ISPI -Italian Instıtute for International Political Studies 12 May 2023 The Elections that Could Change Turkey’s Future - The Refugee Issue and the Turkish Elections: What’s at Stake?

  ISPI -Italian Instıtute for International Political Studies 

12 May 2023

The Elections that Could Change Turkey’s Future

12 May 2023

The Refugee Issue and the Turkish Elections: What’s at Stake?

Turkey 2023: the nation heads to the polls amid an uncertain future

Federico Donelli 

The 3.7 million Syrian refugees living on Turkish soil have been one of the main issues at the forefront of the election campaign in Turkey. The issue’s prominence within the political and public debate has only faded into the background following last February’s dramatic earthquake. Nevertheless, among analysts, there is still a consensus that, along with inflation and the centralization of power in the hands of the government, the refugee issue will for the most part determine the elections outcome.

The Syrian crisis: a polarizing issue

Behind this stance is the fact that the economic crisis’s negative impact on the Turkish lower classes has generated growing feelings of frustration and anger toward the Syrian communities. The social malaise is significantly exacerbated in Turkey’s big cities and districts inhabited by Syrians. Unlike in the past, the negative feeling toward Syrian refugees is cross cutting the Turkish electorate. Anti-Syrian sentiments emerged before the latest local elections (spring of 2019). In a few cases, Turkish discontent had even erupted into xenophobia and acts of violence. The Syrian issue was highly divisive among the Turkish public during the pre-pandemic period. As in almost all Turkish political matters, the voter’s stances were highly polarized. On the one side, those supporting President Erdoğan rule maintained an inclusive approach towards Syrian refugees. While not entirely agreeing with the privileges ensured to the non-camp refugees – permanent residence permits and access to the basic services such as education and health care – the Justice and Development Party (AKP) voter base supported the government’s policies.

Within the constituency, however, there were various reasons for supporting the government’s policies toward Syrian refugees. The more conservative sectors of Erdoğan’s electorate saw the approach towards refugees as an act of Muslim piety or Islamic solidarity, while the more secular ones as leverage toward both the Assad regime and the European Union. On the other side, however, the opposition groups have always viewed the government’s inclusive policy with distrust. At the root of their criticisms were political and security concerns. The Turkish opposition was criticizing Erdoğan’s whole policy vis-a-vis the post-Arab Spring Syrian crisis. In particular, the ambiguous relationship established by the Turkish government with various anti-Assad groups, including some Qaedist-inspired movements. From a strictly political perspective, the early open-door policy was criticized severely for its effects on Turkey’s southern provinces’ overall demographic’ balances. Many believed that Erdoğan was generating a future electoral constituency. Finally, among those against policies toward refugees, some believed the AKP political elite was pursuing a more ambitious project. Integrating nearly four million Syrians would reshape Turkish identity by consolidating the Muslim-conservative traits.

Anti-Arab Sentiment in the Election

An aspect of the issue often ignored is the widespread anti-Arab sentiment rooted within Turkish society. For some years, the anti-Syrian sentiments was entangled with the anti-Erdoğan feelings of some secular segments of society, feeding off each other. However, the trend has gradually changed since 2019. Many side effects of Turkey’s inclusive policy emerged, especially in the suburbs of big cities such as Istanbul and Ankara. The socio-economic pressure of the increasing Syrian presence has exacerbated inter-ethnic relations and increased the hostility towards the government’s refugee policies. As mentioned previously, the growing discontent was a factor during the 2019 election. The Covid-19 pandemic, the Turkish lira depreciation, and the subsequent high inflation are all factors which worsened the Turkish public’s relation towards refugees. More to the point, many of Erdoğan’s voters have shifted their attitudes toward government policies. For this reason, the issue has become paramount in the political debate heading into the presidential election.

Before February’s catastrophic earthquake, the campaign was placing a great deal of emphasis on the refugee issue. The opposition in particular reiterated their desire to promote a rapid return to Syria of the nearly four million refugees. There are doubts whether the entire Syrian community can return, mainly due to the risk of reprisals they would face. However, the topic has taken hold of the electorate, including many undecided and Erdoğan’s voters. As a result, the AKP political elite has changed its stance on refugees. While not denying the open-door policy, the Turkish government has begun to contemplate programs for the repatriation of refugees. The matter inevitably became intertwined with Turkish options on the conduct of the Syrian crisis. Early in the fall, Ankara was considering launching a new military operation on Syrian ground to reinforce the buffer zone and facilitate the gradual resettlement of entire refugee communities. The Turkish government then changed its strategy due to a new military operation’s political and economic costs. Thus, Ankara started unofficial talks with the Syrian regime and simultaneously launched a series of targeted strikes against Kurdish militia outposts. The dramatic earthquake that hit the Turkish-Syrian border regions has suddenly halted the tripartite dialogue (Ankara-Damascus-Moscow) to stabilize Syria.

Like the election outcome, the future of the nearly four million Syrians living in Turkey is shrouded in uncertainty. Regardless of the vote result, a partial solution to the Syrian issue will have to go through an agreement with Bashar al-Assad and, most importantly, Vladimir Putin. For this reason, the next president will have to deal with three major obstacles. The first concerns the 30-kilometer buffer zone. Turkey wishes to maintain troops along with political and economic weight in the area to provide security for the repatriated Syrians while protecting the nation’s borders from Kurdish militias. On the other side, Syria has reiterated that an agreement is reachable only on the condition of the withdrawal of Turkish troops from its soil. The second challenge relates to the chance of reaching an agreement with Putin. This prospect is likely to be opposed by Ankara’s Western partners, particularly the United States. Washington has already expressed disappointment with Turkey’s unofficial talks with Damascus and Moscow. Therefore, both Erdoğan and the main opposition front’s candidate Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu must improve their relations with the United States. However, there is a noticeable divergence of interests between the two countries in Syria more than anywhere else. Finally, the third and most serious obstacle concerns the willingness of Syrian refugees to return. Few of them want to voluntarily leave, primarily due to the survival of the Assad regime. Therefore, the repatriation would only affect a portion of them and must be done by force. Those sheltered in refugee camps will be most likely be the first to be involved in return policies. Syrians residing in the big cities are unlikely to be affected. Consequently, the perception of Turkish urban classes of the Syrian refugees’ presence will remain almost the same, leaving the issue from their point of view unresolved.

Federico Donelli

University of Trieste