Friday, April 3, 2020

Der Spiegel: Europe Struggles to Find a Joint Approach to the Corona Catastrophe


DER  SPİEGEL  Eurobonds or Bust?
Europe Struggles to Find a Joint Approach to the Corona Catastrophe

Faced with a growing economic crisis, many European Union member states are clamoring for the introduction of so-called corona bonds. Just like it was in the euro crisis, though, Germany is opposed. In the end, Berlin may not have a choice. By DER SPIEGEL Staff
03.04.2020, 18:29 Uhr


People in Naples waiting for food handouts: "Are we together or are we not?"
 SALVATORE LAPORTA / IPA / DDP IMAGES
There are three recent comments that stand out for what they reveal about the state of the European Union these days. The first comes from Felipe González, a former Spanish prime minister and once a friend of former German chancellors Willy Brandt and Helmut Kohl. "If there is anybody in Europe who believes they are superior to others, they will pay dearly. Such a thing happened to us twice in the 20th century, with horrific consequences."

The second quote comes from Lars Castellucci, a member of German parliament with the Social Democrats (SPD). "Europe is in danger of becoming the most prominent corona fatality," he said. "The mood in Italy is dramatic. Russians and Chinese are being hailed as saviors. But they feel abandoned by Europe."
Finally, there's Bruno Le Maire, France's finance minister. "There is just one question: Are we together or are we not? Are we presenting a sad image to the world of a Continent divided into North and South?" Like the other two, Le Maire's musings were a not-so-hidden reference to Germany.

The Germans and Europe, that long history that has alternated between devastating wars and periods of solidarity, is beginning a new chapter. As the corona crisis tightens its grip on the Continent, hopes are being placed on the shoulders of the large, strong country in the middle. Will it be able to muster sufficient solidarity to help out the weaker EU members, particularly Italy and Spain, which have been hit so hard by the virus?

"There is just one question: Are we together or are we not?"
French Finance Minister Bruno Le Maire

Many doubt that it can. Italy was shocked when the German government initially placed a ban on the export of personal protective equipment. China jumped into the breach. The Germans have, of course, regained a bit of standing by accepting patients from Italy and France. Mostly, though, Europe is looking to Germany for financial solidarity.
It was the same thing we saw in the euro crisis, which erupted in 2010. Back then, the German government refused to allow for eurobonds, which could have been a great help to Greece, for example. Southern European countries were furious and Nazi comparisons were aired -- not unlike the more recent strong words from González.

Unable to Find Agreement

The pressure is once again on the German government now to approve eurobonds, which have been rebranded as corona bonds. Again, Berlin is refusing. And again, Europe is presenting a rather miserable image in a difficult crisis.
The EU wasn't doing all that well even before the crisis. There were divisions between North and South, and between East and West. And there was the burgeoning renaissance of the nation-state and the return of internal borders due to the refugee crisis, not to mention a lack of clear leadership, mostly because German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Emmanuel Macron were unable to find agreement.

The virus has made all of that even worse. Closed borders, nation-state unilateralism, economic collapse. Everybody is following their own path, and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has taken advantage of the crisis to transform his country into a dictatorship. Martin Schulz, the SPD politician who used to be president of the European Parliament, responded by saying: "Orbán is a cold and calculating cynic. He is fully aware of the difficult situation in which member states and the European Union find themselves. His calculus: The Europeans don't have time to stand up to my authoritarian politics. So he has mercilessly pushed it through."

Next week, European heads of state and government may have an opportunity to send out a message of hope to the uncertain and divided EU. Once again, they are to meet up in a video conference for a summit meeting. If it goes well, they will agree on financial solidarity and will censure Orbán. If it doesn't go well, they will be unable to reach agreement and won't even address the goings on in Hungary.
Last Thursday, the summit didn't go well. The video conference lasted for six hours, during which leaders tried to find a joint response to the economic consequences of the corona crisis. One of the main topics discussed was corona bonds.
Merkel, joining the meeting from her at-home quarantine, showed her stubborn side and sang the praises of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), the EU's bailout fund. "Don't be so critical," Merkel told Italian Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte, according to a report in the Spanish daily El Pais. "If you pin your hopes on corona bonds, they are never going to come."

Way Down on the Priority List

Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez threw his support behind his Italian counterpart, which is why there was no joint statement following the summit, just a paltry assignment for EU finance ministers to work something out. The impression left by the meeting was clear to all: "In a crisis, Europe cannot be depended on."

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen did her best to get everyone back on the same page, but she is also having trouble finding her way in this crisis. The issues that she was hoping would define her tenure, such as the Green Deal for Europe, have fallen way down on the priority list and, just like her predecessor, she has been unable to find a convincing response to the developments in Hungary – despite it being the Commission's job to enforce European treaties.
Von der Leyen's attempt to please everybody is reaching the limits of its usefulness. At one point, she said she could envision the adoption of corona bonds, only to then highlight the liability issues associated with them and say that the term was little more than a "buzzword." She then changed her approach again after being criticized by Italian Prime Minister Conte.

Indeed, it became clear to von der Leyen that the crisis currently shaking the EU is too strong to be adequately contained by the Commission in Brussels. But who should do it instead? It is actually a task that should fall to the German chancellor, as leader of the most-populous European Union country. Furthermore, Germany is taking over the rotating Council of the European Union presidency on July 1. That will de facto make Merkel Europe's leading crisis manager. At the same time, though, Merkel is a major party in the dispute over corona bonds, on which Europe's fate seems to currently be hanging.

The problem that must be addressed is the following: There are fears that the creditworthiness of countries like Italy and Spain could sink so far that they will be unable to obtain credit from global financial markets affordably, with interest rates potentially growing ruinously high. Corona bonds, by contrast, would be joint bonds offered by all eurozone countries together, backed by financially stronger countries. Italy and Spain would suddenly no longer have trouble accessing liquidity on global markets.
During the euro crisis, there was concern that Greece, for example, had been extremely careless with its finances and had been living beyond its means. Merkel was unwilling to underwrite such behavior.

Measures to Combat the Crisis

This time, though, it's not about sharing out old sovereign debt from Italy or Spain. These countries have been hit especially hard by a pandemic that is affecting all EU member states. Yet Merkel and German Finance Minister Olaf Scholz are still clinging to the same reservations against the bonds that they had back in the euro crisis. They are afraid that the new bonds could morph into a permanent institution, despite the fact that a time limitation is part of the discussion. German negotiators in Brussels are also pointing out that no eurozone member state has yet run into difficulties on the financial markets, not even Italy.

It is a point that cannot be easily dismissed. On Wednesday, Spanish Economy Minister Nadia Calviño insisted that Spain would not have to apply for an EU bailout package because of the COVID-19 pandemic. Speaking to a Spanish radio broadcaster, she said that the country was having no difficulty obtaining financing on international markets.

German Chancellor Angela Merkel: "Don't be so critical."
 GETTY IMAGES
Should aid become necessary, the so-called "stingy four" – as Germany, Austria, Finland and the Netherlands are sometimes referred to in Brussels – are proposing other instruments, primarily focusing on generating additional funding using more traditional methods. One idea is reassigning money from the EU budget to measures combating the crisis. The European Investment Bank is also to introduce a new program focused primarily on supporting the economies of countries that do not have their own development banks.

Merkel and Scholz, though, are pinning most of their hopes on the ESM. It has proven itself in the past, primarily by shielding Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Cyprus from insolvency.

The bailout fund currently has 410 billion euros available. The Chancellery and the Finance Ministry support the concept of using that money for cheap loans to countries in need. The advantage of this approach is that it would enable the European Central Bank to purchase unlimited amounts of sovereign bonds from these countries.

But if Italy and Spain both need help at the same time, it could quickly exhaust the funds available through the ESM. Merkel and Scholz, though, have considered that possibility and have come up with a potential solution: They would be prepared to double the size of the ESM, with Germany injecting 22 billion euros in fresh capital.
That, essentially, is the price tag Germany would face for avoiding corona bonds. France has sought to accommodate the German position and has proposed the establishment of a special fund for the period after the crisis. Finance Minister Le Maire has spoken with Olaf Scholz about the concept, but the German finance minister is skeptical.

Trapped in a Dilemma

A problem with this debate, as with the corona bond debate, is that it's not strictly about policy. Political symbolism plays a huge role as well, and eurobonds have become a symbol of European solidarity, especially in southern Europe. In the North, meanwhile, they are primarily seen as an attempt by southern European countries to take advantage of the economic strength of countries like Germany and the Netherlands.
Merkel's center-right Christian Democrats (CDU) still haven't recovered from the euro crisis and remain entrenched. "This ideological debate is completely unnecessary," says German Economy Minister Peter Altmaier, adding that the arguments against collectivized European debt haven't changed since the common currency crisis.

More on Coronavirus


His position represents a broad consensus within the party. "We have to join together to lead Europe back to renewed strength," says CDU General Secretary Paul Ziemiak. "But when it comes to corona bonds, we are adamantly opposed. We are a team player, but the solution cannot be simply procuring a joint credit card. What we need in the current situation is targeted support for those countries that have been hit hardest by the coronavirus."

But German conservatives find themselves trapped in a dilemma. If they continue to be unmovable in the corona bonds debate, they will be able to say that they remained true to their convictions, but they would risk Europe's future by doing so. It was a dilemma that almost pulled the CDU apart during the euro crisis, when the conservative group in German parliament reluctantly signed on in 2015 to the final bailout package for the Greeks.

It was a traumatizing experience for the CDU, particularly against the backdrop of the 2013 founding of the AfD, which was initially a staunchly anti-euro party. There is a deep-seated fear within the CDU that the right-wing populists could benefit mightily from the introduction of corona bonds.

Yet even though the AfD's primary focus early on was eliminating the euro, the issue isn't a priority for the party's grassroots any more. AfD leader Jörg Meuthen is opposed to corona bonds, as he made clear on Facebook this week, but Meuthen himself noted that the reaction to his post was far below what he is used to. "The issue is unwieldy and requires some basic knowledge, which is something people like to avoid," he says.

"Germany Isn't an Island"

But, he adds, that's nothing new. "Ever since the refugee crisis in 2015, other things have generated more clicks – asylum or, right now, the coronavirus, for example." He says he has repeatedly floated "test balloons," but financial policy no longer stirs people up the way it once did. He says he is hoping that will change. "In the economic crisis we are currently heading for, these questions will become more pressing."

The Social Democrats are actually in favor of corona bonds, but the party is once again facing the problem that they are part of the government. Finance Minister Olaf Scholz, a senior SPD politician and Merkel's vice chancellor, is opposed to the bonds and in favor of relying on the ESM in the crisis, and the party is currently following his lead, if a bit sullenly. Yet even though party head Norbert Walter-Borjans reached agreement with Scholz that the party would fall into line on the issue, he recently told German public radio broadcaster Deutschlandfunk that corona bonds were "the correct path" – more correct than ESM bailouts.
"If Europe does not make available joint financial instruments against the pandemic, after the crisis, people will think that the European Union is useless."
Former Italian Economics Minister Carlo Calenda

The Green Party, meanwhile, has agreed on a common line. A "joint effort" is needed, says Robert Habeck, one of the party's two leaders. "Germany isn't an island. We can only fight a pandemic and an economic crisis on a European level. Our economy is also dependent on European economies being stabile. That is why we need European bonds."
The Greens are yearning for a second speech from Merkel, this time focusing her attentions on Europe. Essentially, they are hoping she will finally play the leadership role many would like her to play. In her first televised speech on the coronavirus, she didn't mention the word Europe even a single time.
French President Emmanuel Macron, by contrast, focused on Europe's role and responsibility in this crisis in his first speech to the country.

The French are being guided by a trio of motives at the moment. The first is Macron's long-held desire for a politically robust and sovereign Europe. The second is his conviction that this European-wide crisis cannot be overcome with national solutions. And the third is his fear of handing populists a propaganda tool should Europe fail to demonstrate solidarity with countries like Italy and Spain – and that these countries could then plunge into mass-unemployment and lasting recessions.
"We must prove to all those who have always been opposed to Europe and who have been waiting for us to fail that Europe is strong and can overcome the crisis," says French Minister for European Affairs Amélie de Montchalin. "I have the feeling that the political discussion is on the right track and I have the impression that the Germans also want to find a way out of the crisis together with us," she recently said. Still, she felt it necessary to add that Germany and the Netherlands won't be able to recover if the others aren't doing well.

"A Tragic Mistake"

Italy, for example. It has been a few days now since Carlo Calenda joined other Italian politicians in penning an open letter published in the influential German daily Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. A former Italian economics minister, Calenda wrote that he still cannot understand why Italy's "dear German friends" reacted so callously to the catastrophe in his homeland.
"If Europe does not make available joint financial instruments against the pandemic, after the crisis, people will think that the European Union is useless." That could result in the impression that authoritarian countries make better partners. And that, Calenda wrote, "would be a tragic mistake."

"One or two years from now, debt levels will be far, far higher than they are today," argues economics professor Guido Tabellini of Bocconi University in Milan. "And then the debt crisis will return. That would be a disaster." We are now facing the consequences of never having followed up the currency union with a fiscal union, Tabellini says. Corona bonds would be a step in that direction, he believes.
DER SPIEGEL 15/2020
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The article you are reading originally appeared in German in issue 15/2020 (April 4, 2020) of DER SPIEGEL.
But that isn't likely to happen, as an internal paper from the German Finance Ministry indicates. The paper was compiled in preparation for the Euro Group meeting of finance ministers from common currency member states, which is scheduled to take place next Tuesday. The focus of the meeting will be the development of financial instruments for the crisis.

"From the German government's point of view, the discussion should focus on the use of instruments for which solutions can be quickly implemented," the paper notes. That essentially excludes euro bonds, since all the legal challenges necessary for their introduction would take two years.
"The instrument catalog of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) is available in the current crisis," the Finance Ministry paper notes. A precautionary credit line from the ESM "could contribute to stabilizing market access for individual euro zone member states to protect the financial stability of the currency union." The ESM does not require new instruments, the paper argues.

Even if that were all true, such papers are insufficient in the face of the political leadership that is now needed. If Merkel chooses to follow the line laid out in the document, then she must also hold a speech to all of Europe, similar to the address she recently held for Germans. And her message would have to be that in this crisis, Germany will demonstrate heartfelt solidarity with the rest of Europe – initially via the ESM, but should it become necessary, also with corona bonds.

And then, as part of its Council presidency, Germany could present a program described by Michael Roth, state minister for the European Union in Germany's Foreign Ministry, as follows: "Many of the problems we have had in the EU for a long time are being magnified by corona: The currency union lacks a social dimension. As such, many of the issues that we intended to pursue during our council presidency are even more urgent than before: the completion of the economic and currency unions, negotiations over a sustainable, climate-friendly EU budget, the strengthening of the rule of law in Europe, and not just in Poland and Hungary, and improved cooperation in foreign and security policy."
Regarding Hungary, Martin Schulz has a specific proposal: "I expect the EU to establish new budgetary priorities. The priority now should no longer be structural funding in Hungary, but the overcoming of the corona crisis."



The Majority of Crimeans are Still Glad for their Annexation

To Russia With Love
The Majority of Crimeans Are Still Glad for Their Annexation

John O'Loughlin, Gerard Toal, and Kristin M. Bakke
JOHN O’LOUGHLIN is Professor of Political Geography at the University of Colorado at Boulder, where he is a College Professor of Distinction.
GERARD TOAL is Professor of Government and International Affairs at Virginia Tech and is the author of Near Abroad: Putin, the West and the Contest Over Ukraine and the Caucasus, which won the ENMISA Distinguished Book Award in 2019.
KRISTIN M. BAKKE is Professor of Political Science and International Relations at University College London and Associate Research Professor at the Peace Research Institute Oslo.

The authors received funding for this work from a joint U.S. National Science Foundation/Research Councils UK grant.
Six years ago, Russian forces seized the Ukrainian territory of Crimea. Moscow hastily organized a referendum on March 16, 2014, to give the takeover of the peninsula a veneer of legitimacy. According to the official results, 97 percent of Crimeans voted to join Russia. Much of the international community, however, considered the referendum a sham, conducted at the barrel of a gun. In this view, Crimea did not freely join Russia; it was annexed.

Russia and its critics mark different anniversaries to remember this event. Russian officials commemorate March 18, 2014, as the day of “the return of Crimea” to the motherland, when Crimea formally acceded to Russia. Opponents of Russian President Vladimir Putin mourn the annexation of Crimea on February 27, 2014, the day Russian forces launched clandestine operations to seize the peninsula from Ukraine. On that day this year, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo released a press statement declaring that “Crimea is Ukraine [1]”: “The United States does not and will not ever recognize Russia’s claims of sovereignty over the peninsula. We call on Russia to end its occupation of Crimea.”

Do Crimeans feel that they live in an occupied territory, under the heels of Russian invaders? Some certainly do. International human rights organizations and local activists have documented numerous cases of the suppression of dissent and the jailing of activists belonging to the Muslim minority Tatar population on trumped up “terrorism” charges [2]. Local authorities have raided the homes of suspected activists, crushed independent media, and banned the Mejlis, the most significant Tatar civil society organization. But the perceptions of the bulk of the peninsula’s residents don’t get the same attention in the West as do the reports of dissidents. Our surveys in 2014 and again in 2019 show that Crimeans were and remain mostly in favor of the Russian annexation. That popular sentiment complicates the West’s prevailing view of the seizure of Crimea as an aggressive land grab.

HERE TO STAY

The March 2014 referendum in Crimea was deeply flawed. The vote was rushed in polarized conditions after a military invasion, and those opposed to Russia boycotted the referendum. But it is incontrovertible that most, though certainly not all, Crimean residents welcomed joining Russia. Numerous polls at the time of the annexation and in its immediate aftermath revealed broad support for joining Russia, including one the Levada-Center conducted on our behalf in December 2014. Writing earlier about these survey results, we termed the disconnect between the international community, which saw the takeover as illegitimate, and the people within Crimea, who were generally supportive of the move, as “the Crimea conundrum [3].” Yes, Russia was heavy-handed and expansionist in its actions in Crimea, flouting international laws and norms. But that did not bother most Crimeans.
Since 2014, Moscow has poured considerable amounts of money into Crimea. With the severing of Crimea’s links to Ukraine’s water, electric, gas, and transportation systems, Russia brought the peninsula into its own infrastructural networks at great cost. Electricity lines now run to Crimea from the Russian city of Rostov, and an underwater gas pipeline runs to Crimea from Krasnodar. Russia’s most ambitious, attention-grabbing endeavor in the region was the construction of a 19-kilometer-long road and railway bridge across the Kerch Strait (completed in 2019), a mega-project that not only visibly connected Crimea to Russia but symbolized the will of the Putin administration to bind Crimea to the motherland. Along with these and other projects, thousands of new Russian residents have come to Crimea, more than a quarter of a million by some estimates. Crimea was the fastest-growing region [4] of Russia in 2019 and has attracted many Russian tourists.

As part of a broader polling project in the post-Soviet states, we asked the Levada-Center to return to Crimea in December 2019 to survey public attitudes there, five years after our initial survey. The 2019 survey consisted of face-to-face home interviews with 826 people, with a response rate of 54 percent. The survey used both direct questions as well as experimental ones that were designed to reach honest and reliable answers on sensitive topics. The proportions by nationality—the common term for ethnicity in post-Soviet countries—in the sample closely correspond to their ratios in the Crimean census of 2014. In our sample, 66 percent of respondents identified as Russian, 13 percent as Tatar—the ethnic Turkic group that makes up about one-eighth of the population of the peninsula—and 16 percent as Ukrainian.

In general, Crimea’s annexation in 2014 gave residents grounds for optimism, with a majority of Crimeans hopeful that their lives would change for the better. After five years of development initiatives, more than $20 billion worth of investment from Moscow, and integration into Russia’s infrastructure, have expectations in Crimea changed?

From our survey data, it is possible to compare how Crimeans saw their future in December 2014 and how they perceived it five years later. Interviewees were asked if they expected to be better off after two years. Russians in Crimea harbored high hopes in 2014 (93 percent expected to be better off in two years), but they were somewhat less hopeful in 2019 (down to 71 percent). The proportion of Tatars who indicated that they thought being part of Russia would make them better off rose from 50 percent in 2014 to 81 percent in 2019. Ukrainians in Crimea remained generally optimistic: 75 percent indicated they expected to be better off in 2014, close to the 72 percent who did so in 2019. These generally high levels of optimism across ethnic groups suggest that most Crimeans are pleased to have left Ukraine for Russia, a richer country.

Despite the everyday logistical difficulties involved in breaking away from Ukraine, support for the exit remains undiminished. Approval of the outcome of the March 2014 referendum was still very high among Russians (84 percent) and Ukrainians (77 percent) in December 2019, both unchanged from 2014. Surprisingly, the levels of support for the annexation grew among Tatars, up from 21 percent in 2014 to 52 percent in 2019, although this latter number is about 25 to 30 points lower than for the peninsula’s other residents. This minority group has long harbored a particular resentment and suspicion of Moscow.  In 1944, Joseph Stalin deported all Tatars from Crimea to Central Asia as punishment for perceived disloyalty during World War II. After 1991, their descendants returned to an independent Ukraine but struggled to reclaim their properties and find new livelihoods. It is a measure of the economic advantages of incorporation into Russia that many Tatars have warmed to life under Russian rule. At the same time, many Ukrainians and Tatars—potentially as many as 140,000 [5], according to some estimates—who presumably did not want to live under Russian rule have left Crimea since 2014.

Crimeans are also bullish about Russia’s resilience in the face of external economic pressure. The United States and other Western countries imposed economic sanctions on Russia after its annexation of Crimea. Five years later, concerns about the effects of these sanctions among ordinary residents of the peninsula have eased. In our December 2014 survey, 80 percent indicated that they were worried about the effects of international sanctions. That proportion fell to 54 percent in 2019. Crimeans, like people elsewhere in Russia, appear to have become used to life under sanctions.

An eventful five years have elapsed since our previous survey, but the new data from December 2019 show similar results to 2014 for Russians and Ukrainians in Crimea who agreed that their lives have improved since the annexation. The attitude of the Tatar population, however, was markedly more positive in 2019 than it was in 2014. With a vexed historical relationship with the central rulers in Moscow—thanks in large part to the deportations—Tatars were more pessimistic about their future following the 2014 referendum than were Russians and Ukrainians. But the distance in views between Tatars and others in 2014 narrowed dramatically in 2019. For instance, only 19 percent of Tatar respondents strongly agreed in 2014 that conditions in Crimea were better since Russia took over; in 2019, that proportion rose to 45 percent.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

Despite this general goodwill and the positive attitudes toward the annexation, most residents are quick to identify continuing difficulties in the peninsula. In 2014, 73 percent of survey respondents expected “major” or “many” problems in making the transition to join Russia. Five years later, many of those concerns remained. We posed an open question in December 2019 to all respondents, asking them to identify the three biggest problems in Crimea. The consolidated answers are shown in the graph below.

In assessing the problems in Crimea, opinions didn’t differ much across the three main ethnic groups. People in Crimea expressed major economic concerns about low pensions and wages and the continued specter of unemployment. Low government investment in education and health care ranked second overall in the list of concerns. Crimeans also worried about the sustainability of the local economy, inflation, and the slow pace of infrastructural development in the region. At the same time, in response to this open-ended question, Crimeans seemed less concerned with political issues, including the nature of local and national governance, human rights, and relations with Ukraine and other countries. This attitude is in line with sentiments in many other post-Soviet countries, where pocketbook issues take precedence over political ones.

The architect of the Crimean annexation, Putin, gets mixed reviews in our 2019 survey. Putin’s overall approval rating has been declining in Russia over the past few years after peaking in the immediate aftermath of the Crimean annexation; it is now down to 68 percent, according to a Levada-Center national poll conducted in January 2020. Adjusting for any self-reporting bias via an experimental question, Putin’s overall approval rating in Crimea is 55 percent. His ratings are notably higher among Ukrainians (61 percent) and Russians (60 percent) than among Tatars (only 34 percent), suggesting a lingering suspicion of Putin’s government among Crimean Tatars even if they are pleased with changing local economic conditions. Asked directly in 2019 if they trust Putin, 85 percent of Crimeans indicated that they trust the Russian president, exactly the same proportion who indicated that they trust him in 2014.

HAPPY TOGETHER?

These survey results should not be interpreted as a refutation of the image of Crimea that Ukrainian activists and advocacy groups present in the West. Recent testimony before Congress painted a grim picture of “life under occupation” in Crimea. There is no doubt that human rights abuses occur in the peninsula. Life is difficult in the territory for activists and those still opposed to the annexation. Corruption remains endemic.

But when Ukrainian activists and Western politicians claim that the residents of Crimea are “living under occupation,” they mistake the experience of some for the experience of all. The majority of Crimeans do not experience Russian rule as oppressive, alien, or unwelcome. Instead, based on the evidence of our surveys, they are reasonably happy to be living in Putin’s Russia.