ISPI -Italian Instıtute for International Political Studies
12 May 2023
The Elections that Could Change Turkey’s Future
12 May 2023
The Kurdish Electorate and the 2023 Turkish Election: What to Expect
Turkey 2023: the nation heads to the polls amid an uncertain future
Roj Girasun
Türkiye is gearing up for a historic election set for May 14th in which approximately 64 million citizens, at home and abroad, can vote. According to data from Rawest Research and the Kurdish Studies Centre (KSC), Kurds constitute approximately 20% of the Turkish electorate.
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The Kurdish swing vote
The Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) and Kurdish voters did not nominate candidates in Türkiye’s western metropolises, such as Istanbul, Ankara, Adana, Antalya and Mersin in the 2019 local elections, and thus played a crucial role in the transition of municipalities from the People’s Alliance, consisting of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), to the Republican People’s Party (CHP). The result of local elections strengthened the perception that the change in local administrations heralded a change in the general elections. The opposition front, which won the last local elections by forming alliances, included two new political parties that broke away from the AKP. Furthermore, they managed to preserve the alliance, while gaining support of the HDP, as seen during the local elections.
In this historic election, where the opposition might win, Kurdish voters again play a decisive role. Nonetheless, much like African Americans in the US, the voting tendencies of Kurdish people in Türkiye tends to be oversimplified. During the election season, it is considered as if there is only a single Kurdish electorate composed of people with the exact same voting behaviour, and discussions are carried out in this way. However, considering that the Kurdish population, which is made up of millions of people, as a single mass is reductive. Just as it is not rational to speak of a monolithic Turkish electorate, it is equally irrational to speak of a monolithic Kurdish electorate. The perception that there is a unified Kurdish electorate is based on myths created by different Kurdish and Turkish political groups. In this sense, we can say that Kurdish voters differ within themselves, despite their distinctive features and the multiplicity of cross-sectional values within the Kurdish electorate.
According to data gathered by Rawest and KSC, during the Turkish general elections in June of 2018, approximately 33 out of every 100 Kurds who went to the polls voted for the AKP, 10 for the CHP, and 57 for the HDP. According to the latest research conducted prior to the elections on the 14th of May 2023, approximately 21 out of every 100 Kurdish voters are expected to vote for the AKP, 20 for the CHP, and 58 for the HDP.
Another notable result is that CHP’s votes, which doubled among Kurdish voters, increased nearly fourfold in provinces with a Kurdish majority. According to these results, the CHP, which has not been able to elect a representative in the region for decades, is expected to elect deputies in cities such as Urfa, Van, Kars, and especially in Diyarbakır, a symbolic city in Kurdish politics.
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The votes for the AKP, which was the most successful party in the Kurdish provinces in previous elections (2007 and 2011), decreased significantly. However, the HDP, which will participate in the next elections under the moniker Green Left Party cannot seem to increase its share of the votes despite the recent decline of the AKP. While the Green Left Party has managed to sustain its support amongst the Kurdish electorate, there are also indications that it has experienced some decline in its share of votes in the region. Security policies, an alliance with the ultra-nationalist MHP, and the economic crisis are all considered factors for the AKP’s loss of votes among Kurdish voters.
On the other hand, the HDP’s failure to increase its votes is because the 10% electoral threshold fell to 7%, the CHP became a viable party for the Kurds, and the HDP local organizations weakened due to political pressures and arrests. Reasons such as the HDP’s not turning into an alternative political party and not being a part of the government coalition can also be evaluated within this scope.
The change the CHP has experienced in the last ten years under the leadership of Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, the de facto alliance it formed with the HDP during the last local elections, and the amount young people who want to vote President Erdoğan out are among the main reasons for the CHP’s rise. In addition, the emergence of the CHP as the main alternative within the opposition is another key reason.
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A president for the Kurdish people?
When he became prime minister in 2003, Erdoğan was a source of hope for conservatives who were excluded from the system, liberals who were initially sceptical about the AKP, and Kurds with his democratic politics. In 2007, the AKP was a political alternative for the members of the HDP’s predecessor political movement. The political polarization that started with the Gezi protests in Türkiye recently lead to a deviation in Erdoğan’s policies. However, particularly during the June 2015 elections, the HDP’s votes put an end to the AKP’s parliamentary majority. Furthermore, Erdogan’s political stance changed drastically in response to urban conflicts and the coup attempt in 2016. Erdoğan, a conservative democrat, who sought to fully integrate his nation into the European Union and prioritized the policy of negotiation over conflict in regard to the Kurdish issue, has shifted toward security-oriented policies in the Kurdish issue with his nationalist, authoritarian and “war on terror” rhetoric. Therefore, with the change in Erdoğan’s political stance that attracted the oppressed segments of society, these masses began to distance themselves from Erdoğan.
The CHP, which received around 2-3% of the votes in Kurdish provinces in 2018, seems to have increased its votes to over 10% today. More importantly, with the support of the HDP, Kılıçdaroğlu is expected to receive a comparable amount of votes in the provinces like the HDP got in the June 2015 elections. The Kurdish voters seem ready to do their part and finish the elections in the first round by throwing in their support for Kılıçdaroğlu.
According to recent news, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu received 62.4% of the votes and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan received 34.5% of the votes in the first round (after undecided voters were distributed) in the four metropolitan cities of the region. During the 2018 elections, the votes for Tayyip Erdoğan, who received 42.3 votes in these four metropolitan cities, decrease by 8 points.
As of today, not only the AKP but also the CHP attract the attention of the Kurds, but neither party can get close to the number of Kurdish voters who voted for the HDP. In addition, it seems obvious that Kılıçdaroğlu, who is the candidate preferred by most Kurdish voters, will be indebted to the Kurds if he wins the elections. The fact that a new government’s debt to the Kurds necessitates a democracy that also takes care of the Kurds signals the most preferable outcome for the Kurdish population. Otherwise, it is possible to foresee the steps towards democratization concerning the Kurdish issue will be halted in an equation that Erdoğan wins the election. In such a case, it would not be a surprise to see a scenario where the Kurdish issue would be reduced to an anti-terror narrative.
Roj Girasun
Rawest
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