia. The first three are also among the five or six largest economies in the world. Russia, which is economically weaker, makes the grade on the strength of its outsize nuclear arsenal—the largest in the world.
The second criterion of great-power status is reach. Is the state a global power or merely a regional power, and how willing and able is it to deploy force far from home? Does it have a recognized geographical sphere of influence? Can that state draw on a global network of bases? Does it control key transport nodes and chokepoints? Can its intelligence agencies provide top-quality information on most parts of the world, as well as for cyberspace and space? Does it have a large and sophisticated diplomatic service? Has it a large overseas aid budget?
The Return of Great Powers
Is 2024 going to be like 1939? Several trends today share parallels with the onset of World War II, CNN reporter Jim Sciutto argues. Sciutto joined FP’s Ravi Agrawal to discuss.
FP Live
Reach can be both geographic and virtual. A great power will have the capacity to make its presence felt well beyond its own region, but it will also have the capacity to influence or even coopt global institutions such as the United Nations, the markets, or other fora.
Today, reach is very unevenly distributed among powers. The United States stands out through its sprawling network of military bases. Britain does not enjoy remotely the same global position it once did, but it still maintains important sovereign bases worldwide, including Gibraltar, Cyprus, and the Falkland Islands; it also has a presence in places such as Duqm in Oman on the Indian Ocean. Russia claims a sphere of influence in its near-abroad, though it has recently lost ground in Africa and the Middle East. Russia also enjoys global reach in the fields of propaganda, disinformation, and disruptive digital activity.
China may yet become a major global military player, with a base in Djibouti and a large paramilitary presence protecting infrastructure projects across the world. Its real global reach, though, lies in its partial control of the world’s supply chains and critical minerals (such as lithium) needed to power the technological and green revolutions.
A wide, symmetrical view looking down a grand tree-lined boulevard decorated with large, alternating U.K. and Japanese national flags on tall poles. A formal procession of mounted police or military guards on horseback advances down the center of the road, led by officers on white horses in the front row, followed by others on dark horses.
Mounted police officers lead the horse-drawn carriage procession of Britain’s King Charles III and Japan’s Emperor Naruhito as they make their way along the Mall in London on June 25, 2024, during a three-day state visit. Paul Ellis/AFP via Getty Images
The third criterion is reputation. Is the state considered a great power by others, especially other great powers, and almost as importantly, does it consider itself a great power? Few doubt that the United States and China are great powers today and many consider Russia so on account of its military capacity to shape or at least disrupt the global order. Though the status of the United Kingdom is disputed, most Europeans still consider it a major power.
Finland and Sweden, for example, sought a bilateral security guarantee from the U.K. in 2022 before NATO’s kicked in; the British-led Joint Expeditionary Force contributes heavily to the security of the Baltic and High North. The United Kingdom is also prized as an ally by important actors in Asia, such as Japan, as well as in the Levant and Persian Gulf. Besides, if the United States withdraws from Europe and Asia, Britain’s much more limited capabilities will gain in importance.
Moreover, a great power always stands for something beyond brute force. Its greatness is also cultural and ideological. Today, the United Kingdom and other Western powers stand for a liberal international order based on democratic principles and free trade. Britain reinforced that image, proving that it is not the “poodle” of the United States, by refusing to join U.S. President Donald Trump’s attack on Iran. Other powers have positioned themselves in more civilizational terms.
ll.
Putin, in a dark suit and tie, sits alone at a large, curved white conference table with a hollow center inside an official room with wood-paneled walls, a flag, and an emblem. Embedded in the surface of the desk in the foreground is a video screen showing the face of a military official during a conference call.
A photo distributed by Russian state-owned agency Sputnik shows President Vladimir Putin overseeing a nuclear training exercise via a video link in Moscow on Oct. 25, 2023. Gavriil Grigoroov/AFP via Getty Images
For example, Chinese President Xi Jinping has said that China, as a “major country,” should conduct a “distinctive” diplomacy marked by a “salient Chinese feature and a Chinese vision.” Even Russia, perhaps the most brutal of the great powers and one that constantly emphasizes its military and nuclear might, claims that it represents Christian and family values globally against the “soulless” West. What exactly the United States, once the mainstay of the rules-based international order, stands for after the second coming of Trump is not yet clear.
Reputation rests in part on a state’s position in the architecture of global governance. The United States plays a major role—some would say dominates—economic organizations such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. It is also a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, along with a Russia, China, Britain and France. All five powers thereby enjoy significant privileges in the international system, and while these are frequently challenged, reform of the U.N. is as far away as it ever was.
The fourth criterion for great-power status, resilience, concerns how much pain a society and its economy can absorb. Historical performance plays an important role. In the past, victory has not always gone to those who can inflict the most, but sometimes to those who can suffer the most. Past great powers, such as the Habsburg Empire, showed enormous staying power in adversity. Losing and recovering is as critical as winning. A state may command extensive resources and enjoy an impressive reach and reputation yet fall short as a great power if it lacks resilience.
The most resilient powers over time have been Britain and the United States. They have proved able to maintain long contests and to recover from serious defeats, such as the loss of the American colonies or the war in Vietnam. Though both countries are in domestic crisis today in different ways, they can be expected to recover relatively quickly. Russia and China, by contrast, are relatively young powers in their current form, and both have recent memory of political trauma and fragmentation. Like so much else, resilience is rooted in history and especially in the development of social cohesion over time.
A medium shot of three people in business attire. In the center, Takaichi is viewed from behind as she stands with arms wide open. To the left, Meloni, a blonde woman in a dark pantsuit, reacts with a wide-eyed, surprised facial expression and open hands. To the right, Macron, a man in a dark suit watches with a neutral expression.
Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni (left) greets Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi as French President Emmanuel Macron stands nearby at the G-20 summit in Johannesburg, South Africa, on Nov. 22, 2025. Leon Neal/Getty Images
According to these criteria, several great-power contenders can be discounted. Some economically significant actors such as Germany and Japan lack the military capabilities, especially nuclear weapons, to be great powers.
When it comes to reach, Germany, Japan, Brazil, and Indonesia have largely regional military capabilities; some of them enjoy considerable global influence through their diplomatic services and overseas aid policies. Germany and Japan have substantial soft power, but Brazil and Indonesia do not. All four have shown themselves to be brittle in the past and thus lack the necessary resilience.
Despite the endorsement of many, India does not meet most of the criteria either. It has nuclear weapons and the world’s fifth- or sixth-largest economy, but New Delhi’s military reach is largely regional. India claims a reputation as a “world teacher,” but it understands this role in non-great-power terms. Given the country’s relative youth in its modern form, India’s resilience is hard to measure—but its propensity to suffer terrorist and communal violence and its persisting poverty suggests vulnerabilities.
France is hard to assess. It is a large economy and commands a nuclear arsenal more independent than that of Britain, but it has lost important parts of its sovereignty, such as control over its own borders and currency, to the European Union. Paris still enjoys a lot of influence in Africa and has a significant presence in the Indo-Pacific, but it is on the retreat in the former and challenged by anticolonial movements in the latter. France also enjoys a global brand distinct from the Anglo-Saxons, China, and Russia.
In terms of resilience, though, France has repeatedly experienced state collapse in the 19th and 20th centuries, most notably when it was overrun by Germany in 1940 and had to be re-constituted by the Anglo-Americans after the war. It is much more brittle than the United Kingdom.
What is clear is that the extent to which the great powers enjoy resources, reach, reputation and resilience, and the balance between these capabilities, varies considerably. No great power is configured quite like any other, and they differ considerably in capacity and vulnerabilities. It has always been thus. In the past, none of the great powers were exactly as strong as any other, and some were considerably weaker—for example, 18th-century Prussia and late 19th-century Austria-Hungary.
Likewise, the great powers of today differ considerably from each other both in terms of individual strengths and overall strength. Though the United States and China are economically and militarily far ahead of Russia and the United Kingdom, all four states have attributes that mark them out from the next rung of major actors on the world scene. There is also one country, France, whose great-power status is unclear.
This list—those it includes and those it leaves off—may take some by surprise. Seen historically, however, its consistency is remarkable. Although the balance between the actors has shifted considerably, this configuration of great powers would have been recognizable not merely to our grandparents but our great-grandparents. In all likelihood, it will remain so to our children and grandchildren.
Enjoyed this article? Share it with your network. This week only, we’ve lifted the paywall across ForeignPolicy.com to commemorate America’s 250th birthday.
Brendan Simms is the director of the Centre for Geopolitics at the University of Cambridge and the author of The Return of the Great Powers.
