James discusses the prospects for an end to the Iran war on NDTV Profit. To read the transcript or listen or watch the video, go to Transcript [Anchor] James M. Dorsey joining in today of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. Mr. Dorsey, thank you so much for speaking with us. A lot of developments in the last 24 hours, I will start with them. And a lot of them emanating from what the US President is saying, claiming that the war will end sooner than he expected, they’re pretty much done, and they will ensure that the Strait of Hormuz stays open. Is it likely that he can push through on these claims and we will see a quicker end to the war? [James M. Dorsey] Trump will probably unilaterally declare victory. The problem with that victory statement is multi-fold. One, it takes three to tango in this case. In other words, the United States, Israel, and Iran. Israel may very well want to push ahead with the war, irrespective of what the United States does, even though it will be lobbying for the United States to stay in the war. Iran, for Iran’s survival of the regime, survival of the Islamic Republic, is victory. And that will make Trump’s unilateral declaration ring hollow. [Anchor] Mr. Dorsey, I just want to understand from your lens, the moving parts geopolitically beyond the entities that are involved in the war, and you’ve spoken about it in terms of three to tango, but you have the countries in West Asia, you have various trading partners, you have Europe, and you have the political scenario in the US itself ahead of the midterm elections. All of these could have a bearing. So how do you see that playing out? [James M. Dorsey] Well, one reason for Trump to unilaterally declare victory is the fact that this is having a backlash in the United States. A majority of Americans does not want to see this war. In addition, they’re feeling the effects of the war at the gas pump. And that’s not a very good situation for a president who is already running low in his performance ratings in an election year with the midterm elections coming up. As far as the Gulf states, but also the larger international community, they want to see this war end now. They never wanted to see this war begin. And so the Iranian strategy has been primarily directed at increasing the pressure on members of the international community, particularly the Gulf states, but also Europe, in the hope that that would generate pressure on Trump to end this war. [Anchor] Mr. Dorsey, in some sense, there was some people argue it’s an uncalled-for attack by Iran on the GCC countries. Yes, they wanted to make a point, because these countries have US bases or installations or what have you. But a lot of them were not direct participants in the war. What’s the aftermath of something like this? Because at one hand, people are saying GCC countries would disassociate or associate themselves less with the US and the US investments as well, because the US left them high and dry on defence. But two, apparently, Iran was the one who attacked them in the first place. [James M. Dorsey] I think, first of all, one has to understand that Iran faced a choice at the beginning of this war. And that choice was to be defensive or to be offensive. Keep in mind that there are no US or Israeli targets within the borders of Iran. There are no targets close to Iran as such that are purely US. So, Iran had no—if it was going to retaliate rather than try and would have been unsuccessful in trying to fend off the attacks because its military infrastructure, its air defences aren’t such that they could have done so, its only option was to attack targets in the Gulf states, potentially also in Turkey and in Azerbaijan. The problem with that is that it didn’t restrict those attacks to US military facilities. They included hotels, residential towers, airports, energy facilities, oil production facilities, water desalination plants. And that’s really become a problem. I think, though, at the end of the day, what you will have is the Gulf states moving closer to the United States because they have no defence alternative. There is no one they can replace the United States, nor are they capable in and of themselves to defend themselves against Iran. But at the same time, there is anger in the Gulf states, anger not only against Iran for attacking them and drawing them into this war, but against the United States for dragging them into a war they did not choose for. Keep in mind that the Gulf states had lobbied friendly in the run-up to this war to prevent this war from erupting. [Anchor] Yeah, that’s a fair point. Mr. Dorsey, the other aspect is of crude. One line of thought is, when facilities around LPG, crude, etc., are all shut off, they take a fair degree of time restarting. And while the world was in a surplus oil supply scenario until this conflict started, that may not be the case going ahead. You may or may not be a crude expert, forgive me for not knowing that. But if you have some thoughts on this, we’d love to know. [James M. Dorsey] Sure. I think that Iran trying to hit the energy facilities in the Gulf was key to its strategy. At the bottom line, Iran’s strategy is to increase pain, increase the pain of the international community and the Gulf states when it comes to access to oil and gas or the ability to export oil and gas, and that that in turn would also have effects on the American public and combined would increase the pressure on the United States. So, this was a price that Iran was willing to extract no matter what. [Anchor] Mr. Dorsey, just trying to understand what’s happening on the Iranian side. And you have written extensively about the new supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei. That’s the Ayatollah’s son. He has lost his father, his mother, his wife, his daughter in the American and Israeli strikes. Is he going to be in any position to find a way to halt this war? What’s happening on that end? Because we’re hearing a lot of what the Americans are saying. What about the other side? [James M. Dorsey] Your guess is as good as mine. Having said that, he has a government experience. Well, let me put it differently. His appointment was an act of defiance. It was a demonstration, as far as the Iranians are concerned, of resilience, of regime cohesion, of resistance. He is a man who’s never held public office, but he has for all practical matters in many ways run his father’s office when he was supreme leader. He was his gatekeeper. He was his political broker. He’s a man who has very close ties within the clerical class of Iran, within the military and security establishment, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, or IRGC. And as such, he brings a lot of credibility to the office. His initial statements are going to be hard line. There’s no question about it. And he’s going to emphasise those issues of defiance, of resistance, of resilience. But if anybody—and it’s a pure guess—if anybody is willing not to submit to Donald Trump’s demands, but to seek some form of negotiated settlement, he is someone who will be able to carry that off, because he has the legitimacy also of his lineage. If you look at the pictures, he wears a black turban. That is a sign of being a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad. And, of course, he’s his father’s son. [Anchor] Mr. Dorsey, I’m wondering about the populace. And some of the images that came through just hours back about the mass gathering that took place for the announcement of Mr. Mojtaba taking charge as the supreme leader seems to indicate that there is popular support as well. But having said that, in the run-up to this conflict as well, there were suggestions from outside in that there was an inside push for a change in the regime. How much will that local populace play a role in what ultimately comes to pass at the end of this conflict? [James M. Dorsey] One of Mojtaba’s drawbacks is that he’s not a figure who’s been in the public eye continuously. He’s not a man who’s been out there meeting people in society. He’s not a man who’s held speeches. He’s not a man who’s given a large number of media interviews. So, for many within Iran, he’s an unknown figure. Now, having said that, there is no question that a majority of Iranians would like to see a change. Some of them, whatever percentage that may be, want to see regime change. Some of them want to see social and economic reform, and particularly improvement of their living conditions, which have deteriorated significantly as a result, on the one hand, of mismanagement of the economy, and on the other, because of U.S. sanctions. But there is a significant portion, whatever that may be—many estimate that at 20 to 30 million people, 20 to 30 percent of the populace—which is committed to this regime and to the Islamic Republic—20 to 30 percent of the population is anywhere between 18 and 27 million people. That’s a substantial block. [Anchor] So, Mr. Dorsey, of course, it would be foolhardy to try and predict what’s going to happen. But if the stated goals as of this moment of the U.S. is a regime change, that Iranians come in and choose another leader, and of course, Khomeini doesn’t seem to be acceptable, is that likely to happen at all for this war to cede? Or will new guardrails have to be drawn on what’s acceptable to both sides? [James M. Dorsey] Well, first of all, I’m not sure that—sure, the United States would like to see regime change. But I don’t think that that is a sine qua non for the United States to end this war. It is a sine qua non for Israel. It wants regime change, and it’s determined to achieve that. Trump needs to be able to declare a victory. And the longer this war lasts, the less likely he is going to be able to do so. And so, I think what you will see is, as we talked about earlier, a unilateral declaration by Trump, which will be challenged at least by the Islamic Republic itself, and potentially by Israel. [Anchor] Off-ramps might be difficult in such a scenario. Let’s see how it shapes up. But, Mr. Dorsey, this was fabulous talking to you today. We hope to be able to talk to you soon. And hopefully, that soon comes in after the conflict is over, because for peace sake, we need to see the end of this sooner. |
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