What’s that famous line of Michael Corleone’s in The Godfather Part III about the mafia? “Just when I thought I was out, they pull me back in.”
That’s the Middle East. President Barack Obama sought to pivot to Asia from Iraq and Afghanistan (not Europe, as our insecure transatlantic allies feared). President Donald Trump recently announced that the Western Hemisphere is our top priority. But the Middle East always seems to have something else in mind.
The war in Iran has been well underway for a week. Iran’s former Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and much of the regime’s leadership are dead, more than two thousand targets have been struck across the country, and per U.S. Central Command, the U.S. military has “struck or sunk” more than thirty Iranian ships. Iran has retaliated in full force, unlike its token attack against U.S. forces in Qatar after Operation Midnight Hammer, striking military, civilian, and infrastructure targets in eleven countries so far.
With the exception of China, Russia, and maybe North Korea, very few countries are going to cry tears for the loss of Khamenei, whatever their public posture on the U.S. and Israeli attacks at the moment. His regime wreaked havoc across the region, sponsored terrorism, and had challenged U.S. interests and the interests of Western and Gulf countries for some time. Nevertheless, there is still clearly some discomfort with the operation, from Capitol Hill to our European allies and throughout the Middle East. At the risk of stating the obvious, my sense is that this operation will ultimately be judged on its long-term outcome. If we end up with a more stable and peaceful region and a less hostile Iranian regime, it will be heralded as a resounding success. If, on the other hand, we find ourselves in a quagmire with ongoing chaos and conflict, there will be a lot of second-guessing.
Much of this unease stems from uncertainty about the prospects and nature of regime change in Iran. In Venezuela, Trump pursued leadership change but left the regime largely in place, at least so far, seeking to see the country remain broadly stable with a more pliant leader like acting President Delcy Rodríguez. Such an outcome is far from assured in Iran, given the complex power-sharing arrangement between the clerical establishment and the security apparatus and the ideological rigidity of both constituencies.
On Wednesday, I sat down with Under Secretary of War for Policy Elbridge Colby at CFR’s Washington office. I asked him how Iran fits into the administration’s National Defense Strategy and about the objectives of the operation.
Colby put it this way: “The president has directed the United States Armed Forces to conduct a military campaign with a focus on degrading and destroying the Islamic Republic of Iran’s ability to project military power in the region and potentially beyond.” Notably, he characterized the United States and Israel’s objectives as “overlapping” but drew a clear line between regime change (which seems to be a primary Israeli objective that the United States wouldn’t mind seeing happen) and the U.S. efforts to take out Iran’s nuclear program, its missile and one-way attack drone capabilities, and its naval forces. Yet, on Thursday, Trump told Axios that he needs to be involved in picking Iran’s next leader.
Regardless of whether true regime change is among the administration’s goals, my colleague Ray Takeyh importantly noted for the Wall Street Journal that the old regime certainly isn’t out yet. Who or what will succeed the Ayatollah is not yet clear. Mojtaba Khamenei, the Ayatollah’s son, appears to be the front-runner for succession. It’s possible that we could see some form of collective leadership shared between him and the security services. But there are still plenty of broader unknowns about how this could play out. We could see the succession of another ayatollah, the rise of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the fracturing of the country along ethnic or other lines, or of course, the ascendancy of Reza Pahlavi, the exiled crown prince and son of the late shah.
Suzanne Maloney, vice president and director of the foreign policy program at the Brookings Institution, also explored this issue in a timely contingency planning memorandum for CFR. “Khamenei was initially underestimated as a weak and uncharismatic figure, but he proved to be immensely consequential, strengthening the supreme leader’s dominance, ensuring the regime’s preservation, and vastly extending Iran’s regional influence,” she assessed. “Whether his successors sustain that legacy—and how they do so—will determine the stability, security, and prosperity of the Middle East and, by extension, the degree to which the United States is able to meet its priorities elsewhere.”
So, where do we go from here? Iran is not Venezuela. While Iran’s ballistic missile program has been hit hard, its remaining arsenal remains a serious concern. And, while its proxy capabilities are not what they once were, they shouldn’t be discounted. Tens of thousands of U.S. troops across the region are well within Iran’s reach, as are our allies and partners. Six U.S. service members have been killed thus far. These challenges haven’t deterred Trump. As he posted on Truth Social this morning, “there will be no deal with Iran except UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER!”
Iran’s rate of missile launches dropped more than 90 percent after six days, but we may not have seen the full extent of its retaliation. Iran may respond later—at the time and place and in the manner of its choosing—when the United States is preoccupied elsewhere. As the former U.S. Secretary of Defense and retired Marine four-star general Jim Mattis once said, “No war is over until the enemy says it’s over. We may think it over, we may declare it over, but in fact, the enemy gets a vote.”
One note on military innovation: The United States and its allies have struggled in Ukraine and the Middle East with the arithmetic challenge of using multimillion-dollar interceptors to shoot down drones that cost tens of thousands of dollars. Two technologies may change that calculation going forward: fighting drones with drones and directed energy weapon systems. Over the last four years, Ukraine has developed a knack for using interceptor drones to stop Iranian Shahed drones deployed by Russia. Now, Ukraine says the United States and its allies are seeking its expertise. Separately, there are early reports of the United States and Israel using innovative laser energy weapons like HELIOS and Iron Beam to defend against incoming missiles and drones at a low marginal cost.
There is also the issue of the Strait of Hormuz, the only sea route for suppliers near the Persian Gulf, and the global economic implications of this conflict. Some 20 percent of the world’s oil and liquified natural gas passes through the strait, including Iran’s own exports, to say nothing of other critical goods such as fertilizer. Oil prices are up, but not at crisis levels. Despite Iran declaring the strait closed and attacking ships that traversed the route, it stopped short of mining the waterway. And yet, mines weren’t needed to bring oil tanker traffic to a screeching halt. Oil tanker traffic is down more than 90 percent relative to last week. In an effort to get ships moving again, Trump has said the Development Finance Corporation would insure ships and that the Navy would escort tankers, if needed.
As we consider how this might end, I am reminded that there is a difference between concluding a successful military operation and achieving a positive outcome for Iran’s people. The U.S. military objectives appear achievable. Israel’s political objectives may be more difficult. But what this all means for a future of freedom and prosperity of the Iranian people is the most difficult question of all.
Let me know what you think about the war in Iran and what this column should cover next by replying to president@cfr.org.
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