Friday, March 1, 2024

Project Syndicate Making Bretton Woods Work for Africa Mar 1, 2024 HIPPOLYTE FOFACK

 Project Syndicate

Making Bretton Woods Work for Africa

Mar 1, 2024

HIPPOLYTE FOFACK


The recent push to reform the global financial architecture creates an opportunity to build a more inclusive system that matches Africa’s aspirations, accelerates the green transition, and advances development objectives. Most importantly, such a system must provide equal access to reliable and affordable capital.


CAMBRIDGE – Last June, during French President Emmanuel Macron’s Summit for a New Global Financing Pact in Paris, Kenyan President William Ruto warned that the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund are “hostage” to the world’s wealthiest countries and unable to meet the development challenges facing the Global South. Echoing United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres’s call to reform the “morally bankrupt global financial system” that “perpetuates poverty and inequalities,” Ruto proposed creating a new multilateral institution that is fit for purpose and treats all member countries as equals.


More than any other region, Africa has borne the brunt of the dysfunction embedded in the world’s financial architecture. Despite decades of engagement with the Bretton Woods system, the continent suffers stubbornly high unemployment and poverty rates, even as living standards have improved elsewhere in the developing world.


The latest reform push for the Bretton Woods institutions creates an opportunity to build a more inclusive global financial system that matches Africa’s aspirations, accelerates the transition to a net-zero world, and advances development objectives more broadly. Such a transformation has become essential as the world economy contends with the mounting effects of climate change, and as major geopolitical shifts threaten to accelerate global fragmentation.


Africa has long been in a vulnerable position within the multilateral system, owing to a constellation of destabilizing forces and policies. The asymmetry of subsidies, which powerful countries with greater fiscal space are more able to deploy, has been a significant constraint on the ability of African countries to diversify sources of growth and competitiveness. The developed world’s recent embrace of industrial policy in response to the escalating climate crisis and volatility of global supply chains is a clear example of this.


Moreover, financial repression, in conjunction with a chronic technological deficit, has further curtailed African countries’ economic development and limited their participation in global value chains to providing raw materials. Given the growing role in global trade of intermediate and manufactured goods with higher technological content, the stickiness of the colonial development model of resource extraction has been very costly for Africa, inexorably shrinking its share of global trade and exacerbating its exposure to global volatility and recurring balance-of-payment crises.


Multilateralism has thus failed to narrow the prosperity gap between Africa and the rest of the world. Africa’s share of world trade has declined steadily over the last few decades, falling from around 5% in the 1970s to less than 3% in 2022. And even though the continent accounts for around 17% of the global population, it is home to more than 60% of the world’s extreme poor – which could rise to 90% by 2030, according to the World Bank. By contrast, countries in Asia have capitalized on labor-intensive, export-led development models to narrow the income gap with advanced economies and lift hundreds of millions of people out of poverty.


As a result of financial repression, the process of structural transformation has continued to elude Africa, and the region is not well integrated into the current two-tiered global financial system, which privileges wealthy countries in the deployment of capital and the issuance of reserve currencies. This is at the root of the “perception premiums,” the overinflated risks perennially assigned to Africa, and the default-driven interest rates that have put many African countries into a debt trap.


In particular, these rates raise the fiscal cost of servicing sovereign debt – more than 50% of government revenues in the most vulnerable countries, such as Ghana. And yet, the external debt stock of African countries accounts for less than 1% of global sovereign debt.


Risk perceptions of Africa have been elevated for decades, with credit-rating agencies assigning sub-investment-grade scores to an overwhelming majority of African countries. With capital scarce, the continent has been unable to invest in other major drivers of economic growth, most notably human resources and physical and digital infrastructure. For example, so acute is the continent’s energy crisis that most African businesses spend a sizable portion of their revenues operating diesel generators, which, aside from exacerbating external imbalances and the climate crisis, inhibits investment and undermines growth.


Africa’s chronically insufficient infrastructure has also widened the global digital divide, which poses a further impediment to development, because technology has overtaken organizational change as the primary driver of economic growth. In the US, for example, the tech sector contributed nearly $2 trillion to GDP in 2022, accounting for 9.3% of total output. By contrast, nearly 70% of Africa’s population does not have broadband internet access, and persistent policy constraints, most notably shrinking fiscal space, make it almost impossible to build more robust infrastructure. As a result, African countries have been unable to reap digital dividends in the form of higher productivity, faster growth, and expanded employment opportunities.


In much of the world, the private sector is expected to play a central role in driving innovation-led growth. But Africa faces a shortage of entrepreneurs, owing largely to the difficulty of accessing finance. And, faced with massive debt-service costs – projected to have risen 35% in 2023, to $62 billion, owing to rapid tightening of global financial conditions – African governments lack the capacity to expand productivity-enhancing public investment, crowd in private capital, and attract foreign direct investment. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, FDI flows to Africa were a paltry $48 billion in 2023, whereas Asia received $584 billion.


At the same time, a series of procyclical downgrades by credit-rating agencies pushed more African countries into junk status and further curtailed their access to global finance. In 2022, only three African countries (Angola, Nigeria, and South Africa) were able to tap capital markets, raising a total of $6 billion, down from $19.6 billion in 2021, at default-driven borrowing rates. This led Zainab Shamsuna Ahmed, Nigeria’s then-finance minister, to announce in December 2022 that her country would not issue Eurobonds in 2023 unless market conditions improved.


INDUSTRIALIZATION, INTERRUPTED

The Bretton Woods institutions further limited Africa’s development options by implementing structural adjustment policies during the post-1990s era of hyper-globalization. The Washington Consensus – the pro-market policy cocktail of trade liberalization, deregulation, and privatization espoused by the IMF and the World Bank – gave rise to costly austerity measures, with public investment being among the first casualties.


For starters, these structural adjustment policies contributed to the dismantling of Africa’s nascent manufacturing base, which consisted mainly of state-led enterprises that had been established after achieving independence. This put the continent on the path toward premature deindustrialization, with African countries running out of industrialization opportunities sooner and at much lower levels of income compared to early industrializers.


The Washington Consensus also undermined investment in human capital. For example, African countries continue to suffer from a serious shortage of skilled engineers and scientists, with a ratio of 198 scientists per million inhabitants, compared to the world average of 1,150 per million. The chronic lack of technical capacity has hindered African governments’ ability to develop the infrastructure needed to attract private capital and expand Africa’s industrial base, and, crucially, to capitalize fully on the continent’s abundant natural resources to develop robust regional value chains and unlock endogenous growth potential.


Consider that Africa is home to 60% of the best solar resources globally, but only 1% of installed solar generating capacity. Without the human capital and financial resources to harness its energy resources (renewable or non-renewable), Africa has become the world’s most energy-poor continent. Sub-Saharan Africa (excluding South Africa) uses less electricity than Spain, and 600 million people on the continent – nearly 43% of the total population – lack access to power.


Given that industrialization is energy-intensive, Africa’s energy poverty has left the continent increasingly dependent on imported manufactured goods. Over the long term, this has undermined the growth of intracontinental trade, which remains dismally low, accounting for around 15% of total African trade, compared to 60% in Asia and 70% in the European Union. Thus, the imported cars clogging city streets in many African countries represent a massive hole in the balance of payments – even though the continent possesses all the raw materials to manufacture automobiles domestically.


The enduring colonial development model of resource extraction has only perpetuated the unhealthy correlation between growth and commodity-price cycles, resulting in increased exposure to adverse global shocks and the amplified perception premiums that are behind Africa’s default-driven borrowing rates. This, in turn, constrains refinancing options, turning liquidity challenges into solvency problems and raising the risk of sovereign-debt crises.


So far, the only four countries that have applied to the G20’s Common Framework for Debt Treatment are African, even though the continent has the lowest share of global public debt. Spreads on Eurobonds issued by these countries (Chad, Ethiopia, Ghana, and Zambia) were in the double digits, putting them on the path toward failure from the outset and making the perceived high risk of default a self-fulfilling prophecy.


In addition to fueling the risk of debt default and undermining the expansion of growth-enhancing public investment, the vicious cycle of recurrent balance-of-payments crises is also keenly felt at the household level. The unemployment rate is at Great Depression-levels – above 30% in Nigeria and South Africa, two of the continent’s largest economies. This fuels migration pressures, as more and more young Africans seek opportunities elsewhere, and exacerbates intergenerational poverty.


BRETTON WOODS TO BLAME?

While no single entity is solely responsible for Africa’s dire situation, it is fair to say that the continent’s sustained engagement with the Bretton Woods institutions has narrowed African countries’ economic policymaking capacity to the management of balance-of-payments crises. Africa’s international partners have done nothing to promote industrialization on the continent. Worse, many wealthy countries have made use of subsidies to bolster their domestic industries and competitiveness, adding to the burden on African entrepreneurs and business leaders, who are already contending with the high costs of financial repression and a chronic infrastructure deficit. This misalignment of development priorities became even more important after the World Bank, at the height of the Washington Consensus, shifted to offering balance-of-payments support.


As a result, Africa has been confronting crises with increasing frequency. In addition to security, energy, debt, and migration crises, the continent is currently experiencing the devastating effects of climate change: water stress, food insecurity, extreme weather events, and violent conflict, all of which ultimately lead to lower economic growth. And yet, Africa’s share of global climate financing is currently just 5.5%.


It was not supposed to be this way. The continent’s outlook following the wave of decolonization of the 1960s was bright. In his 1968 book Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations, Nobel laureate economist Gunnar Myrdal predicted that Africa would enjoy better growth prospects than Asia.


The opposite happened. Asia, unlike Africa, benefited from access to affordable and patient capital, which helped it close its yawning gaps in human and physical capital and led to economic diversification and successful demographic transitions. This has yielded significant dividends in knowledge production, for example, with Asia accounting for 66.8% of the world’s patent applications in 2018 (only 0.5% came from Africa). Bolstered by sustained investment catalyzing export diversification and effective integration into the global economy, Asia entered a long and virtuous cycle of robust economic growth, whereas more than four-fifths of African countries remain dependent on commodity exports and therefore highly vulnerable to global volatility and terms-of-trade deterioration.


In their rush to promote free markets and trade liberalization, the Bretton Woods institutions failed to consider African countries’ individual circumstances and their positions on the economic-development ladder when prescribing austerity measures. Speaking at a news conference after the opening of the African Union Summit in Addis Ababa in February 2023, Guterres remarked that realizing Africa’s potential requires overcoming a series of challenges. Chief among them, he stressed, is the “dysfunctional and unfair global financial system that denies many African countries the debt relief and concessional financing they need.”


But to the extent that Africa faces the perpetual threat of debt overhang, owing to the twin problems of financial repression and a chronic technological deficit, reforming this “dysfunctional and unfair” system requires channeling affordable and patient capital toward the continent. Similar to the postwar Marshall Plan for rebuilding Europe, this financing would accelerate the structural transformation of African countries and the implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). Such an approach could reduce the unhealthy correlation between growth and commodity-price cycles and, eventually, mitigate correlation risks (one of the main drivers of perception premiums), which would help to leverage more private capital.


In other parts of the world, trade integration has spurred structural transformation and the development of new products, suggesting that, under the right conditions, the AfCFTA would accelerate the diversification of the sources of growth required to boost both extra- and intra-African trade and sustain robust economic growth. Preliminary estimates show that intra-African exports would increase by 109%, led by manufactured goods, especially if the implementation of the AfCFTA is accompanied by robust trade facilitation measures. This is important in a region where the consequences of non-tariff barriers, equivalent to an import tariff of 18%, have been just as costly for trade and endogenous growth as market fragmentation has been. Corporations could take advantage of economies of scale and the gains in productivity and competitiveness associated with investing in smaller markets.


The rules of origin underpinning the AfCFTA would stimulate industrialization, as championed by African leaders, in a region where industrialization and intra-African trade are mutually reinforcing. Most importantly, trade integration would increase the supply of patient capital and technology transfer to expand manufacturing output and boost resilience to negative global shocks, putting African countries on a path toward fiscal and debt sustainability and reducing the frequency of balance-of-payments crises.


FIT FOR AFRICA

How can we ensure that any reforms to the existing global financial architecture are more than just a facelift of octogenarian institutions? How can we create a new system that has Africa’s best interests at heart and realizes the tremendous growth and development potential that Myrdal recognized nearly six decades ago?


Some important proposals have already been advanced. In its “evolution roadmap” released last year, the World Bank outlined a wide range of options to revamp its business model and boost its lending capacity to help its member countries deal with climate change and other global challenges. These include an injection of new capital, changes in the Bank’s capital structure, a higher statutory lending limit, lower equity-to-loan requirements, and deployment of callable capital. They also include innovative financial instruments such as guarantees for private-sector loans, and a new concessional lending trust fund to attract financing from bilateral shareholders and private foundations in support of growth and the green transition in middle-income countries. But for low-income African countries, which have remained highly vulnerable to global volatility and recurrent adverse commodity terms-of-trade shocks, the scale of development challenges calls for a massive injection of patient and affordable capital.


In the short term, Guterres has called on the IMF to redirect $100 billion a year in special drawing rights (SDRs, the Fund’s reserve asset), to pay for investments in sustainable development and climate action. Meanwhile, the Bridgetown Initiative, championed by Barbadian Prime Minister Mia Amor Mottley, has proposed measures to channel more credit and investment into strengthening climate resilience. That includes providing debt relief and restructuring to climate-vulnerable countries, increasing official-development assistance to $500 billion annually, and making international financial institutions more representative, equitable, and inclusive.


But any meaningful reform should address the entrenched inequalities that are largely responsible for recurrent debt crises in low-income countries. Policymakers must devise a new and improved credit-rating system to account for countries’ growth prospects and long-term debt sustainability, while remaining consistent with the IMF’s assessment of macroeconomic stability. This would ensure that any improvements in macroeconomic fundamentals are credit positive and would provide equal access to reliable and affordable capital. At the same time, this system should be underpinned by an inter-temporal approach to fiscal deficits that enables countries to mobilize funds for structural transformation – measures that increase deficits in the short and medium term may be necessary to put countries on the road toward long-term fiscal and debt sustainability.


It will also be necessary to support the development of Africa’s digital infrastructure, as this would accelerate the transition to a multipolar monetary system and the use of local-currency settlement (LCS) arrangements. In addition to cutting transaction costs and boosting efficiency, the use of LCS for cross-border trade would boost intra-African trade, help ease the balance-of-payments constraints associated with dollar funding, and deepen regional integration.


Considering that more than 85% of intraregional trade payments in Africa are rerouted offshore for clearing and settlements, adding an estimated $5 billion per year to transaction costs, the increased use of LCS would yield significant benefits for the continent. The Pan-African Payment and Settlement System, launched in 2022 as a complement to the AfCFTA, could be essential to achieving this goal.


At the same time, a multipolar world requires a more democratic system for reserve-currency issuance, drawing on advances in digitalization. This would make the international monetary system more stable and mitigate the perennial shortage of safe assets, which drives capital outflows from the Global South, often at inopportune times, with significant consequences for macroeconomic stability and growth.


Many African countries have recently experienced currency gyrations because of these outflows, with an index combining depreciation against the US dollar and reserve depletion showing that exchange-rate pressures were at a six-year peak in Africa in 2022. To help drive the transition toward a multipolar monetary system, a reformed IMF could strengthen the global financial safety net, which would promote the growth of reserve-sharing arrangements and facilitate the multilateralization of LCS arrangements.


Lastly, the new international financial system must support the development of liquid secondary markets for sovereign and corporate bonds, which would provide investors with flexibility, security, and a steady stream of income. Given that African countries’ external debt is largely denominated in dollars or euros (the “original sin” of sovereign-debt markets), such markets could mitigate foreign-exchange risk and help prevent the sudden stops in capital flows that have pushed African countries experiencing liquidity problems into debt distress, which imposes huge welfare costs. According to the World Bank, poverty levels increase by 30%, on average, after a country defaults on its external obligations and remain elevated for a decade.


But debt need not be a path to default, persistent inequality, and intergenerational poverty. It can be a blessing, as evidenced by the key role it has played in the reconstruction and development of economies around the world. An oft-cited example is the perpetual bond that the United Kingdom issued in 1932, when the government realized that debt-service payments were reducing fiscal space and undermining post-World War I reconstruction. The debt was finally redeemed in 2015.


To be afforded the same opportunity, African sovereigns and corporate entities must be able to borrow reliably on reasonable terms, leaving behind the costly default-driven interest rates to which they have long been subjected. Any reform of the international financial system that does not provide equal access to capital, especially affordable and patient capital to invest in human resources, infrastructure, and the green transition, would be a facelift unacceptable to Africans.


The good news is that Guterres’s call to reform the global financial system is being well received, even by one-time apostles of the Washington Consensus. In fact, many of these former proponents now acknowledge that one-size-fits-all austerity measures are not appropriate if they ever were. In a much-praised Foreign Affairs article, IMF Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva deplored the fact that “many countries lack the technology, financial resources, and capacity to successfully contend with economic shocks on their own.”


Ongoing efforts by the World Bank to boost its lending, together with the recent decision to increase IMF quotas by 50% are steps in the right direction. But more must be done to create an inclusive global financial system that works for all countries and builds climate resilience. Such a system must address the twin problems that prevent Africa, and the Global South more generally, from devising solutions to new development challenges: financial repression and a chronic technological deficit. In today’s “polycrisis” world, ensuring that all countries have access to green technology and affordable financing will be essential to combating climate change and providing hope to all who aspire to a fair share of global prosperity.


FEATURED

Europe and the World Need Ukraine to Prevail

Feb 21, 2024 DMYTRO KULEBA & JOSEP BORRELL


A Stablecoin Pilot in China?

Feb 27, 2024 ANDREW SHENG & XIAO GENG


The Financial March to War

Feb 27, 2024 HAROLD JAMES


Sharing the Tech Wealth

Feb 22, 2024 DIANE COYLE


How America’s CHIPS Act Hurts Taiwan

Feb 26, 2024 CHANG-TAI HSIEH, et al.


Hippolyte Fofack

HIPPOLYTE FOFACK

Writing for PS since 2020

26 Commentaries

Follow


Hippolyte Fofack, a former chief economist and director of research at the African Export-Import Bank, is a research associate at the Harvard University Center for African Studies, a distinguished fellow at the Global Federation of Competitiveness Councils, and a fellow at the African Academy of Sciences.





0



Department Press Briefing – February 29, 2024 February 29, 2024 1:37 p.m. EST


Department Press Briefing – February 29, 2024

February 29, 2024

1:37 p.m. EST

MR MILLER: Good afternoon, everyone. Let me start by addressing the tragic incident in northern Gaza today, where more than 100 Palestinians are reported to have been killed and many more injured.

I, first of all, want to express the United States’ deepest condolences to the families of those who died. Far too many innocent Palestinians have been killed over the course of this conflict, not just today, but over the past nearly five months. And when you think about today’s tragedy, it is especially heartbreaking to consider how many of those families affected will be burying loved ones not for the first time. In fact, I’m sure that many of those affected have buried multiple loved ones over – since this conflict began.

When it comes to establishing facts on the ground, we are urgently seeking additional information on exactly what took place. We have been in touch with the Israeli Government since early this morning and understand that an investigation is underway. We will be monitoring that investigation closely and pressing for answers.

This tragic event also underscores the importance of expanding and sustaining the flow of humanitarian assistance into Gaza in response to the dire humanitarian situation, including through the – a potential temporary ceasefire as part of a hostage deal.

If there’s anything that the aerial footage of today’s incident makes clear, it is just how desperate the situation on the ground is. People need more food; they need more water; they need medicine and other humanitarian goods, and they need it now.

We continue to make clear in all of our discussions with the Government of Israel that all possible measures must be taken to allow the entry of more assistance into Gaza through as many points of access as possible and to enable safe and secure distribution of that aid throughout Gaza.

But as we have said before, the best way to alleviate the ongoing suffering of the Palestinian people is to reach an agreement for a temporary ceasefire that would get hostages out, enable more aid to come in, and allow that aid to move everywhere inside Gaza.

We continue to work, day and night, to achieve that outcome, including through calls the President held this morning with President El-Sisi of Egypt and the Emir of Qatar Sheikh Tamim, as well as ones Secretary Blinken held earlier today with Qatari Prime Minister Al Thani.

Every leader on those calls agreed that this terrible event underscores the urgency in bringing the hostage talks to a close. We continue to believe a deal is possible and that a deal is in the interest of Israel, the Palestinian people, and the broader region, and we will continue to push for it to be concluded as soon as possible.

With that, Matt.

QUESTION: Yes. Thanks. So on that, what is your understanding of what happened?

MR MILLER: So our understanding is that it – the – there was a commercial convoy delivering humanitarian assistance, that there were no UN agencies involved. They were delivering assistance, and then beyond that, we have seen, obviously, conflicting reports. We’ve seen the reports from the Government of Israel; we’ve seen accounts from local Palestinians who were on the scene. We don’t have ground truth on what happened. We know what we’ve seen people say publicly, and we’re seeking more information and looking for the results of the investigation, as I said in my opening comments.

QUESTION: Understanding that you don’t have anyone on the ground, and you don’t know – all you have to go on right now, I presume, are what you’ve heard from the Israelis, what you’ve heard from witnesses, and the footage that you’ve seen. Based on all of that, what can you say about what it appears happened?

MR MILLER: I don’t want to say – I don’t want to draw any conclusions about what appears happened, because I think it’s too early to say. Oftentimes, the early accounts in these situations have turned out to be incorrect.

But two things are clear. One, just from the aerial footage, you can look at that and right away conclude the situation is incredibly desperate, that people are swarming these trucks because they’re hungry, because they need food, because they need medicine and other assistance. And that tells you that we need to do more to get humanitarian assistance in. And then the second thing is that too many Palestinians died today, as has been true far too many days since October 7th.

And so that’s why we continue to push for a temporary ceasefire agreement that would alleviate the suffering of the hostages that continue to be held by Hamas and get them home to their families, and that would alleviate the suffering of the Palestinian people.

QUESTION: Well, when you say too many Palestinians died today, does that mean that there’s some kind of acceptable number of Palestinian deaths?

MR MILLER: The acceptable number is zero. The acceptable number is zero of innocent Palestinians – I’m differentiating that from Hamas fighters, obviously. But the acceptable number of innocent Palestinians dying is zero.

QUESTION: All right. And then last one. So you talked about how it’s important to expand aid deliveries but also to increase the access points. You’ve been speaking publicly and privately for weeks now about your push for the Israelis to open Erez crossing for aid deliveries. How is that going?

MR MILLER: I don’t have any updates on it, other than it continues to be a high priority for us. And if you look at the situation today, the reason we have been pushing for an opening of a crossing in northern Gaza is because we know that the situation there is incredibly dire. Even when you’ve had assistance flowing – not enough assistance flowing ever, but certainly over the past few weeks, not enough assistance flowing in the south at least there has been assistance getting in. The situation in the north has been much more difficult because of the difficulty of trucks traveling all the way from the south to the north and the difficulty of guarding those trucks, which I think is one of the things that we saw today. So we continue to push for a northern crossing to be open. It continues to be a high priority for us, but I don’t have an update on it.

QUESTION: Thank you.

MR MILLER: Shaun.

QUESTION: Could I just pursue, I mean, some elements of that? You talk about the safe delivery of aid. The Israeli military being there – I mean, do you have an idea what the situation was and is this – are there risks in this in itself on having the military so closely near aid delivery?

MR MILLER: I don’t have any updates, other than what I’ve seen the Israeli military say publicly, which is that they were military stationed there not as part of the aid, but I think it was either as a checkpoint or a normal military staging facility.

So I think the – obviously, whenever you have a military operating in any area, you have a risk of misunderstanding, you have a risk miscalculation, you have a risk of civilian casualties. That is an ongoing risk as long as there is an ongoing military operation.

But you also see that risk increase now because of – as I said earlier – how desperate people are, right. Just look at the footage, and you can tell. You can see the people swarming those trucks. They’re desperate. They need food. And so whenever you have that kind of situation you have the risk not just of harm from military action that goes wrong and unfolds in a way that no one anticipates or no one wants, but you also have a heightened risk of accident. You have a heightened risk of criminal activity. You have all of those heightened risks to innocent people who are just trying to get food and water and medicine and things that they need to feed their families and make their families comfortable and try to keep their families safe.

And so that’s why you keep – hear me keep saying we are trying so hard to get this temporary ceasefire agreement to release the hostages, because it would do so much to alleviate every problem that the Palestinian people are facing now. It would allow us to get more aid in. It would allow aid to be delivered safely throughout Gaza. And it would allow people in Gaza more freedom of movement to move around and get to aid and get to their homes and get to their neighborhoods. So it is urgent that this agreement be reached, and that is why you see the President and the Secretary and others in the United States Government pushing so hard to get it over the finish line.

QUESTION: And just when you say that you – I mean that the United States is pressing for answers, in what form does that take? I mean, have there been calls initially? And to what extent will the U.S. follow up on that? Is there – are there – is there talk about accountability already for this?

MR MILLER: Again, I think it’s appropriate to let the investigation unfold and see what it produces, but we – I can tell you we were in touch at senior levels with the Government of Israel early this morning U.S. time. Obviously, Israel is seven hours ahead of us, so by the time we woke up here, people in Israel – in the embassy were already in touch. And those contacts were followed up by people here in the State Department, pushing for answers and pushing – and we’re told that there’s an investigation. We’ll look to see what the results of that investigation yield and what further measures, if any, are appropriate.

Jenny, go ahead.

QUESTION: President Biden said that he believes that this will complicate the negotiations to secure that ceasefire and free the hostages. Can you give us any details about what’s underlying his assessment there?

MR MILLER: I won’t other than to say it very well could, but the reason you saw the President on the phone with the president of Egypt and the emir of Qatar, and the reason you saw the Secretary on the phone with the prime minister of Qatar is to try and push past this situation and to try to make clear that, in fact, this incident today – this tragedy today – just underscores why we need to get a hostage deal and why we need to get a temporary ceasefire as soon as possible. So it may very well complicate it, but our hope is that it will not. And we are going to push very hard to try to get a deal over the line.

QUESTION: And can you give us any more details on what other measures the U.S. is considering to try to get aid into Gaza? We’ve seen reports of potentially air drops. Is there any contemplation —

MR MILLER: So —

QUESTION: — serious contemplation there?

MR MILLER: There are a few – so we continue to try to improve the distribution system and work through that with the Government of Israel and the United Nations and try to find a way to unstick this problem that we have right now with providing security to convoys of assistance. We also continue to explore other measures – I’m not going to get into what those are from this podium – but we continue to consider another – a number of other possible measures to get assistance in, as well as working with our countries to get assistance in. You saw the Government of Jordan facilitate an air drop earlier this week, something that we very much support.

But, again, our – it’s not to say that we are not focused on those, because we are and those would help immediately, but the real solution here to this is to try to get – or to get, I should say – an agreement that would dramatically increase the flow of assistance in and help with the distribution problems and help with the problem that civilians face of being able to move safely to get to aid when it actually does make it in.

QUESTION: I mean, is there any discussion about any other crossings in the north of Gaza beyond Erez being opened or instead of Erez?

MR MILLER: All I can say about that is that we continue to push for a crossing in the north to be open, and I’ll leave it at that.

Simon.

QUESTION: Come back to the crossings specifically, could you – I mean, a lot of people will be looking at this and saying you’re the main supporter of Israel. Israel is completely in charge of this crossing – the Erez crossing – and other border crossings and potentially – that could potentially open up aid to northern Gaza. We see these images, as you say, that demonstrates the desperation that people are feeling. Why is Israel unable to open that border?

MR MILLER: So there are a number of security and technical challenges that they have been willing to work through. They can, of course, speak to those directly. I won’t try to speak for them, but I will speak on behalf of the United States and say that the Secretary has made clear directly in conversations with Israeli Government partners and as have others in the United States Government that we want to see a crossing opened in the north as soon as possible.

You may recall that it was our intervention and our push that got Rafah first open for humanitarian assistance and then our push that got Kerem Shalom open for humanitarian assistance. In both those cases, it’s not something that happened over night. It’s something that we pushed for repeatedly and were eventually able to achieve, and we are hopeful to eventually be able to achieve a crossing – the opening of a crossing in the north because we think it’s incredibly important.

QUESTION: So are you telling the Israelis that you don’t think that their security, whatever concerns they have, are enough to justify keeping that border closed?

MR MILLER: I’m not going to get into our private conversations, but I will say that we do continue to press with them the urgent importance of opening a crossing in the north.

QUESTION: And there’s been this question of the Israelis targeting Palestinian police who have – in other instances are guarding aid. As Shaun was getting at, we seem to have an instance here where the Israelis have ended up involved in securing aid that’s being delivered. What does – does the U.S. have, like, a vision or a plan for how aid delivery should be secured, given the kind of chaos that we’ve seen today?

MR MILLER: I’m not at a point where I can discuss those details publicly. It’s something that, as I said earlier, we are engaged with the Government of Israel as well as the United Nations, who provides most of the convoys coming in; they provide most of the humanitarian assistance coming in. But then there are, as we saw today, some commercial convoys that are coming in as well delivering goods that are available for sale.

So we’re continuing to work through that situation and trying to get it solved as quickly as possible. Our special envoy, David Satterfield, has been engaged with it, but I just don’t have – I just can’t get into the details publicly, unfortunately.

Said, go ahead.

QUESTION: Thank you, Matt. You don’t have any doubt that only one side did the shooting, and the killing, and the shelling, and so on of these people, correct?

MR MILLER: Said, I have seen reports of – I have seen different reports with respect to that very question.

QUESTION: Right.

MR MILLER: We don’t know, as I said earlier, the ground truth of what happened, which is why we think it’s appropriate that an investigation be conducted.

QUESTION: So you think that there were other people shooting Palestinians who were then —

MR MILLER: Said, I said I have seen reports that other people were shooting. I don’t know the veracity of any of those reports —

QUESTION: Right.

MR MILLER: — which is why we’re seeking more information.

QUESTION: And you expect to get any results from these investigations —

MR MILLER: We do.

QUESTION: — these reports?

MR MILLER: We do.

QUESTION: Will you come back to us next week and tell us this is what happened?

MR MILLER: I can’t promise you next week because I don’t know how long an investigation will take, but certainly —

QUESTION: So what —

MR MILLER: — but – hold on – certainly, when an investigation is completed and we’re briefed on that investigation, I’m happy to come brief you on that.

QUESTION: On the principle of it, why is it so difficult for this government to say we condemn the killing of children, Palestinian women and children? Why can’t you say the word “condemn”?

MR MILLER: We do – Said, if you listened to what I said a moment ago, I —

QUESTION: No, I listened very carefully.

MR MILLER: Hold on, hold on. Said, please don’t interrupt me.

QUESTION: Yeah.

MR MILLER: I said far too many —

QUESTION: Right.

MR MILLER: — Palestinians have died, thousands of Palestinian children have died, and it is a tragedy when one of them dies. Of course we don’t want to see a single child die.

QUESTION: Right.

MR MILLER: We don’t want to see anyone die —

QUESTION: Right.

MR MILLER: — as a result of this conflict, which is why we have been working to bring this conflict to a close as soon as possible. But whenever you ask me these questions, I do think you continue to kind of just elide over the fact that Hamas bears a great deal of responsibility for putting those children in harm’s way. Remember it was Hamas that launched this war in the first place with an attack on Israel that killed men, women, and children, and that Hamas – that hid and continues to hide behind children as human shields.

So yes —

QUESTION: Okay. We —

MR MILLER: Yes, we do not want to see —

QUESTION: Right.

MR MILLER: — any child die. We don’t want to see any innocent civilian die, which is why we are working so hard to try to achieve a temporary ceasefire that would alleviate their suffering.

QUESTION: Yet I have not heard the word “condemn.” I mean, this war began way before October 7. I mean, in fact, the reason that this administration was so strong on pursuing a Middle East peace and so on because the war has been going on for decades before and so on. We heard this administration when they came into office talking about the opening of the consulate, talking about the opening of the PLO office here, talking about restarting and reigniting the peace talks and so on, re-aiding UNRWA and so on, simply because that war has been going on for a very long time, because Gaza was under siege for a very, very long time.

MR MILLER: Said, that being – hold on. Nothing that happened before October 7th justifies what Hamas did on that day. And it is – and it is what Hamas did on that day that led to the outbreak of this war and led to the suffering of so many innocent Palestinians.

QUESTION: Right. So you are —

MR MILLER: And I just feel it’s important to correct that fact.

QUESTION: Okay, that’s fine. I mean, you guys said this many times before. But in fact, Israel has been waging war on Gaza for a very, very long time.

Let me ask you on the aid issue, on the trucks and the trailers and so on: Is there anyone other than Israel that is holding the aid from going in?

MR MILLER: It is not a question of aid going in. That’s not the problem right now, Said. The problem is that when aid gets in there is a distribution problem —

QUESTION: Right.

MR MILLER: — inside Gaza right now because there are police officers, some of whom are members of Hamas —

QUESTION: Right.

MR MILLER: — who have been providing the security for those – for that distribution inside Gaza. And what Israel says is that they have a legitimate right to go after members of Hamas. So we would obviously prefer to see members of a security force inside Gaza who are not Hamas members, but that’s not where we are today. So it is —

QUESTION: So —

MR MILLER: It is the situation that we continue to try to work through.

QUESTION: So this is really the classic catch-22 kind of situation, because Hamas governed Gaza for a very long time – all of the police, all the – many —

MR MILLER: I’m well aware.

QUESTION: Many of security forces and so on. Unless you supply Gaza with police and other staff people, whatever, who are from Egypt, from anywhere, to distribute these things, it’s going to be the same people to distribute it, correct?

MR MILLER: As I said, it is an —

QUESTION: So this is really you’re saying okay, you can’t – it’s a catch-22 situation, you can’t do it?

MR MILLER: I don’t think you’re listening to what I said. What I said is we believe the way to ultimately solve this problem is to try to get a temporary ceasefire that would get hostages out and alleviate this problem and make it possible for aid to move around, and get food in people’s mouths so they’re not so hungry and they’re not so desperate that they’re swarming the convoys that do come in.

QUESTION: Last question. A last —

MR MILLER: Said, just let me go to —

QUESTION: I have one last question.

MR MILLER: One last question then. Yes.

QUESTION: Allow me one last question. Do you suspect that Mr. Netanyahu perhaps authorized this raid to scuttle the negotiations?

MR MILLER: There is no —

QUESTION: Do you have any suspicions?

MR MILLER: There is no evidence of that that I have seen, Said.

Go ahead.

QUESTION: Thank you, Matt. You keep saying that you don’t want to see any Palestinian civilians dead, and the number of civilians should – killed should be zero. But you saw the numbers – I’m sure you did – today; they are staggering. There are 30,000 dead, 70,000 wounded, and 7,000 are missing. With due respect, Matt, many people in the Arab and Muslim world do not believe that this administration is sincere when they keep saying the same message that we don’t want to see Palestinian dead, for many reasons. Number one, you supply Israel with lethal weapon with no conditions and no reviews, as much as we ask about it. And second is you shelter them in the Security Council and you are still siding with Israel that no ceasefire till now. You want a short pause, and it didn’t work out.

So how can you respond to people who criticize this administration that actually you are the one who’s supporting the Israelis when they’re killing —

MR MILLER: So I would – I would turn it around with a question – not to you, because I know that’s not the way this exchange is supposed to work. But to anyone that wants Israel to stop, just to stop the war unilaterally, what is their solution to the Hamas leadership that launched the attacks of October 7th and continue to be at large? What is their solution to the thousands of Hamas fighters who continue to be operating inside Gaza and continue to say that they are committed to the destruction of the state of Israel, to say that they continue to be committed to the intentional murder of Israeli civilians?

So anyone that is asking the question about Israel and Israel’s conduct in this campaign – which are fair questions, and it’s why we stand up here and answer them – also needs to ask questions about Hamas’s culpability and Hamas’s side in it. Because this is a difficult problem, and we continue to believe that Israel has a legitimate right to go after terrorists that are right across its borders, right in Gaza, that are committed to the destruction of the state of Israel and are committed to killing Israeli civilians. But we want them to do it in accordance with international humanitarian law, and it is important that they do that.

Again, as I’ve said before, if Hamas came out and laid down arms, all of this could be over today – all of it, every bit of it.

QUESTION: The only difference is we are journalists covering the State Department, so it’s our right to ask you.

MR MILLER: It’s why I made clear – it’s why I made clear I’m not asking the question of you. I’m very aware.

QUESTION: We’re holding the administration accountable.

MR MILLER: Yeah.

QUESTION: Other journalists will hold Hamas. But one – another question. Senator Coon said today that if Israel does not present a secure and credible plan to evacuate civilians – 1.5 million from Rafah – then he’s willing to consider restriction on arms sales to Israel. And this is an advanced position from – the senator is very close to the Biden administration. So do you believe now you start losing the argument even among – in Congress? And do you support that at one stage, that even this administration will impose arms restriction?

MR MILLER: I think it’s important that we take things one step at a time, and where we are today is that we have said we cannot support an operation in Rafah unless there is a credible and executable plan to deal with the more than 1 million civilians who are sheltering there. And we have not yet seen such a plan. We haven’t been briefed on such a plan. And we can’t support it until we see that plan.

And so to speculate about what may happen down the road, I, of course, can’t do. I can’t tell you what’s going to happen tomorrow, but I’ll take it one step at a time and say right now there’s not a plan on – there’s not a plan in place that we have seen that we can endorse.

Alex, go ahead.

QUESTION: Thank you, Matt. A couple of questions. May I get the department’s reaction to Putin’s speech, his accusations against the West, and obviously a renewed nuclear war threat? Anything in particular stood out?

MR MILLER: So it is not the first time we have seen irresponsible rhetoric from Vladimir Putin. It is no way for the leader of a nuclear-armed state to speak. We have communicated in the past privately and directly with Russia about the consequences of the use of a nuclear weapon. That said, we do not have any sign that Russia is preparing to use a nuclear weapon, and we will continue to monitor this carefully.

QUESTION: Thank you. Yale University just came out with a report this morning. They highlighted 323 incidents of targeting Ukraine energy infrastructure, damaging it, mostly outside of the front line. This is something the Secretary flagged last fall. Now that you have a report backing it, is there any action you’re going to take to hold Russia accountable?

MR MILLER: Any action we’re going to take to hold Russia accountable?

QUESTION: If it’s verified.

MR MILLER: I think you have seen us take a number of actions to hold Russia accountable over the two years since this war began, the more than two years now since this war began, when it comes to imposing sanctions on Russia, imposing exports on Russia to try and dry up the fuel for the Russian economy and the Russian military machine, and you have most significantly seen us hold Russia accountable by providing security assistance to Ukraine to defend itself and repel the Russian aggression from its borders. And it’s why we continue to say that the most effective step that can be taken to hold Russia accountable would be for Congress to pass the present supplemental request to make sure that Ukraine continues to get what it needs to hold Russia accountable.

QUESTION: In Vienna at OSCE, you guys invoked today Moscow Mechanism, along with other countries. Criticism is that the Moscow Mechanism has been invoked multiple times last year, but there is no impact – real impact if Russia stays a member of the OSCE. So what are you guys trying to achieve with the next round of Moscow Mechanism?

MR MILLER: So we continue to hold Russia accountable at all levels, in multiple fora, and I don’t think you should look at actions in just one as the totality of our engagement.

Janne – let me —

QUESTION: Can I – let me have one more.

MR MILLER: Let me go ahead. We’re already half an hour in.

QUESTION: Please come back to me.

MR MILLER: Janne, go ahead.

QUESTION: Thank you very much, Matt. Strengthening cooperation in responding to North Korea was discussed at the U.S. and South Korea foreign ministers’ meeting yesterday. However, China is violating sanctions against North Korea and continues to provide used ships, including fuel, to North Korea. Why are there no additional sanctions against China?

MR MILLER: So the Secretary and the foreign minister of the Republic of Korea did discuss yesterday their concerns about the DPRK’s increasingly aggressive behavior, their repeated violations of UN Security Council resolutions. And I can tell you that in every conversation the Secretary’s had with his Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi, he has raised North Korea’s activities, and he will continue to do so. And I don’t want to preview any further actions.

QUESTION: Second question. President Biden signed executive order banning the sale of information about U.S. individual and U.S. Government to adversaries. As you know, China is carrying out information activities through Confucius Institute around the world, including United States. What measures is the United States currently taking on this?

MR MILLER: Let me take that one and get back to you.

Michel.

QUESTION: Yeah. Matt, CNN reported that American – the American administration is concerned that Israel is planning to – is planning a ground incursion into Lebanon that could be launched in the spring or next summer. Can you elaborate on that, and to what extent are you concerned?

MR MILLER: I am not going to comment on leaked reports, even ostensibly to your esteemed colleagues at CNN in the room here. But as you have heard me say before and as you’ve heard the Secretary say before, we believe that the best way to achieve Israel’s legitimate security concerns in the north of Israel is to pursue a diplomatic path and achieve a diplomatic resolution. The Government of Israel has said it believes that the diplomatic path is the best way to seek a resolution, and that’s what we’ll continue to engage in.

QUESTION: And do you expect an incursion in the spring or in the summer?

MR MILLER: I do not want to comment, again – I talked a minute ago about taking things step by step. Let’s take this step by step. Right now, we take the Government of Israel at their word that they want to pursue a – or pursue a diplomatic resolution, and that’s what we’re engaged on.

QUESTION: And can you tell us about the efforts that the U.S. is taking to achieve a diplomatic solution?

MR MILLER: I can tell you that they’re private, and in the best – in the – the best prospect of them being successful is to keep them private, but that we are engaged intensively on them.

QUESTION: Thanks.

MR MILLER: Go ahead in the back, all the way.

QUESTION: Matt, thank you. Mark —

MR MILLER: Because I know I skipped you a couple of briefings ago, so —

QUESTION: Thank you. Mark Stone from Sky News. The Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said today that – he was asked how many women and children had been killed by Israel since October the 7th. He said it was 25,000. If the total number is 30,000, that leaves 5,000 men killed. If you assume that all those men are combatants, which is an absurd assumption but some have made that assumption, that means that more than 80 percent of the people killed since October the 7th are civilians. How is that anything other than a complete disaster and a total failure of American leadership?

MR MILLER: So I have seen the comments by the Secretary of Defense. I haven’t seen them in full, so I will refer you to the Department of Defense to discuss exactly what he meant. But I will say whatever the exact number is of civilians that have been killed, it is far too high, which is what you heard me addressing a moment ago, and which is why we continue to try to perceive a temporary ceasefire that would alleviate that suffering.

QUESTION: So what is – but if I can follow up.

MR MILLER: Yeah.

QUESTION: First of all, are you suggesting that maybe the Defense Secretary got it wrong?

MR MILLER: No, I’m suggesting that for comments about the things the Defense Secretary said, you should take that up with the spokesperson for the Defense Department, who does have a daily briefing and I’m sure will be happy to talk about —

QUESTION: So how many civilians do you think – how many women and children —

MR MILLER: I don’t – I don’t have a further estimate to offer.

Go ahead.

QUESTION: Thank you. Two questions on Iran. So what does the department think about the parliamentary elections to be held in Iran tomorrow? What is the expectation and assessment, and does it think that it’s fair and free? And then I have another Iran question.

MR MILLER: So I have no expectation that Iran’s elections will be free and fair, and I suspect that a great number of Iranians have no expectation that those elections will be free and fair. As you probably already know, thousands of candidates were already disqualified in an opaque process, and the world has long known that Iran’s political system features undemocratic and nontransparent administrative, judicial, and electoral systems.

QUESTION: And my second question is: What is, again, department’s assessment of Russia putting an Iranian satellite into orbit? Does it believe that it – the satellite is, as the Iranians say, to be used for civilian purposes?

MR MILLER: So we’ve seen the reports of this satellite launch. It’s yet another indication of the deepening military partnership between Iran and Russia. As we have warned publicly on a number of occasions, this partnership is harmful to Ukraine, to Iran’s neighbors, and to the international community. We have demonstrated our ability to take action in response to the military partnership between Russia and Iran in close coordination with our partners and allies. And if Iran goes further and sells ballistic missiles to Russia, I can assure you the response from the international community will be swift and severe.

Go ahead. And I’ll come to you next.

QUESTION: Today is the fourth anniversary of controversial Doha Agreement which paved the way for Taliban to return to power. Many U.S. experts and politician believe it as the worst agreement in the history of United States in diplomatic way. And you and Taliban also accusing each other to violating the terms of this agreement. Don’t you think this moment is the time for you to abrogation this agreement and announce it as null and void?

MR MILLER: So in our view, the agreement empowered the Taliban, weakened our partners in the Afghan Government, and committed the United States to withdrawing our troops with no clear plan for what should come next. The Taliban have not fulfilled their commitments in the Doha Agreement. While they have taken some steps regarding certain terrorist groups in Afghanistan, it is well known that the Taliban also sheltered al-Qaida leader Zawahiri in downtown Kabul, which flies directly in the face of the agreement. They have not fulfilled their Doha commitment to engage in a meaningful dialogue with their fellow Afghans leading to a negotiated settlement and an inclusive political system. So we will continue to make clear to them what we believe their obligations are.

Go ahead.

QUESTION: Okay, thank you, Matt.

QUESTION: Well, so why didn’t you – why didn’t you pull out of it?

MR MILLER: Because we are continuing to make clear what we believe their obligations are under the agreement. And —

QUESTION: Well, yeah, but if they’re – but if they’re not doing it, then – hey, look, you guys took what you say now is a flawed and bad agreement from the previous administration but forged ahead with it, even while knowing that – or knowing – even while thinking that it was a bad agreement. Why?

MR MILLER: I think has been litigated from this podium many times, mostly before I got here, is that we were playing the hand that we were dealt and thought it was important to withdraw U.S. troops from Afghanistan. And the —

QUESTION: Yes, but the hand that you were dealt on other things, such as the Paris Climate Accord – you rejoined that after it had been pulled out of. You – there are other examples.

MR MILLER: And the – and the idea of leaving U.S. troops in Afghanistan was not one that the President supported.

QUESTION: All right, and then related to this —

MR MILLER: I told her I was going to go next, but go ahead.

QUESTION: Well, yeah, I know, but this is —

MR MILLER: (Laughter.) Yeah.

QUESTION: But this is directly related to Afghanistan.

MR MILLER: Sure.

QUESTION: So I asked you yesterday to follow up on Nick’s question —

MR MILLER: Oh, yeah.

QUESTION: — on the HFAC. So Chairman McCaul has just announced a March 7th markup for a bill that would hold the Secretary in contempt of Congress for refusing, allegedly, to turn over these after-action report interview notes. What’s your response to that, and do you have any response to the questions that I asked you yesterday on that?

MR MILLER: Let me – let me first – let me take the second question first, because I hadn’t really looked at that statement, which came out right before the briefing. So what I said two days ago was accurate; I stand by it. We did not tell the committee that the interview notes were the property of other agencies, as the committee said in its letter from a couple of days ago. We also did not tell the committee that the interview notes implicated other agency equities and needed to be cleared for release by other agencies, as the committee said in its statement yesterday.

So what I said was accurate and I stand by it, but as it relates to the overall question, this is a matter we have been trying to resolve amicably for some time. We recognize the committee’s legitimate oversight function, and we – that’s why we have – we have supplied them with thousands of pages of documents. It’s why we have made people available for transcribed interviews. As you know, we have gotten – we have come to kind of loggerheads at certain points in the past and been able to reach a resolution, and that’s what we’ll try to do here.

QUESTION: Yeah, okay, so – but you’re still not prepared to turn over what they’re asking for. Whether their interest is in your view legitimate or illegitimate, they do have a legitimate interest in the subject, but you’re still not going to hand them over. Is that correct?

MR MILLER: Two things. One, they have a legitimate interest in the subject, but that does not mean that there aren’t also longstanding Executive Branch equities that we need to be mindful of. So that’s the first thing. The second thing is I’m not going to negotiate over this in public, but we are and will be in contact with the committee about this to try to reach some kind of resolution.

QUESTION: Well, are you at all concerned that there’s going to be this markup in the committee that would hold the Secretary in contempt of Congress?

MR MILLER: We are going to try to achieve a resolution. We’ve seen these markups announced —

QUESTION: Before then?

MR MILLER: Yes, before then.

QUESTION: Thank you.

MR MILLER: Now go ahead.

QUESTION: Thank you. Going back to humanitarian aid into Gaza, the ICJ ordered last month immediate and effective measures to protect Palestinians in Gaza from a risk of genocide. That includes ensuring humanitarian assistance. So do you think that Israel is complying with this ICJ ruling? And do you believe – do you agree that today’s attack near Gaza on starving people waiting for humanitarian assistance violates this ICJ’s ruling?

MR MILLER: So again, let me just say I don’t believe we have established the facts of what actually happened today. But it is important that those facts be established, which is why we have called for an investigation and will look forward to the results of that investigation. As I have seen, there are conflicting accounts and we don’t know the ground truth of what happened. When it comes to the overall question, we certainly have seen Israel take some steps to facilitate the assistance of humanitarian aid into Gaza, but we think that there’s more that they can do and more that they should do. And it’s why we continue to press them on it.

QUESTION: And I have a follow-up on that.

MR MILLER: Yeah, go ahead.

QUESTION: Because UNRWA’s head Lazzarini today said during an interview with CNN that there has been a 50 percent reduction of humanitarian aid entering Gaza compared to last month, despite the ICJ’s ruling. So it seems that Israel is not taking maybe those steps to allow more humanitarian aid. Do you think that Israel maybe should face some consequences for not complying with this ruling?

MR MILLER: So we think they should allow more humanitarian assistance in, but ultimately, this goes to this problem I was referring to a minute ago, where you have the problem not just of it getting in but then getting properly distributed to those who need it because of the very severe security situation on the ground. That’s what we want to see resolved and that’s what we’re working with the Government of Israel as well as the appropriate UN agencies on trying to accomplish.

Go ahead, Jen.

QUESTION: The Palestinian factions are meeting in Moscow today. I’m wondering what the U.S. assessment is of Moscow taking this role to try to play I guess a diplomatic role here.

MR MILLER: So we have not seen Moscow play much of any role in trying to resolve this conflict since October 7th. We have always said that we would welcome countries that were willing to play a constructive role in trying to achieve a diplomatic resolution, but I will say it has never been our assessment that that is the role that Moscow wants or is willing to play.

Shaun.

QUESTION: Could I take you to Africa for a few questions?

MR MILLER: Yeah.

QUESTION: Ghana. I know there’s a statement that you issued last night on the anti-LGBTQ bill. Just to follow up on that, if my understanding is that the President Akufo-Addo hasn’t signed it yet, are there talks with Ghana trying to stop this from becoming law? And if it comes to fruition, are – is there a sense of what the repercussions, if any, could be from the U.S.?

MR MILLER: So we have made very clear what our opinion is on that law – you can look at my statement yesterday – and we have made that clear in private conversations with the Government of Ghana as well. I don’t think I should get any more specific than that, but if this bill becomes law, it would certainly have a chilling effect on foreign investment and tourism in Ghana. You’ve seen that same chilling effect bear fruit in Uganda, which passed a very similar law in the past, and I can say that should the bill pass, it would potentially have ramifications on U.S. assistance in the country.

QUESTION: Sure. Just a couple more on Africa.

MR MILLER: Yeah.

QUESTION: In Chad, the opposition leader was killed, Mr. Dillo Djérou. I wonder if the U.S. has any comment on that in terms of what this – how this complicates, if at all, the situation in Chad.

MR MILLER: No – so we are aware of the targeted violence that transpired yesterday in a neighborhood in the capital. That violence has abated, but we continue to monitor the situation closely, and we’ve seen reports of his death – widespread reports of his death – but have not confirmed them and don’t have any other assessment at this point.

QUESTION: Sure. And just one more. I know I’ve asked about this before, but in Senegal, the date for the election – the opposition is calling for it to be held before April 2nd, when President Sall has said he’ll step down. I know you’ve said before you want – that the U.S. wants the election as soon as possible. Does the U.S. want to weigh in on that timeline, whether it should be before he leaves office?

MR MILLER: I don’t want to weigh in other than to reiterate what we have said before, which is, as the supreme court ordered, we want to see the constitutional process followed and we want to see the election as soon as possible.

I’ll take a couple more and then wrap. Go ahead.

QUESTION: Thank you very much, Matt. Thank you very much. A gentleman named Jiao Diego, a Portuguese American from Texas, did $200,000 business with China, got cheated, got robbed. To date there is no clue about who did it. Three months before him, a gentleman from Reston did the business with the same company for about 120,000, went to the Beijing office of the state – of the U.S. embassy, complained, filed the name of the person, phone number, picture. That same person basically cheated this other gentleman three, four months later. Any protection for U.S. businessmen regarding State Department officials sitting in Beijing about solving their business-related issues?

MR MILLER: I do not know the underlying specifics of the cases that you’ve raised so can’t possibly comment on it.

QUESTION: Just one more – one, please.

MR MILLER: No, go – go – let me just – we’re – it’s been a busy day.

QUESTION: Please, one more.

MR MILLER: Go ahead. Just fine – yeah, go ahead.

QUESTION: So as you know, the Polish foreign minister was in town recently, and in many comment before his meeting with Secretary Blinken, he repeatedly warned that if America fails to honor the President’s pledge of supporting Ukraine as long as it takes, it will badly damage America’s credibility as an ally and then the – some allies will look for security elsewhere and others will look to pursue their own nuclear weapons. Is that – what’s your response to that? And do you share this worry?

MR MILLER: So we think that America’s credibility when it comes to upholding our commitments to our allies is well established, and it’s something that has been well established over decades. That said, I am quite sure that our allies are watching closely what the United States Congress does when it comes to supporting Ukraine. And even more than that, I know our adversaries are watching closely what the United States Congress does when it comes to Ukraine – most importantly President Putin, who I am sure is watching and waiting to see if the United States Congress is going to stand with democracy and stand with those who support freedom or if it is going to allow President Putin to continue his aggressive – aggression against Ukraine without ongoing military support from the United States.

QUESTION: Sorry. You’re —

MR MILLER: Yeah.

QUESTION: Upholding our commitment to allies is well established?

MR MILLER: Believe so.

QUESTION: Yeah?

MR MILLER: Yeah.

QUESTION: Okay. Well, you’re going to tell that to the Montagnards, to the Hmong, to the Cambodians, the South Vietnamese, to the Kurds, to the Afghans – all of whom were abandoned by the United States after having gotten firm commitments of support.

MR MILLER: So we could do a long tour through United States foreign policy, I’m sure most of which —

QUESTION: Well, we don’t have to do the long tour.

MR MILLER: Well, hold on. Hold on. Most of which we don’t —

QUESTION: I just want to know who comes up with the language that your commitment to allies is well established, when, in fact, what’s well established is a long history of you abandoning allies.

MR MILLER: I think when it comes to our allies – and specifically I was speaking about our NATO Allies in response to that question – I think our track record of support them is clear. And the – more importantly, the commitment from the President is clear.

QUESTION: All right. My last thing is just —

MR MILLER: And then we’ll wrap.

QUESTION: — I have asked you before —

MR MILLER: Yeah.

QUESTION: — about Chinese – complaints from the Chinese embassy about the treatment of Chinese students will valid U.S. visas being harassed and/or deported on their arrival in the United States.

MR MILLER: Right.

QUESTION: Do you guys have anything more to say about that and how widespread an issue this is? I realize it’s not mainly a State Department concern once people arrive at a port of entry, but you do give the visas out. And if someone has a valid visa —

MR MILLER: Yeah.

QUESTION: — they should have an expectation of not – at least not being harassed.

MR MILLER: Let me say generally that people-to-people ties are one area where we can work cooperatively and constructively with China, and it’s something that we have sought to increase. You may have seen the announcement just recently that we agreed with China to allow 100 weekly flights, direct flights, between the United States and China – 50/50 between – split between the PRC and the United States.

When it comes to people from China coming to the United States, students make up a significant portion of those who come. And my understanding – you’re right that it is not primarily a State matter when it comes to this question of people being detained or denied admission, but my understanding is that the percentage of Chinese students who have been detained is less than one-tenth of 1 percent and that overall the percentage has been stable over the past few years. So I’ll just say that we believe that people‑to‑people ties are important, and we’ll continue to push to expand them.

QUESTION: Do you have any idea what that actual – one-tenth of 1 percent, what the number – what that number is, either what the —

MR MILLER: I —

QUESTION: — total number of visa holders are?

MR MILLER: I was going to say I don’t, because I don’t know what the numerator is – or maybe it’s the denominator. I don’t know what the total number of students that come in is, which is what we need to figure that out.

QUESTION: Okay. Well, do you know what one-tenth of 1 percent of – even without —

MR MILLER: Of students? It’s —

QUESTION: — even without knowing what the total number of visa-holding Chinese students is? Do you know what the number —

MR MILLER: No.

QUESTION: — of one-tenth of 1 percent is?

MR MILLER: No, I don’t. I don’t know either the numerator or the denominator. I know the ratio. That’s the extent —

QUESTION: Ah-hah. Okay.

MR MILLER: That is the extent of it. That is the extent of the math I’m going to do from this podium —

QUESTION: How extremely – (laughter) – okay.

MR MILLER: — as a government and English major.

QUESTION: Thank you.

MR MILLER: So with that, we’ll wrap for today and the week. Thanks, everyone.

(The briefing was concluded at 2:22 p.m.)

# # #