Pakistan’s Political Crisis Is Masking a Foreign Policy Realignment

 

Pakistan’s Political Crisis Is Masking a Foreign Policy Realignment

Arif Rafiq Wednesday, April 6, 2022

Addressing a security forum in Islamabad on Saturday, Pakistan’s army chief of staff, Gen. Qamar Javed Bajwa, condemned Russia’s war in Ukraine in no uncertain terms, describing it as an “invasion” and “aggression against a smaller country that cannot be condoned.”

These statements would be uncontroversial had they not contradicted the official position of Pakistan’s civilian government, which is in the midst of a political crisis that also involves the army. Indeed, Pakistan’s ongoing political turmoil—which has seen Prime Minister Imran Khan avoid a vote of no confidence through questionable parliamentary maneuvers, as his coalition and party fracture amid pressure from the opposition—is as much about foreign policy as it is about domestic politics.

On Feb. 24, Imran Khan became the first Pakistani prime minister in almost 23 years to make a state visit to Russia, hoping to finalize an agreement over a vital gas pipeline project that has been years in the making. The timing, though, was momentous for another reason: Earlier that day, Russian President Vladimir Putin had announced the start of the invasion of Ukraine. Days later, Pakistan—along with China, India and dozens of other countries—abstained from voting on the United Nations General Assembly resolution condemning the Russian invasion.

Both Khan’s visit and Pakistan’s U.N. abstention were roundly criticized within Pakistan and outside the country. Many saw the meeting with Putin, in particular, as ill-advised, because of how it could be viewed as an endorsement of the invasion of Ukraine. Some Pakistani commentators, including one journalist often considered to be an informal mouthpiece for the army leadership, alleged that Khan was trying to join an “anti-Western” China-Russia bloc.

In Pakistan, which has been ruled by military dictatorships for roughly half the country’s history, the armed forces play a prominent political role, even when civilian governments are in power. The army backed Khan when he ran for prime minister in 2018 and is widely believed to have played a critical role in helping to secure his victory.

Now, however, that support appears to be waning. Bajwa ceased backing Khan’s government earlier this year, and there has been speculation that the army did not approve of his visit to Moscow, especially amid its efforts to improve relations with the United States. Khan rejected these claims in a national address last Thursday, stating that he only made the trip after consultation with the army and diplomatic corps.

But Bajwa’s statement at the Islamabad security conference amounts to a repudiation of the elected leadership’s policy of neutrality, timed just the day before Khan was to face a vote of no confidence.

In his own address to the Islamabad security forum on Saturday, Khan emphasized Pakistan’s need for self-reliance and highlighted the negative effects of Pakistan’s past cooperation with the U.S., claiming that Pakistan’s elite had sold the country out to Washington in exchange for aid and protection of their ill-gotten wealth, causing great economic damage and tremendous loss of life. He conspicuously made no mention of any positive aspects of previous periods of partnership between the two countries.

The simultaneous tilt toward the U.S. by both Pakistan’s army and the political opposition indicates that the military leadership is seeking a combined political and geopolitical realignment.

In contrast, Bajwa presented the U.S.-Pakistan relationship in a more positive light, stating that the two countries “have a long and excellent strategic relationship.” And while he emphasized that Pakistan did not seek to align with any geopolitical bloc, Bajwa suggested that the country was pushed into China’s embrace since the U.S. shut the door to cooperation in recent years, strongly insinuating the need for a course correction.

Leaders of the opposition have in recent weeks adopted a similar line, seeking closer engagement with Washington. Yousuf Raza Gilani, a former prime minister and senior leader of the opposition Pakistan People’s Party, quickly expressed agreement with Bajwa’s views on relations with the U.S. and alleged that Khan has harmed them.

On Thursday, Khawaja Asif—a former defense and foreign minister with the opposition Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz, or PML-N, party, who only last year  gloated over the Taliban ouster of the U.S. from Afghanistan—said that Pakistan must maintain its partnership with Washington, likening U.S. assistance to “ventilators” keeping Pakistan’s economy alive. Shahbaz Sharif, the PML-N’s likely prime ministerial nominee to replace Khan, concurred with Asif. Pointing to Pakistan’s economic woes, Sharif added, not without some controversy, that “beggars can’t be choosers.”

This simultaneous tilt toward the U.S. by both Pakistan’s army and the political opposition indicates that Bajwa is seeking a combined political and geopolitical realignment.

Nevertheless, pressure from the West for Islamabad to distance itself from Russia appears to have only emboldened Khan’s defiance. In March, diplomats from 20 European countries along with Australia and Japan publicly called on Pakistan to vote in favor of the U.N. General Assembly resolution condemning Russia. Days later, Khan shot back at a public rally, asking whether European diplomats made the same request to India and whether they thought Pakistanis were their “slaves.” He has since accused Washington of having a hand in the current political turmoil, alleging that he is the target of a U.S. regime-change campaign, in part because of his Moscow trip.

Khan is right to note the West’s double standards. Even so, it is unclear whether his Russia visit was worth the risk of alienating Western countries, particularly given that much of Pakistan’s economic stability depends on sustained, rapid export growth—and its chief export markets are the U.S. and Europe.

In fairness, the Pakistan-Russia relationship has seen significant improvement in recent years, even if many in Pakistan are almost certainly overestimating its potential. For more than a decade, the two countries have sought to develop broad-based ties in response to growing U.S.-India cooperation. Since 2011, the two former Cold War adversaries have aligned their Afghanistan policies, initiated joint military exercises and modestly expanded trade. Russia has also lifted a ban on defense exports to Pakistan, with some notable arms transfers having subsequently taken place.

Khan’s ill-timed visit, which was planned months before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, was largely aimed at finalizing the Russian-built Pakistan Stream pipeline deal that, if completed, would allow Pakistan to transport liquefied natural gas, or LNG, upcountry from the Arabian Sea. Pakistan’s once-abundant natural gas reserves have been rapidly depleting, and long-planned gas pipeline projects from Iran and Turkmenistan remain in the doldrums due to conflict or sanctions, forcing Islamabad to rely on LNG as a stopgap solution to stave off a pending domestic fuel crisis. The Russian pipeline would be a key part of its distribution network.

But while Pakistan’s now-former finance minister has said that the agreement, initially agreed to in 2015, is nearly sealed, the project may now be jeopardized by U.S. sanctions. Pakistani diplomats, like many others in Asia, appear to have assessed that Western sanctions on Russia will eventually be rolled back. But until that happens, taking a combative approach toward the West reduces the likelihood that Pakistan will obtain exemptions from sanctions likely to affect the pipeline in the event the deal is completed.

Moreover, while the pipeline is meant to expand the country’s domestic gas distribution network as it ramps up LNG import capacity, LNG supply will now remain scarce as the demand of wealthy European importers, seeking alternatives to Russian fuel, exceeds supply. Such geopolitical barriers are likely to continue to block Pakistan’s access to the affordable energy supplies vital to fueling the country’s economic growth.

The country’s energy crisis has now become enmeshed in its domestic politics, further complicating an already thorny problem for as long as the current political crisis continues. But once the current brinksmanship in Islamabad ends, it is vital that Pakistan grounds its foreign policy in sound geostrategy.

Pakistan has carefully built ties with Russia for over a decade, allowing Islamabad to exploit contradictions in India’s foreign policy without directly antagonizing the West.* Russia is India’s long-time partner and a major supplier of defense hardware. But India is also increasingly aligning with the United States. By engaging with Russia, Pakistan hopes to demonstrate that it, too, can maintain a diverse portfolio of partnerships, and also that burgeoning U.S.-India ties will not be without cost to New Delhi and Washington.

At the same time, members of Pakistan’s strategic community have often indulged in what one might call geo-fantasy, proposing the creation of a Eurasian geopolitical bloc led by China and Russia and including countries like Pakistan, Iran and Turkey. There has been additional discussion in recent years of integrating Russia and its Eurasian connectivity initiatives with the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, without assessing their economic feasibility—or recognizing the broader weakness of the Russian economy outside the energy sector.

Khan’s pursuit of self-respect and equity in foreign relations is understandable. But as Pakistan’s economic woes deepen, Islamabad can ill afford to root its foreign policy in anything but hard realities.

*Editor’s note: The original version of this article stated that Pakistan has been building ties with Russia for decades. The shift began in 2011. WPR regrets the error.

Arif Rafiq is president of Vizier Consulting, LLC, a political risk advisory company focused on the Middle East and South Asia. You can find him on Twitter at @arifcrafiq.