ISPI : 5 Jul 2023 Sophia Besch Cooperation and Integration: Why Vilnius is also about EU

 5 Jul 2023

Sophia  Besch 

Cooperation and Integration: Why Vilnius is also about EU

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has transformed European defence, aligning threat perceptions, increasing defence budgets and focusing political will. In light of the current scenario, what are the prospects for EU-NATO cooperation?

COMMENTARY EUROPE AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE · TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS

Countless articles have been written about the promise of EU-NATO relations. All too often, analysis on this topic is reluctant to leave the realm of theory, because in theory, all is well: there are obvious incentives for close cooperation between two organizations that are based in the same city, and share a (growing) majority of their member-states, values, and interests, as well as a single set of forces. Security challenges often require both conventional defense and deterrence and resilience against non-military threats, and opportunities abound for both organizations to work in complementarity. But once theory turns into practice, the obstacles to cooperation become just as obvious: from concerns over duplication, to competing defense industrial interests, let alone that tensions between individual members can paralyze unanimity-based processes in both organizations. 

The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 is widely said to have transformed European defense, aligning threat perceptions, raising defense budgets, and focusing political will. If everything is different, then what has changed between the two organizations at the heart of Europe’s security and defense architecture?

Progress report

One formal way to measure the temperature between NATO and EU is to look at the two organizations’ joint declarations on cooperation. Successive documents have gradually reduced an initial long laundry list of common actions to a more focused list of priorities for collaboration. Particularly promising in practice are the limited cooperation efforts on military mobility, new formats to facilitate the protection of cyber, energy and communication infrastructure, and first signs that the two organizations might want to align their efforts to deter threats in space. Regular progress reports also show extensive staff-to-staff contacts and informal information exchange formats. And numerous meetings, visits, communications and joint press conferences take place between the NATO and EU presidencies and leadership bodies. 

And yet, a tally of the interactions between officials working at headquarters does not amount to a significant statement about the extent to which the current transformation of European defense has lastingly transformed the two organizations’ relationship. Ultimately, successful cooperation relies on governments agreeing on both organizations’ respective remits and added values, and utilizing the tools they offer in a complementary way. 

In practice, the response to the invasion of Ukraine has been an example of just that. The war left no doubt on NATO’s raison d’être, providing defense, deterrence and reassurance to allies. It put an end to discussions on NATO’s “brain death”, with even French President Macron saying that the Alliance had been revived by the “electric shock” of the war. Meanwhile, Europeans relied on the EU to coordinate sanctions on Russia, provide training and even lethal equipment to Ukrainian armed forces, and lay the groundwork for Ukraine’s economic and political future as an eventual member of the Union. The idea of a “European pillar” in transatlantic security cooperation has begun to take material shape. The question is to what extent this comparatively smooth collaboration is an indicator for future EU-NATO relations. Since February 2022, the two organizations have benefitted from a number of favorable circumstances allowing them to align their efforts. Whether this trend can continue depends on the evolution of several factors. 

Known unknowns : US-EU relations and political developments

One is of course the direction of US policy. Not only did the US in large parts organize and enable the Euro-Atlantic response to the war, but the Biden administration’s focus on transatlantic unity and its openness to working directly with the EU has reassured European governments that investing in both NATO and the Union would not alienate Washington. The future of US political interest, however, is uncertain. Even without a dramatic change in political leadership undermining domestic support for NATO or appreciation of the EU, if Washington devotes less political attention to alliance management in the future this could suffice to weaken the current trend of governments aiming to utilize both organizations to their full potential. Europeans might retreat to formerly entrenched positions or even hasten a bilateralization of security relationships outside of NATO or EU.  

Another related factor determining the future of their cooperation will be the success or failure of NATO and EU to coordinate and align their respective defense-industrial agendas. The EU has in recent months creatively repurposed instruments like the European Peace Facility, launched new undertakings like the Collaborative Procurement of Ammunition project, and proposed new initiatives like the European Defence Industry Reinforcement Through Common Procurement Act (EDIRPA), or the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP). While the immediate focus of these and other initiatives is to support Ukraine and refill European stockpiles, the EU’s longer-term ambition is to strengthen European defense firms through European research, development, and procurement projects. Related debates over cooperation with third country firms are tense and ongoing. The NDPP and EU capability planning processes do not yet work well together. Whether NATO and EU will succeed to collaborate in supporting Ukrainian defense industrial needs, bridging European capability gaps and bolstering stockpiles and securing the future of Europe’s defense technological and industrial base will depend heavily on the political will and creativity of their members.  

The EU commitment on addressing eastern flank

Then there is the future organization of European crisis management. With NATO firmly focused on territorial defense and deterrence, the EU’s 2022 Strategic Compass aimed at strengthening and expanding CSDP efforts and the invasion of Ukraine led EU member-state to reconsider the regional scope of their deployments. The EU Advisory Mission to Ukraine as well as the new civilian EU Missions to Armenia and Moldova show that, in future, there could be a stronger role for CSDP in Europe’s eastern neighborhood. Europeans might even choose to expand their engagement in Ukraine to help create secure conditions for recovery and reconstructions ahead of EU membership, while avoiding possible escalatory dynamics linked to deployments under US leadership. Against this background, NATO and EU need to align their ambitions on troop commitments and readiness levels, as well as continue to increase investments in joint exercises and training, and in the interoperability of troops and equipment.  

The relations between EU-members and China

Finally, there is the future relationship with China. The most recent joint EU-NATO declaration takes note of China’s growing assertiveness and in recent months, both European and US leaders have publicly subscribed to a “de-risking” agenda vis-à-vis Beijing.  But this alignment is fragile and largely focused on lowest common denominator efforts. It will not be able to mask differences in interest and outlook among Europeans and between Europe and the United States (and thus between members of both NATO and the EU) for long. NATO’s current focus on the East has defused tensions, but debates will no doubt pick back up again in the future: over the China-Russia partnership, over cooperation with partners in the Indo-Pacific, and over the organization’s “global” mandate beyond Europe’s neighborhood. 

When the EU-NATO relationship is treated with any ambition rather than reduced to a mix of wishful thinking and meeting tallies, it is inseparable from these major questions on the future of Euro-Atlantic security. The war in Ukraine has allowed allies and member states to overcome some long-standing ideological divisions in favor of pragmatic cooperation. They must build on this success to safeguard and institutionalize, and possibly strengthen and expand, these new-found ways of cooperating.

READ THE DOSSIER

Sophia Besch

Fellow in the Europe Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

EU NATO

Introduction

Progress report

Known unknowns : US-EU relations and political developments

The EU commitment on addressing eastern flank

The relations between EU-members and China

PUBLICATIONS