Saturday, July 31, 2021

NPR/Marist Poll: Biden Gets High Marks On COVID-19. It's Not The Case On Immigration

 POLITICS

NPR/Marist Poll: Biden Gets High Marks On COVID-19. It's Not The Case On Immigration

March 30, 2021

Domenico Montanaro - 

DOMENICO MONTANARO

Twitter

Two-thirds of American adults polled approve of the job that President Biden is doing with the coronavirus pandemic. That's nearly twice as high as those who say the same of Biden's job on immigration.

Jim Watson/AFP via Getty Images

Americans say President Biden is faring well when it comes to his handling of the coronavirus pandemic and, to a lesser extent, the economy, a new NPR/Marist poll finds. But immigration looks like it will continue to be a thorn in the president's side.

The survey out Tuesday also finds that an increasing number of Americans now say they will get a COVID-19 vaccine when one becomes available to them — bringing the U.S. closer to the range that scientists say is needed to reach a safe level of immunity that will stem new outbreaks of the coronavirus. But there are clear disparities by race on who has already gotten the vaccine.

"There is not an issue of willingness," said Lee Miringoff, director of the Marist Institute for Public Opinion. "It's an issue of access. With Trump voters, it's an issue of acceptance."

Two-thirds of Americans approve of the job that Biden is doing with the pandemic. That includes almost a third of Republicans. Overall, the president's approval rating is up to 52%, and his handling of the economy has now reached 51%.

All three are improvements from a poll conducted earlier this month.

But just 34% of Americans approve of Biden's handling of immigration, while 53% disapprove. A majority of independents and even a quarter of Democrats disapprove of the job he's doing on the issue.

The findings are a warning sign for the Biden administration as it grapples with a surge in migrants at the southern U.S. border, many of them unaccompanied minors.

Biden has blamed the Trump administration for what he calls immoral practices and for dialing back capacity to hold people who cross the border. Republicans say that Biden has reversed Trump-era policies that worked and that his softer tone on immigration has been a magnet for those fleeing difficult conditions in Central America.

The survey of 1,309 adults, who were contacted on cellphones and landlines by live callers, was conducted March 22 to 25. The poll has a margin of error of plus or minus 3.4 percentage points. In other words, results could be 3.4 percentage points lower or higher than the shown result. The margins of error are bigger for political subgroups.

When it comes to COVID-19 vaccinations, 70% of American adults now say they either have gotten at least one shot of the vaccine already (36%) or will get it when one becomes available to them (34%).

That's a steady increase from 62% in February and then from 67% earlier this month.

The change, according to the newest poll, is largely because of Republicans becoming less hesitant. Supporters of former President Donald Trump and Republicans are still the least likely to get the vaccine, but they are marginally less likely to say they won't get it now, as compared with earlier this month.

Forty percent of Trump supporters say they won't get the shot, down from 47% nearly four weeks ago; 36% of Republicans say they won't get it, down from 41%.

The new survey found little to no difference when it comes to vaccine reluctance by race — about a quarter each of whites, Blacks and Latinos said they would not get it if one comes available.

But more whites are getting vaccinated than Blacks or Latinos. Forty percent of white respondents said they've gotten a shot, compared with 34% of Blacks and just 28% of Latinos.

The survey comes a day after Biden warned about rising numbers of coronavirus cases.

"We're in the life-and-death race with a virus that is spreading quickly, with cases rising again," Biden said at the White House on Monday afternoon. He added, "We're giving up hard-fought, hard-won gains. And as much as we're doing, America, it's time to do even more."


Avrupa Birliği’ne artık ‘yolunuz açık olsun’ demenin zamanı! - Faruk LOĞOĞLU

 

Avrupa Birliği’ne artık ‘yolunuz açık olsun’ demenin zamanı! - Faruk LOĞOĞLU

  
30 Temmuz 2021 Cuma

Son yıllarda bir yanda AB, öbür yanda ülkemizdeki karşılıklı gelişmelere bakarak Türkiye’nin AB’ye tam üyelik hedefinin anlam ve getirisini artık yitirdiğini görüyorum. Ve AB’yle ilişkilerimiz konusunda artık başka türlü düşünmemiz gerektiği sonucuna varmış bulunuyorum. Dört ayrı nedenle. 

Birincisi, AB bugün, kuruluşuna ilham veren evrensel değerlerden kopmuş ve uzaklaşmıştır. Irkçılık kol gezmektedir. Faşist ve aşırı ideolojiler yükseliştedir. Popülizm ve popülist liderler revaçtadır. Yabancılara karşı husumet ve şiddet eylemleri yaygındır. İslamofobi kronikleşmiştir. Göçmenlere karşı kucaklayıcı politikalar yerine “bana gelmesinler” anlayışının hâkim olduğu olumsuz uygulamalar sürmektedir. Dışlanan ve ayırımcılığa uğrayan azınlıklar vardır. COVID-19 salgınına karşı bile birlik halinde bir mücadele stratejisi sergilenememiştir. AB ülkeleri korkularının esiri olmaya başlamışlardır. 

AB’NİN BAHANESİ

İkincisi, Türkiye’nin durumudur. Anayasamıza göre Cumhuriyetimiz demokratik, laik, sosyal bir hukuk devletidir. 1960’larda Ortaklık Anlaşması’nı imzalayan Türkiye devlet ve siyasi yapısı ve uluslararası toplumdaki saygın konumuyla çağdaş ve ilerici bir ülkeydi. 2021 yılı Türkiye’si ise altın çağını ileride değil geçmişin karanlık dehlizlerinde aramakta olan bir ülkedir. Tek adam yönetimi ihdas edilmiştir. Cumhuriyetimizin taşıyıcı kolonu laiklik her fırsat ve vesileyle yok edilmektedir. Bilime değil inanca dayalı eğitim yaygınlaştırılmaktadır. Adalete güvensizlik artmıştır. Halkın büyük kesimi fıtrat algısıyla yoksulluğa alıştırılmıştır. Temel hak ve özgürlükler artan baskı altındadır. Sonuç olarak, adaylığının kabulünden sonra Türkiye Kopenhag ölçütlerinde hep geriye gitmiştir. AB bu olumsuz gidişatı da bahane ederek zaten isteksiz yaklaştığı Türkiye’yle katılım müzakerelerini askıya almıştır. AB bu tutumuyla Türkiye’deki olumsuzlukları pekiştiren bir etki yapagelmiştir. 

2015 ANLAŞMASI GÖZDEN GEÇİRİLMELİ

Üçüncü nokta, ilişkilerde Türkiye’nin ektiğini AB’nin, AB’nin ektiğini de Türkiye’nin biçmekte olmasının tarafları getirdiği çıkmazla ilgilidir. AB’nin bizi istemediği, bizim de istesek de mevcut halimizle üye olamayacağımız gerçeği net olarak ortadır. Şöyle ki AB zirvelerinde Türkiye’nin katılımından artık söz edilmemektedir. AB yıllar boyu aslında kendi açısından tutarlı davranmıştır. Öte yandan, Türkiye de AB’nin eğri tutumundan şikâyeti elden bırakmazken demokrasi, hukukun üstünlüğü ve insan hakları planındaki yükümlülüklerini yerine getirmek şöyle dursun, aksi yönde adımlar atarak üyelik koşullarından iyice uzaklaşmıştır. Neticede AB’nin bilinçli eğrisi ile Türkiye’nin seçilmiş eğrisi birbirine denk gelmiş bulunmaktadır. Bu denklik, AB üyeliğimizin AB için var olmadığı, Türkiye için ise ulaşılamaz olduğu gerçeğini anlatmaktadır. 

Son nokta, ilişkilerdeki mevcut didişme ve tıkanıklığın karşılıklı çıkarlara verdiği zararla ilgilidir. Oysa aradaki bağlar her iki taraf için de hayati stratejik, siyasi, toplumsal ve ekonomik çıkarlar barındırmaktadır. Bu nedenle Türkiye-AB ilişkileri işlevsel ve gerçekçi bir çerçeveye oturtulmalıdır. 1963 Ankara Anlaşması’nda örnek unsurlar vardır. Yeni ilişki düzeninin adı değil, içeriği önemli olacaktır. Ticari ilişkilerin önemine binaen öncelikli hedef Gümrük Birliği Anlaşması’nın yenilenmesidir. İkinci sırada ise göçmenler/sığınmacılar meselesi vardır. 2015 anlaşması gözden geçirilmelidir. Ve tabii vizesiz dolaşım konusu ele alınmalıdır. Böyle bir adım tarafları “tam üyelik” kısır kıskacı ile Rum/Yunan istismarından kurtaracak, karşılıklı yararları çoğaltma şansı artacaktır. 

KARŞILIKLI YARAR

Uygarlık yolunda ilerlemek için Türkiye’nin önce içeride demokrasi, hukuk ve temel özgürlükler bağlamlarında kendisine bir düzen vermesi gerekmektedir. Bu süreçte AB’nin en iyi uygulamalarını her zaman örnek alabiliriz. Ancak bunun için üye olmamız şart değildir. İlişkilerin yeni bir güzergâha yerleştirilmesi ise AB’yi terk etmek olarak değil, karşılıklı yarar sağlayacak bir zemine çekilmesidir. Önemli olan AB üyesi olabilmek değil, demokratik, laik bir hukuk devleti olmaktır.

FARUK LOĞOĞLU 

EMEKLİ BÜYÜKELÇİ

The Sting in COVID-19’s Tail - For Poor Countries, What Comes Next Could Be Worse

 

  • TAREK GHANI is Chief Economist and Program Director, Future of Conflict at the International Crisis Group and a Nonresident Fellow at the Brookings Institution.

At the outset of the COVID-19 pandemic, many feared that the disease would hit the world’s poorest countries the hardest—that cases would overwhelm hospitals, health-care workers would run out of equipment and supplies, and the death toll would be devastating. Those eventualities, thankfully, have not yet come to pass. From available data, there appear to be fewer deaths per capita in low- and middle-income countries than in their richer counterparts.

But developing countries may have suffered more from the pandemic economically and politically than they have in the realm of public health. A recent International Monetary Fund (IMF) study has found that social unrest increased after the SARS, H1N1, MERS, Ebola, and Zika pandemics, particularly in countries with high levels of inequality. COVID-19 has more potential than all those past diseases combined to increase poverty, deepen social fractures, and intensify conflicts.

The likely scope and severity of the COVID-19 recession are worse than those of any global economic crisis since World War II. In October, the World Bank announced that the global poverty rate will rise for the first time in more than two decades: the pandemic could push as many as 150 million additional people below the extreme poverty line (defined as living on $1.90 per day) by the end of 2021, erasing years of progress. A Brookings Institution analysis has noted that this growth in poverty could persist until 2030, particularly in the most politically fragile, low-income countries.

Wealthy countries are weathering the economic storm far better than poor ones. The IMF has forecasted that global growth will rebound in 2021 as vaccinations and better COVID-19 testing help reopen many economies. But those gains will not be evenly shared. The poorest countries are disadvantaged several times over: their pre-pandemic growth rates were below the global average; they have had little fiscal and monetary flexibility during the crisis; their populations bear deep scars from hunger, disease, and missed schooling due to COVID-19; and they have limited access to vaccines. The International Crisis Group’s field research has suggested that these economic forces could fuel future instability. 

Ending the pandemic is therefore not only a matter of supplying immunizations and other medical assistance. Wealthy countries must look beyond their borders and international financial institutions must redouble their efforts if they are to prevent COVID-19’s long tail from causing further disruption.

A RECIPE FOR INSTABILITY

Like the pandemic itself, the economic crisis is both broadly global and highly localized. Most of East Asia, for example, has seen relatively modest economic fallout. Well-organized responses to the pandemic there have boosted hopes for a quick recovery. In Africa, by contrast, COVID-19’s economic impact is already serious: the continent is home to 70 percent of the world’s poor—more than 400 million people—who are particularly likely to lose jobs and go hungry during the pandemic. In Latin America, home to roughly one-quarter of the world’s current COVID-19 fatalities, the pandemic has pulled the rug out from under a rapidly growing middle class. In the Middle East and Central Asia, health systems are stretched thin, and large informal sectors have taken a battering, leading the typically staid IMF to warn of mounting social unrest.

Overall, COVID-19 has pushed many economic levers in poor countries in the wrong direction. The pandemic-induced recession has enlarged the ranks of the unemployed and increased dependence on weak state institutions. It has reduced tax revenues in many countries, leading governments to take on new debt or to squeeze public services and social programs. Some developing countries have responded to the crisis by depreciating currencies, with the effect of lowering real wages and raising the costs of living. Individually, each shock strains the system. Together, they are a recipe for instability.

For countries grappling with conflict, climate change, or both, the pandemic has hit at an especially inauspicious time. In February 2020, before analysts had meaningfully registered COVID-19’s impact, the World Bank projected that two-thirds of the extreme poor would live in fragile and conflict-affected situations by 2030. COVID-19 has darkened the economic picture in exactly those settings.

In war-torn countries, for instance, the pandemic did not inspire states and armed groups to embrace UN Secretary-General António Guterres’s call for a global cease-fire. Instead, from Afghanistan to northern Syria to Yemen, the health and economic effects of COVID-19 have added to the human toll of war. In October 2020, the Food and Agricultural Organization and the World Food Program warned that in conflict settings, the pandemic was driving millions into food insecurity, raising the risk of famine in Burkina Faso, northeastern Nigeria, South Sudan, and Yemen. The pandemic has interfered with the transport of goods into war zones, and important funding appeals remain unmet—for example, the WFP had to cut the delivery of food rations in Yemen from monthly to once every other month in April 2020. Yemeni children are dying of hunger.

Politically fragile, oil-dependent economies have taken a beating during the pandemic. Already teetering from a price war between Russia and Saudi Arabia, the global oil market has collapsed. Oil-exporting countries have seen their public debts swell and their budgets shrink. Iraq, the third-largest oil exporter, is now particularly squeezed with a monthly deficit of $3.5 billion to $4.5 billion and currency reserves of only $53 billion in October 2020. In November, Prime Minster Mustafa al-Kadhimi warned that he was struggling to pay government salaries. Days later, protesting government workers clashed with security forces in northern Iraq in deadly violence. In late December, Iraq’s central bank devalued its currency by one-fifth, causing further agitation. More markdowns are expected.

Three of Africa’s top oil producers have also experienced growing unrest since the onset of the pandemic. In November, police in the Angolan capital, Luanda, used live bullets, tear-gas, and dogs to disperse a peaceful demonstration against the rising cost of living and the postponement of municipal elections due to the pandemic. In Nigeria, which is facing its worst economic recession in four decades, enormous protests have erupted against both police brutality and economic mismanagement and corruption, leading the IMF to warn that surging unemployment and poverty during the pandemic are fueling social instability. Algeria has used COVID-19 lockdowns to limit public protests as socioeconomic indicators continue to deteriorate.

The pandemic threatens to push already precarious political and economic systems over the edge. Take Lebanon, for example. For more than a decade, the Lebanese state has spent more than it received in revenues while failing to deliver basic services, such as electricity and garbage disposal. A fiscal and monetary crisis came to a head in October 2019, when protests brought the country to a standstill. By January 2020, the protests had turned violent, with more than 150 people injured in clashes with the police. 

Then came COVID-19 in March 2020, and a three-month lockdown. Lebanon’s economy entered a tailspin. By May, more than half the population had fallen below the poverty line, nearly double the previous year’s rate, and by July, inflation had soared past 100 percent (it had been below 20 percent back in March). The economic crisis compounded political gridlock, as politicians deflected blame onto one another, delaying the reforms that the IMF required for a bailout. Throughout the turmoil, the Lebanese state has receded dangerously: crime has soared, but the real wages of security forces have fallen, and competing armed factions have engaged in a growing number of deadly incidents. As one military officer told Al Arabiya in September, “all of Lebanon is armed, we can’t do much about it.”

Lebanon offers a cautionary tale for other countries struggling to deal with unrest at a time when they lack economic flexibility. In Latin America, COVID-19’s death toll exceeds 570,000, and its economic consequences threaten to force tens of millions of people into poverty. Social unrest has flared in GuatemalaPeru, and elsewhere in response to the failure of governments to protect lives and livelihoods from the pandemic. Where states have fallen short, armed criminal groups seek to fill the gap: such has been the case in ColombiaEl Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico.

COVID-19’s economic fallout is also complicating delicate political transitions. In Sudan, inflation reached record highs of 212 percent in September and 230 percent in October, running down the country’s reserves of foreign exchange and forcing the government into a state of economic emergency. Demonstrators have demanded action, closing off streets with burning tires in AugustOctober, and again last week. In Tunisia, ten years after a popular revolt over economic conditions toppled the old regime, a wave of violent protests over growing poverty and unemployment has swept through at least 15 cities this month, prompting authorities to ban further demonstrations

GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITY

COVID-19 isn’t responsible for the precarious economic balance in many countries at risk of conflict, but it almost certainly increases the likelihood of strife. Just as a health crisis can trigger an economic collapse, economic crises can trigger political instability in the societies least able to weather the storm. But this looming problem has so far attracted too little attention from international donors.

Because wealthy countries have also suffered shocks from the pandemic, they are understandably focused on their own recovery. On average, advanced economies have spent nearly 20 percent of annual GDP on fiscal stimulus, ten times the two percent of annual GDP that low-income countries have spent. But without additional resources and support, the aftershocks of COVID-19 in low-income countries could become ever more severe. The pandemic has pushed tens of millions into poverty, and their governments may soon have to grapple with their increasingly urgent demands, even while struggling to fill security vacuums before criminal and armed groups do so instead.

The governments of developing countries need to protect the sick and the poor until vaccines arrive and economies stabilize. Economists and public health experts agree that every country, regardless of wealth, should stave off the collapse of health-care systems, transfer cash to vulnerable citizens, and test enough people for COVID-19 to determine when and where reopening is possible. All that is easier said than done in low-income countries short on funds, long on debt, and wary of credit downgrades. Local leaders may be reluctant to challenge the international and domestic forces that promote economic austerity. But if austerity hurt wealthy economies after the 2008 financial crisis, it is not likely to help poor ones now.

Wealthy countries ought to take the long view and act boldly to forgive the debts of poor countries and expand emergency financial assistance. The Biden administration could start by reversing former U.S. Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin’s call for the World Bank “not to burden shareholders with premature calls for new financing.” The White House should make clear that an extraordinary global crisis calls for an extraordinary response. With interest rates at historic lows, such an effort doesn’t require new aid money—the World Bank’s donors could agree to tap financial markets to expand lending capacity and to more swiftly replenish funds for grants and low-interest loans for the world’s poorest countries. Likewise, U.S. President Joe Biden could quickly authorize $650 billion in new reserve assets at the IMF, known as special drawing rights, and back proposed legislation to further expand this total. With new resources and clear policy guidance to mitigate the risks of conflict, international financial institutions could boost efforts to protect the lives and livelihoods of the world’s most vulnerable populations.

The United States and Europe are still in the midst of a winter COVID-19 surge and their own economic crises. They may feel it unwise or premature to direct attention beyond their borders. But although vaccine distribution and economic stimulus offer advanced economies a path to recovery, the same cannot be said for poorer countries, where the most at-risk populations live and where the possibility of conflict and war is greatest. In the years ahead, many Western priorities—such as climate change, migration, terrorism, and infectious diseases—will require cooperation with the countries currently most threatened by COVID-19’s long tail. The aftershocks that the world doesn’t deal with today may have destabilizing consequences for decades to come.

South Korea vs. North Korea: Who Has the More Powerful Military?

 



South Korea vs. North Korea: Who Has the More Powerful Military?

Comparing the capabilities of the two Koreas’ militaries isn’t easy given their radically different capabilities, especially the North’s possession of nuclear weapons. But that judgment doesn’t much matter so long as the U.S. is responsible for the ROK’s defense.

by Doug Bandow 

In the past, South Koreans believed that North Korea had the stronger military. The numbers have recently flipped, however, and a plurality now believes the South is stronger. Why opinion shifted, and what that means for policy, is uncertain.

A few years ago forty-two percent of South Koreans believed that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) fielded the more powerful armed forces. Only thirty percent sided with the South’s military. A sizable gap prevailed through last November, but the outcome shifted dramatically in an April poll by the Korea Institute for National Unification. The South came out slightly ahead: 37.1 percent believed that the Republic of Korea’s (ROK) forces were more powerful, compared to 36.5 percent who saw the DPRK’s Korean People’s Army as being stronger.

Jina Kim of the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses called the result “surprising.” She noted: “Just this year North Korea announced that they will develop new types of weapons, test-launched cruise and short-range missiles.”

Indeed, shortly before the November poll, the North held a large parade that highlighted the North’s new intercontinental ballistic missile. Although it would not be used to target neighboring South Korea, it represented power lacking in the ROK. Kim Jong-un spoke to the assembled crowd of defense while showcasing offense: “We will continue to strengthen the war deterrent, the righteous self-defense means, so as to contain and control all the dangerous attempts and intimidatory acts by the hostile forces, including their sustained and aggravating nuclear threat.”

Even if these images might fade in South Korea by April, the North held another lengthy military parade in January. Pyongyang proudly described the highlight: “The submarine strategic ballistic missile, the world’s strongest weapon, entered the square in succession powerfully demonstrating the might of the strong revolutionary army with military and technological upper hand of the world.”

Nor did the DPRK offer any words of friendship for Seoul. Kim’s sister, Kim Yo-Jong, insulted South Koreans for watching the parade. Observers must be “shaking in their shoes,” she insisted. Without even a hint of conciliation from Pyongyang, in April South Koreans should have been more worried, even alarmed, than in November.

Of course, South Koreans are used to living with their dangerous neighbor. For most of the last seventy-three years the ROK has suffered through blustering, insulting, and threatening behavior.

Jina Kim told NKNews that South Koreans might have changed their opinion on the military balance because they were feeling better about the alliance with the United States: “South Korea has a combined defense system. So the strength of the U.S.-ROK alliance also influences the people’s trust in their military force.” She also pointed to increased talk about the South’s missile program.

Or maybe South Koreans recognize the many other challenges that face the North. Opined Kim: “In 2020, there’s been lots of reports about North Korean soldiers put into farming or construction projects during the COVID-19 pandemic. So even if the North Korean forces are bigger than South Korea’s in number, South Koreans may be realizing that they can’t ‘fight tonight’ like South Korean soldiers can.”

These are all interesting, even plausible theories. Yet none are persuasive. The military alliance has survived radically different governments on both sides of the Pacific. Even Trump did not seriously impair the alliance, despite his splenetic comments and the difficult negotiations over the Special Measures Agreement. Nor did the South Korean public appear to be particularly concerned about the status of the alliance: the majority opposed paying significantly more even while supporting the relationship.

South Korea’s missile development pales in extent and importance compared to the North’s efforts. It will take time for Seoul to take advantage of the recent decision to lift range and weight limits previously set by Washington. As for recognition that the DPRK’s problems undermine its military effectiveness, that is ancient history. Things might have gotten worse last year, but they already were worse in November.

Dongyoun Cho of Seokyeong University noted that few “domestic factors” changed between November and April. South Korean military outlays are up, but that was much debated before. Maybe there was more talk about the South’s qualitative military advantages, she suggested: “I think South Koreans are perhaps becoming more aware of the fact that the military is heading toward the field of artificial intelligence, automatic driving, pilotless planes, space and cyber. There’s an assessment that South Korea is ahead of North Korea in general, so that may have brought changes in perception on the military.” Yet that seems like inside baseball for the public, an esoteric factor unlikely to cause large numbers of people to change their opinions.

Beyond the issue of causation is the more important question of the impact of such a public opinion shift on policy. Does the change make it easier for the ROK to provide for its security?

South Koreans rightly fear the Korean People's Army. It is the world’s fourth-largest in terms of personnel. However, much of its equipment is old; its soldiers are neither in the best health nor the best trained. In sheer mass, it could do substantial damage, especially in a push on Seoul, which is only thirty or so miles from the border. The air force would not last long, but the navy displayed some dangerous capabilities with the 2010 sinking of the ROKS Cheonan. Artillery and Scud missiles could target Seoul even now. Much more damaging would be the DPRK’s presumed ability to use nuclear-tipped missiles against South Korea and beyond.

The ROK certainly should be able to defend itself against the North. With more than fifty times the economic strength, a vast technological advantage, and twice the population, South Korea could build a military of the size and capability necessary to deter and, if necessary, defeat another North Korean invasion. There is no need for Seoul to accept military inferiority of any kind.

Rather, the South’s lagging capabilities reflect its reliance on the United States. The more the ROK offloads responsibility for its defense, the less it will do for itself, leaving its forces less capable vis-à-vis Pyongyang. And then South Korea will be more vulnerable since Washington will put its own interests first in a crisis and pressure Seoul to conform to U.S. priorities. Moreover, the latter are likely to change dramatically once North Korea gains, or is believed to have gained, the ability to target the American homeland, especially as the DPRK’s arsenal grows. At that point—the Rand Corporation and Asan Institute figure the North could have two hundred nuclear weapons by 2027—Washington would be reluctant to fight even a conventional conflict on behalf of South Korea since any conflict could end with a nuclear exchange and destruction of major American cities.

Comparing the capabilities of the two Koreas’ militaries isn’t easy given their radically different capabilities, especially the North’s possession of nuclear weapons. However, nothing substantial changed between November and April to justify the radical shift in South Korean opinion regarding the peninsula’s military balance. But that judgment doesn’t much matter so long as the U.S. is responsible for the ROK’s defense.

If Pyongyang’s nuclear program continues to expand, however, America’s commitment will necessarily become less certain. What U.S. president would be willing to risk Honolulu, Los Angeles, Chicago, and even, perhaps, Washington, D.C. and New York City, to defend Seoul? Then the South Korean people would have to not just assess the military balance but redress any weaknesses. That world is approaching faster than many people might imagine.

Doug Bandow is a Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute.  A former Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan, he is the author of several books, including Tripwire: Korea and U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changed World and co-author of The Korean Conundrum: America’s Troubled Relations with North and South Korea

Philippines’ Visiting Forces Agreement with US in full force after Duterte ‘retracts’ termination letter

 Philippines’ Visiting Forces Agreement with US in full force after Duterte ‘retracts’ termination letter

Duterte had threatened to cancel the VFA that allows for the rotation of US troops in and out of the Philippines

After meeting with Pentagon chief Lloyd Austin, he decided against doing so, ensuring stability in Washington-Manila ties as the US tries to counter China’s rising influence

Raissa Robles

Published: 12:45pm, 30 Jul, 2021

US Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin walks past military honour guards in Manila on Friday. Photo: AFPUS Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin walks past military honour guards in Manila on Friday. Photo: AFP

The Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) that allows American soldiers to conduct military exercises on Philippine soil is once again in full force after President Rodrigo Duterte “retracted” a previous letter notifying Washington he was terminating it.

Duterte arrived at the decision after meeting with US Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin in Manila on Thursday.

Speaking to reporters at the Philippines armed forces headquarters on Friday, with Austin by his side, Philippines Defence Secretary Delfin Lorenzana said Manila had submitted a termination letter to Washington stating that the VFA would end in six months. However, this six-month period was extended several times.

“That letter has been retracted as if nothing happened,” Lorenzana said.

“The VFA is in full force again. There is no termination letter pending and we are back on track,” he added.

Duterte’s decision to do away with terminating the VFA, which came into force in 1999, effectively does not change anything on the ground since the deal that provides rules for the rotation of thousands of US troops in and out of the Philippines for war drills and exercises, was never cancelled.

But it provides stability for both countries’ ties, as the US tries to counter China’s growing influence in Asia by stepping up its outreach to the region. Austin visited Singapore and Vietnam this week before arriving in the Philippines while Secretary of State Antony Blinken went to India. News reports suggest Vice-President Kamala Harris could travel to Vietnam and Singapore next month.

Duterte has championed closer ties with Beijing, with Manila seeking to benefit from more Chinese investments, though the country has also opposed China’s expansive claims in the disputed South China Sea.

Duterte announced his decision to terminate the VFA after the US denied a visa to a Philippine senator that he regards as an ally. Subsequently, he demanded vaccines from the US in exchange for continuing with the VFA.

US Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin (left) with his Philippine counterpart Delfin Lorenzana in Manila. Photo: AFP

The US has shipped millions of vaccines to the Philippines, although China is currently the biggest supplier.

Lorenzana told reporters he did not know what made the president change his mind, but said Austin’s courtesy call on Duterte – the first by a senior cabinet official under US President Joe Biden’s administration – had yielded an “open and frank discussion on the status and future direction of Philippines-US engagement.”

“They agreed that the alliance can be further strengthened through enhanced communication and greater cooperation, particularly in the areas of pandemic response, combating transnational crimes, including the war on illegal drugs, maritime domain awareness the rule of law, and trade and investments,” said Lorenzana.

Asked about a section in the VFA that has proven controversial – where the US retains custody over soldiers who are undergoing trial for heinous crimes committed in the country – Lorenzana said this was being ironed out between both sides.

“It will not affect the original document, but it will just be an adjunct or an additional agreement between the two countries,” he said.

Austin thanked Duterte for the decision that he described as “very welcome”, disclosing that the US had named one of its operations in the Indo-Pacific “Operation Pacific Eagle Philippines” though he did not give further details.

“I also reaffirmed America’s commitment to supporting a sovereign and secure Philippines and to building an even more capable alliance together,” Austin said, adding that he and Lorenzana had discussed how to work together “toward a free and open Indo-Pacific rooted in a rules-based international order.”

Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte (right) greets US Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin in Manila. Photo: DPA

With the restoration of the VFA, Austin said the Department of Defence would be able to conduct more than 300 bilateral exchanges a year with the Philippines Armed Forces, including exercises where troops would be in combat training “shoulder-to-shoulder”.

Austin disclosed that before meeting with Lorenzana, he had visited the American Memorial Cemetery in Metro Manila. “My father served probably in the Philippines during World War II as a corporal in the United States Army. He was one of the many American and Filipino service members who fought side by side to defeat aggression and secure freedom in the Pacific.”

Presidential spokesman Harry Roque later said Duterte’s decision was based “on upholding Philippines’ strategic core interests, the clear definition of [the] alliance as one between sovereign equals, and clarity of the US position on its obligations and commitments under the [Mutual Defence Treaty]”.

The United States this month repeated a warning to China that an attack on Philippine forces in the South China Sea would trigger the treaty, which came into force in 1951.

Roque added though that the Philippines would “continue to engage other countries for partnerships that work, based on our core national interests.”

Security analyst Collin Koh, a research fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore, said he believed “the domestic dimension” had prompted Duterte to change his mind. The Philippines is set to vote in a new president next year and while Duterte is barred from seeking re-election, his PDP-Laban Party is keen for him to run as vice-president.

“The South China Sea looks set to be an important issue alongside the Covid-19 response and economic challenges that could feature in the polls,” Koh said.

“Restoring the VFA could demonstrate Duterte’s care for South China Sea issues, while at the same time, appealing also to the Philippine military, which remains a powerful national institution and which has longstanding, institutionalised relations with its US counterpart.”

Additional reporting by Reuters

This article appeared in the South China Morning Post print edition as: Duterte withdraws letter ending U.S. forces agreement

Raissa Robles

Raissa Robles

Raissa Robles has written for the SCMP since 1996. A freelance journalist specialising in politics, international relations, business and Muslim rebellion, she has contributed to Reuters, the Economist Intelligence Unit, Daily Mail, Times of London, Radio Netherlands and Asiaweek. She runs the award-winning investigative and opinion blog, raissarobles.com. Her book, Marcos Martial Law: Never Again, a brief history of the dictatorship won the 2017 National Book Awards for Non-Fiction. Her Twitter handle is @raissawriter.



İKV Açıklaması : TÜRKİYE İÇİN AB’NİN ÖNEMİ DEVAM EDİYOR

 


İKV Açıklaması :  TÜRKİYE İÇİN AB’NİN ÖNEMİ DEVAM EDİYOR

Son yıllarda Türkiye’nin Avrupa Birliği sürecinde yaşanan zorluklar ve gerilimler toplumun genelinde ve siyasi kadrolarda bir umutsuzluk ve hayal kırıklığı yaratmıştır.

Gerek AB reformlarının durma noktasına gelmesi gerekse AB içinde Türkiye’nin üyeliğini engelleyen çevrelerin varlığı zaman zaman yılgınlık yaratmakta ve AB hedefinden vazgeçme yönünde çağrılara yol açmaktadır.

Ancak bu konuda kararlı bir şekilde belirlediğimiz hedeften sapmadan yolumuza devam etmemiz çok önemlidir.

Yıllar önce Rahmetli Özal’ın da ifade ettiği gibi AB sürecinin uzun ve ince bir yol olduğu başından itibaren bilinmektedir.

AB katılım sürecinde Türkiye’nin karşılaması gereken kriterler zaten ülkemizin kendisi için hedef olarak seçtiği koşulları karşılamaktadır.

Hukukun üstünlüğü, demokrasi, insan hakları çağdaş bir toplum ve devlet olmanın ön koşuludur.

Türkiye’nin bulunduğu coğrafyada ekonomik, siyasi ve kültürel açıdan bir arada olmasının makul ve doğal olduğu ülkeler grubu AB’dir. 

Bu sebeple bu hedeften vazgeçilmesi Türkiye’nin ali çıkarlarına hizmet etmez.

Türkiye’nin AB yolunda yürüyüşüne devam etmesi kendi sosyoekonomik gelişme hedefleri ile koşut ve uyumludur.

AB’nin zaman zaman kendi değerlerini sorgulatan yaklaşımları olsa da, temelini oluşturan ilke ve hedefler evrensel değerlerle örtüşmektedir.

Bunun yanında AB önemli bir değişim ve dönüşüm sürecinden geçmektedir. AB’yi yeni yüzyılda anlamlı kılacak Yeşil Mutabakat gibi projeler Türkiye’yi de yakından ilgilendirmekte ve uyum ihtiyacını acil hale getirmektedir.

Ayrıca, kendisi köklü bir dönüşümden geçen ve krizleri aşmayı hedefleyen AB ile ilişkimizi yeniden tanımlama zamanı değildir.

Belirli bir süre daha izleyerek AB’nin nasıl bir yapıya evrildiğini görmek ve ondan sonra gerekirse ilişkimizi yeniden tanımlamak daha doğru olacaktır.

Türkiye’nin AB üyesi olabilmesi AB kriterlerini yerine getirmesine bağlı olduğu kadar aynı zamanda bir konjonktür meselesidir. 

Almanya’nın eski Başbakanlarından Helmut Kohl, yıllarca Türkiye’nin AB üyeliğine karşı çıkmış, ancak ondan iktidarı devralan Gerhardt Schröder Türkiye’nin AB ile müzakereleri başlatmasına ön ayak olmuştur.

Konjonktürü oluşturan koşullar hızlı bir biçimde değişebilir.

Önemli olan Türkiye’nin reformlara hız vermek suretiyle, kendi demokrasi ve ekonomisini güçlendirerek AB için uygun bir aday olması ve koşullar izin verdiğinde üyeliği gerçekleştirebilecek hazırlık durumunda olmasıdır.

Aksi takdirde Türkiye’nin uluslararası konumu açısından en önemli kazanımlarından olan AB adaylığını rafa kaldırıp sonu belirsiz bir yola çıkmak Türkiye’nin yararına olmayacaktır.

Türkiye’nin yeri Avrupa’dır. Türkiyesiz AB eksik kalacaktır

Globalization Strikes Back by Richard Haass

 Globalization Strikes Back

Jul 26, 2021

RICHARD HAASS

The still-raging pandemic and climate-related disasters worldwide demonstrate the woeful inadequacy of efforts to address the problematic aspects of globalization. The so-called international community has again shown itself to be anything but a community.

NEW YORK – The summer of 2021 has come to be largely defined by the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic and accelerating climate change. Both are manifestations of globalization and the reality of a world increasingly defined by the vast and fast cross-border flows of just about everything, from goods, services, and capital to data, terrorists, and disease.

Little nowadays stays local for long. The lethal coronavirus that first appeared in Wuhan, China did not remain there, and greenhouse gases emitted anywhere warm the atmosphere and ocean everywhere.

These two crises demonstrate the woeful inadequacy of efforts to address the problematic aspects of globalization. The so-called international community has again shown itself to be anything but a community. The supply of COVID-19 vaccines is billions of doses short of what is needed. The funds to pay for global immunization are likewise billions of dollars short. Governments are putting their countries first, even though fast-spreading variants are emerging in under-vaccinated populations elsewhere and are indifferent to political borders.

As a result, the pandemic remains an intense threat. The death toll thus far is said to be over four million, but the real figure is several times higher, owing in some cases to flawed reporting systems and to deliberate undercounting by populist leaders in Brazil, India, Hungary, Russia, and elsewhere. The economic consequences are likewise substantial, with the pandemic estimated to have reduced global GDP by over 3%. Approximately 100 million people have fallen back into extreme poverty. Inequality between and within countries has spiked.

What makes these developments all the more frustrating is that we know what to do about COVID-19 and possess the means to do it. Several safe and extraordinarily effective vaccines exist. What remains to be done is to scale up production to meet global demand.

In some countries, such as the United States, what needs doing is the opposite: to increase demand to meet the available supply. Vaccine hesitancy, fueled by partisan politics or misinformation circulating on social media, television, and talk radio, has become dangerously widespread. If vaccination were complemented by public-health measures known to slow the spread of disease – masking, social distancing, readily available and accurate testing and contact tracing, and quarantining – there would be far fewer and less severe infections, and the pandemic as we know it would fade away.

The effects of the other crisis, climate change, have arrived sooner than many anticipated. For years, the tendency has been to put off any concerted response to the threat, despite clear and growing evidence that the planet is warming. As is often the case, the urgent crowded out the important. But the summer of 2021 is showing that climate change is both important and urgent.

Its effects are many. In the US, wildfires in the West rage out of control as the temperature climbs, and smog has blanketed swaths of the country. Europe and China are the scenes of massive flooding. In Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East, there are signs of prolonged drought. The loss of life has been relatively modest, but it could well grow. Economic effects will likewise mount. The number of people who are being internally displaced or forced to migrate is rising sharply as large tracts of territory become inhospitable to human life.

There is much talk about how to slow or stop climate change, but it is mostly just that. The United Nations climate-change conference (COP26) in Glasgow in November will continue to emphasize an approach whereby individual countries offer voluntary commitments to reduce their emissions.

This is important, but it is obvious that many countries are focused more on economic growth at all costs, and are unable or unwilling to adopt energy paths that will meaningfully reduce their contribution to climate change. It remains to be seen whether there is the will to adopt tariffs that raise the prices of goods made in factories fueled by coal, or to impose sanctions against governments that refuse to stop the destruction of rainforests that absorb carbon dioxide. Also to be determined is whether wealthier countries are prepared to make available the funds and technologies that poorer countries need to shift to a greener energy mix.

At the same time, focusing on slowing the rate of climate change, however necessary, is insufficient. A good deal of climate change has already happened, and more will happen regardless of what is decided in Glasgow. Efforts to adapt to existing or inevitable effects of climate change, to make cities and rural areas alike better able to withstand pervasive heat and sprawling wildfires, more frequent storms and floods, and more severe drought, will also be needed. Resilience will be as important as prevention.

Lastly, we must accelerate both the development and regulation of new technologies that promise to remove CO2 from the atmosphere or reflect sunlight away from Earth. Such potential responses to climate change are unproven and controversial. But if the collective failure to deal with COVID-19 is any indication, we had better be prepared to consider them sooner rather than later. There is no escape from globalization; the only question is whether and how we choose to manage it.

Richard Haass

RICHARD HAASS

Writing for PS since 2020

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Richard Haass, President of the Council on Foreign Relations, previously served as Director of Policy Planning for the US State Department (2001-2003), and was President George W. Bush's special envoy to Northern Ireland and Coordinator for the Future of Afghanistan. He is the author, most recently, of The World: A Brief Introduction (Penguin Press, 2020).


Miscalculating Tunisia

 Miscalculating Tunisia

If Westerners are shocked at political developments in Tunisia, it’s because they described it as a straightforward success for too long. 

Article by Steven A. Cook

July 28, 2021 11:46 am (EST)

Supporters of Tunisian President Kais Saied chant slogans denouncing Assembly Speaker and Islamist Ennahdha party leader Rached Ghannouchi in front of parliament. Fethi Belaid/AFP/Getty Images

On July 25, Tunisian President Kais Saied dismissed the country’s prime minister and suspended parliament for 30 days. Security forces were then deployed around the parliament building in Tunis, blocking legislators from passing through. The next day, the president forced out the acting justice minister, sacked the defense minister, and ordered the offices of Al Jazeera closed. He also banned gatherings of three people or more. 

Rached Ghannouchi, the speaker of the now shuttered parliament and longtime leader of the Islamist Ennahdha party, called Saied’s action a “coup.” The president disagreed, citing Article 80 of the Tunisian Constitution, which gives the head of state the power to do precisely what he did in the event of “imminent danger threatening the integrity of the country and the country’s security and independence.” There is a significant difference of opinion, however, as to whether Tunisia’s current dire economic problems, parliamentary drift, and a debilitating wave of COVID-19 actually amount to such imminent danger. This would seem to be a problem that the Constitutional Court could adjudicate—but alas, there is no court because either no one can agree on which judges to appoint or the president has blocked their appointment. 

Coup or no coup, this was not supposed to happen in Tunisia. Tunisia is (or was) the “lone success story” of the Arab Spring. But these kinds of clichés, used by international media over and over for a decade, were themselves always a problem. They framed Tunisian politics in a way that closed off other possibilities—like backsliding—and envisaged linear developments from protests to elections to a constitution. When breathless editorials described a peaceful transfer of power to a “genuine democracy,” they stripped out the complexity of Tunisian politics specifically and transitions to democracy more generally. 

It is unclear that Saied’s power grab constitutes the end of the country’s democratization. Tunisians have been on the brink before, including during an extended political stalemate in 2013. Then, in 2015, newly elected President Beji Caid Essebsi preferred a government that would have excluded Ennahdha and its allies. Unfortunately for Essebsi and the secularists of his Nidaa Tounes party, the parliamentary math did not work in his favor, forcing a broader coalition. Goodwill eventually developed between the president and Ghannouchi, but what seemed more important than personality in forcing a compromise was the very fact that neither Essebsi nor Ghannouchi had the kind of popular support necessary to impose his will on the other—an apparent benefit of a divided society.

It was laudable and notable that Tunisia did not descend into violence in 2013, that a workable coalition government was established in 2015, and that there was a peaceful transfer of power after Essebsi died in 2019––though none of these achievements necessarily meant that Tunisia was going to continue to progress. Serious analysts knew this because they understood the country’s economic challenges, the lingering questions around identity, the yen for the old order among elites, and the inability of parliament to make good on the promise of the January 2011 revolution. 

Yet curiously, some of these same experts and observers continued to describe Tunisia straightforwardly as a success—creating an unwritten and unacknowledged expectation that the country’s progress would invariably continue. This was especially odd, given the ongoing erosion in the past decade of democratic institutions in countries considered consolidated democracies––including the United States. 

In the few days since Saied gave himself executive authority, there have been protests both in support and opposition to his actions. The former are more interesting. Dispatches from Tunisia indicate that those hailing the president have had enough of poor governance and a lack of economic opportunity. Layer into these problems the fact that a recent wave of COVID-19 has devastated the country’s health care system, and a lot more people seem willing to bet on an authoritarian who promises to make their lives better with more unencumbered power at his disposal. 

The readiness to part with hard-won gains after a decade of democratization seems to be part and parcel of Tunisia’s particular political culture. No, I’m not referring to the canard that Arab and Muslim societies are unpracticed at democracy; rather, I mean to draw attention to the cultural legacy of the big Arab state that promised (but rarely, if ever, delivered) security, education, and opportunity. The analysts, journalists, and civil society activists with whom Westerners tend to interact in Tunisia want to forge a more just and democratic society. But what about Tunisians more broadly? Many—or at least the ones in the streets in the last few days—seem to have a more ambivalent relationship with democracy. They seem to want a more effective state that can deliver jobs and a social safety net regardless of the character of the political system. It is possible that after a decade in which Tunisians enjoyed greater personal freedoms, the lack of prosperity has made a potentially significant number of them more willing to give some version of authoritarianism another try. 

Of course, it remains entirely unclear what will happen in Tunisia and what foreign powers can do about it. Given how much attention the press and experts have lavished on Tunisia since the overthrow of Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali in January 2011, combined with U.S. President Joe Biden’s commitment to a values-based foreign policy, there will be at least some pressure for the United States to respond. Yet here is the conundrum: In Washington, Tunisia tends to be viewed through the prism of its presumed success. Thus, experts and activists have advocated for providing more assistance to Tunisia precisely because it is alleged to have made the transition to democracy. The United States has also developed a security relationship with Tunisia based on fighting extremism. Should the United States now withhold or cut this aid? That would seem appropriate in terms of values but perhaps risky when it comes to security, given Tunisia’s penchant for producing extremists and instability in the neighboring Sahel region. This is not an easy circle to square. 

In what would be one of the more unexpected developments in U.S. Middle East policy, Tunisia may end up being a cautionary tale in building a policy around a regime type because political systems can change—quickly. 



Friday, July 30, 2021

How Americans Think About Trade - Winners, Losers, and the Psychology of Globalization

 

  • DIANA C. MUTZ is Samuel A. Stouffer Professor of Political Science and Communication at the University of Pennsylvania and the author of Winners and Losers: The Psychology of Foreign Trade (Princeton University Press, 2021), from which this essay is adapted.

The way ordinary Americans think about trade is very different from the way economists and policy wonks think about it. Most people do not have accurate knowledge of how trade affects them personally: they do not support trade if they stand to gain from it or oppose it because it will hurt them economically. Instead, Americans’ views are shaped by trade’s perceived effects on the United States as a whole, their feelings about the trading partner country and U.S. political party in power, and their general outlook on the world beyond their country’s borders.   

Put simply, most Americans’ opinions about trade are rooted in the psychology of human interaction. Their attitudes toward people and countries they see as dissimilar to themselves significantly influence their opinions. The basic distinction boils down to whether they believe it is possible to cooperate for mutual benefit or whether they view with suspicion those who seem very different from themselves. For this reason, it is not surprising that racial prejudice turns out to be one of the strongest predictors of opposition to trade.

Following the 2016 presidential election, pundits and politicians claimed that Donald Trump’s victory represented the beginning of a “backlash” against globalization. This view has also filtered down to the public; my research has shown that Americans believe the country is becoming less supportive of international trade. In fact, the opposite is true: support for trade has increased among both Democrats and Republicans and is now stronger than ever. The result is a strange situation in which many policymakers continue to publicly disavow and disparage trade even as the public heartily embraces it.

“AMERICA FIRST,” NOT ME FIRST

The fact that self-interest matters little to their trade preferences does not imply that Americans are unconcerned about the economic impact of trade. People care a great deal about how they perceive the country as a whole to be affected by trade. They connect policy decisions made in Washington to what they see as those policies’ national consequences; it is difficult for them to politicize their personal economic experience, particularly with complex issues such as international trade.

Few Americans have an accurate sense of both the positive and negative aspects of trade. The media has likely contributed to this: coverage tends to focus on sympathetic individuals losing their jobs as a result of trade, rather than the complex ways in which Americans benefit from globalization. In 2013, about half of Americans endorsed the view that trade reduced the number of jobs available in the United States and increased the number of jobs available overseas. This suggests a zero-sum way of thinking about trade; in this line of thought, trade takes a finite number of jobs in the world and reallocates them from one country to another.

If Americans do not possess sophisticated knowledge of what they or the U.S. economy stands to gain or lose, how do they form views about trade? Willingness to trade with a country, as with another individual, depends on trust. Trust, in turn, is heavily influenced by perceived similarity. The more similar to the United States a given country is—whether in terms of religion, language, standard of living, form of government, or culture—the more positively Americans will evaluate it as a potential trade partner. The most common explanation people give for why the United States should or should not trade with a particular country is that they think it can (or cannot) be trusted.

Scholars of political economy tend to eschew the idea that basic human psychology enters into attitudes toward international commerce. But for many Americans, whether they support trading with another country parallels their own interpersonal decisions; they often want assurance that a trading partner country is honest and like-minded in its values.

Unfortunately, this kind of reasoning leads to many of the same problems in international trade that it does in interpersonal relations. People are less likely to want to interact with those people or countries that are different from themselves. They do not trust those who seem “foreign,” in both the literal and the colloquial sense. Due to a lack of trust, people may forego potentially beneficial economic opportunities.

Many Americans see the benefit of trade as diplomatic rather than economic. They emphasize the importance of trade for maintaining alliances. In interpersonal relationships, people sometimes engage in trade—such as buying Girl Scout cookies from the daughters of their colleagues—not so much because they truly want the cookies but to be friendly and supportive. Likewise, large numbers of Americans of both political parties and across the ideological spectrum believe that international trade is beneficial because it strengthens the United States’ relationships with other countries. They recognize that these relationships may come in handy at a later point in time.

FORTRESS AMERICA

In 2005, the British pollster Stephan Shakespeare characterized people as either “drawbridge up” or “drawbridge down” types when it comes to globalization. Drawbridge up types, he wrote, “think the bad things will go away if we lock the doors.” These are people who believe that cooperation is for suckers. They tend not to trust strangers, and they especially do not trust foreigners.

My research has corroborated this view, finding a strong link between opposition to multiculturalism and racial diversity and opposition to international trade. Americans’ attitudes toward fellow citizens belonging to other racial groups are by far the strongest predictor of their support for trade, far more so than how they believe trade will impact their personal economic interests.

Like other forms of similarity, racial similarities between countries foster greater trust. For instance, a 2017 study asked respondents to name the United States’ top three trading partner countries (China, Canada, and Mexico). White Americans who thought the major U.S. trading partners were also predominantly white expressed more support for trade. Americans who did not name China, perceived to be the most dissimilar of the top three trading partners, were more supportive of trade; those who did not name Canada, the most similar to the United States, were more hostile toward trade.

The same zero-sum thinking that leads drawbridge up types to believe that progress among minorities occurs at whites’ expense leads them to adopt a competitive framing of trade. If trade benefited “them,” then it must have been bad for “us.” Using experimental studies, I have demonstrated that China-bashing anti-trade rhetoric from both Democratic and Republican presidential candidates increases white discrimination against not only Asians in general but also Asian Americans. Negative attitudes toward foreign outgroups make people more hostile toward trade, and trade bashing triggers more hostility toward those same groups. 

On the other hand, drawbridge down types, Shakespeare wrote, “think it’s a big beautiful world out there . . . if only we could all open our arms and embrace each other.” These people come out of central casting for the old Coca-Cola commercial featuring a multicultural chorus of young people singing, “I’d Like to Teach the World to Sing in Perfect Harmony.” Of course, this characterization is overly simplistic and definitely corny. But the belief in international cooperation for mutual benefit is a central reason that Americans support trade.

The distinction between these two worldviews boils down to whether Americans view trade as a form of competition or as a form of cooperation. For the drawbridge up types, trade is a competition: they divide the world into us versus them, and their opinions hinge on whether they see their home country as the winner or the loser. The drawbridge down people, meanwhile, think about trade as a form of cooperation and see it as a means of maintaining potentially useful friendships with other countries.

SURVIVAL OF THE FITTEST

The United States tends to encourage a competitive framing of trade. The economist Paul Rubin lamented in a 2013 address that introductory economics textbooks in the United States mention competition eight times as often as cooperation.

It is no surprise, then, that many Americans view trade as a Darwinian struggle in which only the strong survive. And due to globalization, many no longer see themselves as sure-fire winners of this competition. It is in this sense that Americans today complain about trade’s “unfairness,” a concern that no longer refers to unfair treatment of overseas labor, or the unequal distributional consequences of trade for American workers. Instead, ordinary Americans use this term to express concerns that the game itself is rigged, and thus their country may “lose” this international competition through no fault of its own.

Politicians contribute to this misperception. A recent Democratic platform stated, “If the playing field is level, Americans will be able to compete against every other country on Earth.” The Republican platform similarly advised that on a level playing field, American workers “can surpass the competition in international trade.” Therefore, it should come as no surprise that Americans cry foul if they believe that they are not “winning” this global competition and that China is gaining ground. They have been repeatedly told that they are the best and that they deserve to win.

In the lead-up to the 2016 election, Trump encouraged Americans to believe that other countries had taken advantage of them through trade. Trump supporters thus assumed they deserved the chance to even the score—their views went beyond pure self-interest to the pursuit of retribution.

Throughout my research, I have asked random samples of Americans to explain why they support or oppose international trade. As one respondent put it during these discussions, “The American people deserve more.” Others fear that trade risks their country’s autonomy as a nation: “The way things are going, we will all work for the Chinese one day,” one person said. From this perspective, trade is essentially another weapon in a great-power competition.

Economists, however, mean something entirely different when they refer to the winners and losers of trade. They are describing the differential economic effects of trade on import- and export-oriented lines of work within a single country. In the United States, businesses and industries that export products generally benefit from trade, but specific industries that cannot compete in the global marketplace may go out of business. In contrast, when the public at large thinks about winners and losers, they are more likely to think of a competition involving the United States and a trading partner country. To many Americans, there is little difference between international trade and the Olympics.

MAKE AMERICA TRADE AGAIN

Perhaps the most useful concept for understanding trade preferences comes from studies of what psychologists call “ingroup-outgroup dynamics.” The changes in support for trade that occurred in the aftermath of Trump’s election illustrate these dynamics well. In the period leading up to the 2016 election, when a Democrat was still president, Republicans were mostly opposed to trade and Democrats were significantly more supportive. Just as GOP voters were concerned about foreigners illegally crossing the border, they perceived a similar threat from international commerce.

But as soon as Trump was elected—and long before any trade policies had changed—Republican support for trade surged by double digits. By 2018, rank-and-file Republicans were once again the party of free trade and remained more supportive than Democrats throughout the rest of Trump’s presidency. Since President Joe Biden took office, however, Democrats are now the party most supportive of trade.

This illustrates how American attitudes toward trade are subject to a “party in power” effect: When one’s party holds the presidency, trade is viewed as far more palatable than when power is held by the rival party—even if trade policies themselves have not changed at all. The reason that Republicans became more enthusiastic about trade after the 2016 election was not because the trade deficit shrunk—in fact, it soared to new heights during Trump’s time in office. Instead, opinions shifted because Trump convinced his followers that the United States was now winning the trade competition.

For Republicans, who tend to be drawbridge up types, trade support is not contingent simply on whether the United States benefits from a trade deal. Instead, my research has suggested that Republicans will support only those trade agreements that they believe give the United States an advantage and simultaneously disadvantage trading partners. They see trade as a means to dominate foreign countries—a conception that plays neatly into a zero-sum, nationalistic view of the world. Democrats, on the other hand, are more enthusiastic about “win-win” trade agreements in which both countries gain when compared with agreements in which the United States benefits and the trading partner loses out.

AN UNDERSTANDING DEFICIT

The broader lessons that can be gleaned from Americans’ opinions on trade are sobering. In national surveys, both trade advocates and trade opponents have often commented at length that the United States had a “debt” or “deficit” as a result of international trade. Most Americans used these two terms interchangeably: as one respondent put it, “I think it contributes to our national debt.” Many echoed this sentiment: “Too much debt. Sell them our stuff to get out of debt. If we buy American-made products, we keep the money in our own country and perhaps help decrease our country’s debt,” said another respondent.

Since the trade deficit plays an outsize role in public discussion about globalization, this should come as no surprise. Moreover, Americans’ belief that deficits are a bad thing seems perfectly logical. After all, when one runs a deficit at home or in a business, it means one is losing money. Most economists, in contrast, see the trade imbalance as irrelevant to the economic health of the nation and the availability of jobs. The deficit can be driven up by government spending and a booming economy, for instance, which means Americans have more disposable income with which to buy things from overseas. We clearly need an alternative indicator that communicates to Americans whether trade is helping or hurting the U.S. economy.

Most Americans and policymakers inaccurately believe that trade is largely unpopular. Studies of public opinion do not bear out the widely held view that the 2016 election represented the beginning of a backlash against trade in the United States. In fact, as shown by my data, as well as by others,’ trade is more popular now than ever. Support for trade has increased among both Democrats and Republicans in recent years: by 2019, the percentage of Americans who thought trade was good for the U.S. economy had hit an all-time high since consistent public opinion measurement began in 2004.

Nevertheless, the backlash perspective is widely believed by the public. In our 2021 survey, twice as many Americans said that they believe the country has become less supportive of trade in recent years than said it has become more supportive. Although it is true that some Americans may embrace trade only temporarily when their party is in power, it is clear that trade per se is not what its critics object to.

It is difficult to tell Biden and Trump apart on this issue. Although Biden has reversed a large number of his predecessor’s policies since taking office, he has retained Trump’s protectionist trade policies. The phrases “Made in America” and “Buy American” appeared 29 times in candidate Biden’s policy document on trade; once elected, he signed an executive order promoting Buy American to favor domestic producers. The current administration does not even give lip service to the idea of nondiscrimination against foreign products, an underlying principle of free trade.

This framing of international trade is destined to create problems for the Biden administration. It will require the administration to promote the idea that Americans are winning an international competition in order to maintain mass support. However, this rationale does not speak to the primary reason most Americans already favor trade agreements—because they believe such agreements are good for the United States’ international relationships and its economy as a whole.

My work has demonstrated that the levels of American support for trade can be improved by emphasizing basic human similarities and mutual trust between nations. Arguments suggesting that trade can line individuals’ pockets do not work.

My research also suggests that Americans’ views on trade and their attitudes toward other groups within the United States are intertwined. American officials who cater to trade opposition are making U.S. participation in the global economy even more difficult and harming the kind of intergroup attitudes needed to sustain a diverse nation. Fanning the flames of American chauvinism will only increase international tensions—as well as racial tensions at hom