Yetkin Report - 30 Ağustos 2024, cuma - IMF'nin Türkiye analizi : İstikrar mı, toplumsal bedel mi?

 

IMF’nin Türkiye analizi: İstikrar mı, toplumsal bedel mi?

Yazar: YetkinReport /  30 Ağustos 2024, Cuma /  Oda: Siyaset

IMF’nin 2024 ön gözlem raporundaki politika önerileri eleştirileri de beraberinde getirdi. Uzmanlar Uluslararası Para Fonu’nun halkın üzerine daha fazla ekonomik yük bindirecek adımları desteklerken yapısal sorunları gözardı ettiği konusunda uyardı.

Uluslararası Para Fonu (IMF), Türkiye ile gerçekleştirdiği 2024 yılı Madde IV görüşmelerinin ardından ön gözlemlerini açıkladı. 2023 yılının ortasından bu yana ekonomik istikrarda önemli kazanımlar elde edildiğine dikkat çeken IMF’nin raporu, enflasyonla mücadele ve sürdürülebilir büyümeyi sağlamak için daha sıkı önlemlere ihtiyaç duyulduğunu vurguluyor.

Ancak raporun önerileri eleştirileri de beraberinde getirdi. Özellikle ücret politikaları ve mali sıkılaştırma önerilerinin hali hazırda alım gücü düşmüş ve ekonomik zorlukla mücadele eden kesimler üzerinde yaratacağı etki, uzmanların ilk dikkat çektiği nokta oldu.

Uzmanlar, IMF’nin politika önerilerinin sosyal ve ekonomik olarak riskli olduğunu vurguladı.

IMF raporu

IMF’nin ön gözlem raporu, Türkiye’nin ekonomik göstergelerinde 2023 yılı ortasından bu yana kayda değer bir iyileşme olduğunu belirtti.

IMF ayrıca cari açığın 2024’ün ilk çeyreğinde GSYİH’nin yüzde 2,7’sine gerilemesi, uluslararası rezervlerin Nisan ayından bu yana 91 milyar dolar artması ve ülkenin risk priminin 440 baz puan düşmesini de olumlu karşıladı.

IMF raporunda enflasyonun 2024 yılı sonunda yaklaşık yüzde 43’e, 2025’te ise yüzde 24’e düşeceğini öngördü. IMF’nin enflasyon tahmini, Türkiye Cumhuriyet Merkez Bankası’nın (TCMB) üst sınırının üzerinde kaldı.

IMF ekonomik büyümenin de 2024’te yüzde 3,4’e, 2025’te ise yüzde 2,7’ye gerilemesi beklendiğini belirtirken, orta vadede ise potansiyel büyümenin yüzde 3,5-4 aralığına dönmesini öngördü.

Rapor, yüksek enerji fiyatları, Ortadoğu ve Ukrayna kaynaklı jeopolitik gerilimler ve sermaye akışlarının tersine dönmesi gibi olası risklere de dikkat çekti.

IMF’nin Politika Önerileri

IMF’nin ön gözlem raporunun tartışılan bölümü ise ekonomik tablo içerisinde geliştirdiği politika önerileri oldu.

Uluslararası Para Fonu, enflasyonun ve enflasyon beklentilerinin kontrol altına alınması için sıkı para politikasının sürdürülmesi gerektiğini, gerekirse ek sıkılaştırma önlemleri alınabileceğini önerdi.

IMF’nin tavsiyeleri arasında fiyatlar, ücretler ve kira gibi sözleşmelerin “ileriye dönük enflasyon beklentilerine göre belirlenmesi” de yer aldı.

IMF, kayıt dışı ekonomiyle mücadele, işgücü piyasasında esnekliğin arttırılması ve kadınların işgücüne katılımının teşvik edilmesi gibi reformlar da önerdi.

Fon, vergi harcamalarının rasyonelleştirilmesi ve vergi tabanının genişletilmesi, gereksiz projelere yapılan harcamaların sınırlandırılması gibi önlemlerin alınmasını savundu.

Uzmanlar uyardı

IMF’nin politika önerileri arasında özellikle işgücü piyasasında esnekliğin arttırılması, mali konsolidasyon paketi, ücretlerin ileriye dönük enflasyonla belirlenmesi ve kademeli yaklaşım ekonomistler tarafından eleştiriyle karşılandı.

Uzmanlar, “işgücü piyasasında esnekliğin arttırılmasının” iş güvencesi ve işçi hakları konusunda gerileme yaratacağını, bu tür reformların çalışanların haklarını zayıflatma ve iş güvencesini azaltma riski taşıdığını belirtti.

Ekonomistlere göre Gayrı Safi Yurt İçi Hasıla’nın yüzde 2,5’i oranındaki mali konsolidasyon paketi ise kamu hizmetleri ve yatırımlar üzerine potansiyel bir baskı oluşturabilir. Bu durum da sosyal hizmetlerde olumsuz etkilere yol açabilir.

Eleştirilere göre IMF’nin kademeli yaklaşımı ise enflasyonla mücadele sürecini uzatma ve bu süreçte ortaya çıkabilecek risklere karşı da ekonomiyi savunmasız bırakma potansiyeli taşıyor.

Ayırca önerilen politikaların özellikle düşük ve orta gelirli kesimler üzerindeki olumsuz etkileri sosyal eşitsizliği derinleştirme riski taşıyor.

“Geniş halk kesimlerine yükleniyor”

IMF’nin yüksek enflasyonun sürmesinde hane halkının enflasyon beklentilerini sorumlu tuttuğunu belirten ekonomi yazarı Hayri Kozanoğlu, “gelirler politikası” ifadesinin ücretlerin düşük tutulması, insanların yoksullaşarak mal ve hizmetlere talep yaratma güçlerinin azalması anlamına geldiğini söyledi. Kozanoğlu, IMF’nin bu durumdan “duyduğu memnuniyeti dile getirdiğini” belirtti.

BirGün gazetesindeki köşesinde raporu değerlendiren Kozanoğlu, IMF’nin yapısal ekonomik sorunları göz ardı ederken genel nüfusu orantısız bir şekilde etkileyen politikaları desteklediğini belirtti.

Kozanoğlu, “Özetle, IMF bildik neoliberal, sıkı para ve maliye politikalarına dayanan, kemer sıkmanın tüm yükünü emekçilere yıkan reçetesini güncel veriler ışığında bir kez daha dayatıyor,” değerlendirmesinde bulundu.

Kozanoğlu raporun “büyük müteahhitlere KOİ projelerinin kapsamında fiyat ve miktar garantisi üzerinde yapılan ödemelere bir eleştiri getirmediğini” bu ödemelere “örtük bir onay verdiğini” belirtti.

Ücret artışlarının ileriye dönük enflasyonla belirlenmesi

IMF’nin ücret artışlarını ileriye dönük enflasyona dayandırma önerisi, özellikle geçmiş enflasyondan ciddi şekilde etkilenmiş çalışanlar açısından adaletsizlik yaratma potansiyeli taşıdığı gerekçesiyle eleştirildi.

Eski Hazine Müsteşarı Mahfi Eğilmez,  IMF’nin bu önerisinin halihazırda yüksek enflasyondan zarar görmüş işçileri haksız bir şekilde etkileyebileceğini belirtti.

Ücretlilerin geçmiş enflasyon nedeniyle yaşadığı kayıpların göz ardı edilmemesi gerektiğini savunan Eğilmez, IMF’nin rolünün sadece ekonomik önerilerde bulunmak olduğunu, ancak kalıcı çözümler için sosyal ve siyasal faktörlerin de dikkate alınması gerektiğini belirtti.

Eğilmez, “Ücret artışlarını geçmiş enflasyon yerine gelecekte beklenen enflasyona dayandırmak, halihazırda yüksek enflasyondan zarar görmüş işçileri haksız bir şekilde etkileyebilir. Hem ekonomik hem de sosyal bağlamları dikkate almamız gerekiyor,” dedi.

Selva Demiralp: Riskler ve denge

Ancak Prof. Dr. Selva Demiralp’e göre bu madde tek başına uygulandığında “acı reçetenin maliyetini ücretli kesime yükler,” ama eğer bir mali paket ile desteklenirse dezenflasyonun maliyeti daha adil dağıtılabilir.

Demiralp’e göre, “bu madde cımbızla çekip tek başına uygulandığında acı reçetenin maliyetini ücretli kesime yükler. Ancak diğer maddeler ve özellikle (5) ile beraber uygulanırsa dezenflasyonun maliyeti daha adil dağıtılır.”

Demiralp  5. maddeyi şöyle açıkladı: “Maliye politikasının daha aktif bir şekilde dezenflasyon sürecine destek vermesi gerekir. Vergi tabanın daha hızlı genişletilebilirdi. Gereksiz kamu harcamalarının kısıtlanması ve GSYH’nın yüzde 2.5’ine karşılık gelecek bir mali paket dezenflasyon sürecine daha iyi destek verirdi.”

Demiralp bunun yanında enflasyonla mücadelede kademeli sıkılaştırma politikalarının risklerine dikkat çekerek, bu yaklaşımın enflasyon beklentilerinin çıpalanmasını geciktirebileceğini belirtti.

Demiralp, daha agresif önlemlerin gecikmesinin enflasyonist baskıları uzatabileceğini ve Türkiye’yi dışsal risklere maruz bırakabileceğini belirtirken, bu tür politikaların ücretlilere aşırı yük bindirmeden, daha aktif bir mali politika ile dengelenmesi gerektiğini vurguladı.

Demiralp, vergi tabanının genişletilmesi ve gereksiz kamu harcamalarının kısıtlanmasının dezenflasyon sürecine daha etkili bir destek sağlayacağını ifade etti.

Project Syndicate Fawaz A. Gerges Says More… Aug 27, 2024

 Project Syndicate

Fawaz A. Gerges

Says More…

Aug 27, 2024

This week in Say More, PS talks with Fawaz A. Gerges, Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and the author of What Really Went Wrong: The West and the Failure of Democracy in the Middle East.

Project Syndicate: In January, you lamented that for many in the Middle East and across the Global South, Israel’s military campaign in Gaza is “as much US President Joe Biden’s war as it is Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s,” and Biden will be remembered as “just another American leader whose actions betray a lack of concern for Arab lives.” When the next US administration takes over, is there a US policy approach toward Israel that is both realistic, from a domestic political perspective, and more responsive to the needs of Arabs?

Fawaz A. Gerges: Any discussion of what is politically “realistic” within the United States, in terms of responding to the needs of the Arab people, runs up against a fundamental problem: America’s Middle-East policy is shaped significantly by the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). This precludes an approach that is fair, balanced, and even-handed.

And it is not just AIPAC: special interests and lobbyists have a stranglehold on US foreign policy, in what amounts to a crisis of democracy. Until their grip is broken – through campaign-finance reform and the broadening and diversification of the foreign-policy community (a generational aspiration) – any substantive change in American policy is unlikely.

PS: As you pointed out in your commentary – and detail in your new book, What Really Went Wrong: The West and the Failure of Democracy in the Middle East – the US and other Western powers have, for nearly a century, pursued an “interventionist, militaristic, and anti-democratic foreign policy” driven largely by the “desire to roll back communism and secure the dominance of liberal capitalism.” Is it too late for the West to mend fences with the Global South, and what risks arise when alternative powers like China attempt to fill gaps left by the West?

FG: It is never too late for the West to mend fences with the Global South; history is not destiny. But doing so would require the US immediately and fundamentally to change how it acts on the world stage. As I have written elsewhere, America’s preponderant support for Israel’s war in Gaza may ultimately represent a great rupture in international relations, hardening long-dormant fault lines between the West and the Global South and shattering the international liberal order that has underpinned American hegemony since the end of World War II.

A growing number of people in the Global South think that the rules are different for “the West” and “the rest,” and recent opinion polls suggest that China is gaining ground in the Global South at America’s expense. That said, China has neither the desire nor the hard military power to establish an informal “empire” in the Middle East, as the West has. Unlike the US, China is interested mainly in geoeconomics, not geopolitics, and it pursues transactional relations with Middle Eastern states.

PS: Understanding the flaws in America’s approach to the Middle East, you explain in your book, is “fundamental to imagining a new future for the region.” Following the election in Iran of a reformist president, do you see opportunities not only for a more constructive Western policy toward the country, but also for “diplomatic openings and new security arrangements” of the kind that seemed possible in 2021?

FG: It is difficult to see opportunities for the normalization of relations between Iran and Western governments, particularly the US – to put it mildly. If Donald Trump wins the US presidential election this November, there is a real danger of a military confrontation between the US and Iran.

As I explain in my book, the US and Iran remain caught in a deadly dance. Over the past four decades, they have nearly come to military blows several times, with potentially devastating implications for international peace and security, yet both sides have remained unwilling fully to come to terms with the past and reconcile. Now, Israel’s war in Gaza risks escalating into a wider regional conflagration, which would drag the US, France, and the United Kingdom into direct military conflict with Iran and its local allies.

BY THE WAY . . .

PS: Your book explores what might have been in the Middle East, had the region’s newly independent countries been “allowed to chart their own development immediately after the end of European colonial rule.” Where do we see this historically? Which decisions, had they been different, might have contributed to making the region more “stable, prosperous, and pluralistic”?

FG: Let us consider Iran, which is a central case study in my book. In 1953, a US-backed coup removed the country’s democratically elected progressive leader, Muhammad Mossadegh, and installed Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. This ruptured political life in Iran, triggering a cascade of crises that radically altered the country’s political and developmental trajectory. Values were corrupted, and constitutionalism, liberalism, and pluralism suffered a powerful blow, making way for the rise of radical and revolutionary ideologies like Marxism and Shia Islamism. It thus set the stage for the 1979 Iranian Revolution.

We know the legacies of America’s 1953 intervention: uninterrupted authoritarianism – under both the repressive rule of the Pahlavi monarchy and the clerical rule that followed Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s subsequent takeover – and an acrimonious US-Iran relationship. But what would have happened if the US had not intervened? As I show in my book, most Iranians seem to believe that democracy and political secularism – values that are routinely invoked by the US – may well have established deep roots in their country. A democratic Iran could have been a peaceful country and an example for its neighbors.

PS: While your book focuses on the Middle East, you also consider Guatemala’s experience for comparative purposes. Which parallels and divergences stand out, and what do they imply about the motivations and impact of US policy toward both regions?

FG: The Middle East has experienced more than its share of covert and overt American interventions, but it is not alone. The US waged multiple battles on many fronts in its efforts to roll back Soviet communism, tame assertive nationalist leaders, and secure the dominance of liberal capitalism. One of those fronts was Guatemala.

The CIA toppled Guatemalan President Jacobo Árbenz just a year after engineering Mossadegh’s ouster, for many of the same reasons – just replace “oil” with “land.” Whereas Mossadegh “sinned” (according to US President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s administration) by nationalizing the oil industry, Árbenz transgressed by launching agrarian reforms and undertaking land redistribution. Both Mossadegh and Arbenz pursued centralized economic development and “neutralism” in foreign policy – approaches that were anathema to the US.

The consequences of America’s intervention in Guatemala can be considered even more catastrophic than what happened in Iran. Whereas Iran descended into political authoritarianism, Guatemala was plunged into a brutal 36-year civil war that cost over 200,000 lives in a country of just 4.1 million.

PS: In What Really Went Wrong, you describe Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser as an “enduring symbol of Arab unity,” who “continues to inspire those seeking dignity.” What lessons does Nasser’s story hold for the people of the Middle East and their leaders?

FG: Western-backed rulers learned that human-rights abuses and clampdowns on popular dissent would be ignored as long as the US government’s orders were followed. And the people of the Middle East learned that, in the eyes of oil-addicted US policymakers dedicated to maintaining the authoritarian status quo, their rights are dispensable.

After World War II, ordinary people in the region had genuine goodwill and admiration for the US. But that has since been replaced by mistrust, suspicion, and even hatred. Whatever lingering doubt the people of the Middle East might have had about American hostility was destroyed by the decades-long US “war on terror.”

America’s complicity in Israeli crimes in Gaza was the final straw. In a survey conducted by the Doha Institute’s Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies this past January, more than 75% of respondents across the Arab world cited the US (and Israel) as the “biggest threat” to the region’s “security and stability.”

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Fawaz A. Gerges

Fawaz A. Gerges

Writing for PS since 2003

13 Commentaries

Fawaz A. Gerges, Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics, is author of the forthcoming What Really Went Wrong: The West and the Failure of Democracy in the Middle East (Yale University Press, 2024).

Project Syndicate How Fascism Happens Aug 30, 2024 Mark Jones

 Project Syndicate

How Fascism Happens

Aug 30, 2024

Mark Jones

In the face of renewed threats to democracy, historical knowledge of past dictatorships becomes as important as ever. After all, the Holocaust and World War II show what can happen when democracies allow themselves to be undermined from within.

DUBLIN – In the spring of 1933, following Adolf Hitler’s appointment as German chancellor, Thomas Mann was on holiday in Switzerland with his wife. While there, the Nobel laureate author received a warning from Germany that it would be unsafe for him to return. Now that the Nazis were in power, they wanted to send Mann to a concentration camp for having publicly opposed them.

Mann thus became one of the first German refugees from Hitler’s regime. Until 1938, he spent most of his time in Switzerland. But as Hitler’s power increased and war in Europe looked increasingly likely, he moved to the United States, where he did not stay silent. Even at the height of Hitler’s conquests in Europe, Mann remained doggedly optimistic, promising Americans that “democracy will win” in the end.

Will it, though? Many nowadays are not so sure. As authors like Ruth Ben-Ghiat of New York University remind us, we are living in a new age of the “strongman,” with democracy retreating in many parts of the world. Hate-inspired violence is becoming more common on both sides of the Atlantic, and things that were once unthinkable have become normalized. This November, in the country where Mann once promised that democracy would prevail, tens of millions of Americans will vote for a candidate who responded to losing the 2020 election by instigating a fascist-style assault on the US Capitol.

The Past as Prologue

Given the need to defend democracy, historical knowledge has become more important than ever. Fortunately, in the lead-up to this year’s US election, historians Richard J. Evans and Timothy W. Ryback have each published books that mine the past to offer guidelines for navigating our increasingly concerning present.

Evans, an emeritus professor at the University of Cambridge, is the more distinguished of the two authors. A prolific historian, he first came to public prominence in the early 2000s for his role as an expert witness in a libel case brought by the notorious Holocaust denier David Irving against Penguin Books and the historian Deborah Lipstadt. Evans played a key role in the trial, clashing with Irving in courtroom scenes that were later dramatized in the 2016 film Denial.

Up until then, Evans’s major works had largely focused on nineteenth-century Germany; but following the case, he moved forward in time to write a critically acclaimed three-volume social and political history of Nazi Germany, published between 2003 and 2008. Alongside Ian Kershaw’s two-volume biography of Hitler, which focuses on the life of the dictator, Evans’s trilogy remains among the most important general works on Nazi Germany.

By contrast, Ryback, an American historian who serves as director of the Institute for Historical Justice and Reconciliation in The Hague, has never written a general history of Nazism. He is best known for his 2008 best-seller, Hitler’s Private Library, a cleverly conceived study in which the dictator responsible for the “industrial production of corpses” (to borrow Hannah Arendt’s phrase) is also revealed to have been a book lover and an avid reader. Then came Ryback’s 2014 book, Hitler’s First Victims, which offered a forensic account of the SS’s first excesses of violence in the concentration camp at Dachau (where the Nazis wanted to send Mann) in 1933.

Fateful Decisions

For all their differences, Evans and Ryback both see German history as a powerful lens through which to view the problems currently facing liberal democracy. Thus, Evans sees the fall of the Weimar Republic as “the paradigm of democracy’s collapse and dictatorship’s triumph,” and Ryback begins his book Takeover in early August 1932, just days after the Nazis reached their electoral high point.

Following a summer of violent street fighting between Nazi Brownshirts and Communists, Hitler’s party won 37% of the vote and 230 seats in the Reichstag in the election on July 31, 1932. The magnitude of the Nazis’ triumph led Hitler to assume that he was entitled to the position of chancellor. But German President Paul von Hindenburg, whose office was supposed to serve as a guardian of the constitution, disagreed.

At a meeting on August 13, 1932, Hindenburg snubbed Hitler and used emergency powers available to him under the Weimar constitution to support the chancellorship of arch-conservative Franz von Papen, the leader of the cabinet that Hindenburg had appointed on June 1, 1932. Papen’s government was entirely dependent on Hindenburg’s support and lacked an electoral mandate of any kind. It was so stacked with aristocratic conservatives that it was known as the “cabinet of barons.”

In late summer 1932, shocking scenes played out in the briefly reconvened German parliament. Reichstag President Hermann Göring, who had received the position in August thanks to the votes of his fellow Nazi Party members, abused the position to humiliate Papen by ignoring him in the Chamber before the Nazis and Communists joined forces to vote through a no-confidence motion in Papen’s government. Hindenburg then called yet another election for that November. But when this failed to produce a workable parliamentary majority, he changed his mind about who should be chancellor, this time appointing General Kurt von Schleicher. Like Papen, Schleicher lacked an electoral mandate, but he did have the support of the army and business.

Schleicher’s cabinet lasted for just eight weeks. Angry about being dismissed, Papen conspired against the new chancellor and sought Hitler’s support for a new government. When Schleicher demanded more support from Hindenburg in the final days of January 1933, the aging president decided to push him to the side.

On January 30, 1933, with Papen’s encouragement, Hindenburg appointed Hitler, who had served as a corporal when Hindenburg was field marshal. The new chancellor would head a coalition government surrounded by “respectable” conservatives led by Papen. The latter believed that he had “boxed” Hitler in, and that he would be able to control and manipulate the new chancellor to force through his own conservative agenda.

Contingencies and Counterfactuals

Ryback offers a blow-by-blow account of the intrigues and scheming that occurred during the 170 days between Hindenburg and Hitler’s meeting on August 13, 1932, and Hitler’s appointment as chancellor. The figures who feature most prominently include Hitler and his inner circle; his Nazi Party rival Gregor Strasser; his rivals for the chancellery, Papen and Schleicher; the conservative politician and media tycoon Alfred Hugenberg; and the aging but fully lucid Hindenburg. Ryback’s narrative mixes their voices in with those of contemporary newspapers, including a large selection of quotations from the New York Times’s Berlin correspondent, as well as illustrative observations from well-known diarists like Harry Graf von Kessler.

Written with verve and close attention to detail, Takeover will be a successful book. But is it a good one? Ryback succeeds in capturing the hectic nature of events and the intrigues and scheming that continuously shifted the key players’ positions and prospects. He also offers a powerful historical message: while Nazism was once explained as the product of centuries of German history, the truth is that the story could have turned in another direction right up until the final minutes before Hitler became chancellor. Even on the morning of January 30, 1933, there was a last-gasp debate about whether to back out and abandon the envisaged coalition. There is human agency at every moment in history.

But this point, however well delivered, isn’t really new. The American historian Benjamin Carter Hett’s The Death of Democracy, published in 2018, is just as much of a page-turner, and it includes a closer examination of why things happened as they did, making it a superior book. Takeover, by contrast, includes hardly any analysis of the Germans who opposed Nazism during the winter of 1932-33. The speeches that ultimately forced Mann to flee the country are not included in Ryback’s story, nor is the leadership of the Social Democratic Party. All we get are a few passing quotes from a Social Democratic newspaper.

This is a glaring omission. In March 1933, just minutes before the passage of the Nazi’s Enabling Act (the legal starting point of the dictatorship), the Social Democratic politician Otto Wels addressed the Reichstag and bravely defended “humanity” and democracy as “eternal” values that would outlive Nazism. As he spoke, he had a suicide pill in his pocket, fearing that he might be arrested and handed over to Nazi torturers immediately afterwards.

Takeover tells us nothing about this scene or the man at its center. This is not only because Ryback ends his book on January 30, 1933, thus leaving out the process by which the dictatorship was created (for that, readers should turn to Peter Fritzsche’s Hitler’s First Hundred Days). More fundamentally, it is because the choices facing those who fought Nazism do not feature in Ryback’s story. Yet as recent events in the Democratic Party have shown, those who oppose populists do have choices, and they can use them to re-energize the defense of democracy.

The Hitler Circle

Evans also says little about the Germans who opposed Nazism, though he does discuss Wels when providing context for Hitler’s establishment of a dictatorship. Hitler’s People is a collection of 24 biographies, each of which tells us something important about who the Nazis were and how the regime worked. Evans starts with Hitler and spends 100 pages providing a short but comprehensive biography of the one-time nobody who became the leader of the Third Reich.

The next section includes chapters on Hitler’s inner circle, whose personal proximity to the leader gave them unique positions within the overall history of the Nazi regime. Among these “paladins,” as Evans calls them, are familiar names such as Göring, the former fighter pilot who rose to become the “second man” in the Third Reich; Heinrich Himmler, the chief of the secret police and the driving force behind the implementation of the Holocaust; and Joseph Goebbels, the regime’s top propagandist.

Evans next focuses on those just outside the inner circle, such as Julius Streicher, Nazi Germany’s most notorious antisemitic propagandist and a key figure in the Holocaust, as well as Reinhard Heydrich, Adolf Eichmann, and Hans Frank, all of whom bore direct responsibility for the murder of millions of people.

These shorter biographical profiles are all important and well worth reading, but even more disturbing is a third cluster that Evans calls “The Instruments”: the people through whom the top officials carried out their vision of a Nazified world order. Of the nine biographies in this section, the only name many readers will recognize is Leni Riefenstahl. After 1945, the director of Triumph of the Will, the most important propaganda film made about Hitler during the Third Reich, presented herself to the world as an apolitical non-Nazi and got away with it.

The other “instruments” need to be better known, especially in the context of our current politics. They include the generals who ignored the international laws of war; the men and women who ran concentration camps and shot and tortured prisoners for fun; the doctors who killed sick children; and the women who cheered the regime and never apologized or felt remorse for its crimes. For example, Evans’s last chapter focuses on Luise Solmitz, a middle-class woman who fell for Hitler’s promise to return Germany to greatness, even though her own husband was classified as Jewish under Nazi law (he was a conservative nationalist, a veteran, and a Christian convert, but his mother was Jewish).

Hitler’s People is an excellent book, because it shows us who the Nazis really were: upper-class and middle-class Germans who faced downward social mobility, feared equality and social progress, and took out their frustrations over Germany’s defeat in World War I on those least responsible for it, Jews and Social Democrats. From the earliest days of the Nazi movement, they supported or fully tolerated its violence. Even after Hitler launched a genocidal war across Europe, they continued to cheer for him. And most of those who survived Nazism’s final defeat were unrepentant for the rest of their days.

Every reader of Evans’s book will encounter a few figures who stick in his or her mind. For some, it will be Goebbels, who has become the template for those who seek to manipulate public opinion and undermine democracy. For others, it will be the architect Albert Speer, whose successful myth-making autobiography, Inside the Third Reich, led many to believe that he was “the good Nazi.” Fortunately, Evans debunks such unhistorical nonsense.

The Past Is Never Dead

For me, the most striking chapter is on Karl Brandt, a doctor who drew on his medical knowledge to become a mass murderer in the service of the regime. No one forced him into it. He could have lived a prosperous life without becoming a Nazi, but he chose not to.

Brandt was a product of the German university system, and my only disappointment with Hitler’s People is that its subjects do not include any of the university presidents who oversaw the academic world that helped transform students of medicine into mass murderers. Many of these men would remain respected figures in their fields long after 1945. They do not deserve to have their complicity in the Nazi-era horrors so conveniently forgotten.

Evans writes with the wisdom and anger of a scholar who has spent a lifetime using history to make political points. He disdains the descendants of General Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb, who still live on an estate that was a gift from Hitler. His chapter on Papen, who was released from prison in 1949 and lived until 1969, offers a searingly insightful look at political collaboration with evil. And he is no less appalled by Gertrud Scholtz-Klink, the head of the Nazi women’s organization who remained unrepentant until her death in 1999.

Reading Hitler’s People, one cannot help but recognize the parallels to those who are complicit in, or openly profiting from, undermining democracy today. We should all share Evans’s anger. History has already shown us what happens when democracies allow their enemies to weaken them from within. Though we face an onslaught of manipulative propaganda and technologically augmented lies, there is still time to prove Mann right.

Richard J. Evans, Hitler’s People: The Faces of the Third Reich, Penguin Press, 2024.

Timothy W. Ryback, Takeover: Hitler’s Final Rise to Power, Knopf, 2024.

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ASPI ( Australian Strategic Policy Institute) The Strategist - 30 August 2024 - Nishank Motwani - The Danger od AI in war: it doesn't care about self - preservation

 

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The danger of AI in war: it doesn’t care about self-preservation

30 Aug 2024|Nishank MotwaniThe Sydney Dialogue

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Recent wargames using artificial-intelligence models from OpenAI, Meta and Anthropic revealed a troubling trend: AI models are more likely than humans to escalate conflicts to kinetic, even nuclear, war.

This outcome highlights a fundamental difference in the nature of war between humans and AI. For humans, war is a means to impose will for survival; for AI the calculus of risk and reward is entirely different, because, as the pioneering scientist Geoffrey Hinton noted, ‘we’re biological systems, and these are digital systems.’

Regardless of how much control humans exercise over AI systems, we cannot stop the widening divergence between their behaviour and ours, because AI neural networks are moving towards autonomy and are increasingly hard to explain.

To put it bluntly, whereas human wargames and war itself entail the deliberate use of force to compel an enemy to our will, AI is not bound to the core of human instincts, self-preservation. The human desire for survival opens the door for diplomacy and conflict resolution, but whether and to what extent AI models can be trusted to handle the nuances of negotiation that align with human values is unknown.

The potential for catastrophic harm from advanced AI is real, as underscored by the Bletchley Declaration on AI, signed by nearly 30 countries, including Australia, China, the US and Britain. The declaration emphasises the need for responsible AI development and control over the tools of war we create.

Similarly, ongoing UN discussions on lethal autonomous weapons stress that algorithms should not have full control over decisions involving life and death. This concern mirrors past efforts to regulate or ban certain weapons. However, what sets AI-enabled autonomous weapons apart is the extent to which they remove human oversight from the use of force.

A major issue with AI is what’s called the explainability paradox: even its developers often cannot explain why AI systems make certain decisions. This lack of transparency is a significant problem in high-stakes areas, including military and diplomatic decision-making, where it could exacerbate existing geopolitical tensions. As Mustafa Suleyman, co-founder of DeepMind, pointed out, AI’s opaque nature means we are unable to decode the decisions of AI to explain precisely why an algorithm produced a particular result.

Rather than seeing AI as a mere tool, it’s more accurate to view it as an agent capable of making independent judgments and decisions. This capability is unprecedented, as AI can generate new ideas and interact with other AI agents autonomously, beyond direct human control. The potential for AI agents to make decisions without human input raises significant concerns about the control of these powerful technologies—a problem that even the developers of the first nuclear weapons grappled with.

While some want to impose regulation on AI somewhat like the nuclear non-proliferation regime, which has so far limited nuclear weapons to nine states, AI poses unique challenges. Unlike nuclear technology, its development and deployment are decentralized and driven by private entities and individuals, so its inherently hard to regulate. The technology is spreading universally and rapidly with little government oversight. It’s open to malicious use by state and nonstate actors.

As AI systems grow more advanced, they introduce new risks, including elevating misinformation and disinformation to unprecedented levels.

AI’s application to biotech opens new avenues for terrorist groups and individuals to develop advanced biological weapons. That could encourage malign actors, lowering the threshold for conflict and making attacks more likely.

Keeping a human in the loop is vital as AI systems increasingly influence critical decisions. Even when humans are involved, their role in oversight may diminish as trust in AI output grows, despite AI’s known issues with hallucinations and errors. The reliance on AI could lead to a dangerous overconfidence in its decisions, especially in military contexts where speed and efficiency often trump caution.

As AI becomes ubiquitous, human involvement in decision-making processes may dwindle due to the costs and inefficiencies associated with human oversight. In military scenarios, speed is a critical factor, and AI’s ability to perform complex tasks rapidly can provide a decisive edge. However, this speed advantage may come at the cost of surrendering human control, raising ethical and strategic dilemmas about the extent to which we allow machines to dictate the course of human conflict.

The accelerating pace at which AI operates could ultimately pressure the role of humans in decision-making loops, as the demand for faster responses might lead to sidelining human judgment. This dynamic could create a precarious situation where the quest for speed and efficiency undermines the very human oversight needed to ensure that the use of AI aligns with our values and safety standards.

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Nishank Motwani is a senior analyst at ASPI’s Washington office.

 

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August 30, 2024 Readout of National Security Advisor Sullivan’s Meeting with Quad and Ukrainian Counterparts

 August 30, 2024

Readout of National Security Advisor Sullivan’s Meeting with Quad and Ukrainian Counterparts

National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan convened a meeting at the White House today with French Diplomatic Counselor to the President Emmanuel Bonne, German Chancellery Foreign and Security Policy Advisor Jens Ploetner, British National Security Advisor Tim Barrow and Head of the Office of the President of Ukraine Andriy Yermak to discuss our strong and steadfast support for Ukraine in its defense against Russian aggression.  Mr. Sullivan conveyed the United States’ unwavering support for Ukraine, and partners discussed the steps we are taking to strengthenUkrainian forces on the battlefield, including through the provision of artillery, air defense, and other critical capabilities. 

They discussed our efforts to continue to strengthen Ukraine’s air defenses and harden Ukraine’s energy grid amid Russia’s renewed aerial attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure as well as the investments the United States and our allies are making in Ukraine’s defense industrial base to support its long term security. In addition, the group conferred on efforts to generate support for a just and lasting peace based on the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity following the Ukraine Peace Summit in Switzerland.

Following the meeting, National Security Advisor Sullivan met with Mr. Yermak to discuss the ironclad partnership between the United States and Ukraine, including through support for Ukraine’s military and Ukraine’s economic reconstruction.

NIAC ( National Iranian American Council) - Week of August 26, 2024 - A New Era in Iranian Politics: Pezeshkian’s Cabinet and Emerging Reforms

 

Week of August 26, 2024 | Iran Unfiltered is a digest tracking Iranian politics & society by the National Iranian American Council  A New Era in Iranian Politics: Pezeshkian’s Cabinet and Emerging Reforms Killing of Mohammad Mirmosavi While in Custody Sparks Outrage and Investigation President Pezeshkian Appoints First Sunni Kurd as Vice President, Breaking New Ground Iranian Judiciary Files Legal Case Against Actress Baran Kowsari and Director Rakhshan Banietemad for Violating Hijab Law Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi Says JCPOA “Not Implementable” in Current Form Ali Entezari Removed as Dean After Controversial Comments on Mahsa Amini’s Death A New Era in Iranian Politics: Pezeshkian’s Cabinet and Emerging Reforms A week after Iran’s parliament granted a vote of confidence to Masoud Pezeshkian’s entire cabinet, the new President has begun implementing some of his campaign promises. Among the most notable appointments is that of Abdulrahim Hossein-Zadeh – a Sunni Kurd – as Vice President, the highest position a Sunni has held since the 1979 revolution. Pezeshkian has also added several women to his cabinet, signaling potential shifts within the Iranian political landscape. These changes come amid new comments from conservative politicians and support from Ayatollah Khamenei, which played a crucial role in securing parliament’s unified vote of confidence for Pezeshkian’s proposed ministers. However, the extent and direction of these developments within the Iranian government remain uncertain. During a recent meeting with Pezeshkian, Judiciary Chief Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejei, expressed a reformist approach towards those who have committed offenses, emphasizing rehabilitation over punishment. Mohseni-Ejei stated, “Our approach to members of society who have made mistakes, without intent of enmity, should be reformative and inclusive. We need to consider how many individuals we could have reformed and included, but neglected, pushing them to the opposition.” Amid these developments, Pezeshkian and Mohseni-Ejei are reportedly considering lifting the house arrest of Green Movement leaders. Hossein Karroubi, the son of Mehdi Karroubi, stated, “Last week, we received a message from President Pezeshkian and Judiciary Chief Mohseni-Ejei indicating efforts to end my father’s house arrest, with some progress being made. Following this message, we sought my father’s opinion.” Karroubi expressed gratitude for the efforts but stressed that the lifting of his house arrest should be simultaneous with the release of Mir Hossein Mousavi. In a related development, Tehran’s Friday Prayer leader, Ali Akbar Abotrabifard, in an interview with state media, emphasized the need for a problem-solving approach in governance. “The Islamic Republic has accumulated unresolved issues. If we do not think about reforming today, tomorrow will be too late,” he stated, urging parliament to cooperate with the government to address the country’s unresolved challenges. Meanwhile, conservative figure Mojtaba Zolnour, known for symbolically burning the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) text during Hassan Rouhani’s presidency, recently commented on the fate of the nuclear deal. “Whether the JCPOA proceeds or not is a supra-organizational decision, not within the authority of any one entity. Various bodies, such as the Supreme National Security Council and the heads of the three branches, must reach a consensus. Whatever decision they make—whether to continue negotiations, stop them, or revive the JCPOA—we will support it.” Despite this support, influential conservative media outlets like Kayhan continue to oppose Pezeshkian’s government. In contrast, Amirhossein Shahani, head of the Supreme Leader’s office in the Basij Ministry and Administrative Affairs, urged Basij members to support the government rather than become its opposition. “Friends in websites and social media should be cautious not to weaken the Islamic Republic’s government, as this is certainly not the wish of Basij officials,” Shahani said. On the reformist front, Abbas Abdi, a political activist close to Pezeshkian, issued an open letter to former President Mohammad Khatami, calling for a change in the reformist approach. Abdi criticized the radical language and combative stance of some reformist voices, arguing that such rhetoric is incompatible with the principles of reform. Some prominent reform figures, in recent years, have disavowed change from within and argued for the need for a transition from the Islamic Republic. Abdi’s comments appear to push back on this approach. Abdi stated, “The voices that are often recognized as representing the core of the reformist movement—voices that are prominent among some members of the Reform Front—tend to use radical and combative language. In my analysis, this language is not in alignment with the principles and strategies of reform. My intention here is not to criticize or dismiss the approach of confrontation, but to point out that, whether this rhetoric is right or wrong, it is not suitable for the reformist agenda. This approach seems more focused on defeating and replacing the opposing side rather than fostering reform. It falls into a binary view of good versus evil, which hinders the creation of mutual understanding and empathy. The language of confrontation has its own particular requirements, including a focus on heroism and courageous acts, where expressing a position is seen as an act of defiance. In this rhetoric, those who bear the cost are valued and even seen as just. However, a politics based on reform is directed toward the benefit and well-being that politics should bring to society as a whole. The politics of confrontation typically frames the situation in binary terms, defining good and evil as absolute and intrinsic. This kind of rhetoric often has a parallel or counterpart within the power structure, either nurturing or reflecting it. The politics of confrontation is essentialist, lacking in analytical and sociological perspectives, and is disconnected from relativistic thinking. Essentialism leads to dogmatism, which is inherent in the politics of confrontation,” Abdi wrote. As Iran enters what Pezeshkian has termed a period of “national unity,” the effectiveness and impact of this new political approach will become clearer in the coming months. The motivations behind Ayatollah Khamenei and other power structures in Iran for the recent policy shift remain unclear. However, there are signs that the Woman, Life, Freedom movement may have triggered concern within certain factions of the Islamic Republic. The government’s recent efforts to engage with some reformists, increase the presence of women and ethnic minorities in leadership, and address longstanding issues such as the house arrest of Green Movement leaders suggest an attempt to mitigate public dissatisfaction and rebuild social capital. While early in the 2022 protest movement, some officials hinted at the need for reforms, those voices quickly fell silent. Now, after the presidential election, elements within the government appear to be moving in the direction of implementing at least some limited changes. Whether they are able to achieve this, or are undercut, will become clearer in the near future. Killing of Mohammad Mirmosavi in Custody Sparks Outrage and Investigation Following the death of Mohammad Mirmosavi in police custody in Lahijan, northern Iran, and the dispatch of a special delegation from Tehran to Rasht to investigate, the Iranian Police Information Center released a statement this morning. The statement, based on the inspection team’s findings, attributed his death to the “lack of control over anger and emotions” by officers and their “disregard for the detainee’s condition.” On August 29, videos of Mirmosavi’s funeral and the washing of his body were circulated, showing wounds and marks on his body that appeared consistent with severe beatings and possible torture. A person in the video pointed to two spots on Mirmosavi’s back, stating, “These areas are punctured.” In a published photo, autopsy marks were visible on Mirmosavi’s chest, but no official report from the forensic authority has been released yet. According to BBC, a source close to the family said they are under intense pressure to refrain from sharing details about Mirmosavi’s death. This source also claimed that based on the condition of the body, the family is certain that Mirmosavi’s hands were bound for hours. Local sources familiar with the Lahijan police station allege that after his arrest, Mirmosavi was taken to the back of the station, an area without surveillance cameras, where he was severely beaten. These local sources further reported that Mirmosavi had repeatedly requested medical attention during the night, but his pleas were ignored. According to Iran’s Judiciary News Agency, the police initially reported that on Thursday, August 22, residents of Naserkiadeh village in Lahijan repeatedly informed the local station about a violent altercation. The police claimed that Mirmosavi was the instigator, and that his vehicle had been completely destroyed and set ablaze, as was shown in images. The statement noted that after the police arrived, Mirmosavi and all other parties involved were arrested. It further stated that Mirmosavi began “cursing, resisting police orders, and engaging in a physical altercation with officers” from the station until he was placed in detention.  The Iranian police command acknowledged that the incident is under review by forensic experts to determine the exact cause of death, considering the events before police involvement and Mirmosavi’s physical and mental state. The police condemned the actions of some officers involved as unprofessional and unacceptable, announcing that those responsible have been handed over to the judiciary. The police chief of the station has been dismissed, and other involved officers have been suspended from duty, as per orders from Police Commander General Radan. The statement also warned that if negligence or inattention by other police managers is confirmed, appropriate disciplinary measures will be enforced. In a part of the statement addressing Mirmosavi’s death, the police referenced his “several previous records of misconduct and violence” and a nine-month prison sentence. On the previous day, the President, Interior Minister, and Police Commander of Iran had ordered the formation of a special committee to investigate and report on the incident. The Iranian state news agency reported that a delegation, led by the Deputy Interior Minister for Security and Law Enforcement, had arrived in Rasht and convened a provincial security council meeting. President Pezeshkian Appoints First Sunni Kurd as Vice President, Breaks New Ground in Iranian Politics In a historic move, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian has appointed Abdulrahim Hossein-Zadeh, a Kurdish Sunni member of parliament, as his Vice President for Rural Development and Deprived Areas. This appointment marks the first time a Sunni has held a cabinet-level position in post-revolutionary Iran, representing the highest political rank achieved by a Sunni Muslim in the Islamic Republic. Hossein-Zadeh, who currently represents Naqadeh and Oshnavieh in the Iranian Parliament and serves on the Infrastructure Commission, was chosen by Pezeshkian for his “commitment and valuable experience.” In the decree issued on August 26th, Pezeshkian instructed Hossein-Zadeh to focus on improving rural living conditions and enhancing rural development indices, emphasizing the role of villagers in achieving a resilient economy. Pezeshkian’s election victory had raised hopes for greater inclusion of Sunnis in government positions, with promises of a “National Unity Government” that would collaborate with capable individuals across the political spectrum. However, the release of his proposed cabinet list, which lacked Sunni representation at the ministerial level, sparked disappointment and criticism from religious leaders and Sunni representatives. During a recent Friday prayer in Zahedan, prominent Sunni cleric Molavi Abdolhamid voiced concerns, stating, “The people’s expectations were not met at the first step, and many voters and those who encouraged participation are now worried.” Born in 1980 in Naqadeh, Abdulrahim Hossein-Zadeh holds a master’s degree in urban planning from Iran University of Science and Technology. He is a reformist politician, the head of the Parliamentary Citizen Rights Caucus, and a veteran of both the ninth and tenth terms of the Iranian Parliament. Hossein-Zadeh has also been active in several parliamentary friendship groups with countries such as Mexico, Cuba, Nicaragua, Argentina, and Canada, and has served in various committees focused on ports, maritime industries, and the environment. Two years ago, during the nationwide protests following the death of Mahsa (Jina) Amini in custody, Hossein-Zadeh expressed his condolences in an Instagram post featuring a photo of Amini, lamenting, “I testify that this current state of countless compatriots, regardless of their language, ethnicity, religion, or culture, was for you. They wept and mourned for you with all their hearts. I saw how they felt—an entire nation grieved for its daughter, and all of Iran wept for you.” In another significant development, Fatemeh Mohajerani has been appointed as the spokesperson for Pezeshkian’s government, making her the first woman, and the first without the traditional chador, to hold this prominent position in the Islamic Republic’s government. Mohajerani’s appointment was announced alongside the selection of Elyas Hazrati as head of the Government Information Council. Mohajerani, who previously led Iran’s National Organization for Development of Exceptional Talents, gained attention during Pezeshkian’s campaign rally in her hometown of Arak, where she spoke out against the violence that claimed the life of protester Mehrshad Shahidi. In her speech, with former Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif standing behind her, she declared, “As a mother, I will not allow another Mehrshad Shahidi to fall. We will not let a few extremists fill our streets with the blood of our youth.” Her appointment has drawn mixed reactions on social media, with some praising her as a “lioness” while others, particularly those aligned with the conservative camp, labeled her a “supporter of sedition.” Additionally, Mehrshad Shahidi’s father, Amir Shahidi, criticized Mohajerani’s remarks as “political exploitation” of his son’s name and “unethical behavior.” Mohajerani, born in August 1970 in Arak, entered university in 1989, earning her bachelor’s and master’s degrees in mechanical engineering from Shahid Bahonar University of Kerman. She later pursued a master’s degree in strategy at Heriot-Watt University in Scotland and completed a Ph.D. in business management. She has held various leadership positions, including as president of the National Organization for Development of Exceptional Talents since 2017. Her appointment is seen as part of Pezeshkian’s broader effort to diversify his cabinet, which had promised at least 20% of the nominees would be women and minorities. So far, four women have joined the cabinet: Farzaneh Sadegh Malvazhd, as Minister of Roads and Urban Development; Zahra Behrouz Azar, as Vice President for Women and Family Affairs; and Sheena Ansari, as head of Iran’s Environmental Protection Organization. The selection of Mohajerani, 54, and Hazrati, 63, also prompted renewed scrutiny of Pezeshkian’s campaign promise to promote youth in government roles—a promise that remains largely unfulfilled. Zahra Rahnavard, in a statement from house arrest, criticized Pezeshkian’s cabinet, calling for the release of female political prisoners and the repeal of the “arbitrary” mandatory hijab law. Rahnavard, the wife of 2009 Green Movement Leader Mir Hossein Mousavi who has been under house arrest for 15 years, described mandatory hijab as a “symbol of the regime’s autocracy.” In her message criticizing Pezeshkian’s cabinet, she wrote, “A ‘National Unity Cabinet’ can only be credible and meaningful if it takes fundamental steps to envision a brighter future for women, such as the release of political prisoners, especially the many courageous women detainees, the repeal of the arbitrary mandatory hijab law and its disreputable apparatus across the country, and the drafting and implementation of civil, political, and social laws concerning women’s rights.” In her statement, published on September 8th on Kalemeh – a website close to the leaders of the Green Movement – Rahnavard mentioned prominent women’s rights activists Mehrangiz Kar and Shirin Ebadi. She stated, “National unity first and foremost requires recognizing the equal rights of all citizens and ensuring their effective participation in the political, economic, social, and cultural destiny of the country, especially for those groups and movements whose rights have been unjustly violated and who have been excluded from the political sphere and governance.” On the other hand, Kayhan newspaper criticized some figures in Pezeshkian’s cabinet as “problematic,” calling the new appointments “a distribution of positions among riot supporters disguised as national unity.” The paper added that “with the start of appointments in the fourteenth government, concerns about employing individuals who lack even the slightest belief in the principles and core values of the regime and who played a role in the unrest have been growing.” Kayhan also warned that “these inappropriate appointments raise concerns about creating distractions instead of serving the public in the new government.” After the initial criticism of the cabinet lineup subsided, some voters have expressed support for the inclusion of women and a Sunni Kurd in the government. Mohammad Sahafi, a former press director at Iran’s Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, shared photos of the women appointed in Pezeshkian’s government on X, stating, “It is no exaggeration to say that the presence of women in high-ranking positions in Pezeshkian’s government is primarily owed to the Woman, Life, Freedom movement.” The four women in Pezeshkian’s cabinet include a minister, two vice presidents, and a spokesperson for the Islamic Republic’s government, marking the highest level of female representation in government since the 1979 Revolution. In another significant move, former Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif announced his return to Pezeshkian’s team as Deputy for Strategic Affairs following “negotiations and written instructions” from Pezeshkian. Zarif’s return, alongside Abbas Araghchi’s continued role at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, signals an apparent desire to shift towards improved relations with the West—a stance that appears to have the tacit approval of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. During a meeting with Pezeshkian’s cabinet, Khamenei remarked, “We can engage with the enemy where necessary, but the issue is that we must not place our hope or trust in them.” Iranian Judiciary Files Legal Case Against Actress Baran Kowsari and Director Rakhshan Banietemad for Violating Hijab Law The Iranian judiciary’s official news agency, Mizan, has reported that a legal case has been filed against prominent actress Baran Kowsari and acclaimed director Rakhshan Banietemad for allegedly “violating the hijab law.” According to the report, the two figures had attended a film review session without wearing a hijab, prompting the authorities to open a case at the Public and Revolutionary Prosecutor’s Office in Tehran. Images of Bani Etemad and Kowsari participating in the discussion of the film Someone Always Gets Lost without the mandatory head covering were widely circulated on social media, attracting significant attention. This is not the first time Iranian actresses have made headlines for appearing in public without the compulsory hijab. Several actresses, including Pantea Bahram, Katayoun Riahi, Baran Kowsari, Fatemeh Motamed-Arya, and Afsaneh Bayegan, have previously faced legal action for similar reasons. Despite the legal pressure, these well-known figures, along with many other women in Iran, assert that choosing their own attire is a fundamental right. Some have spoken openly in interviews or social media posts about engaging in “civil disobedience” to secure the “right to choose their clothing” in Iran. While increasing numbers of Iranian women routinely flout the nation’s hijab laws, Iranian authorities have targeted individuals with prominent followings – including actresses – as part of their continued efforts to claw back adherence to the hijab mandate. Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi Says JCPOA “Not Implementable” in Current Form Abbas Araghchi, Iran’s newly appointed Foreign Minister, has stated that the revival of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with the six world powers “is not feasible in its current form.” In his first public comments since taking office, Araghchi told state television that rather than simply reviving the JCPOA, “the agreement needs to be reopened” to allow for modifications. He clarified that his remarks should not be interpreted as signaling “the death of the JCPOA.” Araghchi, who has been part of Iran’s nuclear negotiating team since the early 2000s and served as Deputy Foreign Minister during the initial JCPOA negotiations, emphasized that the agreement must be revised. “The JCPOA can serve as a guide, but it cannot be revived as it was,” he said. Reflecting on the negotiations during the final months of Hassan Rouhani’s presidency, Araghchi noted that in late 2020, after Joe Biden became U.S. President, the United States expressed interest in rejoining the JCPOA. According to Araghchi, Iran did not reject the offer outright, but instead set conditions for its return. During that period, the Iranian parliament also passed the “Strategic Action Plan to Lift Sanctions and Protect the Rights of the Iranian Nation,” a law that Rouhani’s government opposed but which played a significant role in shaping the country’s nuclear program and position on negotiations. In recent weeks, former senior officials of Iran’s previous administration have harshly criticized this law, blaming it for obstructing the JCPOA’s revival. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, however, defended the law, calling it a “very correct move” and condemning those who criticize it. Former Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, a key architect of the JCPOA, and former President Hassan Rouhani, have both labeled the law as a significant obstacle to restoring the nuclear deal. Rouhani even described it as “the worst law in the history of the Islamic Republic of Iran.” The JCPOA, which was reached in the summer of 2015, led to the lifting of international sanctions against Iran in exchange for limitations on its nuclear program. However, in May 2018, U.S. President Donald Trump unilaterally withdrew from the agreement and re-imposed sanctions on Iran, including unprecedented restrictions on its oil and gas sectors, which severely impacted the country’s primary revenue source. Iran has since gradually scaled back its commitments under the agreement and now possesses uranium enriched at levels far exceeding those allowed under the JCPOA, including enrichment up to 60%. Additionally, Iran has largely abandoned the agreement’s supplementary oversight provisions, leading the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to describe its monitoring of Iran’s nuclear program as being conducted in a “void” and “black hole.” Araghchi highlighted the changing global landscape as a reason for revisiting the JCPOA. “The situation today is not the same as before; the world has changed. The Ukraine war and the conflict in Gaza have altered the conditions. Therefore, the JCPOA cannot be revived in its current form, and certain parts of it must be revised.” Iran’s sale of drones to Russia, which have been used in the Ukraine conflict, has led to additional sanctions against Iran from the European Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States. These sanctions target individuals and military entities involved in the drone sales. Araghchi reiterated that while the JCPOA negotiations can serve as a reference, the agreement itself cannot simply be revived as it was. “We must approach this with a different perspective,” he stated. One of the challenges in reviving the JCPOA is that several key dates for obligations within the agreement have passed without compliance from either side. For example, the agreement’s restrictions on Iran’s research and development of new uranium enrichment centrifuges were not observed, making a return to the original terms difficult. Similarly, the European Union was supposed to lift all remaining restrictions, including arms embargoes, but this did not happen. Following his television interview, Araghchi later clarified that he did not declare the “death of the JCPOA” but emphasized that the agreement in its current form is not revivable. However, he indicated that other forms of agreements might be possible, which Iran would pursue. If the JCPOA had been fully implemented without violations, the agreement was set to remove many restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program by October 2025 and permanently lift the United Nations Security Council sanctions that are currently suspended. The three European countries that sponsored a resolution this past spring concerning the IAEA’s “unsatisfactory” monitoring of Iran’s program have submitted a report to the United Nations Security Council, which could pave the way for the re-imposition of prior UN sanctions on Iran. The United States, a key player in the JCPOA negotiations, faces a presidential election in November 2024. Both Republican candidate Donald Trump and Democratic candidate Kamala Harris have taken a tough stance on Iran’s foreign policy, though neither has yet provided a clear position on whether they would pursue a new comprehensive nuclear agreement with Iran or seek to revive the current JCPOA, though many U.S. observers similarly believe that the window to revive the 2015 agreement in its prior form has likewise passed. Ali Entezari Removed as Dean After Controversial Comments on Mahsa Amini’s Death Ali Entezari, the Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences at Allameh Tabataba’i University, has been dismissed from his position following his use of the phrase “nefleh shodan” (a derogatory term meaning “being wasted”) to describe the death of Mahsa (Jina) Amini while in the custody of the morality police. Entezari had previously apologized for his remarks, which sparked widespread controversy, including criticism from Amini’s parents. According to IRNA, Iran’s official state news agency, Entezari was removed from his post, and Abdullah Motamedi, the university’s president, appointed Ahmad Ghiasvand as the acting dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences. The decision to remove Entezari was attributed to his “use of inappropriate language that is inconsistent with Iranian and Islamic cultural norms” during an appearance on the state television program Shiveh. Entezari appeared on the program alongside Taghi Azad Armaki, where he discussed the 2022 protests. He remarked, “The enemy’s expectation was that when young people take to the streets over the killing or death or ‘wasting’ of a young Kurdish Sunni woman, the regime would be forced to resort to violence.” The use of the term “nefleh shodan” provoked significant backlash, leading Entezari to issue an apology. In a statement shared by Shiveh on the filtered platform X (formerly Twitter), Entezari explained, “I intended to present the issue from the perspective of the protesters, but I should have chosen my words more carefully and not relied on local colloquialisms.” Despite his apology, Entezari criticized the media for what he called a “malicious” portrayal of his comments. Mojgan Eftekhari, Mahsa Amini’s mother, condemned Entezari’s remarks in an Instagram story, describing them as “an insult to all Iranians” and suggesting that “hatred is deeply ingrained in his mind.” Amjad Amini, Mahsa’s father, also reacted to Entezari’s comments in an Instagram story, stating, “In response to the vulgar, insulting, and entirely false remarks made by Ali Entezari, so-called professor and dean at Allameh Tabataba’i University on the Islamic Republic’s state television regarding Mahsa (Jina) Amini and the Kurdish Sunni community, all I can say is ‘shame on him,’ and it’s best to leave it at that. To call Mahsa, a Kurdish Sunni girl, ‘wasted’ comes from a base mind.” During the same program, Entezari described the government’s response to the protests as “paternal,” claiming that the Islamic Republic did not act harshly towards protesters and that no one was expelled from universities. In contrast, Azad Armaki, who also participated in the discussion, responded to Entezari by saying, “We shot pellets at people, so many died, both supporters and opponents, so many were killed, there were poisonings in schools… Who did all of this? Was it not us?” According to estimates by the Iran Human Rights organization, at least 537 people were killed during the protests known as “Woman, Life, Freedom.” Thousands were imprisoned, and many students and professors lost their jobs. Dozens of protesters continue to suffer from injuries such as loss of eyesight, and several remain under threat of execution.