12 May 2023
Turkey 2023: A New Foreign Policy or Much of the Same?
Turkey 2023: the nation heads to the polls amid an uncertain future
Valeria Talbot
In a country where rampant inflation and the depreciating lira have tremendously deteriorated people’s standards of living, foreign policy has not taken centre stage in the pre-election debate, which, conversely, has been mainly focused on economic and social concerns. Nonetheless, foreign policy has been high on Turkey’s political agenda since Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in the fall of 2002. By combining an export-oriented economic model and the country’s strategic geographical location at the intersection between Asia, the Middle East and Europe, the AKP government carried out an increasingly autonomous and diversified foreign policy. As a result, Turkey has not rarely been considered as a maverick by its Western partners. Following a pragmatic approach that relies on pursuing security, economic and energy interests, Turkey has broadened its horizons, becoming a prominent player in different geopolitical theatres, from the Middle Eastern and Caucasus regions to Africa and Central Asia, albeit not always with a positive agenda. Over the years, Ankara has increasingly looked beyond its traditional NATO allies towards other international powers, notably Russia and China. Undoubtebly, the economic factor has played a key role in Turkey’s partnership diversification strategy and foreign policy calculations.
While the question about “where Turkey is going” has long been raised both in Washington and the European capitals facing Erdoğan’s harsh anti-Western rhetoric, one year after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, it seems evident that Ankara will continue down the path of partnership diversification, even if that means pursuing an uneasy balancing act. Overall, whoever wins the May 14 elections, Turkey’s foreign policy is not expected to make a U-turn, and continuity will likely prevail over radical change.
Economic data suggest that major geopolitical realignments are unlikely to occur regardless of whoever will run the country. In 2022, Russia surpassed Germany as Turkey’s top trading partner and China as its top supplier. This is mainly due to a boom in Ankara’s energy imports that constitute the largest part of the US$58.8 billion imports from Russia, a figure that doubled compared to 2021, on a total exchange of around US$69 billion. Although China dropped to the second place as a supplier, its exports to Turkey increased from US$32.2 billion in 2021 to US$41.3 billion in 2022, when total trade amounted to US$44.6 billion. Nevertheless, Europe continues to be Turkey’s top economic partner. The old-continent accounts for more than 50% of the total trade in 2022 as well as more than 60% of foreign direct investments in the last twenty years. Aside from Europe, Turkey maintains sound trade relations with the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), which constitutes its second largest partner region when it comes to exports: US$59 billion out of a total exchange of US$86.44 billion. In this respect, it is noteworthy that economic and trade relations with some MENA countries – such as Egypt and Israel – have remained stable, even when political and diplomatic ties have deteriorated.
If reconfirmed, there is no reason to think that Erdoğan will abandon the path he has taken so far. Undoubtedly, Turkey will continue to mediate between Russia and Ukraine without adhering to Western sanctions against Moscow and to follow the track of diplomatic normalisation with regional neighbours. Certainly, the task is far from easy, in particular with Syria. As a matter of fact, the Assad regime – whose regime Ankara tried to overcome – is an inevitable counterpart with which Turkey has to deal with in order to repatriate millions of Syrian refugees. In addition, anti-Western rhetoric and veto on Sweden’s NATO membership are likely to remain for a while. However, it is not excluded that an Erdoğan, strengthened by the electoral victory, could have some surprises in store also on foreign policy dossiers.
For his part, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu’s foreign policy is not expected to divert from the directions set by his predecessor, which were based on both security and economic priorities. The partnership with Russia would likely continue. However unpopular with the West, it has been useful, especially when it came to negotiating grain agreements or prisoner exchanges with Moscow. At the same time, the new government would also continue down the path of diplomatic normalization with Middle Eastern countries: after the United Arab Emirates, Israel, and Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Syria are next on the list. Kılıçdaroğlu has long expressed his support for resuming talks with the regime in Damascus, with the aim to repatriate Syrian refugees. However, it is unclear what would happen to the Syrian areas under Turkish military control. While the opposition front in its programme explicitly referred to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries and a non-militarization of foreign policy, it remains to be seen how this will be carried out, not only in Syria but also in Libya.
In addition to a change towards a less personalistic and assertive approach along with more conciliatory tones, the main line of discontinuity would concern the European Union with which there seems to be the intention of resuming talks on a whole range of bilateral issues, including negotiations to join the Union that have since frozen. This scenario, however, appears unlikely in the foreseeable future. Conversely, it is unclear what will be the approach towards the US.
Regardless of whoever wins the elections, it is certain that Ankara will continue to pursue an independent foreign policy on different geopolitical theatres. While the approach might change, the ambition to maintain the status of a regional player will not be abandoned.
Valeria Talbot
Head, MENA Centre
GEOECONOMICS MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
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