Strategic risks in the Asia-Pacific:
Examining Australian, British, Japanese, and South
Korean perspectives
Project Report
The European Leadership Network (ELN) is an
independent, non-partisan, pan-European NGO
with a network of nearly 200 past, present, and
future European leaders working to provide practical
real-world solutions to political and security challenges.
The Asia-Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear
Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (APLN) is a network
of former and currently serving political, diplomatic,
and military leaders, as well as senior government
officials, scholars, and opinion leaders across the
Asia-Pacific region.
About the authors
Anna Clara Arndt
Policy Fellow, ELN
Dr Maximilian Hoell
Senior Policy Fellow, ELN
Joel Petersson Ivre
Policy Fellow, APLN
Alice Saltini
Research Coordinator, ELN
Acknowledgements
This project was made possible by funding from the UK
government’s Counter Proliferation and Arms Control Centre.
For the avoidance of doubt, the findings of the project reflect
the conclusions of project participants and do not represent
any institutional position of the UK government, nor of the ELN
or APLN. The ELN and APLN look forward to further work
on this topic in 2023–2024.
The authors acknowledge the helpful comments on an earlier
draft of this report from Shatabhisha Shetty, Manpreet Sethi,
Jun Bong-geun, Michiru Nishida, Melissa Conley Tyler, Lauren Sukin,
and Simon Chelton. Any mistakes belong solely to the authors.
Contact
Published by the European Leadership Network
and the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network, June 2023
European Leadership Network (ELN)
8 St James’s Square
London, UK, SE1Y 4JU
Asia-Pacific Leadership Network (APLN)
4th fl., 116, Pirundae-ro, Jongno-gu,
Seoul, Republic of Korea, 03035
@theELN | europeanleadershipnetwork.org
@APLNofficial | www.apln.network
Published under the Creative Commons
Attribution-ShareAlikev 4.0
© The ELN and APLN 2023
The opinions articulated in this report represent the
views of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect
the position of the European Leadership Network
and the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network, or any
of their members.
Strategic risks in the Asia-Pacific: Examining Australian, British, Japanese, and South Korean perspectives 2
Executive summary
The deteriorating global security environment, including
in the Asia-Pacific region, risks undermining the existing nuclear
order. Regional policy-making is shaped by heightened threat
perceptions due to factors such as North Korea’s aggressive
nuclear and military activities, China’s assertiveness in the
region, and a worsening strategic competition between
the United States and China.
In an increasingly volatile regional environment, the governments
of Australia, Japan, and South Korea are making strategic choices
to address the risks that these developments pose to their
national security. Meanwhile, the UK is working to strengthen
its engagement in the Asia-Pacific. Understanding how actors
in the Asia-Pacific perceive and react to evolving strategic risks
is important to promote regional and global stability and reduce
negative impact on the non-proliferation regime.
In the framework of a joint APLN-ELN project funded by the UK
Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), experts
and officials from Australia, Japan, South Korea, and the UK
identified strategic risks emanating from a shared set of concerns,
notably North Korea’s nuclear posture and China’s assertive
behaviour, as well as twin concerns over a potential US retreat from
the region and the risk of entrapment in a conflict of somebody
else’s choosing. Yet, there was disagreement on the relative
immediacy and significance of these threats as well as on their
impact on the global nuclear order.
All four states view North Korea’s aggressive nuclear posture
as a “strategic” risk, though they disagree on its degree of immediacy.
South Korea perceives potential North Korean military aggression
as the most direct threat, as does Japan, which would be a likely
target for a North Korean nuclear strike in such a conflict scenario.
The UK is, for geographical reasons, less concerned about
any direct threat from North Korea than about the impact of
Pyongyang’s policies on nuclear risks in the region more broadly.
Australia is assured that the US presence in the region suffices
to manage the threat posed by North Korea’s nuclear arsenal,
which it ranks below concerns over China’s military expansion
and assertiveness in the region.
In contrast to the perception of North Korea as a relatively narrow
nuclear threat, the findings of this project suggest that Australia,
Japan, South Korea, and the UK see much broader “strategic”
risks emerging from China’s assertive foreign policy, which is
backed up by its economic clout and expanding nuclear arsenal.
Australia and Japan are most concerned about the direct threat
posed to their sovereignty by Chinese behaviour, particularly around
Taiwan, and the risk of being dragged into an armed conflict with
China. By contrast, South Korea and the UK are more apprehensive
of the wider disruptive effects of a confrontation involving China
on regional stability, based on economic as well as security and
proliferation concerns.
In light of the perceived strategic risks stemming from China
and North Korea, the three Asia-Pacific states seek to balance
their desire for US assurance against their fear of entrapment.
Mirroring these sentiments, most British participants
considered the US presence in the region a stabilising
(Strategic risks in the Asia-Pacific: Examining Australian, British, Japanese, and South Korean perspectives 3)
factor, but some also warned against forcing regional states
to choose sides.
While the war in Ukraine is perceived as a direct strategic risk by the UK, it serves as an additional prism through which Australia, Japan, and South Korea assess their security environment. However, they disagree on its implications for the region. Some are concerned
that North Korea and China might seek to replicate the way in which Russia has used nuclear threats to shield its war of aggression
against Ukraine, while others believe that the war has demonstrated
the costs of aggression. Consequently, there is also no consensus
on whether the Russian invasion of Ukraine has made a Chinese
invasion of Taiwan more or less likely.
British, Japanese, and Australian participants were apprehensive
of both regional proliferation and broader stresses on the
non-proliferation regime. South Korean analysts appeared
comparatively less concerned. Throughout the project, many raised
concerns over the viability of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
The Chinese nuclear modernisation was perceived as undermining
the NPT, but potential South Korean proliferation and a subsequent
domino effect on Japan were also mentioned as a potential
risk. The Australia-UK-US (AUKUS) security pact was not viewed
as a proliferation concern by any of the four countries, but some
analysts acknowledged that it had become a divisive issue that
could undermine international unity on non-proliferation issues.
Policy recommendations
• Australia, Japan, South Korea, and the UK should coordinate
their efforts in groups such as the G20, the G7, and the P5
to call for high-level US and Chinese commitments to an
official Track 1 dialogue. Australia, Japan, South Korea, and
the UK should also encourage engagement with China on
the value of crisis communication channels and seek the
resumption of military-to-military crisis communication channels
between the United States and China or set up their own bilateral
or multilateral channels with China.
• Within the NPT framework, Australia, Japan, South Korea,
and the UK should encourage the launch of a new working
group (or groups) as part of the current review cycle to develop
targeted risk reduction measures, including through discussions
on risk escalation scenarios and by exploring synergies between
existing risk reduction initiatives.
• The UK, supported by Australia, Japan, and South Korea,
should engage China on disarmament verification by sharing
their experience from participating in verification initiatives
and by facilitating the development of cooperative disarmament
verification initiatives for the region.
• To address South Korea’s primary security concern – the risk
of direct aggression from North Korea – the UK and Australia
should provide additional support to Seoul on the basis
of a clearly articulated condition that it does not take any
concrete steps towards acquiring its own nuclear weapons.
Such aid could take the form of continued low-key military
(Australia, Japan, South Korea, and the UK should coordinate their efforts in groups such as the G20, the G7, and the P5 to call for high-level US and Chinese commitments to an official Track 1 dialogue.Strategic risks in the Asia-Pacific: Examining Australian, British, Japanese, and South Korean perspectives 4 )
cooperation with South Korea.
The UK, in particular, could also take a greater role in working with South Korea on technological developments, and intelligence and cyber-security issues.
• Australia, Japan, and the UK should use existing diplomatic
channels to communicate the economic, political, and security
implications of nuclear armament to South Korea. In particular,
they should make clear that any move towards nuclear weapons
acquisition or development will be met with tough sanctions,
especially against the South Korean nuclear industry.
• The South Korean and Japanese administrations should build
on the current positive momentum to solidify a bilateral
framework that includes regular exchanges at both senior
and working levels.
• As Japan shares South Korea’s concern over North Korean
aggression, while also being apprehensive of South Korean calls
for nuclear armament, both countries should consider developing
exchanges on potential scenarios and responses to a North Korean
attack. Eventually this could enable Japan to agree to provide
some form of aid to South Korea in the case of North Korean
aggression – on the strict condition that Seoul does not take
any steps towards nuclear armament.
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