Why Russian Sanctions Won’t Stop Putin A former head of NATO’s armed forces, Gen. Philip Breedlove, makes the case for what will stop the war instead.(NYT)

Why Russian Sanctions Won’t Stop Putin

A former head of NATO’s armed forces, Gen. Philip Breedlove, makes the case for what will stop the war instead.

Wednesday, April 6th, 2022

Jane Coaston

Today on “The Argument,” former Supreme Allied Commander of NATO, General Philip Breedlove.

General Breedlove, thank you so much for joining me.

Philip Breedlove

Jane, thanks for having me this morning. I look forward to our conversation.

Jane Coaston

So we are in the sixth week of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. And though Moscow has retreated from Kyiv, it hasn’t stopped its attacks on several cities. There are now calls to investigate apparent war crimes committed by Russia. This is based on photos of dead, unarmed civilians, and a mass grave in Bucha, which is a suburb of Kyiv. Poland’s prime minister has called the killings “acts of genocide,” and the findings have triggered renewed calls for harsher sanctions.

Of course, the Kremlin has said the photos are fake. So I wanted to hear from you about what the U.S. and what NATO should be doing at this point, because in addition to being Supreme Allied Commander of NATO, you’ve served as the commander of U.S. Air Forces in Europe and Vice Chief of Staff of the US Air Force, among many other distinguished military positions. But for people who don’t know what a Supreme Allied Commander in Europe is, will you briefly explain what your role was at NATO?

Philip Breedlove

Sure, so the SACEUR, as we say it — Supreme Allied Commander, Europe — this is a position always held by an American, and it is nominated from America to NATO to approve. And it is the commander of the military forces of NATO. And that is all their forces that are out in the world, doing mission, as well as leading, then, those that are in garrison providing. And while it sounds really cool, it’s really about leading the NATO alliance to do the things that it needs to do for its military.

Jane Coaston

So I want to briefly walk through a few of the major news events that have to do with what’s taking place in Ukraine to get your read on them. I just saw a report from the Associated Press that President Biden has called for a war crimes trial against Vladimir Putin, and said that he’s seeking more sanctions after reported atrocities. And based on what we saw in Bucha, based on those apparent atrocities, I think that there is a fear right now that as Russian troops withdraw from other cities, we are going to see more atrocities committed against civilians, or other mass gravesites. But what was your reaction to those revelations, to those images?

Philip Breedlove

Well, they don’t surprise me. Remember what Russia did in Grozny, and when they were fighting the Chechens, and remember what Russia has been doing in Mariupol, on the south. It’s horrid. And now we are just seeing more of it in the North. And both in Irpin and Bucha, there are atrocities that we haven’t discovered yet. More and more will come out, I’m sure.

And I think that the world has to hold not only Putin responsible, but I think it’s time that we look at the named units that were in Bucha and Irpin, and we hold the commanders of those units responsible, because it is their direct tactical authority under which these things have happened. And so we need to cast this net wide, for all of those in the chain of command who’ve allowed their troops to create all these atrocities.

Jane Coaston

What does that look like? How do we hold Putin responsible? How do we hold commanders of units responsible?

Philip Breedlove

Well, as you know, there are war crimes trials. There is the International Criminal Court. There is the Hague. There are many ways that we’ll work at this. But don’t be fooled, it’s going to be really hard to hold the sitting leader of a nation responsible. But that should not deter us. We need to go after Mr. Putin for the overall conduct of this war to this point. But what I was trying to bring up is that individual commanders in the chain of command of those units, which, we know the units that were in there. We need to go after them and hold them accountable, because they are directly, as a commander, responsible for the conduct of their troops.

Jane Coaston

Russia and Ukraine have attempted peace talks, to be clear. And last week, we saw some interesting possible concessions, including a 15 year negotiating process for Crimea, the peninsula that Russia seized in 2014, and Ukraine agreeing not to join NATO. Now, I am very pessimistic about the results of those peace talks, because I don’t know how much those negotiations will actually affect what Russia does next, or if those negotiations have anything to do with what Russia wants to do. How hopeful are you about those peace talks?

Philip Breedlove

I’m right with you. And it’s for a wealth of reasons. And probably, for me, the most important reason is that while there has been some agreement around the edges, the tough stuff in the center, there has been no progress on. Russia is going to try to hang on to the new lands that they have invaded, and President Zelensky has said those are not on the table. You know, he is right now saying we have to go back to the pre-war phase, which is Crimea, and the two half provinces in the Donbass being in Russian hands.

And that’s the only thing he will accept. And so right now, the big things are at an impasse. And so like you, I don’t hold out a lot of hope right now. And I think what’s going on to some degree on the battlefield is both sides are trying to better their bargaining position so that they can get to where they need to be in this business.

Jane Coaston

If Ukraine commits to not joining the NATO alliance but does become a neutral territory, what are the implications for Ukraine? What does that mean?

Philip Breedlove

Well, first of all, if in fact, President Zelensky wants to do that for his people, I want it to be his decision. What would be really bad is if he is accepting that position based on pressure from other Western nations that want this war to be over with whatever result. Secondarily, if Ukraine accepts that it will not become a part of NATO, then that’s their sovereign decision. It doesn’t mean that they can’t become a part of the European Union. It doesn’t mean that they can’t associate themselves with the West in a business sense and in a values sense. And that’s what I would hope for Ukraine, because they have done so much. Yes, there’s still more to do, but they have done a lot in bringing themselves toward the west in the last eight years.

Jane Coaston

But if Ukraine has asked for security guarantees, would that mean that NATO would need to defend Ukraine’s sovereignty? And if NATO is defending Ukraine’s neutrality, how is that different from essentially invoking Article V of the alliance, where a NATO member country must come to the defense of member countries? Does that make sense?

Philip Breedlove

It does. But I think the premise of your question is not good, because I haven’t heard that Ukraine is seeking these guarantees from NATO. In fact, I’ve heard exactly the different. Ukraine is disappointed in NATO, completely, because they have not come to Ukraine’s defense in many ways. And so what I hear is Ukraine is seeking a coalition of nations, not NATO, that would be the guarantors of their security. And center to all of that is the United States, because they know that nothing else is going to hold this together unless the United States is a part of it.

So rather, it is four or five of the big, old Western NATO nations and the United States.

Jane Coaston

So it’s a non-NATO NATO.

Philip Breedlove

It’s a coalition of the willing inside of NATO, that’s correct.

Jane Coaston

OK what is your read on Putin overall? How has he changed in your view, since you had to deal with him? Or has he at all? Is this strategic shifts, where in the early 2000s, he was saying nice things about liberalism and the rule of law, and now he is this very different entity who is longing for the return of imperial Russia and honoring Alexander III. Has there been a change, or is this all strategic?

Philip Breedlove

I don’t believe there’s been a change. I don’t know if you’re familiar with the Russian word maskirovka. Maskirovka is the art of masking your real intentions, but I believe all of these overtures to the West during the time that Russia was at its weakest were all maskirovka, as Russia has continually been building to and moving toward what they’re doing now. Now, I do believe — and this is not conspiracy theory, but I do believe that Mr. Putin sees a window of opportunity that will dwindle.

There are so many factors working against Russia right now, from their internal demographics, to their economics, et cetera, et cetera. And I think Mr. Putin is being now spurred on to tougher action because he sees maybe that his window of ability to effect the kind of change that would make him a great czar again, he probably sees this window as dwindling.

Jane Coaston

So to me, looking at what the Russian military has attempted to do, they have not been successful in the aims that were put forward a couple of weeks ago. But my colleague, Bret Stephens, made a counterargument that Putin did not miscalculate, that he didn’t intend to conquer all of Ukraine, that his goal was to secure Russian energy dominance, not unite parts of the Soviet Union. What’s your take?

Philip Breedlove

So I read Bret’s article just this morning, and it’s an interesting, well-written article. I just don’t subscribe to it. If you look at what has happened to the Russian military, it’s unthinkable to me that I would throw my military into a buzzsaw, get it all chewed up, and many of my best soldiers killed all as a ruse to try to better position myself geostrategically. I think it’s crazy.

Jane Coaston

One generally doesn’t try to lose that many tanks on purpose.

Philip Breedlove

Tanks and people. And depending on who you believe, and I don’t believe some of the huge numbers — but even if you believe the lower numbers now, that is going to be a problem for him in a huge way at home, when the people at home begin to think that. So while Bret, I think, did a good job of writing an article, I just don’t agree at all with his premise.

Jane Coaston

You mentioned the Russian military and Russian military lack of success. Do you think that Putin really did — or perhaps more importantly, the Russian military really bought into Russian propaganda about what they would experience in Ukraine, that they would be greeted as liberators, particularly outside of those Eastern regions which are more Russia affiliated, I guess. But you saw that some of the propaganda efforts, where they really believe that this was — like, this was a Civil War.

It wasn’t even a different country. Do you think they really bought into that?

Philip Breedlove

Well, I think history will judge it all, and we’ll probably have better hindsight in five years or so. But the fact of the matter is, I think it’s a mixed bag. There are hardline Russian commanders and what they call the contract troops that are a longtime part of the Russian military. I don’t think they were fooled in what was going on. I think they followed orders and they went in there, and they probably expected to have an easier time of it than they did.

There are absolutely portions of this Russian army that did not know they were going to war. And that’s why you have seen — and there is so much reporting that it’s hard to believe that there’s not some truth there, of all of the defections and all of the business that was going on with this force, and still goes on with this force when they won’t fight and so forth. The real, I think, interesting question here is where and how deep this belief was at the top that this was going to happen quick, easy and we’re going to be welcomed with roses.

Because that’s the kind of war they planned. Here is something that I will not be the source on. I am reporting other people’s reporting, but it appears that there was several units in this invasion force that had their dress uniforms with them, because they were going to participate in the parade that would be happening shortly after the invasion. And so I think that there is going to be some great papers written after this war.

In war, there’s a lot of things you want to do. And in planning war, there’s a lot of things you want to do. The list is — there’s a list. But a couple of those things are, one, deter your enemy and not allow yourself to be deterred. Two is seize the initiative, and don’t let the enemy take the initiative away from you. We are zero for two in that respect.

Jane Coaston

But we’re not at war with Russia. Is it worth saying that?

Philip Breedlove

I think we are in a proxy war with Russia. We are using the Ukrainians as our proxy forces.

Jane Coaston

Can a proxy war stay a proxy war?

Philip Breedlove

I assume that that’s our current plan. So I think the answer is yes. Now, if the atrocities continue to be unveiled, at what point do the conditions change? The NAC, the North Atlantic Council, and NATO had an emergency meeting this morning. My guess is that was all about what we saw in Irpin and Bucha. And somebody’s got to be held responsible for that. You asked me a question, can this go on? I think it can, if the nations continue to choose to allow Russia to do as it wills on the battlefield without consequence. I guess it can go on.

Jane Coaston

Thinking back to the Crimean invasion, you were Supreme Allied Commander of NATO at the time. Do you look back on that time and think there were missteps, or things you would change, things that you would assess differently about Russian threats that we should have learned from but didn’t?

Philip Breedlove

Well, this is going to sound pretty smug. I’m not sure that we missed what was going on. But I do believe that we did not react appropriately to what was going on. I’ve been in the press, and said more than once that when Russia invaded Georgia in 2008, the West’s response was inadequate to task. And that’s part of the reason why we ended up on the border of Ukraine when they invaded Crimea.

And the West’s response to Crimea and Donbass was inadequate to task. And that’s why we find ourselves here again. And I’m pretty critical about this, because in the West when we deal with Putin, it’s almost always completely in sanctions — sanctions, additional sanctions, wider sanctions, special sanctions, extra special sanctions, magnificent, incredible sanctions. OK, and sanctions have never changed Mr. Putin’s actions.

Sanctions have hurt Russia. They’ve hurt the Russian people. They’ve hurt the Russian economy, but they have never changed Mr. Putin’s actions. And that’s the measure of merit. And so I think the biggest learning that we didn’t do after ‘08, and we didn’t do after ‘14, and we didn’t do correctly in this battle, because we were trying to deter him before he invaded. And he looked — we told him what we were going to do. Our seniormost leadership said, we’ve explained it to him. And he knows what’s going to happen. He took a look at what we were going to do. He said, I’m good, and I go. And he invaded again. So my biggest learning point is we’re going to have to do more than sanctions to change Mr. Putin’s behavior.

Jane Coaston

But if not sanctions, what does Putin respond to?

Philip Breedlove

He responds to force.

Jane Coaston

What about energy sanctions —

Philip Breedlove

To force, to metal. We say — you won’t know the word, but we say Tritonal and steel. Tritonal is the most used explosive in bombs and things. And so we say what Mr. Putin responds to is force.

Jane Coaston

What does force look like to you?

Philip Breedlove

Well, why don’t we think about some options we could have used in this war? There were people like me and others talking about no-fly zones before the invasion. And if we had put up a no-fly zone before the invasion, maybe it would have changed his decision. Once we lose the initiative, which we did, and he invades, and now he has the initiative, then it makes your options tougher and smaller.

So if we had been more forceful — before, again, before the invasion — maybe we would not have had this invasion. Who will ever know, because we didn’t take the option. We chose a very passive form of deterrence. And that passive deterrence did not work.

Jane Coaston

I think, though, that the passive deterrence is because — I think that when you’re talking about a no fly zone now, there is a concern that is how you start World War III. But is there a way we can get the initiative back, or is it just gone now?

Philip Breedlove

Well as long as we are deterred like we are now, this whole World War III, it’s going to cause that or it’s going to cause nukes, has us completely deterred. I think actually, though, NATO’s started down this path a little bit after the last meeting that the president was over — at NATO, the emergency session, when they were asked about what happens if WMD, weapons of mass destruction, are used — chem, bio, nukes.

NATO said, we said, and some of the biggest leaders of Western nations all said, if WMD is used, there will be a more forceful response. I think that fell short of drawing a red line, which is good, because in the West, we’re famous for backing up from our red lines. But I think what it did was introduce a little concern into Mr. Putin about what we were willing to do, and it sent the message that if you use these WMD, there will be a more forceful response. In other words, the character of the war will change.

Jane Coaston

I think the conversations about World War III — I understand that that can sound excessive, but I think that those concerns are for many people very real, about what that looks like, and especially with what Putin threatens. How do we get the upper hand, then?

Philip Breedlove

So then, Jane, we go through the rest of history, with Russia  invading another country and threatening nukes. Is that what we’re to sign up to? If Mr. Putin gets the signal that all he has to do is threaten us with World War III and nukes, then what’s to stop him from Moldova and Georgia next?

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Jane Coaston

So I want to ask a little bit about the siege of Mariupol, which is a southern port city in Ukraine. It’s an important area to Putin because it would create a land bridge between Donbass and the previously annexed Crimea region — also, because Putin has decided it’s important. According to the mayor, nearly 5,000 people have been killed. Thousands more are trapped. The Red Cross is still trying to get people out. So I want to ask you about the idea of humanitarian air corridors, because you co-wrote a piece with the title, “It’s Time For Protected Humanitarian Airlift into Lviv.” Would you explain and describe what that should look like?

Philip Breedlove

So first of all, what has happened to that town, the just absolute, physical destruction of that town is a war crime all by itself, never mind the fact that he’s bombed a hospital. We’ve already stopped talking about the bombing of the maternity hospital. So what has happened in Mariupol is just horrid. But it is an example of what’s happening all over Ukraine. So there are those who are crying for a number of things — establishing humanitarian corridors, which I support.

Some are calling for a humanitarian airlift, like the Berlin airlift, where we went — flew in deep into enemy territory and took supplies in there. And then others are calling for a no-fly — a humanitarian no-fly over those options. Once the war starts, putting in a no-fly is an absolute act of war, but a humanitarian no-fly is very different. This is constructed with rules of engagement. And the way that works is, we actually tell the enemy we’re going to do this, just like we did in Georgia, which helped stop the fighting in Georgia.

We’re going to come in there and we’re bringing in aid. You’re willing to inspect it. We’re willing to let you inspect it, whatever you want. But we’re bringing in aid, and we’re going to take out those who need help. And this is when we’re doing it, and this is when we’re coming. And we tell them, like we have in the past, we will not fire on you unless you fire on us, or you fire on those that we are protecting.

If those two happen, then we will defend those that we’re there to protect.

Jane Coaston

But doesn’t that require a show of good faith by Putin and the Russian military that we cannot rely on at all?

Philip Breedlove

I’m not sure that it’s good faith, but a certain amount of acceptance. And you’re right, there is risk here. And I think that’s what’s missing in today’s conversation writ large over a bunch of subjects. We’re not talking about what is acceptable risk. There are people in our government and people in NATO that believe if we keep doing nothing and we just keep doing what we’re doing, supplying them, that the risk will not grow.

I’m here to tell you the risk is growing every day that Mr. Putin’s army underperforms, and he gets more and more concerned and worried about how he’s going to have to answer for how his army is performing, and when he has to answer for all of the young men who are not coming home. The risk is going up every day. And so we just need to have an adult, non-emotional, educated discussion of risk.

Jane Coaston

Let me ask you, too, about President Biden’s recent rhetoric. He said that Putin couldn’t remain in power. And afterward, he clarified that he was not articulating a policy change and wants to avoid a larger war with Russia, which I think is the undercurrent of everything that’s happening right now with regard to what you were just saying about risk. And he said that his statement was an expression of moral outrage. What did it say to you?

Philip Breedlove

Well, I’m sorry, Jane. I have remained all my life an apolitical person, so I try to stay out of what I think are distinctly political things. So if I could answer maybe a little different question, I have the same moral outrage. I’m surprised that the rest of the world doesn’t have moral outrage about what’s going on. And now, we see these incredibly horrible pictures in Bucha and Irpin, and I don’t know what it’s going to take for the West to look at this and say, enough is enough.

And so what — I don’t want to grade the president’s paper. That’s not my job. I will tell you that I am morally outraged at what’s going on in Ukraine.

Jane Coaston

But I think the U.S. has been encouraging allies — I know sanctions are not your favorite thing, but the U.S. has been encouraging allies to press for harder sanctions. That’s not nothing. And I do think that there is very real concern about what escalation could mean, that saying that it is a moral scourge, it is a moral outrage — and then there’s the implied, and we should do something about it.

But what if the doing something about it is terrifying? What does that mean for NATO and for American troops?

Philip Breedlove

I think that our risk is going up every day right now. Mr. Putin — you know that there’s a troop rotation coming up, where the conscripts from last year are supposed to go home. It starts in about a month, and the new conscripts are supposed to come on. A lot of conscripts went to Ukraine and died, and he’s going to have to answer for that — and every day, as that number goes up and up and up, how many thousands of soldiers are not going to come home.

And so our risk is going up every day. I understand your concern. Listen, I have five children, three of them born to me, and two sons-in-law, married in. All five of them are either in the military or work for the military. I still have skin in the game. I don’t want to fight Russia. But the fact of the matter is if Russia is convinced that the West is completely deterred, it’s not going to get better. I’ve said this before, and I was asked not to say it, but I’m going to anyway, because they think I’m comparing Mr. Putin to a two-year-old, and that’s not the intent.

But if you’ve ever raised a two-year-old, here’s what you know. If you allow bad behavior to stand, you’re going to get more bad behavior. If you encourage, or if you don’t cease bad behavior, or you reward bad behavior, which is what we’re at risk of doing now with Mr. Putin, you’re going to get more bad behavior. So how do we change this dynamic? Mr. Putin, right now, has us almost completely deterred.

And if we allow that deterrence to stand, or if we worse yet, reward it with more territory in Ukraine or whatever, then guess what we’re going to get again in a couple of years? More bad behavior.

Jane Coaston

I think my final set of questions for you is about the outlook for NATO and what this war portends for future geopolitics. As you just said, this could hypothetically keep going. We’re seeing NATO alliance countries that are taking on new and I think kind of unexpected roles. You’ve seen French President Emmanuel Macron has held regular meetings with Zelensky and attempted to bridge relations to Russia.

Germany has sent weapons to Ukraine in a dramatic break with past policy, for anyone who’s followed German politics since the early 1990s. I think the party line that everyone is saying is that NATO is stronger than ever, but are there hairline cracks and tensions in the alliance, especially, as you said, as the risk keeps increasing, and as people, I think, have this back and forth about what further engagement means?

Philip Breedlove

Yeah, so the good news and the bad news — the good news, and you have to qualify it, because this horrible war has resulted in, I do believe, NATO being closer than it’s been for a long time. But the bottom line is, Mr. Putin, this is a place where we are not rewarding bad behavior. Mr. Putin is getting exactly what he did not want, and this is good steps to start working. But that was limited to NATO, so that’s good, but it doesn’t help Ukraine.

Now, to your point about cracks, there’s always been cracks in NATO. And Mr. Putin and Russia has always tried to get in on those cracks and expand them. But remember that the cracks in the past have been pretty tough. We got thrown out of one of the NATO nations. I think you remember, we got thrown out of France. And that’s when our headquarters landed in Mons and Brussels, when we were pitched out.

So NATO has survived tough business. And it survives because it has enemies like Russia that keep us focused. And I think that right now, Mr. Putin has made a colossal mistake in that he has refocused NATO.

Jane Coaston

There are some who have argued that NATO’s expansion is part of what drove the war here. Fiona Hill wrote in a Times guest essay that she was part of a 2008 team that warned George W. Bush that announcing Ukraine and Georgia would eventually join NATO would likely provoke Putin. And as she writes, ultimately, our warnings weren’t heeded.

And I think that I’m of two minds there, because on the one hand, it seems as if — if NATO expansion drives forward, that kind of gives it a reason to join NATO. I understand that, but I’m curious as to your thoughts about whether NATO’s actions or appearance of actions got us to where we are now.

Philip Breedlove

So I really respect Fiona and what she says and what she writes, and there’s a certain amount of truth, that maybe that early announcement about Georgia and Ukraine was not helpful. I don’t want to grade those papers. But here’s what I would love to grade, this business of Russia believing that they were promised that NATO would not go eastward. I’ve talked to people that were in the room, and they say that was not promised.

That was — have you ever been to a meeting where different people walked out of the meeting with completely different conclusions? I think that’s what we have there, because people I trust said that was never promised. And here’s the second thing. I will only speak to my personal experience, because I can’t speak for others. I watched for three years the process of trying to bring people into NATO. And for three years, I saw how hard it was to get into NATO.

And so the meetings — when NATO comes together, they’re very scripted. But they always have this dinner where it’s completely unscripted, and people are really letting their feelings out. It’s smaller audience, no journalists, et cetera. And in those meetings, they almost always talked about the open door policy, and nobody was ever advancing in the open door policy.

A very prominent European female who was in the meeting, representing her country, she once got so angry — she said, well, if the beeping door is open, somebody’s going to beeping walk through it. And it reflected how hard it is for a nation to get into NATO. NATO has never gone out and said, I want those, and I want those, because that’ll really piss off Putin.

No, what happens is nations, most of them who have been subjugated — some of them twice — by Russia, were fighting to get in. And now, I personally can only speak to what I saw, but I saw how hard it was for a nation to get into NATO. And so I get pretty incensed if you can’t tell when people talk about the expansion of NATO caused all this. Nations want to get into NATO.

Jane Coaston

I just want to be clear, because I don’t think it’s been reported this way. You’re saying that people in those 2008 meetings did not believe Ukraine had been promised they would one day join NATO.

Philip Breedlove

No, no, no. I do believe that, there may have been those promises. There were those promises, I believe that. I was talking about the assurance that NATO wasn’t going to grow to the Russians. The Russians are always saying they were promised that NATO wouldn’t grow. That’s not what people in those meetings have told me.

Jane Coaston

You must have simulations running in your head of what can happen next, as you’ve been talking about the risk calculus. What is the most likely scenario to you for how this war ends?

Philip Breedlove

Right now, I don’t see either side being able to win in a traditional sense. And I don’t see either side actually losing in a traditional sense. Even if Mr. Putin was to now take the right one third of Ukraine, as some are surmising is his current set of goals. Even if he did that, how are you going to classify what has happened to his army as a win? And so I don’t see a traditional win for Russia at this point.

And Ukraine, as long as they’re fighting alone on the battlefield, it’s going to be really hard for them to have a traditional win and totally defeat the Russian army, because there’s so much more Russian army that can still be brought to the problem from places around the world. And so I don’t see this ending in a traditional way. I think what’s going to happen is we’re going to fight for a while. And the two sides are going to try to make their bargaining position better by battlefield gains.

And I believe there will be a settlement that is struck, and it will be struck by the side that begins to wither first in the face of this great battle. And here’s what I have seen on the battlefield so far. Russia really did believe this was going to be quick and easy, and Ukraine has handed them a defeat, strategically, in that sense. But the real battle is yet to be fought, and that is who will last the longest and be able to strike the best deal at the bargaining table.

And the only thing that will change that dynamic is if the West determines that they are no longer deterred and they begin to contribute to this fight. And I just wonder how many more Bucha and how many more Irpin disasters are going to have to happen before the West begins to think about those options?

Jane Coaston

General Philip Breedlove, former Supreme Allied Commander Europe of NATO, and currently the distinguished Chair of the Frontier Europe Initiative of the Middle East Institute, thank you so much for your time.

Philip Breedlove

It’s been a really good conversation, Jane. And I appreciate it.

[MUSIC PLAYING]

Jane Coaston

“The Argument” is a production of New York Times Opinion. It’s produced by Phoebe Lett, Elisa Gutierrez and Vishakha Darbha. Edited by Alison Bruzek and Anabel Bacon; original music by Isaac Jones and Pat McCusker. Mixing by Pat McCusker. Fact checking by Kate Sinclair, Mary Marge Locker, Michelle Harris and Kristin Lin. Audience strategy by Shannon Busta, with editorial support from Kristina Samulewski. Our executive producer is Irene Noguchi.