THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY Turkey's Pivotal 2023 Elections Issues, Potential Outcomes, and What Comes After Edited by Soner Cagaptay , April 19, 2023

 

THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY

April 19,  2023 

Turkey's Pivotal 2023 Elections

Issues, Potential Outcomes, and What Comes After

Edited by Soner Cagaptay 

by Soner Cagaptay

Apr 19, 2023

Candidates Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Kemal Kilicdarolgu, May 2023 Turkish elections

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Soner Cagaptay

Soner Cagaptay is the Beyer Family fellow and director of the Turkish Research Program at The Washington Institute.

In-Depth Reports

Opinion polls offer hope for the challengers, but Erdogan's media control and other factors could foil their efforts to finally topple the president and his ruling bloc.

On May 14, Turkey’s citizens will cast their ballots for president and parliament, and polls suggest the longtime incumbent could actually lose this time. President Erdogan’s challenger, Republican People’s Party head Kemal Kilicdaroglu, has assembled an ideologically diverse coalition united in its determination to oust the ruling bloc. Guiding the opposition, known popularly as the “Table of Six,” is a message focused on restoring competence amid sky-high inflation and a faltering response to the devastating February earthquakes. But Erdogan’s challengers still face headwinds created in part by his near-complete control of the media.

In this Policy Note compilation, Turkey expert Soner Cagaptay and his fellow contributors concur that Erdogan will use polarizing tactics to keep power, whatever the results of the May 14 balloting or a possible May 28 presidential runoff. They also assess how various wild card developments—including the entry of spoiler candidate Muharrem Ince and meddling from Russia­—could aid the Turkish leader in unforeseen ways.

Introduction

Soner Cagaptay

On May 14, Turkey’s citizens will cast their ballots for both president and 

parliament in undoubtedly the most critical contests since the country’s first 

free and fair elections in 1950. The outcome of possibly the country’s last 

competitive vote under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan will shape Turkey’s 

domestic politics and foreign policy for years to come.

Opinion surveys show a neck-and-neck race between two main blocs: 

Erdogan’s People’s Alliance—comprising his conservative Justice and 

Development Party (AKP), the allied ultra-Turkish-nationalist Nationalist 

Action Party (MHP), and a number of smaller, mostly far-right parties—and 

the six-party opposition, led by the leftist, social democratic Republican 

People’s Party (CHP) and its longtime leader Kemal 

Kilicdaroglu. The CHP is joined in the Nation’s 

Alliance by a diverse coalition, including the 

centrist Democracy and Progress Party (DEVA), the 

center-right Democrat Party (DP), the nationalist, 

center-right Good Party (IYI)—the only other major 

faction besides the CHP—the conservative Future 

Party (Gelecek; GP), and the political Islamist Felicity 

Party (Saadet; FP). Also known as the “Table of Six,” 

the Nation’s Alliance poses the greatest challenge 

to Erdogan in nationwide elections since his AKP 

triumphed in November 2002. A third electoral bloc, 

led by the liberal, pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic 

Party (HDP)—and accompanied by leftist and far-leftist 

parties—is informally backing Kilicdaroglu in the presidential 

race, while separately competing for seats in parliament. 

More than sixty million voters are qualified to cast 

ballots in the May elections, and turnout in Turkey 

usually ranges between 80 and 90 percent of registered 

voters. This means more than fifty million Turkish citizens 

will vote on May 14. While the parliament’s seat distribution 

will be finalized that day, if no presidential candidate wins 50 percent, a 

runoff between the top two candidates will be held 

two weeks later, on May 28. Elections in Turkey 

have been largely unfair since the switch to an 

executive-style presidential system in 2018, exacerbated 

by Erdogan’s growing control over media and 

Turkish institutions, but the vote does remain free. 

Moreover, elections matter in Turkey for the broader 

electorate—including Erdogan’s base—as a source 

of legitimacy rooted in decades of democracy and 

collective public memory of this tradition. 

Regardless of the angle one takes, the May polls will 

be a watershed: either Erdogan will lose and step 

aside after two decades of rule, or he will remain at 

the helm so long as he is alive, folding the country’s 

remaining independent institutions under his 

control. An Erdogan win would likewise probably 

signal the end of competitive elections in the country, 

with the opposition losing any hope of voting him out 

and educated voters and elites potentially fleeing the 

country in droves—all with major ramifications for 

Turkey’s democracy and foreign policy orientation.

Abbreviations

AKP Justice and Development Party

CHP Republican People’s Party

DEVA Democracy and Progress Party 

DP Democrat Party

GP Future Party (Gelecek)

HDP Peoples’ Democratic Party

HUDA-PAR Free Cause Party

IYI Good Party

MHP Nationalist Action Party

OSCE Organization for Security and 

Cooperation

PKK Kurdistan Workers Party

SP Felicity Party

YPG People’s Defense Units

YRP New Welfare Party

YSK Supreme Election Council 

YSP Green Left Party 

CONTENTS

Erdogan’s Multifaceted Election Strategy 3

Ragip Soylu 

The Opposition’s Strategy 8

Seren Selvin Korkmaz 

Potential Outcomes for the Kurdish Vote 12

Guney Yildiz 

The Foreign Policy Angle 16

Alper Coskun 

How Turkey Might Look After the Polls 20

Soner Cagaptay 

Conclusion: Defending the Vote and Turkish 

Democracy 22

Soner Cagaptay 

COVER PHOTOS: MURAT CETINMUHURDAR/PPO VIA REUTERS (LEFT); ALP EREN KAYA/CHP VIA REUTERS

CAGAPTAY

POLICY NOTE 132 3

TURKEY’S PIVOTAL 2023 ELECTIONS

Of the countries between Germany and India, Turkey 

has the oldest democracy and one of the largest 

economies. The results of the May elections will 

undoubtedly resonate beyond the country’s borders, 

and the days surrounding the vote will be fateful, 

especially if the presidential contest goes to a runoff. 

Erdogan has distinguished himself as an innovator of 

nativist-populist politics in the twenty-first century, 

and he has remained an attentive student of this 

political trend globally. Should the race enter a runoff, 

Erdogan is sure to engage in polarizing tactics to 

broaden his base, recognizing the humiliation that a 

loss would entail. Yet the stakes are equally high for 

the opposition and the veteran Kilicdaroglu. A loss 

would certainly doom the CHP leader’s political future 

and shatter any prospects for his six-party coalition.

In the following set of essays, experts on Turkey 

scrutinize the forthcoming vote through various 

lenses. Ragip Soylu dissects Erdogan’s electoral 

strategy (gentle but full of surprises), and Seren 

Selvin Korkmaz analyzes the opposition’s strategy 

(trying to stay unified and avoid culture wars with 

Erdogan). Thereafter, Guney Yildiz sorts out the 

complex, evolving Kurdish vote (kingmaker of the 

elections), and Alper Coskun discusses Ankara’s 

foreign policy trajectories under the opposition 

vis-à-vis more of Erdogan (transatlantic leaning vs. 

coldly transactional). The volume will end with this 

author’s analysis on what elections hold for Turkey 

and the world, including policy suggestions for the 

U.S. government during and immediately after the 

elections.

Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan is facing 

one of his toughest election fights since coming to 

power twenty years ago. In seeking his second term 

under the executive presidential system established 

in 2018, he is fending off the Nation’s Alliance (aka 

“Table of Six”), a united bloc determined to defeat 

him. The challenges of incumbency include a deep 

economic crisis, with inflation reaching as high as 

85 percent, and historic earthquakes that killed more 

than 50,000 Turkish residents. 

But Erdogan has a game plan, and since August 2022 

he and his ruling Justice and Development Party 

(AKP) have been busy creating and implementing a 

strategy. As a result, January 2023 polling indicated 

that his coalition’s numbers had jumped by more 

than six percentage points since a survey taken 

the previous June.

1 The recent entry of Republican 

People’s Party (CHP) defector Muharrem Ince into 

the race as a third-party candidate could further 

boost the incumbent.

2 While Erdogan’s coalition will struggle to break 

the 45 percent barrier, let alone the 

50 percent needed to win the presidency in round 

one on May 14, Ince’s rise could deny Kilicdaroglu 

an outright initial victory, forcing a runoff between 

Erdogan and Kilicdaroglu on May 28.

A Four-Pronged Strategy

Prior to the February earthquakes, Erdogan’s strategy 

rested on three pillars, and he later added a fourth. 

1. Use foreign policy to boost domestic popularity. In pursuit of this goal, Erdogan has repaired damaged relations with Arab heavyweights over the 

past couple of years. One result was that, in 2021, the 

United Arab Emirates agreed to a $5 billion currency 

swap with Ankara and pledged to invest $10 billion 

in Turkey’s start-ups and high-tech industry.3 Dubai 

also purchased hundreds of millions of dollars’ 

worth of drones from Ankara.4 Saudi Arabia deposited $5 billion 

in the Turkish Central Bank in March 2023 after Erdogan dropped 

the court case over the 2018 Istanbul murder of Saudi journalist 

Jamal Khashoggi,5 and Riyadh is poised to both make arms.

Erdogan’s Multifaceted Election Strategy 

Ragip Soylu 

purchases from Ankara and pursue investment 

opportunities. 

Erdogan successfully secured a needed cash injection from 

Russia, amounting to nearly $10 billion, 

through the Akkuyu nuclear power plant construction 

project.6 He has simultaneously kept the country 

open to Russians fleeing their country. Together with 

booming two-way trade with Russia, these steps have 

allowed likely billions of dollars to flow to Turkey.7

Such moves have helped finance the president’s 

unorthodox policy centered on low interest rates and 

a controlled foreign exchange regime, whereby the 

Turkish Central Bank burns its reserves to stabilize 

the Turkish lira against the U.S. dollar and other 

currencies. The strategy so far has kept the lira under 

control, backing up Erdogan’s economic claims, 

while also allowing him to conduct a populist spending 

spree (detailed below).

Simultaneously, Erdogan has been working on 

outreach to Syrian president Bashar al-Assad 

through Russian mediation since last August. 

Along with the economy, the anti–Syrian refugee 

sentiments of Turkish voters continue to be a top 

election issue.8 The president has been under fire 

for allowing nearly 4 million Syrian refugees into 

the country throughout his rule, and mindful of the 

opposition’s promises “to send the refugees back by 

cutting a deal with Assad,”9 Erdogan started his own 

engagement with Damascus, first through intelligence 

channels, then through the Foreign Ministry. 

He has already said he would like to meet with Assad 

before the elections.10 The outreach itself has shown 

voters Erdogan’s intention to match the opposition 

in pursuing a deal with Assad to send some refugees 

back to Syria. 

2. Alleviate heavy price pressures through 

economic relief. Recognizing that more than 50 

percent of the Turkish public earns the minimum 

wage, in January 2023 Erdogan doubled this rate for 

the private sector from the previous January, bringing

 it to US$443 a month.11 He implemented a similar raise 

for the public sector that affected around five million 

employees. In addition, the government 

passed an early retirement package that allowed 

two million Turkish workers to retire immediately; 

launched a cheap mortgage loan scheme for citizens 

who do not own their own home; and provided tax 

debt relief to millions. Erdogan has secured permanent

 positions for nearly one-half million subcontractors in 

the public sector and created a new scheme to give a 

30–50 percent raise to the country’s 1.3 

million health workers. Such moves likely contributed

 to the earlier-noted polling bump for Erdogan’s bloc 

from summer 2022 to early 2023.

3. Focus on the future. To achieve his optimistic 

election strategy, Erdogan has tapped as campaign 

manager Ertan Aydin—a political scientist, pollster, 

and former AKP parliamentarian who correctly 

forecast the AKP’s 2019 mayoral losses in Istanbul 

and Ankara. Aydin has been running a campaign 

focused on Turkey’s centennial and has created 

the “Turkey century” concept; in turn, Erdogan has 

tactically called on the opposition to join him in 

producing creative ideas to build the republic’s next 

hundred years. 

Erdogan invited opposition representatives and 

his media critics to the event held to promote this 

concept, calling on them to acknowledge all his 

government has done in the service of Turkish 

society.12 He then put his political challengers on the 

spot, asking them to present their own proposals. 

Ertan’s team has focused on promoting the Turkey 

century concept by spotlighting Erdogan’s national 

projects, with an emphasis on major projects 

such as highways, dams, factories, and a revived 

defense industry—military fighter jets and drones in 

particular.13

Erdogan also wants to individually spotlight other 

endeavors, such as the Turkish national electric car 

project (TOGG, Turkiye’nin Otomobili Girisim Grubu), 

whose first car is expected to be on the road before 

the elections. Turkish shipbuilders have already 

delivered the light aircraft carrier TCG Anadolu, 

which will be launched before the elections as 

well. Furthermore, the Turkish president plans to 

inaugurate a pipeline that will carry Turkey’s own 

Black Sea gas to households in April, and he has 

already inaugurated a factory that produces boron 

carbide, a mineral with multiple military-industrial 

uses, of which Turkey holds 70 percent of worldwide 

reserves.

In March, Erdogan also signaled a possible change 

in his unpopular and unorthodox monetary policy 

by inviting Mehmet Simsek, the respected former 

finance minister, back into the party as a parliamentary 

candidate for the elections. An AKP official said 

that Erdogan had assigned former finance minister 

Lutfi Elvan, known for his market-friendly monetary 

policy, to write the AKP’s election manifesto.14 All 

these moves suggest Erdogan is also looking for ways 

to address the public disappointment and consternation 

reflected in global markets caused by his unorthodox 

economic policies. 

Furthermore, he added the Islamist-oriented New 

Welfare Party (YRP) to his electoral alliance in March 

to boost his prospects. The YRP and other right-wing 

and far-right smaller parties that Erdogan has since 

welcomed, such as the Kurdish Islamist Free Cause 

Party (HUDA-PAR), could boost the People’s Alliance 

by around 3 percent in the presidential and parliamentary races.15

4. Eschew divisiveness. Erdogan has not won 

successive elections over two decades by using softball 

campaign tactics. But he recognizes this year, 

after the February earthquakes leveled cities and 

dispersed hundreds of thousands to tent cities, that 

he should limit harsh language and bitter attacks. 

One AKP official told the author that the campaign 

will aim to promote the sum of Erdogan’s achievements 

over the past twenty years, and specifically those in the last 

year or so, to imply that the Table of Six cannot deliver the 

same results.16 

The official expected that, from time to time, Erdogan 

would directly target opposition candidate Kilicdaroglu but 

that his main focus would be on his achievements 

and on the future. Another factor pointing to a 

relatively positive tone is Ramadan, which lasts until 

late April and generally does not lend itself to holding 

large rallies. 

Wild Cards: Kurdish Votes and Crackdowns

While Erdogan has a clear election strategy, two variables 

could affect the outcome—the Kurdish vote and his own 

impulsiveness. In an effort to win votes from religious Kurds, 

Erdogan—as noted—added HUDAPAR to his coalition in

 March, triggering considerable criticism from the opposition 

due to the party’s past ties to “Turkish Hezbollah,”17 a 

now-inactive radical Sunni Islamist Kurdish group that carried 

out a bloody campaign in the 1990s. HUDA-PAR, however, 

has since disavowed violence. What is more, the 

party won just 0.3 percent in the 2018 elections. 

According to officials close to Erdogan who spoke on 

condition of anonymity, HUDA-PAR would play only a 

symbolic role in convincing religiously conservative 

Kurdish voters to remain within AKP ranks.18

Days before the 2019 mayoral elections, Erdogan 

successfully pressured Abdullah Ocalan, the imprisoned 

leader of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), to call on Turkey’s 

Kurdish community to boycott the vote, a development that 

would have dashed the opposition’s hopes given the Kurdish

 population in big cities. Ocalan’s willingness to work with Erdogan 

likely derived from his belief that he could negotiate 

a deal with the president on the Kurdish question. 

This strategy, however, failed to persuade supporters 

of Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP)—the beneficiary 

of nearly half of Turkey’s Kurdish votes19—largely 

because many realized that Ocalan had issued his 

call in response to government pressure. If Erdogan 

feels truly desperate, he may again try to use Ocalan 

to weaken the HDP and cause some Kurdish voters to 

abandon the opposition.

Despite his advisors’ strategy of maintaining calm 

during the election campaign, Erdogan might ultimately 

follow his less temperate instincts and run a polarizing 

campaign, especially after Ramadan ends on April 23. 

Along these lines, some pro-Erdogan 

media outlets and social media accounts have 

already started making thinly veiled attacks against 

Kilicdaroglu, suggesting he is not a good Muslim.20

As part of a preelection turn, Erdogan might crack 

down harder on social media platforms, where 

the opposition has a free hand to shape the public agenda. 

Last, Erdogan will likely focus on continued 

post-earthquake reconstruction and associated 

services for constituents in the coming years. He is 

confident that emergency conditions can help him 

consolidate his image as a capable leader. Thus, 

he will continue to employ campaign slogans that 

showcase his promises to rebuild houses, hospitals, 

schools, and industrial sites within a year, he and 

will frequently visit disaster zones to solidify his standing. 

AKP Game Plan for Election Rounds One and Two

People close to Erdogan expect that the presidential 

election results will be very close, perhaps within 

one or two percentage points.21 The opposition 

appears united—with the exception of failed 2018 

CHP presidential candidate Muharrem Ince, whose 

independent candidacy will likely siphon votes from 

the Nation’s Alliance. Ince, who has polled at around 

5–10 percent,22 is likely to prevent Kilicdaroglu from 

reaching the 50 percent threshold required to win in 

the first round. Not surprisingly, some pro-Erdogan 

media networks have given ample attention to Ince, 

granting him more coverage than Kilicdaroglu and 

helping boost his poll numbers.23

Should the presidential vote go to a May 28 runoff, 

Erdogan will contour his strategy based on the 

parliamentary results. If the AKP holds on to its 

majority position, Erdogan will campaign on the 

virtues of a united, experienced national leadership; 

if his party loses its majority, he will argue that 

an AKP presidency can balance an opposition-led 

parliament. Party officials, for their part, believe 

Erdogan can successfully appeal to voters in a 

second round in either case. 

If a runoff occurs, Erdogan may use a harsher style 

and a campaign strategy that targets Kilicdaroglu in 

personal terms, painting him as weak or immoral. He 

would likely present the elections as a binary choice 

between himself, a strong leader with a track record 

of running the country, and Kilicdaroglu, a politician 

who lacks any such experience. Erdogan can here 

draw on his foreign policy and security credentials to 

make his case. 

Conveniently, the AKP has changed the election 

laws, theoretically allowing the party to win more 

legislative seats than it typically would based on 

raw vote share, considering an ideologically divided 

opposition.24 The opposition, however, has overcome 

this hurdle at least in part by crafting—case by case—

either separate or joint lists for different election 

districts across the country to maximize its gains at 

the ballot box. 

Erdogan, together with his ally the Nationalist Action 

Party (MHP), has the steady support of roughly 

42–45 percent of the electorate thanks to the 

strategies described here. The earlier-noted entry of 

Muharrem Ince into the race has produced another 

boon. But the incumbent still faces an uphill battle 

to exceed 45 percent or even win the presidency in 

the first round. Erdogan’s lieutenants take comfort 

in their view that the opposition will struggle to stay 

united, given the cracks that appeared during the 

Table of Six meeting on March 2, when party leaders 

initially failed to pick a joint candidate.25 The president, ever 

a shrewd campaigner, will no doubt keep looking to sow discord 

within the opposition, even if he does so quietly. 

Ragip Soylu is the Turkey bureau chief for Middle East Eye. 

He previously served as a correspondent for the Turkish 

media outlets Daily Sabah and ATV, based in Washington 

DC and London.

1 Team Arastirma (@teamarastirma), post on Twitter, “

The possibility of the People’s Alliance winning the 

parliamentary majority has strengthened...” (in Turkish), 

January 21, 2023, 3:13 a.m., https://twitter.com/

teamarastirma/status/1616710488510930944?s=20.

2 Orhan Coskun and Daren Butler, “Breakaway Candidate 

Could Give Erdogan a Lifeline in Tight Turkey Election,” 

Reuters, April 4, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/

middle-east/breakaway-candidate-could-give-erdogan 

lifeline-tight-turkey-election-2023-04-04/.

3 “UAE Establishes $10bn Fund to Support Turkey Investments

,” The National, November 24, 2021, https://www.

thenationalnews.com/uae/government/2021/11/24/uae-establishes-

10bn-fund-to-support-turkey-investments.

4 “Turkey and UAE Ink $5bn Currency Swap Deal,” Middle East Eye,

 January 19, 2022, https://www.middleeasteye.

net/news/turkey-uae-ink-currency-swap-deal; “UAE to Invest $10bn 

in Turkey After Landmark Visit,” Middle 

East Eye, November 24, 2021, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/

uae-turkey-boost-investment-landmarkvisit. 

5 Reuters, “Saudi Arabia Deposits $5bln in Turkey’s Central Bank—

Statement,” March 6, 2023, https://www.reuters.

com/world/middle-east/saudi-arabia-deposits-5-bln-turkeys-

central-bank-statement-2023-03-06/.

6 Firat Kozok, “Russia Is Wiring Dollars to Turkey for $20 Billion 

Nuclear Plant,” Bloomberg, July 29, 2022, https://

www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-07-29/russia-is-wiring-

dollars-to-turkey-for-20-billion-nuclear-plant.

7 Patrick Sykes, “Turkey Boasts of Russia Trade Boom, Defying Push 

for Sanctions,” Bloomberg, August 12, 2022, 

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-08-12/turkey-

boasts-of-russia-trade-boom-defying-push-forsanctions#

xj4y7vzkg.

8 Sude Akgundogdu, Turkish Backlash: How Street Interviews 

Spread Anti–Syrian Refugee Sentiment (Washington DC: 

Washington Institute, 2023), https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/

policy-analysis/turkish-backlash-how-streetinterviews-spread-

anti-syrian-refugee-sentiment.

9 “Turkey Presidential Candidate Vows to Deport Syrians in Two Years 

if He Beats Erdogan,” New Arab, March 16, 

2023, https://www.newarab.com/news/turkey-opposition-candidate-

vows-expel-syrians-2-years. 

10 Umut Uras, “Erdogan Says He May Meet Syria’s Assad for ‘Peace’ 

in the Region,” Al Jazeera, January 5, 2023, 

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/1/5/syria-348.

11 Reuters, “Turkey Raises Monthly Minimum Wage by 55% for 2023,” December 22, 2022, https://www.reuters.

com/markets/turkey-raises-monthly-minimum-wage-by-50-2023-2022-12-22.

12 “‘Century of Turkiye’ Revolution to Bring Peace to the World,” Daily Sabah, October 28, 2022, https://www.

dailysabah.com/politics/elections/century-of-turkiye-revolution-to-bring-peace-to-world-erdogan.

13 See, e.g., Stephen Witt, “The Turkish Drone That Changed the Nature of Warfare,” The New Yorker, May 16, 2022, 

https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2022/05/16/the-turkish-drone-that-changed-the-nature-of-warfare?.

14 AKP official (anonymous), meeting with author in late March 2023, Ankara.

15 “The Latest Poll Results for the 2023 Elections: How Many Votes Do the Parties Get, How Many Votes Do the 

Alliances Get” (in Turkish), EuroNews, March 31, 2023, https://tr.euronews.com/2023/03/10/2023-secimlerison-anket-sonuclari-partilerin-oy-orani-kac-ittifaklar-kac-oy-aliyor.

16 AKP official (anonymous no. 2), early March 2023, Ankara.

17 See “Turkish Hezbollah,” Military Periscope, https://www.militaryperiscope.com/militant-organizations/middleeast/turkish-hezbollah-0/.

18 Officials within Turkish state bureaucracy, several meetings with author, March 2023, Ankara.

19 Dogu Eroglu, “Research: Kurdish Support for AKP Declines, Gains for CHP” (in Turkish), Medyascope, March 26, 

2022, https://medyascope.tv/2022/03/26/arastirma-kurtlerin-akpye-destegi-dusuyor-chp-oy-kazaniyor/.

20 See, e.g., Sabah (@Sabah), “Kemal Kilicdaroglu thought that the 81st verse of Isra Sura was a Necmettin 

Erbakan quote...” (in Turkish), post on Twitter, April 3, 2023, 9:02 a.m., https://twitter.com/sabah/

8 T HE WAS HINGTON INS T I T U T E FOR NE A R E AS T P OL ICY 

CAGAPTAY TURKEY’S PIVOTAL 2023 ELECTIONS

Polling suggests that President Recep Tayyip 

Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party 

(AKP) could lose in the May 2023 elections, resulting in a 

seismic political shift in Turkey.1 A weak 

economy, sky-high inflation, and poorly functioning 

state institutions, as evidenced by the response to 

the February earthquakes, have provided an opening 

for the six-party opposition known as the Nation’s 

Alliance, which is united under Republican People’s 

Party (CHP) head Kemal Kilicdaroglu. 

By building on its past successes and learning from 

its failures, the opposition has honed a strategy that 

delivered victories against Erdogan’s candidates in 

the 2019 local elections. This approach, rooted in 

a strong alliance model, includes a joint candidate 

and a vision platform as well as a plan for countering 

Erdogan’s polarizing politics. 

This essay will examine the strategy espoused 

by the opposition Nation’s Alliance—aka “Table of 

Six”—and its prospects in the forthcoming presidential and 

parliamentary elections, the outcome of which will determine 

whether Turkey heads toward more-entrenched autocracy or 

more-open democracy. If the opposition wins, it will pursue 

redemocratization, potentially offering a playbook for 

actors opposing similar types of populists elsewhere 

around the world. 

A Unified Bloc

In a competitive authoritarian government such as 

Turkey’s, a unified opposition poses a real threat to 

the incumbent. Typical of populist authoritarians, 

Erdogan has benefited from fragmented politics and 

intense polarization. Yet since the 2017 referendum 

transformed Turkey into an executive presidential 

system, the opposition has worked hard to build a 

broad coalition and implemented numerous strategies 

to counter Erdogan’s divisive rhetoric. 

The opposition’s victories in the 2019 local elections, 

taking major cities such as Istanbul and Ankara 

from the AKP, has instilled hope in Turkey’s voters 

committed to democracy and laid the groundwork 

for larger coalitions. While divisions have sometimes 

status/1642875236877062145; Amberin Zaman, “Will Turkish Opposition Leader’s Alevi Faith Be Hindrance at 

Polls,” Al-Monitor, May 23, 2022, https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/05/will-turkish-opposition-leadersalevi-faith-be-hindrance-polls. 

21 Meetings with Turkish state bureaucrats, March 2023.

22 See, e.g., “Ince Is 10 Percent, Kilicdaroglu Leads Erdogan, and HDP and IYI Votes Fell, While CHP Rose” 

(in Turkish), Serbestiyet, March 21, 2023, https://serbestiyet.com/secim2023/ince-yuzde-10-kilicdarogluerdogandan-onde-hdp-ve-iyipin-oylari-dustu-chpnin-yukseldi-122492/.

23 “Ince Walks Thin Line as Kingmaker for Turkish Opposition Bloc,” Daily Sabah, March 30, 2023, https://www.

dailysabah.com/politics/elections/ince-walks-thin-line-as-kingmaker-for-turkish-opposition-bloc. 

24 Peoples’ Democratic Party, “AKP-MHP Alliance Changes the Election Law According to Its Own Needs,” April 4, 

2022, https://hdp.org.tr/en/akp-mhp-alliance-changes-the-election-law-according-to-its-own-needs/16283/.

25 Ezgi Akin, “Turkey’s Opposition Alliance Fractures, Fails to Agree on Challenger to Erdogan,” Al-Monitor, March 

3, 2023, https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2023/03/turkeys-opposition-alliance-fractures-fails-agreechallenger-erdogan.

The Opposition’s Strategy 

Seren Selvin Korkmaz 

appeared in a diverse opposition encompassing 

Turkish and Kurdish nationalists, secularists, and 

political Islamists, among others, the singular goal 

of defeating Erdogan has given them cause for unity, 

considering the 50 percent plus 1 needed to win the 

presidency. To this end, the six parties in the Nation’s 

Alliance have set aside their differences and banded 

together behind longtime Republican People’s Party 

(CHP) leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu. 

After meeting with Kilicdaroglu, the Labor and 

Freedom Alliance—formed by pro-Kurdish Peoples’ 

Democratic Party (HDP) and other leftist parties and 

platforms—announced that it would not field its own 

presidential candidate, signaling implicit support for 

the CHP leader.2 With its potential to win 10%–13% 

of the vote, the Labor and Freedom Alliance move 

could have a significant impact on the election 

outcomes. In the presidential contest, it could help 

Kilicdaroglu win in the first round. Despite the AKP’s 

identity-based attempts at polarization, the Labor 

and Freedom Alliance decision also could signal a 

broader sociopolitical alliance for the future. 

Team of Six vs. President

The opposition Nation’s Alliance is playing a team 

game. Two popular mayors—Istanbul’s Ekrem 

Imamoglu and Ankara’s Mansur Yavas—will be 

appointed as vice presidents if the opposition wins. 

Ali Babacan, who chairs the Democracy and Progress 

Party (DEVA) and formerly was a foreign affairs and 

economy minister in Erdogan’s governments, would 

prospectively preside over the economy as another 

vice president, wielding his strong international 

reputation for financial management. The other 

Nation’s Alliance leaders would hold vice presidential 

posts as well in the event of a win.

After much internal debate, leaders agreed on 

Kilicdaroglu’s candidacy on March 6, 2023. Despite 

his low tallies in two-way matchups with Erdogan 

relative to other front-runner prospects, including 

Imamoglu and Yavas, Kilicdaroglu has—for the most 

part—gained the trust of most fellow coalition party 

elites. Even Turkey’s opposition is not immune to the 

nation’s trend toward polarization, and the political 

veteran Kilicdaroglu has a unique ability to communicate 

with and unify different blocs. His success in persuading the 

Labor and Freedom Alliance is a case in point.

Vision Platform

The six opposition parties, in addition to agreeing 

on a common candidate, have coalesced around 

a proactive, positive shared agenda—the “Vision 

Platform”—which includes a commitment to restore 

the country’s former parliamentary system and 

advance democratic freedoms. To this end, the 

parties have drafted three “vision” documents: (1) 

an agreement for a strengthened parliamentary 

system, (2) a constitutional amendment package 

seeking this outcome, and (3) a memorandum of 

understanding outlining common policies.3 Those 

texts demonstrate that despite significant ideological 

differences, the opposition parties are embracing 

the country’s diverse reality, along with the need for 

dialogue, negotiations, and reconciliation—rather 

than polarization. 

Unlike Erdogan’s presidential system, which has 

enabled personalized power and the hollowing 

out of institutions, the opposition’s “strengthened 

parliamentary system” would seek to reinforce and 

stabilize policymaking in Turkey. New safeguards, 

including a series of checks and balances, would 

be designed to prevent the rise of a “new Erdogan.” 

The presidency, in the proposed model, would revert 

to a more symbolic-diplomatic role characterized 

by stability, transparency, and accountability. The 

legislature would be structured as a more efficient, 

participatory body. The judiciary would be impartial 

and independent. 

The opposition memorandum, which covers foreign 

as well as domestic policy, calls for institutionalizing 

relations with the United States and returning to 

work on the F-35 project. (Following Turkey’s acquisition of Russia’s S-400 system, the Trump administration removed Turkey from the F-35 program 

in July 2019.4) The alliance generally elevates 

institutional roles over personalities in foreign policy, 

and seeks stronger ties with Europe and America in 

the context of the war in Ukraine. It also commits to 

maintaining coequal relations with Russia, wherein 

dialogue should be balanced and constructive at the 

institutional level.

Inclusive Rhetoric

Historically, Erdogan has sought to divide the opposition

 along historical and ideological fault lines, thus 

ensuring that the ruling alliance gets the most votes. 

For the opposition, delivering a message centered 

on inclusivity amounts to a high-wire act—they must 

satisfy their own voters while winning defectors from 

Erdogan’s bloc—but this approach worked decisively 

in the 2019 local elections. As a result, the Nation’s 

Alliance has stuck with an inclusive tone and sought 

to avoid polarizing rhetoric. 

Kilicdaroglu has added forgiveness and reconciliation—

“helallesme”—to the notion of inclusivity, 

with the aim of healing the country’s past wrongs, 

committed against citizens since the founding of the 

Turkish republic in 1923, mostly targeting devout 

Muslims and Kurds. In practical terms, the opposition 

has taken a pragmatic approach to problems 

such as the struggling economy, thus steering away 

from identity politics and simultaneously compelling 

Erdogan to coopt his opponents’ proposals on urgent 

economic issues.

Campaign in the Shadow of Ruin

The devastation of the February earthquakes has 

engendered a subdued tone from both sides in the 

campaign. President Erdogan has focused primarily 

on immediate reconstruction projects to present 

the image that he will ensure their continuity. His 

government drew heavy criticism, however, for 

failing to quickly mobilize rescue teams, coordinate 

humanitarian aid, and repair critical infrastructure. 

The opposition, for its part, has homed in on weakened 

state institutions to explain the government’s 

post-earthquake failures, in turn emphasizing its 

own vision of strong, transparent, and capable 

institutions that can address the daily problems of 

displaced and otherwise affected residents.

 

Playing Field Tilts Toward Erdogan

As the opposition rallies behind Kilicdaroglu, 

Erdogan will seek to regain advantage by using his 

control of state resources and the media. Election 

security likewise poses a challenge—especially in 

earthquake-hit areas, where one-sixth of voters have 

had to register and will cast ballots under emergency 

conditions,5 requiring the opposition to both shoot 

for a safe 4–5 point margin and mobilize all available 

resources to secure the vote. Yet another challenge is 

the politically motivated effort to shut down the HDP.6

Seeking to evade this risk, the HDP has decided to 

run under the banner of the Green Left Party (YSP) 

and will not nominate politicians who could face a 

ban in parliament.7 Still, all in all, Erdogan enjoys 

an uneven playing field, and will continue to deftly 

manage expectations, intensify suppression of 

dissenters, and employ a fear-based strategy that 

portends “If I lose, you lose.” This is why he should 

not be underestimated.

Postelection Scenarios for the Opposition

To be sure, the return to a Turkish parliamentary 

system would go more smoothly if the opposition 

won the presidency as well as the parliament 

with a three-fifths majority—a prerequisite for a 

constitutional amendment necessary to restore 

the country’s former political system. But recent 

election law changes make such a landslide victory 

unlikely. At the time of writing, Kilicdaroglu was 

leading the presidential race in the first round and 

predicted to win a runoff, while the race for the 

parliament appeared to be a toss-up. Two scenarios 

could therefore emerge in May: (1) Given the wide 

executive powers of the presidency under Turkey’s 

new political system, Erdogan’s loss of his position 

would be a huge blow for his party and base. Hence, 

Erdogan may agree to negotiate with the incoming 

leadership about reverting to a parliamentary system 

in return for immunity from any charges against 

him, his family members, and key people in his 

administration. (2) Erdogan could also be preparing 

to lose the presidency and, in doing so, to ensure 

“parliamentary immunity” from potential charges 

for his ministers. This scenario would appear to be 

supported by recent developments, with Erdogan 

having declared that fifteen of his current ministers 

will run for the parliament. Erdogan could be planning

to cultivate a powerful opposition while in the 

minority—a scenario applicable if he were to also lose 

the parliament—composed of well-connected former 

ministers, in hopes that he can exploit a potentially 

unstable governing alliance, hobbled by economicand 

earthquake-related struggles, to return to power. 

A final scenario must be considered: one in which 

the opposition bloc loses both the presidency and 

parliament. Such an outcome could well lead to deep, 

enduring authoritarianism in Turkey, punctuated in 

the short term by profound disappointment among 

backers of the opposition, when victory seemed in 

reach. An exodus from the country could then ensue, 

resulting in significant brain drain and other societal 

consequences.

Given the election concerns discussed earlier, the 

opposition will work hard to notch a clear victory, 

but if such a triumph proves elusive, Erdogan could 

prematurely declare himself the victor. In response, 

international actors should refuse to validate such an 

outcome.

Seren Selvin Korkmaz is a political analyst and the 

executive director of IstanPol Institute, an Istanbul-based 

think tank. She is also a researcher at the Stockholm 

University Institute for Turkish Studies, a nonresident 

fellow at the Middle East Institute in Washington DC, and 

a Marshall Memorial Fellow at the German Marshall Fund 

of the United States.

1 Tuba Altunkaya, “Turkey Opinion Poll Tracker: Erdogan vs Kilicdaroglu,” EuroNews, April 3, 2023, https://www.

euronews.com/2023/03/14/turkey-opinion-poll-tracker-erdogan-vs-kilicdaroglu. 

2 Reuters, “In Vote Setback for Erdogan, Turkey’s HDP Will Not Field Candidate,” March 22, 2023, https://www.

reuters.com/world/middle-east/vote-setback-erdogan-turkeys-hdp-will-not-field-candidate-2023-03-22/. 

3 “Text of Agreement for a Strengthened Parliamentary System,” Nation’s Alliance, February 28, 2022, https://

chp.azureedge.net/162769dcb2b3453f83f75312cb991643.pdf; “Memorandum of Understanding on Common 

Policies,” Republican People’s Party, January 30, 2023, https://en.chp.org.tr/haberler/memorandum-ofunderstanding-on-common-policies-january-30-2023. 

4 Jonathan Marcus, “U.S. Removes Turkey from F-35 Fighter Jet Programme,” BBC, July 17, 2019, https://www.bbc.

com/news/world-us-canada-49023115.

5 Ezgi Erkoyun, Birsen Altayli, and Ali Kucukgocmen, “Determined to See Fair Vote After Earthquakes, Turks 

Mobilise for May Election,” Reuters, March 28, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/determinedsee-fair-vote-after-earthquakes-turks-mobilise-may-election-2023-03-28/.

6 Ezgi Akin, “Turkey’s Pro-Kurdish Party HDP Faces Threat of Closure After Top Court Ruling,” Al-Monitor, January 

26, 2023, https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2023/01/turkeys-pro-kurdish-party-hdp-faces-threat-closureafter-top-court-ruling.

7 For the official Green Left Party (YSP) website, see https://yesilsolparti.org.

NOTES

Potential Outcomes for the Kurdish Vote 

Guney Yildiz 

Turkey’s Kurdish community, accounting for 15–20 

percent of the country’s population, is segmented 

into three distinct political blocs. The largest, representing 

a little more than half of the demographic, mostly leans left,

 supporting the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP). The second-largest, comprising 20–30 percent, gravitates toward social conservatism, 

backing President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Justice 

and Development Party (AKP). And the smallest, 

about one-sixth of Kurdish voters, opts for the 

left-leaning secular Republican People’s Party (CHP) 

or other factions.1 Based on surveys conducted by 

Rawest Research,2 a polling firm that focuses on 

Turkey’s Kurds, the main opposition party—the CHP—

is experiencing a robust upswing in Kurdish support 

and could secure around 20 percent of its vote in the 

2023 elections. The AKP’s share of Kurdish voters 

may remain marginally higher, but the incumbent is 

trending downward while the challenger rises. 

In the last Turkish parliamentary elections, held in 

2018, the HDP earned 11.7 percent of the parliamentary vote and 7 percent for its (incarcerated) presidential candidate, Selahattin Demirtas, who has been party chair since 2014. Early in his term, Demirtas 

presided over a substantial increase in support for 

the HDP, which doubled its vote share in 2015 to 13.1 

percent, from 6.6 percent in 2011.

The HDP embraced a liberal platform, running a 

gender-balanced list for the parliamentary elections 

in 2015 and including representatives from the 

country’s religious minorities, such as Armenians. 

This strategy broadened the party’s appeal, forging 

a liberal-Kurdish alliance and making the HDP the 

third-largest bloc in the legislature, following the AKP 

and CHP. In November 2016, however, Demirtas was 

imprisoned on charges of inciting violent attacks, 

encouraging citizens to protest, affiliating with an 

armed terrorist organization, and disseminating 

terrorist propaganda. Since then, the government 

has jailed many other HDP officials, including elected 

deputies and mayors. The party has maintained its 

voter base despite government attacks thanks to its 

devoted supporters, Demirtas’s political charisma, 

and Erdogan’s hard Turkish-nationalist pivot since 

2015, which has alienated some conservative 

Kurdish AKP voters and driven more than a few 

toward the HDP.

The HDP, having recently announced it would not run 

its own presidential candidate, has practically asked 

its voters to support CHP leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu.3

With neither the opposition leader nor Erdogan 

likely to surpass 50 percent on May 14 absent strong 

Kurdish support, the HDP will be instrumental in 

determining the outcome. The party’s kingmaker role 

was exemplified in the 2019 local elections, in which 

the Kurdish vote was crucial in securing opposition 

victories in major Turkish cities, including Istanbul.4

In previous elections, the HDP made informal 

alliances with opposition parties, never supporting 

President Erdogan. In fact, during the 2015 election 

campaign, the party leadership focused almost 

exclusively on preventing Erdogan from becoming 

president and reserved most of its hostility for his 

party, the result of ideological incompatibility as well 

as a lack of trust.5 In 2011 and 2013, the Erdogan 

government initiated peace processes with the 

Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK)—the militant wing of 

the Kurdish movement in Turkey, deemed a terrorist 

entity by Ankara and Turkey’s NATO allies—but after 

the last round of talks collapsed in 2015, Erdogan 

booted from the AKP some prominent Kurdish 

members who had played a major role in the talks.6

Today’s AKP criminalizes any attempt to engage with 

the PKK or even with HDP representatives.

Kurdish voting could follow several possible paths in 

the forthcoming elections:

Informal support for the opposition bloc. Given the 

HDP’s decision not to field a presidential candidate 

and to instead direct supporters to vote against 

Erdogan, this is the most likely scenario. Kilicdaroglu 

is known for his social democratic views and comes 

from a predominantly Kurdish town. The HDP’s base 

regards him as an ideal candidate, and party leaders 

appreciated his parliament visit on March 20, 2023, 

after which the party officially announced that it 

would not field a candidate in the elections. If no 

presidential candidate earns more than 50 percent 

in the first round, a second round of voting will occur 

on May 28. The HDP has expressed a wish to see 

Erdogan defeated in the first round.

Informal backing of Erdogan’s bloc. This scenario 

appears to be nearly impossible. The HDP’s leadership 

would consider negotiations with Erdogan only 

if the government tackled a range of matters the 

leadership deems crucial, such as Turkey’s stance 

on the Kurdish-led autonomous administration in 

northern Syria, the replacement of HDP officials with 

state-appointed officials in municipalities where HDP 

candidates won, the release of jailed HDP officials, 

and a comprehensive agreement with the PKK that 

includes permitting Abdullah Ocalan, its founder and 

imprisoned leader, to serve his sentence at home. 

Within the Kurdish movement—the dominant trend 

for Kurds in Turkey, although not representing the 

whole ethnic group—the PKK’s approach to Erdogan 

has been more pragmatic than that of the HDP. This 

is the case even though the PKK has historically 

pursued its goals through violence, including attacks 

on civilians, and has regarded itself since 1984 to be 

at war with the Turkish army. PKK leader Ocalan has 

previously participated in negotiations with Turkish 

security officials and the ruling party, while the HDP 

leadership has maintained a hostile attitude toward 

the AKP. In addition, the PKK recently declared a 

unilateral ceasefire with Turkey in response to the 

February earthquakes, the result—according to 

Kurdish sources—of requests made by U.S. officials 

through the group’s allies in northern Syria.7

Despite unconfirmed rumors that Hakan Fidan, 

Turkey’s intelligence chief, will be appointed 

deputy president—a possible harbinger of renewed 

talks with Kurdish militants, given his past work 

overseeing peace process activities—President 

Erdogan is highly unlikely to offer a fresh opening 

to the group.8 The Nationalist Action Party (MHP), 

Erdogan’s ally, is strongly anti-Kurdish and would 

oppose any such steps. 

No support for either side. This scenario could play 

out only if the Turkish military undertook an operation 

against the Syria-based People’s Defense Units (YPG)—

a PKK offshoot—a move the opposition would 

be forced to back, leading to a split with the HDP. This 

is also an unlikely scenario, since there is no indication 

that Turkey will follow through on its threats to launch 

such an operation before the elections. A more plausible

scenario considering recent developments—such as 

the reported Turkish attempt to kill YPG commander 

Mazloum Kobane Abdi in Iraq on April 7—is a successful 

Turkish assassination attempt targeting a YPG or 

PKK leader in Iraq or Syria, whether preceding the first 

vote or during the runoff stage.9 Such a development 

could splinter the opposition in the presidential race, 

with Turkish nationalist members of the Nation’s 

Alliance, such as the IYI Party, likely lining up behind 

the attack and the pro-Kurdish HDP opposing it.

Dissolution of the HDP by the Turkish 

Constitutional Court. This scenario became less 

likely following the HDP’s decision to field candidates 

under the Green Left Party (YSP) banner, a move 

premised on the March 2021 filing of a court case 

against the HDP following persistent calls to this 

end by the MHP and its leader, Devlet Bahceli.10 The 

prosecution in the case, which could lead to the 

dissolution of the HDP, alleges that the party is the 

successor to previously dissolved illegal parties; 

that it has links to the PKK; and that party leader 

Selahattin Demirtas was involved in mobilizing 

people to commit violence.

The court recently postponed its hearing on the 

dissolution until April 11. Mixed signals from the 

court have heightened worries that the HDP could 

face dissolution following the April 9 deadline for 

submitting candidate lists, prompting the party’s 

leadership to seek participation in the May elections 

under the YSP. The court lacks sufficient time to 

ban the YSP before the May elections. If it moved to 

do so, the pro-HDP electorate would still likely back 

Kilicdaroglu in the presidential race, but the YSP 

might lose some votes for parliamentary representation 

owing to voter confusion.

Can the HDP Maintain an Informal Alliance with the Opposition?

The Nation’s Alliance, or “Table of Six,” as the opposition is known,

 is a grand coalition of diverse parties 

comprising political Islamists, Turkish nationalists, 

social democrats, secularists, and liberals, all united 

in their opposition to Erdogan. The coalition has 

proven more resilient than initially anticipated by the 

Turkish president due to strong anti-Erdogan sentiments 

across the political spectrum—and the view 

that Turkey can progress only if Erdogan is removed 

from power through democratic means. Furthermore, 

Kilicdaroglu has served as a unifying force and has 

helped maintain cohesion among the various parties. 

In September 2021, the HDP outlined its political 

road map, which includes a call to return to a 

parliamentary system and largely aligns with the 

opposition’s program. Notable differences appear 

concerning the Kurdish question, however, such as 

support for mother tongue education, including in 

Kurdish, and for significant local government autonomy.

11 In March 2023, HDP leader Demirtas engaged 

in a critical debate with the Turkish nationalist Good 

Party (IYI), the second-largest member of the Table 

of Six,12 but he has refrained from criticizing the CHP 

or Kilicdaroglu, and the HDP leadership has avoided 

leveling significant criticism against the opposition. 

Tensions between the HDP and IYI may persist 

throughout the election period, potentially providing 

an opportunity for Kilicdaroglu to dampen the IYI’s 

influence over the alliance, or for Erdogan, who could 

exploit the tensions to disrupt the informal alliance 

between the Table of Six and the HDP.

The Erdogan government has at its disposal various 

tactics to prevent the Kurdish population from voting 

for the Table of Six. These include attempting to 

polarize society over the Kurdish question in order to 

splinter the opposition-HDP alliance—a possible path 

in the event of a successful Turkish assassination 

attempt against a YPG or PKK leader;13 using the 

government’s control over the media and state institutions 

to suppress the Kurdish and HDP vote; and directly appealing 

to the Kurds via a new “opening” that potentially includes 

Abdullah Ocalan. The diametrically opposed nature of the 

assassination versus “Ocalan peace” paths shows Erdogan’s 

utter malleability on the Kurdish issue. At the same time, 

Erdogan may attempt to polarize the electorate based 

on religious, ethnic, or ideological divisions. These 

include Islamic sensitivities; Alevi or Kurdish issues 

(Erdogan’s main challenger, Kilicdaroglu, is of Alevi 

and Kurdish origin); and Turkey’s secularist history 

and past injustices against devout citizens. 

The AKP, to regain support from conservative 

Kurds who defected after the party aligned with the 

Nationalist Action Party (MHP) and used antiKurdish rhetoric, 

is now working with the Free Cause Party (HUDA-PAR), a

 Sunni Kurdish far-right group whose predecessor “Turkish Hezbollah” terrorized pro-Kurdish civilians and also conservatives out of 

step with the group’s austere version of Islam.14 The 

Kurdish electorate decisively has favored the HDP over 

HUDA-PAR, but the latter could flip a few votes 

to Erdogan in areas where it operates. 

The government could also appeal cynically to HDP 

voters by claiming that there is little difference 

between the AKP and the opposition on the Kurdish 

issue. As evidence, they could point to occasional 

anti-Kurdish remarks by IYI officials, such as 

Yavuz Agiralioglu, who questioned the “humanity” 

of non-Muslim Kurds and later resigned from the 

party, attributing his departure to the HDP’s de facto 

backing of the opposition.15 

The HDP envisions that a Kilicdaroglu triumph might 

herald a less security-based approach to Turkey’s 

Kurdish issue and a relaxation of political constraints 

on the HDP and its elected representatives. If the 

opposition bloc comes to power, the result would likely 

be a better government relationship with the Kurdish 

community. Such a shift would further empower the 

diverse coalition and spotlight the grassroots solidarity

 among its supporters, including Kurds.16

Guney Yildiz is a researcher and journalist based in 

London whose work focuses on Turkey, Syria, and the 

Kurdish community across the Middle East. He previously 

served as a visiting fellow with the European Council on 

Foreign Relations.

1 Roj Girasun (Rawest Research general director), phone interview by author, March 16, 2023.

2 Girasun, phone interview.

3 Yildiz Yazicioglu, “Did HDP Practically Support Kemal Kilicdaroglu?” (in Turkish), Voice of America, March 22, 

2023, https://www.voaturkce.com/a/hdp-fiilen-kemal-kilicdarogluna-destek-mi-verdi/7016745.html; Reuters, 

“In Vote Setback for Erdogan, Turkey’s HDP Will Not Field Candidate,” March 22, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/

world/middle-east/vote-setback-erdogan-turkeys-hdp-will-not-field-candidate-2023-03-22/.

4 Galip Dalay, “Istanbul Election: Remaking of Turkey’s New Political Landscape?” SWP Comment, July 15, 2019, 

https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/istanbul-election-remaking-of-turkeys-new-political-landscape.

5 “We Will Not Make You the President, HDP Co-Chair Tells Erdogan,” Hurriyet Daily News, March 17, 2015, https://

www.hurriyetdailynews.com/we-will-not-make-you-the-president-hdp-co-chair-tells-erdogan-79792.

6 Guney Yildiz, “The Kurdish Movement’s Disparate Goals and the Collapse of the Peace Process with Turkey,” 

Middle East Research and Information Project, August 19, 2020, https://merip.org/2020/08/the-kurdishmovements-disparate-goals-and-the-collapse-of-the-peace-process-with-turkey/.

7 Amberin Zaman (@amberinzaman), post on Twitter, “The USA was among the countries that asked @Mazloum 

Abdi to mediate for the PKK’s declaration of ceasefire” (in Turkish), March 9, 2023, 4:30 a.m., https://twitter.com/

amberinzaman/status/1633762085967462400?s=20.

8 “‘Surprise’ Moves from the AKP Are on the Way: Hakan Fidan, Mehmet Simsek, HUDA-PAR” (in Turkish), 

Cumhuriyet, March 10, 2023, https://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/siyaset/akpden-surpriz-hamleler-yolda-hakanfidan-mehmet-simsek-huda-par-2059586.

9 For the recent attempt, see Amberin Zaman, “U.S.-Backed Syrian Kurdish Leader Mazlum Kobane Says Turkey’s 

Attempt on Life Not the First,” Al-Monitor, April 8, 2023, https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2023/04/usbacked-syrian-kurdish-leader-mazlum-kobane-says-turkeys-attempt-life-not-first.

10 Esin Isik, “MHP Chairman Bahceli: HDP’s Door Must Be Locked so that It Cannot Be Opened” (in Turkish), 

Anadolu Agency, updated December 12, 2020, https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/politika/mhp-genel-baskani-bahcelihdpnin-kapisina-acilmamak-uzere-kilit-vurulmalidir/2074110.

11 See HDP, “Let Us Win Together,” https://hdp.org.tr/Images/UserFiles/Documents/Editor/2021/hdp-declaration27september.pdf.

12 Burhanettin Duran, “Aksener’s HDP Dilemma: Both Options Lead to Dead Ends,” Daily Sabah, March 11, 2023, 

https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/columns/akseners-hdp-dilemma-both-options-lead-to-dead-ends.

13 A recent enactment of such polarization occurred on March 5, when fans of the Turkish soccer team Bursaspor 

taunted players from Amedspor, a team from the Kurdish-majority city of Diyarbakir. During the match, Bursapor 

fans brandished images of state officials notorious for their criminal acts and human rights violations against the 

Kurdish community.

14 “Huda-Par’s Emergence,” Economist, November 23, 2013, https://www.economist.com/europe/2013/11/23/hudapars-emergence. 

15 “IYI Party’s Yavuz Agiralioglu: Why Would I Call a Non-Muslim Turk and Kurd Human?” (in Turkish), Tele1, 

August 7, 2022, https://tele1.com.tr/iyi-partili-yavuz-agiralioglu-musluman-olmayan-turk-ve-kurte-nicin-insandiyelim-674936/ ; “IP Heavyweight Agiralioglu Resigns from Party over PKK/HDP Ties,” Daily Sabah, March 

28, 2023, https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/elections/ip-heavyweight-agiralioglu-resigns-from-party-overpkkhdp-ties.

16 Guney Yildiz, “Turkish Elections: At the Crossroads of Populism,” Forbes, March 29, 2023, https://www.forbes.

com/sites/guneyyildiz/2023/03/29/turkish-elections-at-the-crossroads-of-populism/?sh=476af4738252.

The Foreign Policy Angle 

Alper Coskun 

In many ways, Turkey’s foreign policy under 

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Justice and 

Development Party (AKP) has resembled a puzzle 

whose pieces do not fit together. Turkey naturally 

pursues diverse and, at times, competing sets of 

interests. But by casting doubt over its identity as a 

NATO ally anchored in the Western security architecture, 

Erdogan has weakened Turkey’s standing in the eyes of its 

friends and foes alike. 

Turkey is regarded today by many as a disruptive 

power with a muddled strategic orientation.1 Dreams 

of toppling neighboring regimes, such as in Syria, or 

building a regional sphere of influence by supporting 

ideologically preferred political forces, such as the 

Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, have not served 

Turkey well.2 Nor has the opportunistic practice of 

playing Ankara’s relations with Moscow against its 

traditional allies and partners in the West.3

This approach has narrowed Turkey’s circle of 

friends, increased its isolation, and weakened its 

diplomatic clout, even though Ankara has at times 

compensated for inadequate political leverage with 

hard power, such as by deploying its drones as far 

away as Libya, where it managed to protect the 

North African country’s internationally recognized 

government against the forces of Gen. Khalifa Haftar 

and Russia’s Wagner Group. The forthcoming elections 

will give Turkey’s prospective leadership an 

opportunity for self-reflection on these matters. And 

irrespective of the results, a certain degree of change 

lies ahead in Turkey’s foreign policy trajectory. 

Turkey’s six-party opposition alliance has an ambitious 

foreign policy agenda that rests on reformulating policy 

structures and reimagining the Turkish role in the world.4 

The alliance enjoys advantages relative to the incumbent 

AKP, which has held power for twenty years. For one thing, 

the opposition would represent a clean slate and enjoy the 

benefit of the doubt with its Western interlocutors. For another, 

it could enact democratic and economic reforms 

to improve Turkey’s image and generate additional 

goodwill with a constructive, consistent foreign 

policy outlook. This would strengthen Turkey’s 

hand in its engagement with the United States, the 

European Union, and other Western states in a way 

the AKP can no longer do, given the confidence 

deficit it has accrued. The skeptical onlooker, in this 

case, will be Russia, which is more than happy with 

Turkey’s troubled relations with the West under 

Erdogan, a leader once referred to in the Moscow 

Times as “our man in NATO.”5

Of course, Erdogan will also make certain calculations 

if he wins the elections. Despite his innate tendency 

to reject failure, he does not shy away from dramatic 

policy changes when he regards them as necessary. 

He proved this in late 2020 when he toned down his 

combative rhetoric toward the West and concurrently 

moved to end Turkey’s regional isolation by mending 

fences with the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, 

Egypt, and Israel.6 He took this reckoning to a new 

level in Syria,7 where the idea of a handshake with 

Bashar al-Assad—once Ankara’s target for regime 

change—suddenly became plausible. Realpolitik had 

dictated a need for change, and Erdogan obliged. 

The Turkish president will continue these efforts 

if he remains in power after the May elections and 

simultaneously conduct his own Western charm 

offensive, despite his visceral aversion to doing so. 

The poor condition of the Turkish economy,8 further 

aggravated by the recent earthquakes—which caused 

damage exceeding $100 billion, alongside grievous 

casualties—has forced the president to welcome a 

steady flow of foreign aid and external financing, 

narrowing his options. Realpolitik will once again 

dictate his actions. 

In areas where problems have ossified or become 

matters of national security, such as disputes with 

Greece in the Aegean Sea or over Cyprus, neither 

Erdogan’s AKP nor the opposition will budge 

easily. The same holds for prioritizing Turkey’s 

ongoing fight against terrorist groups, including the 

Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) or its Syria-based 

affiliate, the People’s Defense Units (YPG). But in 

other areas, changes will differ by shades depending 

on the electoral winner, as outlined below: 

Policy formulation. Contrary to promises made 

when Turkey adopted its executive presidential 

system in 2017, the new system has not exemplified 

good governance. Moreover, the country’s foreign 

policy has progressively become tainted by domestic 

politics. Perversely, the centralization of power 

has siloed line ministries and other institutions at 

the lower levels. With all eyes on the presidential 

office, these mid- and lower-level institutions have 

demonstrated little ability to maintain a culture of 

cooperation and coordination among themselves. 

The political opposition is therefore campaigning 

to revive Turkey’s parliamentary system of governance

—with some modifications to streamline 

decisionmaking. On the foreign policy front, it 

aims to reinstate the central role of the Ministry of 

Foreign Affairs in formulating and implementing 

policy. This will be consequential in at least two 

ways—by disentangling policy decisions from 

domestic political motives and by harmonizing 

foreign policy messaging, thereby bringing clarity 

to Turkey’s positions. 

Turkey-U.S. relations. The belief that the United 

States is indifferent, if not harmful, to Turkey’s core 

interests amounts to conventional wisdom among 

many Turkish elites and voters alike, and this will 

weigh heavily on any incoming Turkish government. 

Matters will only worsen if Turkey’s request to 

purchase U.S. F-16s is declined.9

Little daylight separates the AKP from the opposition 

in this area, but the opposition—should it triumph—

will engage in a bold effort to reset the relationship, 

thus forcing Washington’s hand.10 Here, the opposition 

will enjoy three advantages: a lack of baggage 

in U.S. eyes, relative to the AKP; (2) a demonstrated 

intent to articulate Turkey’s strategic stance as a 

NATO ally; and (3) a stance guided by disapproval 

of Turkey’s purchase of Russia’s S-400 system and 

a corresponding desire to resolve the matter. The 

challenge there will lie in finding a compromise 

that will not be perceived by the Turkish public as a 

humiliating capitulation to American demands while 

simultaneously avoiding a total rupture with Russia. 

The most likely scenario would be to mothball the 

system in Turkey under a subtle, inspection scheme 

mutually palatable to Ankara and Washington.

Erdogan would likewise continue trying to reset 

Turkey’s relationship with the United States, but 

he would struggle to be genuinely forthcoming in a 

manner equal to his opponents. More important, he 

will be constrained by his entanglement with Vladimir 

Putin’s Russia. Erdogan’s strongest card will continue 

to be Turkey’s geopolitical significance, and he will try 

to leverage this at every opportunity, foremost in the 

context of the war in Ukraine. Under these circumstances, 

moving away from a transactional bilateral 

relationship with the United States will be difficult. 

Turkey and NATO. In its quest to ascertain Turkey’s 

strategic orientation, the opposition will focus on 

better harmonizing the country’s foreign, defense, 

and security policies with its NATO membership 

requirements. It will refrain from bringing up bilateral 

issues in an alliance setting. Meanwhile, under 

opposition leadership, Sweden’s chances of joining 

NATO before the planned July Summit will increase 

significantly.11

By comparison, Erdogan’s commitment to Turkey’s 

NATO membership will be halfhearted at best. He 

has grown accustomed to playing brinkmanship 

games in the alliance context and will do the same 

with Sweden’s NATO accession. Moreover, his freelance 

engagement with actors like Russia and China 

will come up, further tarnishing Turkey’s image as a 

NATO ally.

Turkey, Russia, and China. The opposition will 

tread carefully between Turkey’s NATO membership 

requirements and its interests in maintaining a 

nonconfrontational relationship with Russia and 

China. Even as it aims to consolidate Turkey’s place 

in NATO, it will strive to preclude misunderstandings 

in Russia and China of its benign intent. That said, 

Turkey will be inclined to call out Russia for its violations

 of international law and be more vocal about 

offenses against China’s Muslim Uyghur community. 

The opposition’s steps to resolve challenges associated 

with the Russian S-400 missile defense system 

will be a leading factor in relations with Russia, and 

could become a source of friction. Turkey made a 

single two-battery procurement of the S-400s in late 

2017 and has since activated the systems only once, 

for testing purposes, storing them in a warehouse 

since. Moreover, there are signs that Turkey’s interest 

in the S-400 may be waning as it moves closer to 

fielding its own systems.12

Turkey, Putin, and the Ukraine war. Erdogan 

will not easily relinquish his close, if previously 

sometimes uneasy, relationship with Putin. The 

more Russia is sanctioned and Putin is isolated on 

the international stage, the stronger Erdogan’s hand 

will be in the relationship, making the rapport easier 

to manage. On the other hand, while ill-conceived 

dreams of deepening defense industry cooperation 

with Russia have subsided, bilateral cooperation on 

other initiatives, including the nuclear reactor now 

being built by Russia, will continue.13 Western sanctions 

on Russia may upset these developments, and 

here Erdogan will be inclined to push limits but not 

cross the line. By staying out of the sanctions regime, 

Turkey has been able to attract Russian wealth and 

increase bilateral trade, only to scale back in the face 

of Western unease. Erdogan would continue this 

juggling act.14 The opposition would likely remain 

outside the sanctions regime as well but be more 

vigilant about preventing Turkey from being seen as 

a sanctions refuge by its Western allies and partners. 

Turkey’s energy-related reliance on Russia, which 

has grown again recently, is another area where the 

opposition will look to rebalance.15

Engaging Damascus. Facilitating the voluntary 

return of Syrians to their homeland has become a 

political priority in Turkey. This will push Ankara 

toward seeking some form of compromise with the 

Syrian regime. While doing so, the AKP and the 

opposition will see merit in retaining a working 

relationship with Russia and Iran, although the 

opposition will be more skeptical of such ties. As 

Assad gradually emerges from his international 

isolation, he has shown himself to be in no rush with 

Turkey and, specifically, careful not to strengthen 

Erdogan’s hand before the May elections. The bad 

blood with Erdogan suggests Assad would prefer to 

talk about normalization with the Turkish opposition. 

In any case, Assad’s precondition that Turkey 

withdraw from Syria will be a sticking point.16 This 

demand is something on which the opposition may 

be predisposed to deliver, but only after Turkey’s 

security concerns relating to YPG activities in 

northern Syria are met satisfactorily. This, in turn, 

represents a challenge for Assad, especially given the 

continuing U.S. military presence in northeast Syria 

and American support for the YPG.17

Turkey and the European Union. European-led relief 

and aid efforts after the February earthquakes were 

well received in Ankara and breathed positive energy 

into an otherwise strained relationship with the 

European Union. Moreover, recent positive exchanges 

with Greece have increased hopes of greater stability 

ahead. Erdogan needs this tranquility more than 

ever for economic and political reasons, and he can 

be expected to refrain from escalatory behavior in 

the postelection period. His hope would be to start 

modernizing Turkey’s customs union with the EU—by 

broadening its scope, as well as adding services to 

already-covered industrial goods—and to enhance 

Turkey’s role in Europe’s supply chain as a reliable 

manufacturing base. His long record, however, will 

inevitably be cause for European skepticism. The 

opposition would pursue the same goals with the EU 

and enjoy the advantage of being a preferred interlocutor..

Signs already suggest that political change could prompt 

a surge in foreign investor interest.18

An opposition-led government could consolidate this 

trend by quickly establishing macroeconomic stability 

and rebuilding trust in the rule of law and the country’s investment ecosystem.

Alper Coskun is a senior fellow within the Europe Program 

at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, where 

he leads the Turkey and the World initiative. His research 

focuses on Turkish foreign policy, especially in relation to 

the United States and Europe.

1 Marc Pierini, “Turkey in Europe: Disruption as a Policy,” Judy Dempsey’s Strategic Europe, Carnegie Europe, May 24, 

2022, https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/87190.

2 Gonul Tol and Birol Baskan, “From ‘Hard Power’ to ‘Soft Power’ and Back Again: Turkish Foreign Policy in the 

Middle East,” Middle East Institute, November 19, 2018, https://www.mei.edu/publications/hard-power-softpower-and-back-again-turkish-foreign-policy-middle-east.

3 Agence France-Press, “Putin, Erdogan and Iran’s Raisi Pledge Cooperation Against ‘Terrorists’ in Syria,” France 

24, July 19, 2022, https://www.france24.com/en/asia-pacific/20220719-putin-to-meet-turkey-s-erdogan-andiranian-president-raisi-in-tehran.

4 Nicolas Camut, “Turkish Opposition Unites Behind Kilicdaroglu as Anti-Erdogan Candidate,” Politico, March 6, 

2023, https://www.politico.eu/article/turkish-opposition-kilicdaroglu-erdogan-ankara-election/; “Memorandum 

of Understanding on Common Policies,” January 30, 2023, https://en.chp.org.tr/haberler/memorandum-ofunderstanding-on-common-policies-january-30-2023.

5 Vladimir Frolov, “Our Man in NATO: Why Putin Lucked Out with Recep Erdogan,” Moscow Times, April 15, 

2019, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/04/15/our-man-in-nato-why-putin-lucked-out-with-receperdogan-a65237.

6 For Erdogan’s toned-down rhetoric, see Dimitar Bechev, “What Erdogan’s Tilt to the West Means for RussiaTurkey Relations,” Royal United Services Institute, July 1, 2021, https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/

publications/commentary/what-erdogans-tilt-west-means-russia-turkey-relations; for mending fences, see 

Karel Valansi, “Turkey Has Flipped the Script on Its Regional Isolation. But Will It Amount to Real Change?” 

TURKEYSource, Atlantic Council, October 12, 2021, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/turkeysource/turkeyhas-flipped-the-script-on-its-regional-isolation-but-will-it-amount-to-real-change/. For UAE: Natasha Turak, 

“Erdogan’s Celebrity Welcome in the UAE Affirms a Sea-Change in Relations, Lifeline for Turkey’s Economy,” 

CNBC, February 15, 2022, https://www.cnbc.com/2022/02/15/erdogans-uae-visit-affirms-shift-in-relations-helpfor-turkeys-economy.html; Saudi Arabia: “Turkey, Saudi Arabia Strive to Renew Relations for New Era: Erdogan,” 

Daily Sabah, April 29, 2022, https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/diplomacy/turkey-saudi-arabia-strive-to-renewrelations-for-new-era-erdogan; Egypt: Reuters, “Turkey’s Erdogan Shakes Hands with Egypt’s Sisi at World Cup,” 

November 20, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkeys-erdogan-shakes-hands-with-egyptssisi-world-cup-2022-11-20/; Israel: Isabel Kershner and Safak Timur, “Israel’s President Visits Turkey in Sign 

of Thawing Relations,” New York Times, March 9, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/09/world/middleeast/

israel-isaac-herzog-turkey-visit.html.

7 Andrew Wilks, “Turkey-Syria Summit Postponed at Last Minute as Russia Nudges Rivals to Reconcile,” AlMonitor, March 16, 2023, https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2023/03/turkey-syria-summit-postponed-lastminute-russia-nudges-rivals-reconcile.

8 Liz Alderman, “Turkey’s Reeling Economy Is an Added Challenge for Erdogan,” New York Times, February 19, 

2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/19/business/turkey-earthquake-economy-erdogan.html.

9 Michael Crowley and Edward Wong, “Biden Administration Faces Resistance to Plan to Sell F-16s to Turkey,” New 

York Times, January 13, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/13/us/politics/us-turkey-f16s.html. 

10 Nektaria Stamouli, “Turkey’s Anti-Erdogan Opposition Vows a Reset on EU and NATO,” Politico, March 15, 2023, 

https://www.politico.eu/article/turkey-anti-recep-tayyip-erdogan-opposition-reset-eu-nato/.

11 “NATO Secretary General Announces Dates for 2023 Vilnius Summit,” NATO, November 9, 2022, https://www.

nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_208802.htm.

12 Agnes Helou, “As Interest in Russia’s S-400 Wanes, Turkey Pushes Its Own Air Defense Systems,” Breaking 

Defense, March 24, 2023, https://breakingdefense.com/2023/03/as-interest-in-russias-s-400-wanes-turkeypushes-its-own-air-defense-systems/.

13 Reuters, “Turkey’s Unfinished Akkuyu Nuclear Plant Not Damaged by Quake,” February 6, 2023, https://www.

reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkeys-unfinished-akkuyu-nuclear-plant-not-damaged-by-quake-rosatomofficial-2023-02-06/.

20 T HE WAS HINGTON INS T I T U T E FOR NE A R E AS T P OL ICY 

CAGAPTAY TURKEY’S PIVOTAL 2023 ELECTIONS

14 “Turkey Blocks Transit of Goods Sanctioned by EU, U.S. to Russia,” Bloomberg, March 10, 2023, http://bit.

ly/3ZEfj3q.

15 Patricia Cohen, “Turkey Is Strengthening Its Energy Ties with Russia,” New York Times, December 9, 2022, https://

www.nytimes.com/2022/12/09/business/turkey-erdogan-energy-russia.html.

16 Suleiman Al-Khalidi, “Syria’s Assad Says He Won’t Meet Erdogan Until Turkey Ends Its ‘Occupation,’” Reuters, 

March 16, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syria-assad-says-he-wont-meet-erdogan-untilturkey-ends-its-occupation-2023-03-16/.

17 Lolita C. Baldor, “A Look at the U.S. Military Mission in Syria and Its Dangers,” Associated Press, March 24, 2023, 

https://apnews.com/article/syria-us-troops-drone-attack-6194dca97f594e3609914637463c4ce3.

18 Jonathan Spicer and Nevzat Devranoglu, “Foreign Investors Test Turkey’s Waters After Years in the Cold,” 

Reuters, March 24, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/foreign-investors-test-turkeys-watersafter-years-cold-2023-03-24/.

How Turkey Might Look After the Polls 

Soner Cagaptay 

The potential outcomes of Turkey’s May elections—a 

presidential-parliamentary sweep for the opposition, 

a sweep for Erdogan’s bloc, or a split decision—will 

lead Turkey in meaningfully different directions, both 

in the short and the long term. 

When it comes to Turkey’s foreign policy, an 

opposition triumph will prompt an Atlanticist turn, 

including on the Ukraine war, while an Erdogan win 

will cement the country’s existing transactional 

approach. Domestically, an opposition victory will 

revive adherence to the rule of law—the new government

 will release wrongfully jailed figures such as 

the HDP’s imprisoned leader, Selahattin Demirtas, 

and the philanthropist Osman Kavala, and lift restrictions

 on key freedoms covering media, assembly, and 

expression. Such a pivot will improve the country’s 

investment environment and invite large cash 

inflows, ironically resuscitating a dynamic from the 

early Erdogan years. Markets will likely rally, and the 

lira will eventually stabilize. 

An emphasis on democratic freedoms will warm 

relations with Turkey’s largest trade and investment 

partner—the European Union, a body Turkey seeks 

to join—while heralding short-term economic 

stability and growth. Ties with the United States will 

strengthen as well, given the opposition’s willingness 

to end the drama over the (Russia-supplied) S-400, 

even as differences will remain on other issues, such 

as U.S. support for the Syria-based Kurdish People’s 

Defense Units (YPG). Turkey’s deep economic bonds 

with Russia will likewise prevent it from aligning 

completely with U.S.-led economic sanctions targeting 

Moscow. 

In the case of an uncontested Erdogan win, the president

could conceivably ease his general crackdown 

on rights and liberties, even as he proceeds with his 

model of “stable autocracy.” One can expect an altogether

 harsher reality if the results are contested. On 

the economic front, Erdogan could embrace the more 

conventional economic policies that led to boom 

times during his first decade in power, recognizing 

the failure of his more recent reliance on unorthodox 

views. Even a reversion on economic policy would 

not entirely mitigate the negative effects of eroded 

rule of law and institutions and the associated 

damage to the national economy. Erdogan will therefore

 have to navigate continued instability, leaning 

on infusions from Russia and the Gulf monarchies 

to sustain the lira day-to-day. A key economic challenge 

for Turkey will be dealing with the exodus of 

educated middle- and upper-class citizens who have 

lost hope amid a sweep by Erdogan’s bloc. The cost 

in talent will be significant, stunting the country’s 

aspirations to become an advanced, wealthy society. 

In the short term, to summarize, Turkey will look 

more stable economically and politically in the 

event of an opposition win, and less so—especially 

economically—if Erdogan’s bloc wins both the presidency

 and parliament. But to understand long-term 

scenarios for the opposition Nation’s Alliance, or 

“Table of Six,” one needs to peruse Turkish political 

history, wherein no coalition government has ever 

finished its full term. Moreover, all thirteen coalition 

governments since the early 1970s have ended in 

both political and economic crisis. Given the ideologically 

disparate nature of the Nation’s Alliance, as 

well as its tenuous relationship with the HDP, political 

differences will almost inevitably surface among its 

component parties, undermining its resilience.

Moreover, proposed reforms, institutional restoration, 

and the establishment of checks and balances 

will likely be slowed by high-ranking Erdogan 

loyalists, while his media acolytes keep fanning 

polarization. A “Netanyahu outcome” could therefore 

eventually befall Turkey, with the opposition splintering

 and Erdogan allying with far-right groups to 

rebound in possible snap elections following political 

or economic crises. 

The Putin Factor

Russian president Vladimir Putin could insinuate 

himself into Turkish politics at various future events 

to help Erdogan. The Russian president’s overall goal 

would be to hinder a potential Atlanticist mandate 

for the opposition and either deny the opposition a 

victory or help bring Erdogan back to power. 

For starters, Putin could initiate new lump-sum financial

 transfers to Turkey, as he did in 2022, providing Erdogan 

with an economic lifeline. Putin may also 

interfere in Turkey’s elections, including by launching 

information operations—including fake news—to 

undermine opposition unity and manipulate social 

media to benefit third-party presidential candidates 

such as Muharrem Ince. The Russian leader here would 

aim to deny Kilicdaroglu an outright win on May 14, 

even if the latter somehow triumphs on May 28, aided 

by vote-switchers from Ince as well as abstentions. 

Faced with a Kilicdaroglu presidency, Putin may seek 

to catalyze economic troubles for Turkey through de 

facto embargos on trade and Russian tourist visits. 

Russia is Turkey’s number-one source of tourists, and 

a June boycott could cost the Turkish economy billions 

of dollars for the summer season. Should the opposition

 win, Putin also would likely demand immediate 

payment of Ankara’s delayed energy bills or even 

impose new higher prices on gas exports to Turkey, 

this time burdening the economy with hefty bills in 

winter. Such penalties could offset Turkey’s short-term 

financial gains from Western investment flows. 

Putin, furthermore, could delay further natural gas 

deliveries, undermining Ankara’s military positions in 

Libya, Syria, and the South Caucasus, where Russian 

troops and proxies oppose Turkish and Turkish-linked 

forces. Such moves, combined with economic troubles 

and coalition infighting, could render the opposition 

feeble and ineffective in the eyes of the Turkish 

electorate. Erdogan could then pitch his restoration as 

a return to stability and security.

Prospect of Split Government

While the path to presidential victory is direct—

crossing 50 percent for a candidate in the first round 

or, if no one does so, winning a two-person runoff 

on May 28—the route to a parliamentary triumph 

is quite convoluted, owing to a system of electoral 

alliances, as well as a 2022 change to the election law 

that favors Erdogan.

In 2022, Erdogan passed a new electoral law through 

the parliament,1 replacing an existing law that 

apportioned seats based on aggregate votes and 

favored stronger electoral alliances. Predicting that 

the opposition Nation’s Alliance would be stronger 

than his People’s Alliance, Erdogan supplanted the 

law with one that favors stronger parties—in this 

case, his own AKP. 

Accordingly, on May 14, Erdogan’s AKP, together 

with its allies, could win a legislative majority even 

if these parties collectively fail to reach 50 percent 

of the vote. If fact, some simulations show Erdogan’s 

bloc winning a majority with as little as 45 percent 

support thanks to the new electoral law.2

A split-government outcome in the May elections—

with Erdogan’s bloc winning the parliament and 

the opposition taking the presidency—appears to 

be the most likely scenario at the time of writing. 

This outcome could result in early elections as well, 

this time precipitated by an even quicker political 

crisis—triggered by the Erdogan majority bloc and 

Erdogan-appointed bureaucrats sabotaging reform 

efforts, with Putin playing the spoiler. Amid the 

ensuing government impasse, snap elections could 

be held within the next couple of years.

1 Didem Yilmaz, “The Effects of the Latest Modifications on Electoral Laws in Turkey,” Heinrich Boll Stiftung, 

September 13, 2022, https://tr.boell.org/en/2022/09/13/effects-latest-modifications-electoral-laws-turkey.

2 Nezi Onur Kuru (@NOnukuru), “If the new election law had been implemented in 2018, the number of 

MPs of the Nation’s Alliance would have decreased by 19 and the Cumhur [People’s Alliance] would have 

increased from 344 to 358. The people would get 59.7% of the Turkish Grand National Assembly with 53.7% 

of the votes” (in Turkish), post on Twitter, September 11, 2022, 5:51 a.m., https://twitter.com/NOnurkuru/

status/1568899969964277760.

NOTES

Conclusion: Defending the Vote and Turkish Democracy 

Soner Cagaptay 

Ultimately, Turkey’s nearly 61 million voters will 

determine the country’s future direction on May 

14, casting one ballot each for president and parliament—and possibly in a May 28 presidential runoff.1

The outcome of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s 

most serious challenge in twenty years will have 

long-term ramifications both within Turkey and 

outside its borders. For the United States, Turkey is 

an important NATO ally, including in the context of 

the Ukraine war. It also figures prominently in the 

alliance’s Nordic expansion and in the great power 

competition pitting Washington against Moscow, 

Beijing, and Tehran. Setting aside its milestone status 

since Turkey’s first free and fair vote in 1950, the 

contest could also be the most consequential on the 

world stage in 2023, given Turkey’s global role. 

A Longer Tradition of Free Elections 

than Spain

A peaceful election season, which as of now remains 

most likely, is important for Turkey’s stability. This 

hopeful prospect owes in part to Turkey’s deep 

democratic traditions—it has held elections longer 

than has Spain—and its record of generally smooth 

handovers. Finally, Turkey’s citizens have shown a 

love of voting. In the 2019 nationwide local elections, 

for example, turnout was at 86 percent.2 Citizens 

often return to polling places after they have voted to 

observe and assist the count. They are, in this sense, 

a safety valve for Turkish democracy. 

But Unfair Races of Late

Nevertheless, election campaigns in Turkey—

especially since the switch to an executive-style 

presidential system in 2018—have become increasingly unfair. 

This is because President Erdogan 

has expanded his grip over the media, courts, and 

independent bodies such as the national Supreme 

Election Council (YSK), thereby undermining their 

integrity. More and more, these institutions take 

their cue from him, endangering election security. 

The unfair climate actually predated the change to a 

presidential system. In 2014, for example, Erdogan’s 

candidate for Ankara mayor, Melih Gokcek, trailed 

his rival by 27,000 votes on election night, March 30, 

2014, only to be declared winner by 31,000 votes 

following an “overnight recount.”3 Five years later, 

on May 6, 2019, the YSK annulled the results of the 

March 2019 elections in Istanbul, which had delivered 

a loss to Erdogan’s party.4 Notably, YSK officials 

had remained mum for five weeks on the matter, only 

announcing their decision after Erdogan claimed the 

vote had been rigged.5

Some key bureaucrats, too, have started openly 

supporting the government, blurring the party

state distinction, as well as making state resources 

unfairly available to the Justice and Development 

Party (AKP) and its chair—none other than Erdogan 

himself. For instance, AKP officials frequently hold 

joint press conferences with governors—the top 

bureaucrats in Turkey’s eighty-one provinces—often 

at the governors’ offices, suggesting the steady but 

sad erosion of the party-state firewall.6 Together with 

Erdogan’s complete control of the police, a national 

force reporting to his interior minister, these dynamics 

will help Erdogan at the ballot box, while also 

providing his camp with a competitive advantage 

to potentially overpower the opposition bloc if the 

vote is contested or if the presidential race goes to a 

runoff on May 28. Another threat to the opposition 

has emerged lately in the third-party candidacy of 

populist CHP defector Muharrem Ince, who is getting 

outsize attention in pro-Erdogan media outlets and 

social media platforms and could, accordingly, pull 

enough votes from the CHP-led coalition to force a 

presidential runoff.7

Democratic Resilience and Likely a Free Vote

A broadly free vote could help counter the unsettling 

prospect of coercive AKP behavior. Moreover, 

elections in Turkey still matter as a source of legitimacy, 

including for President Erdogan’s base. The ultimate 

outcome of the 2019 Istanbul mayoral vote 

offers a case in point. In that race, Erdogan’s candidate-

Binali Yildirim—had fallen short by 13,000 votes 

to Republican People’s Party (CHP) candidate 

Ekrem Imamoglu in March, only to be trounced by 

800,000 votes in the June redo. The president had 

wrongly believed his sway over Turkey’s bureaucracy,,

institutions, and media would help him reverse the outcome. 

The huge margin for the CHP reflected many vote-switchers 

and participation by others who had stayed home for the 

initial vote. 

The message was clear: Even losers have to respect the 

outcome. Also bitter for Erdogan was Gokcek’s loss 

of the Ankara mayoralty—won in the rigged 2014 

contest—to Mansur Yavas. To emphasize its messaging on 

democracy, the opposition is running both Imamoglu and Yavas 

as vice presidential candidates this year. This is democracy, the party 

is proclaiming.

Embrace it.

In the forthcoming elections, large-scale rigging is 

unlikely. As in 2014 and 2019, however, Erdogan’s 

advisors could counsel refusing to recognize the 

outcome in narrowly contested districts—separated 

by perhaps 1–2 percent for president, or a seat or 

two for parliament—claiming fraud as they did for 

Istanbul in March 2019. Still stinging from that 

ultimate outcome, though, Erdogan may actually 

reject such a tack. Further, if election security were 

under threat, Turkey’s civil society could push back 

successfully to protect the country’s democracy, as it 

did four years ago in Istanbul.8

The Central Role of Information Flow

Even then, the U.S. government can take note of the 

following areas where Turkey’s citizens will work 

hardest to keep the vote free and the country stable.

Information flow to the OSCE mission. Turkey 

has a long tradition of transparent vote-counting, 

reinforced by a broad middle class and strong civil 

society groups focused on election monitoring and 

security. These civil society groups, which include 

Oy ve Otesi (Vote and Beyond), Turkiye Gonulluleri 

(Volunteers of Turkey), and Secim Guvenligi Platformu

(Platform for Election Security),9 have long worked 

with European bodies such as the Organization 

for Security and Cooperation (OSCE), which will be 

sending an election-monitoring mission to Turkey. 

Citizens will take the OSCE findings seriously, 

given Turkey’s historic relationship with Europe. 

For its part, Washington can help ensure the rapid 

flow of election results from Turkish civil society to 

the European body and from there to global audiences—and 

once again, vetted and emphatic, back to Turkey. 

Openness of social media platforms. Another way 

for pro-democracy actors to facilitate the free flow 

of information is by empowering responsible social 

media channels. In reaction to what is essentially 

a government monopoly on Turkish conventional 

media—with pro-Erdogan businesses controlling 

nearly 90 percent of such outlets—citizens have 

migrated to social media platforms in even larger 

numbers than the rest of the world. With at least 

18.6 million Turkish users on Twitter alone,10 for 

instance, Turkey is the world’s seventh-largest user 

of the service, vis-à-vis a global population ranking 

of eighteenth.11

Simply put, social media has become the media in 

Turkey. Erdogan’s response has been to impose 

blackouts, content bans, and—finally—access restrictions,

 as he did on February 8, only two days after the 

earthquakes, when he visited the country’s disaster-stricken 

provinces.12 To prevent criticism over the 

uncoordinated nature of earthquake relief efforts, the 

president’s advisors narrowed access bandwidth for 

Twitter, making communication over the platform all 

but impossible for hours. 

Turkey’s citizens are resourceful and have become 

technology savvy to bypass internet bans. The 

U.S. government, in turn, could consider working 

with social media platforms to devise strategies 

and technologies to ensure Ankara does not 

throttle social media access and hamper the flow 

of information. A Turkish social media law passed 

in 2020 forces global platforms to open offices in 

the country, exposing them to sanctions and fines, 

and their staff to imprisonment, if the firms fail to 

respond to government directives to ban or limit 

content.13 This will be Washington’s biggest hurdle 

as it encourages social media companies not to give 

in to censorship.

The Need for Common Transatlantic Messaging on 

Turkey’s Economic Ties to the West

To deliver its messaging on the Turkish elections 

most effectively, Washington should coordinate 

with its European allies. Notwithstanding Erdogan’s 

(partially) successful efforts to shift Turkey’s 

identity—at home, from secular to Islamic; internationally, 

from European to Middle Eastern—the country remains 

economically part of Europe and 

a customs union, and as a resource-poor country, 

Turkey needs Western financial inflows in order to 

grow.14 The EU alone furnishes around 70 percent 

of foreign direct investment in Turkey,15 and Turkey 

and the EU are part of each other’s supply chains, so 

entwined is their relationship. 

Erdogan would struggle to ignore a unified U.S.-

Europe message on election security and integrity, 

especially given its links to Turkey’s long-term 

economic prospects. To be sure, the president has 

embraced a transactional view of foreign policy 

and he may threaten retaliatory measures, such as 

further delaying Sweden’s NATO accession. In this 

regard, Britain—which is trusted by Erdogan and 

Turkey’s security elites, among other reasons, for 

having quickly reached out after the failed 2016 coup 

attempt—can play messenger and goodwill ambassador 

for the West. 

Possible Offer from the Opposition

In the unlikely scenario in which Erdogan signals his 

intent to reject the vote outcome, the opposition—to 

secure its own interests as well as a democratic 

transition—would almost certainly need to promise 

not to prosecute the president, his family members, 

or key figures in his administration. Recognizing the 

various pressures facing the opposition, including a 

fragile economy and possible snap elections that could 

conceivably return Erdogan to power (explained in the 

previous section, on Turkey’s outlook after the polls), 

Erdogan may take up this offer. 

Beware of Russian Meddling

If Britain is America’s best partner when it comes to 

Turkey policy, Russia is its worst adversary. By transferring 

significant funds to Turkey before the elections—

and helping boost Erdogan’s popularity—Russia’s 

President Vladimir Putin has already picked sides.16

As noted, Putin could potentially send more money, as 

well as engage in information operations aimed manipulating 

social media content and interfering in the 

elections. Putin’s likely motives to interfere in Turkey’s 

democratic process will spike if the presidential 

vote goes to a runoff. An Erdogan win would give the 

Russian president cause for hope as the war in Ukraine 

drags on with little for him to celebrate.

Behold Turkey’s Democratic Memory

None of the mechanisms suggested here to defend 

the vote in Turkey could work were it not for the 

country’s resilient democratic tradition. This could 

be reason for optimism as Turkish voters prepare to 

go to the polls in May. If a core lesson of America’s 

interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan is that it takes 

much time and effort to build a democracy, then the 

Erdogan era dictates that tearing down a democracy 

also requires a lot of work. Free elections in Turkey 

still matter, and the vote in May will likely be free and 

peaceful. Less certain is what future elections will 

look like if Erdogan wins. 

NOTES

1 “Nearly 61 Million Electorates [sic] to Cast Votes in May 14 Polls,” Hurriyet Daily News, March 24, 2023, https://

www.hurriyetdailynews.com/nearly-61-million-electorates-to-cast-votes-in-may-14-polls-181855.

2 Although voting in Turkey is, in fact, compulsory, no enforcement occurs and anyway entails a small cash 

payment—about US$5, as of 2019. Voter participation is therefore regarded as being driven by a desire to 

participate; for the 86 percent figure, see Sebnem Gumuscu, “In Turkey, the Latest Elections Had Over 80 

Percent Turnout. Here’s Why,” Monkey Cage (blog), Washington Post, June 30, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.

com/politics/2019/06/30/turkey-latest-elections-had-over-percent-voter-turnout-heres-why/.

3 For details on the finish, see Firat Kozok, “24-Hour Scandal in Ankara” (in Turkish), Cumhuriyet, April 1, 2014, 

https://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/ankarada-24-saatlik-skandal-56167; Oguz Demir, “In the Breathtaking 

Ankara Race, Both Candidates Claim Victory” (in Turkish), Hurriyet, March 31, 2014, https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/

gundem/ankara-yarisi-nefes-kesti-iki-aday-da-kazandim-dedi-26122247; “Gokcek Gets Mandate” (in Turkish), 

Sozcu, April 5, 2014, https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2014/gundem/gokcek-mazbata-aliyor-481804/; “How Many Votes 

Did Parties Receive in Ankara in the 2014 Local Elections” (in Turkish), T24, November 27, 2018, https://t24.

com.tr/haber/2014-yerel-secimlerinde-ankarada-hangi-parti-ne-kadar-oy-almisti,758006.

4 Zia Weise, “Turkish Authorities Cancel Istanbul Mayoral Election,” Politico, May 6, 2019, https://www.politico.eu/

article/turkish-authorities-cancel-istanbul-mayoral-election/.

5 Weise, “Turkish Authorities Cancel,” https://www.politico.eu/article/turkish-authorities-cancel-istanbul-mayoralelection/; Bethan McKernan, “Erdogan’s AKP Party Seeks Rerun of Istanbul Mayoral Election,” Guardian, April 

9, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/apr/09/turkey-erdogan-akp-party-seeks-rerun-of-istanbulmayoral-election.

26 T HE WAS HINGTON INS T I T U T E FOR NE A R E AS T P OL ICY 

CAGAPTAY TURKEY’S PIVOTAL 2023 ELECTIONS

6 “Governor, Refusing to See Imamoglu, Hews to AKP’s Side” (in Turkish), Sozcu, March 12, 2022, https://www.

sozcu.com.tr/2022/gundem/imamogluna-randevu-vermeyen-vali-akplilerin-yanindan-ayrilmiyor-7005284/.

7 Orhan Coskun and Daren Butler, “Breakaway Candidate Could Give Erdogan a Lifeline in Tight Turkey Election,” 

Reuters, April 4, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/breakaway-candidate-could-give-erdoganlifeline-tight-turkey-election-2023-04-04/. 

8 See, e.g., “A Black Mark in Our History of Democracy and Law,” statement by forty-nine bar associations, Bianet 

English, May 9, 2019, https://bianet.org/english/politics/208325-a-black-mark-in-our-history-of-democracyand-law.

9 For Oy ve Otesi, see https://oyveotesi.org/; for Turkiye Gonulluleri, https://turkiyegonulluleri.org/; for Secim 

Guvenligi, https://secimguvenligi.org/.

10 “Twitter Statistics and Trends,” Data Reportal, https://datareportal.com/essential-twitter-stats. 

11 “Population, Total,” World Bank, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?most_recent_value_

desc=true.

12 Reuters, “Twitter Restricted in Turkey Two Days After Quake, Says NetBlocks,” February 8, 2023, https://www.

reuters.com/business/media-telecom/twitter-restricted-turkey-netblocks-2023-02-08/.

13 Sude Akgundogdu, Turkish Backlash: How Street Interviews Spread Anti–Syrian Refugee Sentiment (Washington DC: 

Washington Institute, 2023), https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/turkish-backlash-how-streetinterviews-spread-anti-syrian-refugee-sentiment.

14 Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Customs Union,” November 15, 2022, https://www.ab.gov.tr/customsunion_46234_en.html.

15 Presidency of the Republic of Turkiye Investment Office, “2021 Foreign Direct Investments in Turkiye,” https://

www.invest.gov.tr/en/library/publications/lists/investpublications/foreign-direct-investments-in-turkiye-2021.

pdf.

16 “Russia Transfers Billions of Dollars to Turkey for $20B Nuclear Plants,” Daily Sabah, July 29, 2022, https://www.

dailysabah.com/business/energy/russia-transfers-billions-of-dollars-to-turkey-for-20b-nuclear-plant.

AFTERWORD AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I edited this set of essays over March and April 2023 with the aim of understanding the complex drivers that will determine 

the outcome of the vote in Turkey, from an unfair campaign season to a likely free vote on May 14, along with potentially 

consequential changes such as the entry of Muharrem Ince and the seemingly obscure role of actors like the Free Cause 

Party (HUDA-PAR). The political scene is very dynamic in Turkey, and future developments could foil the various predictions offered here. Whatever happens from now on, I hope these essays offer a useful snapshot of Turkey at this moment 

of political uncertainty. I’d like to thank all my contributors for their deft analysis as well as editors Jason Warshof and 

Miriam Himmelfarb and research assistant Sude Akgundogdu. Final thanks go to designer Daniel Kohan.

—Soner Cagaptay, April 2023