Hamas’s brutal October 7 attack on Israel and the subsequent war in Gaza have shone a spotlight on the rising role in regional and international politics of a small Gulf state: Qatar. Since the conflict began, the country has been engaged in high-profile efforts to mediate a truce between Israel and Hamas and to negotiate deals to free the civilian hostages taken by Hamas, as well as evacuate foreign nationals from Gaza. As a country that enjoys generally good relations with both its Arab neighbors and most Western countries, Qatar in many ways finds itself in an enviable position. But it must also manage a difficult balancing act.

For the past two decades or so, Qatar has embarked on a foreign policy rooted in hedging—one that is now being tested by the war in Gaza. Doha uses its vast wealth and close ties to the United States to move freely on the global stage, often unconstrained by typical pressures of international relations such as alliance commitments. Qatar has, for instance, maintained working relations with Israel while remaining Hamas’s key backer. Its balancing act has been on clear display in its response to the October 7 massacre. Qatar has not publicly condemned the attacks and even stated that Israel alone is responsible for the escalating violence. At the same time, it has helped free more than 100 hostages thanks to its unique access to both Israel and Hamas.

So far, Qatar’s maneuvering has paid off, allowing it to deepen partnerships with key actors, including the United States. Qatar has used its regional influence and diplomatic leverage to win Washington’s trust by mediating between the United States other powers including Iran and Venezuela, and has gradually become one of Washington’s closest allies in the Middle East. But there is a complication: Qatar probably played a role in the October 7 attack. Although it had no direct involvement in Hamas’s assault, it was no idle bystander, either: for years, Qatar has supported the organization by providing funding, hosting Hamas’s leadership in Doha, and amplifying the group’s messaging through its propaganda and media networks.

And yet Qatar’s admittedly fraught relationship with Hamas also grants it the unique ability to influence the group’s leaders and bring them to the negotiating table to hammer out a new hostage deal. The United States and Israel still need to lean on Doha to use its leverage with Hamas to achieve some essential wins—even if Qatar must ultimately cut ties with the organization.

ALL-SIDES DIPLOMACY

Qatar is home to around 2.7 million people, but the majority are South Asian migrant laborers with very few rights; only 300,000 or so are Qatari citizens. Despite its small size, however, Qatar wields outsize international influence. It is one of the richest countries in the world in terms of GDP per capita and one of the planet’s largest suppliers of liquefied natural gas. And over the past several decades, it has used its energy wealth to fuel its ascendance on the diplomatic stage, becoming a key broker in fractious international disputes.

Until the early 1990s, Qatar was a conservative, marginalized state that typically took its foreign policy cues from the other members of the oil-rich absolute monarchies of the Gulf Cooperation Council. But Doha has emerged as a regional power in the years since 1995, when Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani carried out a bloodless coup against his father, who had been emir for more than two decades. On coming to power, Hamad used the country’s natural gas revenues and adopted a foreign policy aimed at elevating Qatar’s global standing and bolstering the state against Saudi Arabia, its much larger and more dominant neighbor. Qatar’s bid for regional independence has suffered setbacks, including a failed countercoup in 1996; Hamad’s abdication in favor of his relatively inexperienced son, Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani, in 2013; and a Saudi-led blockade that lasted from 2017 to 2021.

Nonetheless, Qatar has succeeded in establishing itself as a heavyweight mediator in conflicts—a role that has made it a valuable ally to an unlikely array of states. Doha has brokered negotiations between the United States and the Taliban; Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo; and Sudan’s military and the Rapid Support Group, among many others. Even though Qatar’s mediation efforts have not always succeeded, they have helped the Gulf state win the international prestige essential to its survival among its larger and more powerful neighbors, Saudi Arabia and Iran.

Qatar’s status as a diplomatic broker has been made possible because of its perceived neutrality, which the country has cultivated by maintaining relations with all sides of an array of conflicts, and because its deep pockets allow it to offer financial incentives for peace. Qatar aims to stay stable and safe, and it believes that the bigger its international profile, the more external partners have a stake in its long-term security. Acting as a mediator has also allowed it to win the trust of competing powers, theoretically insulating it from the effects of international rivalries. But in the aftermath of October 7, this all-sides approach to international partnerships might not have as long a shelf life as Doha may have hoped.

THE COMPANY YOU KEEP

Although Qatar’s hedging strategy has helped cement some key alliances and kept its larger rivals at bay, it also carries great peril. Qatar’s backing of Islamist groups, for instance, has backfired in the past. In 2014, for example, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates broke off relations with Doha over its support for the Muslim Brotherhood. In 2017, they went further and instituted a diplomatic and economic blockade of Qatar after accusing it of supporting Islamist terrorists as well as Iran.

Today, Qatar’s relationship with Hamas has become the subject of intense scrutiny. In keeping with its neutral appearance, the country has hosted the leadership of Hamas since 2012, when tensions between the group and the Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad amid a mounting civil war forced the organization to flee its longtime base in Syria. Qatar has since claimed that it allowed Hamas to open an office in Doha following a request from Washington to establish indirect lines of communication with the organization. Qatar has also backed Hamas in more subtle ways; in 2012, Hamad also became the first head of state to visit Hamas-controlled Gaza, and the Qatari-owned Al Jazeera television network has provided the group with valuable propaganda.

But Qatar has gone beyond allowing Hamas to relocate to Doha and facilitating dialogue with Washington; it has also provided critical financial support for the group amounting to billions of dollars over roughly a decade, without which the Hamas government might not have survived. Qatar has been aiding Hamas since it won a majority in the Palestinian Legislative Council election in 2006 and seized the Palestinian Authority’s military and governmental institutions in the Gaza Strip in 2007. These dollars entered the Gaza Strip not just with Israel’s tacit permission but also with its express assistance. Israel hoped that these funds would encourage Hamas to maintain stability and security in Gaza, perpetuate the split between Hamas’s rule in Gaza and the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, and counterbalance Iran’s influence over Hamas. By abetting Qatar’s support for Hamas, Israel was essentially buying short-term peace—but at the cost of its long-term national security, given that Doha’s funds likely helped Hamas expand its military wing.

In the past, Qatar’s connections to Hamas granted it influence and status in the Middle East and beyond. Doha’s backing of Hamas bolstered the public perception that Qatar is working for the Palestinian cause, unlike other Arab regimes—such as Bahrain, Morocco, Sudan, and the United Arab Emirates—that were seen as having abandoned the Palestinians in favor of normalization with Israel. Moreover, Qatar was able to position itself as the exclusive mediator between Israel and Hamas at a time when other countries in the region were distancing themselves from the Palestinian issue as its political prospects seemed to grow dimmer. Even Egypt, which until a few years ago had worked to counter Qatar’s regional influence, has since mended fences with Doha and accepted Qatar’s diplomatic monopoly over Gaza. This accumulated influence means that despite Hamas’s toxic baggage, Qatar is reluctant to sacrifice its relationship with the group entirely. Doha would like Hamas to remain in power in Gaza as it wants to see a return on its investment—and retain leverage over Washington.

COMING TO HEEL

But Qatar is toeing an extremely precarious line when it comes to the war in Gaza. Uniquely among the Arab states, Doha has managed to maintain lines of communication with Israel over the past several decades, even as it has strengthened relations not only with Hamas but also with Iran. In 1996, Qatar opened a de facto Israeli embassy in Doha—formally designated a trade office—becoming the first Arab Gulf state to establish formal ties with Israel. Qatar closed the office in 2009 after a military conflict between Israel and Hamas but has since sustained a working relationship with Israel.

This line of communication has allowed Qatar to carry out limited trade with Israel and engage in in-person dialogue with Israeli diplomats and businesspeople, despite enduring policy differences over the Palestinian question. There has even been talk of normalization of relations, although Qatar has said that it has ruled out the possibility in the absence of an Israeli commitment to a two-state solution. Qatar’s dialogue with Israel has extended to Gaza; before October 7, for instance, Qatari aid to the strip was funneled through an organization called the Gaza Reconstruction Committee, which is headed by Mohammad al-Emadi, a Qatari official who also serves as an informal envoy to Israel. Qatar was also a key mediator in an effort to end 11 days of clashes between Israel and Hamas in May of 2021, an endeavor that earned praise from Israeli leaders.

Qatar has maintained its dual position on Israel even in the aftermath of October 7. Even as Tamim, the Qatari emir, criticized Israel for the civilian death toll of its war in Gaza, Qatari officials worked closely with the CIA and the Israeli Mossad to negotiate a release of Israeli hostages from Hamas. Israel has hosted Qatari intelligence delegations for similar discussions, with one Israeli official even telling the press that cooperation between the Israeli and Qatari agencies is “traditionally close”—an unusual statement that reflects the countries’ unorthodox and informal relationship.

But with Israel having vowed to eliminate Hamas, it now faces a dilemma over Doha. Israel cannot allow Qatar to continue supporting the group, but Qatar’s connections with Hamas have made it an indispensable pillar of any future negotiations, particularly regarding the release of hostages still being held in Gaza. Israel’s indecision on Qatar is already proving politically costly, especially given mounting calls within Israel to declare Qatar an enemy state and take action against it. Israeli Foreign Minister Eli Cohen, for instance, has accused Qatar of financing Hamas and harboring its leaders, and he has said that Doha “could influence and enable the immediate and unconditional release of all hostages held by the terrorists.” In dealing with Qatar, Israel must therefore balance the short-term goal of rescuing as many hostages as possible with the long-term objective of toppling Hamas.

PLAYING QATAR’S GAME

Washington and Israel should proceed with caution as they lean on Qatar for assistance with Hamas, as neither can afford to alienate the Gulf state. Qatar is a valuable U.S. ally in a geopolitically important region; it hosts thousands of U.S. troops, including the forward headquarters of U.S. Central Command, and is the home of the largest U.S. Air Force base outside the United States, known as Al Udeid. In January 2022, Tamim became the first Gulf leader to meet with U.S. President Joe Biden, who lauded Qatar’s $20 billion deal with Boeing—one of the largest in the company’s history—and then declared Qatar a “major non-NATO ally.” Moreover, Qatar has over $26 billion in active U.S. foreign military sales, making it the United States’ third-largest buyer of U.S. military equipment. In recent weeks, Washington reached an agreement with Doha to extend its presence at Al Udeid, highlighting the United States’ military reliance on the emirate.

Washington and Israel must make clear that they will not tolerate Qatari support for Hamas moving forward. Washington should pressure Qatar not only to expel Hamas leadership from its territory but also to funnel any future assistance to the Palestinians—the funding necessary for humanitarian aid and Gaza’s reconstruction effort—through a revitalized Palestinian Authority. In the interim, however, Washington and Israel must play a short-term game: they need Qatar to pressure Hamas into acceding to another hostage deal, and Hamas will refuse to do so if it believes Qatar will eventually cut it off.

Given Qatar’s vital role in both short-term dialogue with Hamas and Gaza’s long-term future, the United States and Israel should refrain from publicly criticizing Doha or taking forceful action against it, such as assassinating the Hamas leaders who remain in Qatar. The priority right now should be on securing the release of more hostages; Doha is highly conscious of its international reputation and may prove less willing to assist the United States and Israel should those countries come out against it publicly. Qatar can be pressured—but discreetly, not on the public stage.

Qatar is pragmatic and opportunistic more than ideological; it accommodates to changes in its geopolitical environment and adapts quickly in search of influence. Although these characteristics may not make it the most reliable ally, it is currently a useful asset in Israel’s effort to release hostages from Gaza. Once the hostage issue has been resolved and the war is over, however, the international community must condition Qatar’s involvement in postwar Gaza on a change in its policy toward Hamas. Given the country’s practical approach to global politics and its desire to maintain its influence on the Palestinian issue, it will likely comply with those demands. For now, however, Washington and Israel must play Qatar’s game—and maneuver to achieve their own ends.