Önder Özar Diplomasi Sevgisi

Wednesday, August 31, 2022

Readout of President Biden’s Call with Prime Minister Mustafa Al-Kadhimi of Iraq AUGUST 31, 2022 •

Readout of President Biden’s Call with Prime Minister Mustafa Al-Kadhimi of Iraq

AUGUST 31, 2022

•

STATEMENTS AND RELEASES

President Joseph R. Biden Jr. spoke today with Prime Minister Mustafa Al-Kadhimi of Iraq to discuss U.S. support for a sovereign and independent Iraq. The President commended Prime Minister Kadhimi’s personal leadership during escalating tensions and violence over a 24-hour period earlier this week. He praised the performance of the Iraqi Security Forces and extended condolences to the families of those killed in the recent fighting. The President and the Prime Minister welcomed the return of security to the streets, and called on all Iraqi leaders to engage in a national dialogue to forge a common way forward consistent with Iraq’s constitution and laws. The President finally offered his full support for Prime Minister Kadhimi’s efforts to de-escalate tensions in the region through dialogue and diplomacy. The two leaders agreed to remain in touch over the coming weeks.

WILSON QUARTERLY DISPATCH AUGUST 2022 The Russia-Ukraine conflict has surpassed six months

WILSON QUARTERLY DISPATCH AUGUST 2022

Since the publication of our summer issue, Ripples of War, the Russia-Ukraine

conflict has surpassed six months. Last week, the Kennan Institute held an event with

several Wilson Quarterly authors, who provided additional insights on implications

for Russia, energy and the economy, and what might lie ahead in the coming months,

especially as it relates to European security and governance.

William Pomeranz, director of the Kennan Institute, discussed the heavy price the Russian leader is paying for his territorial quest. “The consequences of this war have been devastating in terms of Russia’s global exposure and global access to international institutions,” said Pomeranz. “I think what is important about this war is that it essentially took, I would argue, two weeks to destroy and eliminate all the things that Russia has achieved in the past 30 years.” His article, “Putin’s Imperial Dream,” examines Putin’s motivations against the backdrop of Russian history.

From the earliest days of the invasion, the blow of rising fuel prices in the US and Europe, soon gave way to deeper implications. Robin Quinville, director of the Global Europe Program, heard from many the hope that Putin would remain a reliable energy partner, as he did during the Cold War. “They have seen now that for Putin, energy is a weapon. They also see that energy security for Europe is really a whole-of-Europe discussion,” she said. Quinville, who recently served as Charge d'Affaires at the US Embassy in Berlin, Germany, is one of several foreign policy leaders who shared key learnings in our summer issue.

Andrian Prokip, an energy expert and senior associate with the Kennan Institute based in Ukraine, predicted Russia would ultimately fail to alter the European energy picture, including its move to green energy, but did offer caution. “We do see already more attention to coal usage, more attention to nuclear, and maybe Russia will, with blackmailing, achieve the goal of selling more energy to Europe than Russia expected.” Prokip then issued a stark warning: “I believe that the situation with nuclear terrorism at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant is something that he may try to use in this game. That is something that we—the whole world—should prevent, because it is going to be a disaster for the whole of Europe.” As we saw in recent days, the Zaporizhzia plant—and surrounding area—has seen active combat, and is the center of tense inspections that indeed have the world on edge. You can read more from Prokip, whose article in our summer issue offers several scenarios for Russia’s energy future.

As Bruce Jentleson, Duke University professor of public policy, observed, the Russian economy is not in complete collapse, but it has paid a heavy price in sanctions. “The projections of the GDP now are like they were in the early 1990s chaos that Russia went through then.” He went on to say that sanctions on semiconductors have been some of the most effective. “I think almost over 2,500 armored vehicles have been lost, largely through the bravery and skill of Ukrainian resistance and US and NATO aid. [Russia has] fired over 75%, by one Pentagon count, of their precision-guided missiles, and they’re taking semiconductors out of refrigerators and dishwashers, which, you know, probably aren’t designed the same exact way.” Here he examines the impact of sanctions, and key takeaways for their future use.

Global fellow Jill Dougherty, moderated the lively discussion, which included a number of questions from an educated and engaged audience. In her article for the summer issue, she shared the experiences of Russian journalists who have fled their home country.

One thing seems increasingly clear: the shape of Europe is forever changed.

“It is important to understand that Ukraine after this war will not be a post-Soviet country, it will be a European country, or at least that’s what its intention is,” said Pomeranz.

“You now see the EU deciding to offer candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova. You see NATO saying, right, we’re going to take on Sweden and Finland, who changed decades of their neutrality in order to join an alliance to deter further action, to strengthen that alliance,” said Quinville. “What you see then is Europe has a new threat perception, it’s changing to meet it, and individual countries are changing to meet it.” Quinville went on to call on European leaders to double down on their efforts in the coming months to both support Ukraine and strengthen its own security.

In closing thoughts, Pomeranz brought things back to Russia, and Putin. “I think that what this war also demonstrates is that Russia still doesn’t understand its own human capital, and doesn’t take advantage of its human capital. Bruce has talked about sanctions, but the brain drain will be a significant loss for Russia going forward. So I‘m looking at how does Russia recover from the sanctions, and the brain drain, and its isolation from the rest of the world.”

Bookmark the Wilson Center’s Hindsight Up Front: Ukraine webpage for ongoing analysis of the Russia-Ukraine war.

What is Taiwan’s plan to protect itself against Chinese pressure? Ryan Hass Friday, August 19, 2022

What is Taiwan’s plan to protect itself against Chinese pressure?

Ryan Hass Friday, August 19, 2022

Flying into Taiwan amidst Beijing’s unprecedented military exercises in response to U.S. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s August 2-3 visit was notable for its normalcy. There was no panic, no run on food and home supplies. The public calm contrasted with the last Taiwan Strait crisis in 1995-96, when Taiwan’s stock market and currency dropped and people queued to apply for American visas. Now, by comparison, restaurants are packed and sidewalks are filled with people living their everyday lives.

Ryan Hass, Fellow, Foreign Policy, John L. Thornton China Center, Center for East Asia Policy Studies, The Brookings Institution

Ryan Hass

Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center for East Asia Policy Studies, John L. Thornton China Center The Michael H. Armacost Chair Chen-Fu and Cecilia Yen Koo Chair in Taiwan Studies Nonresident Fellow, Paul Tsai China Center, Yale Law School

ryanl_hass

I visited Taiwan with Brookings colleagues from August 8-13. Our group met with Taiwan’s top elected and appointed officials, opposition party leaders, business executives, public intellectuals, and members of civil society. Recognizing that it is not possible to form a full picture of Taiwan’s outlook based on one week on the ground, I nevertheless am sharing this situation report to help fill in the gaps at a time when COVID restrictions make it difficult to engage in such face-to-face exchanges.

At the surface, there seemed to be public pride in Taiwan’s resilience in the face of China’s escalating pressure. That steadiness both reflects and is reflected in the temperament of Taiwan’s leader, President Tsai Ing-wen. Tsai has signaled that Taiwan will not flinch, but also will not provoke. She instructed her administration to deprive China of any justification for escalating tensions in the Taiwan Strait.

During our meetings, Taiwan’s leaders were unanimous that it was necessary for Taiwan to welcome Pelosi. To do otherwise, they argued, would have communicated that visits to Taiwan are constrained by Beijing’s preferences. Such a signal would have cratered public morale inside Taiwan and fed a feeling of international isolation, they warned.

To be sure, Beijing’s intensifying diplomatic, economic, and military pressure has contributed to rising international awareness of Taiwan’s situation. So, too, has Taiwan’s centrality to global value chains through its production of over 80% of the world’s advanced semiconductor chips. America’s staunch advocacy for Taiwan’s international space, including through the G-7, the Quad, and other international groups, also has played a role.

While some of our interlocutors called for the United States to project force in response to Beijing’s military exercises, such requests reflected a minority view. By far the more common refrain was that the United States and Taiwan should work in lockstep to strengthen U.S.-Taiwan relations and solidify Taiwan’s international support. Most of our Taiwan counterparts spoke of the need to keep international focus on China’s overreaction to Pelosi’s visit.

RESPONDING TO CHINA’S “COGNITIVE WARFARE”

Below the surface, there were a few variations in viewpoints among our Taiwan counterparts. One gap appeared over how to interpret China’s cyber, influence, and disinformation operations against the Taiwan public.

Broadly speaking, officials and experts with responsibility for Taiwan’s foreign relations were more prone to frame China’s attacks as a form of “cognitive warfare.” They sought to present China’s efforts to influence public and political attitudes in Taiwan as a threatening element of a Chinese campaign to alter Taiwan from within. By contrast, those with responsibility or research focus on Taiwan’s media and political discourse were more prone to poke fun at China’s ineptitude in influencing Taiwan’s domestic debates. They noted admiringly that Taiwan’s pluralistic and democratic society had produced strong antibodies to Beijing’s meddling. They highlighted Taiwan’s growing media literacy and the impotence of many of Beijing’s cyber and influence operations. They also cautioned that inflating the impact of Beijing’s intrusions carried second-order risks, such as infusing anxiety, spooking markets, and spurring capital flight.

On many internal issues, there seemed to be broad consensus. The main partisan policy divergence was over cross-Strait issues. Both major political parties, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Kuomintang (KMT), presented themselves as safe-keepers of the status quo. They both presented the other party as rigid and ideological on China. The KMT’s argument was that they could deal directly with Beijing to lower risk and preserve stability. Since Beijing refuses to deal directly with the DPP, the DPP’s response has been to bolster Taiwan’s relations with the United States, Japan, Australia, Europe, and other partners as a bulwark against Chinese pressure.

U.S.-TAIWAN COORDINATION IS DEEP

This presents a double-edged sword for U.S.-Taiwan relations. On one hand, it incentivizes the DPP to actively coordinate with Washington. This impulse has deepened private coordination between senior U.S. and Taiwan officials. Their consultations have generated early signs of progress in advancing a shared agenda around substantive issues, such as strengthening Taiwan’s asymmetric military capabilities and building a forward-looking trade and economic agenda. It also has concentrated minds on the importance of developing a common understanding between Washington and Taipei on how to define and defend the cross-Strait status quo.

On the other hand, the DPP’s desire for visible proof of progress with the United States and others has put a premium on symbolic demonstrations of support. When such visible symbols of support have not been as forthcoming from the Biden administration as some leaders in Taipei would prefer, Taiwan authorities seem to have been turning to members of Congress and former American officials to fill the void.

TAIWAN’S ECONOMY IS STRONG

Taiwan’s economic performance was a bright spot of our meetings. In 2021, Taiwan’s economy outperformed nearly every other advanced economy, growing near 6%. Several tailwinds contributed to this growth. These included a significant brain gain as Taiwan expatriates in China and the United States returned to shelter from COVID-19 and apply their talents and investments in Taiwan. Beijing’s worsening business environment also contributed to the reshoring of thousands of Taiwan firms. A global surge in demand for semiconductors disproportionately benefited Taiwan. The U.S.-China trade war also incentivized Taiwan companies to shift production from China to Taiwan to avoid American tariffs on Chinese exports.

We detected some concern that Taiwan may now be at the peak of a business cycle; as global macroeconomic conditions worsen, so too might Taiwan’s outlook. There also was guarded wariness that Taiwan’s economy may be growing over-reliant on semiconductors, what one counterpart referred to as “Dutch tulip syndrome,” and that a slowdown in demand could curb Taiwan’s overall economic performance. Such concerns were not evident in our interactions with leaders in the semiconductor sector, though. These executives projected confidence that their companies could sustain Taiwan’s global technological edge and deliver innovations that would generate demand well into the future.

TAIWAN’S SECURITY SITUATION IS EVOLVING

Although we did not detect alarm about risk of imminent Chinese military attack against Taiwan, neither did our interlocutors seem sanguine. The war in Ukraine served as a reminder of the real risk of conflict. There was an expectation of upticks in Chinese military and other forms of pressure on the horizon. Such upticks potentially could be in response to American naval or air presence demonstrations near Taiwan, the conclusion of the Chinese Communist Party’s 20th Party Congress this fall, and/or in the run-up to Taiwan’s 2024 presidential and legislative elections, when Beijing may attempt to use shows of force to influence voter preferences.

Even though China’s military exercises were ongoing while we were visiting Taiwan, there was not much evidence of new thinking or greater urgency around Taiwan’s defense reforms. Officials and experts pointed to Taiwan’s plans to raise defense spending in 2023. Taiwan still seemed to favor a mix of defense investments between conventional and asymmetric capabilities to deal with a range of contingencies, as opposed to a pure “porcupine strategy.” They broadly agreed upon Taiwan’s need for more training for conscripts and reservists, but they did not seem to have consensus around a plan for doing so. They uniformly asserted Taiwan’s responsibility to defend itself. Most also acknowledged that Taiwan’s war reserve stockpiles are inadequate and that Taiwan must increase its supplies of fuel, food, medicine, and critical munitions. Even so, most footnoted these comments with encouragement for the United States to routinely remind Beijing that it does not rule out use of force to respond to a future Chinese attack on Taiwan. In other words, Taiwan’s leaders know Taiwan must defend itself, but they also hope the United States will do more to deter Beijing from trying to take Taiwan by force.

These expectations reflect broad recognition in Taiwan that China seeks to foster conditions for eventual unification by weakening Taiwan, limiting U.S.-Taiwan relations, and isolating Taiwan on the world stage. There also is concern in some quarters that Xi Jinping might become less patient in his approach to Taiwan the nearer he comes to the end of his time in power.

Taiwan’s current theory seems to be that it can offset Chinese pressure with greater investments at home, improved defense capabilities, predictable and steady cross-Strait policies, sustainment of its central role in global value chains, and tighter coordination with friends and partners abroad. President Tsai seems to believe that it is wiser for Taiwan to deny China an ability to achieve its goals than to confront China directly in a showdown. Her bet is predicated on an expectation that other powers in Asia and globally will recognize that their interests are implicated by conditions in the Taiwan Strait, and that this will encourage them to act on their interests to bolster stability in the Taiwan Strait. This seems a reasonable posture. At the same time, the cross-Strait situation is dynamic, not static. As challenges from China mount on Taiwan’s ability to maintain political autonomy, democratic governance, economic vibrancy, and international space, so too will Taiwan’s overall strategy need to adapt.

Pelosi’s Visit to Taiwan: Provoking the First AI War in History?

Foreign Policy

Pelosi’s Visit to Taiwan: Provoking the First AI War in History?

Aug 26, 2022printTweet

Cheng Li

Director, John L. Thornton China Center, The Brookings Institution

01. AI war.jpg

For the past few years, prominent diplomats and scholars of U.S.-China relations have worried that the nearly half-century-long absence of major war in East Asia might come to an end as a result of the drastic deterioration of the bilateral relationship. These worries have reached an unprecedentedly elevated level following the visit of U.S. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi to Taipei this August.

Beijing’s exceptionally strong reaction, which has included dispatching missiles, warships, and warplanes into the air and seas around Taiwan, has sent the unambiguous message that the Chinese leadership is prepared to use force. From the perspective of this rising authoritarian global power, Washington’s de facto support of Taiwan independence (of what the Chinese perceive to be a “runaway province”) challenges China’s “vital core interest.” The aggressive military drills by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) have notably crossed the so-called “median line” in the Taiwan Strait. In addition, the PLA has fired missiles targeting seven sea areas surrounding the island of Taiwan, including the far side of the island facing the Pacific, the region frequently navigated by U.S. naval vessels. This development was seen by some experts as a move akin to rehearsing a blockade.

Speaker Pelosi was neither the first, nor will she be the last, prominent American leader to visit Taiwan. Washington clearly has become more explicit in its military support of Taiwan. “The Taiwan Policy Act of 2022,” a bipartisan bill being considered on the floor in the U.S. Congress, proposes that the United States designate Taiwan as a “major non-NATO ally,” the status granted to Japan, South Korea, and Australia. Beijing regards this U.S. policy as the official abandonment of the “one China policy” by the United States. In the view of the Chinese leadership, this bill, if passed, will leave China with no other choice but to resolve the Taiwan question by force.

02. The Taiwan Policy Act of 2022.png

FILE PHOTO: U.S. senators Lindsey Graham (R-SC) and Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Bob Menendez (D-NJ) are the two authors of the Taiwan Policy Act of 2022.

While China speaks about One-China Policy, America is planning to discuss the Taiwan Policy Act 2022 in September.

Notedly, analysts in China, the United States, and Taiwan have now given more thought to when these three parties will unavoidably engage in war rather than whether it will happen. Many analysts also assess how war would likely unfold. But surprisingly, except for Dr. Henry Kissinger and a few others, very few have highlighted the fact that a war over the Taiwan Strait would be between two artificial intelligence (AI) superpowers. The extensive application of AI in warfare is arguably inevitable, which will likely escalate from a limited conventional or proxy war into a rapidly spiraling high-tech war on the one hand and magnify miscalculation and misinformation on the other.

Any serious student of warfare should be alert to this would-be first AI war in history and explore all means to prevent such a cataclysmic war in which everyone would lose.

Henry Kissinger.png

U.S. Former Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger and his book The Age of A.I.

In an interview with the German newspaper Die Welt in April 2021, Kissinger warns China and U.S. to guard against an “all-out” artificial intelligence conflict, and urges U.S. to ramp up its AI.

Sober warnings from American strategic thinkers

Both China and the United States carry some responsibility for the dangerous downward spiral of the world’s most consequential bilateral relationship. Several of America’s most distinguished strategic thinkers, scholars, and journalists have been explicitly critical of Pelosi’s provocative visit to Taiwan, not to mention President Biden’s ineffectiveness at preventing the ongoing downward spiral. Stunningly, Henry Kissinger, Graham Allison, and Thomas Friedman all have warned that Washington may be heading toward a situation in which the United States is simultaneously plunged into military conflicts with a nuclear-armed Russia over Ukraine and a nuclear-armed China over Taiwan. In the words of Dr. Kissinger, the increasing animosity between the United States and China over the Taiwan Strait risks a global “catastrophe comparable to World War I.”

A major war between two superpowers will most likely result in enormous casualties. In fact, even during the three wars in East Asia in which the United States engaged between the post-WWII period and the mid-1970s, a quarter of a million American lives were lost. The death tolls of people in East Asia were much higher. There is no comparison at all between the Chinese Communist troops then and the PLA forces today, as the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is now the second largest military power in the world.

Professor Cho-yun Hsu, a distinguished historian and a member of the Academica Sinica in Taipei, was recently quoted in media outlets on both sides of the Taiwan Strait: “If there is a war between China and the United States, both countries (and Taiwan) will suffer devastating consequences, and half of the world will be destroyed.”

Cautiously optimistic views and their limitations

Understandably, given the well-grounded argument that neither China nor the United States can achieve a “total victory” by destroying the other without destroying itself, many people believe that both sides will therefore be very hesitant to go to war against the other. As my Brookings colleague Ryan Hass, who previously served as director for China, Taiwan, and Mongolia on the National Security Council in the Obama administration, recently observed, “If war arrives in the Taiwan Strait and involves PRC, Taiwan, and U.S. forces, it is difficult to imagine a scenario whereby any party could prevail and come out strengthened by conflict.”

That may explain why there is no enthusiastic public support in the United States or Taiwan for military conflict with the PRC. As for Beijing, long-standing Chinese military strategy espoused by ancient philosopher-strategist Sun Tzu, including that, “The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting” (buzhan er quren zhibing), is perhaps particularly relevant regarding China’s hesitance to use force to achieve unification with Taiwan. Taiwanese are always regarded in Beijing’s official narrative as “flesh and blood compatriots” (gurou tongbao). As for Beijing’s strategic thinking regarding the trend in Washington calling for abandonment of the “one China policy,” commentary has frequently called for “promoting the fighting spirit, but not breaking into war” (dou er bupo), which reflects a more cautious approach on the part of the Chinese foreign policy establishment.

While these cautiously optimistic views are all valid to a certain extent, it is important to also be clear minded about the fact that several key factors point to a different and far more pessimistic scenario. These factors include:

1) The drastic surge of ultra-nationalistic and anti-Washington sentiments among the Chinese public during this ongoing Taiwan Strait crisis.

2) The increasingly prevalent assessment by the Chinese leadership that Washington will not give up its determination to use issues including human rights, Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and Taiwan (on each of which Speaker Pelosi has left her legacy) to destabilize, divide, and dismember China.

3) The growing consensus in Zhongnanhai that the chance for peaceful reunification is so slim that the Taiwan question can only be resolved militarily, or in the words of a prominent advisor to the Chinese leadership, there is an “urgent need for rethinking the strategy for reunification and policy toward the United States.”

4) The rapid elevation of risk for incidents resulting from the frequency of warship navigation and warplane flight drills by all three parties (PRC, the United States, and Taiwan), as well as American allies.

5) The increasing risk for incidents coinciding with “the breakdown in all direct channels of communication between Beijing and Taipei as well as Beijing and Washington.”

Arguably the most important factor that highlights both the danger and potential for quick escalation of military conflict and the urgent imperative to prevent such an outcome lies in the fact that the United States and China are the world’s greatest AI superpowers. The outbreak and advancement of such a war will likely have exceptional features and will differ profoundly from many other wars, including the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war.

Digest VOL 34.png

Click to read the latest issue of China-US Focus Digest

The potential for high-tech war over Taiwan

The Russia-Ukraine war has been largely a land war, and the U.S. and NATO have not provided air support as requested by the president of Ukraine. Although naval warships have participated in the battle, their roles have been quite limited. In contrast, the prospect of war over the Taiwan Strait will differ completely based on both the island’s geography and the strategic objectives of the forces involved.

According to a November 2021 report on China’s military by the U.S. Department of Defense, in such a battle, the PLA will vigorously challenge the United States in the domains of air, land, sea, digital networks, and space. More specifically, according to the same source, the PRC has commenced building at least three solid-fuel Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) silo fields, which will cumulatively contain hundreds of new ICBMs.

China is a late comer as it adopts joint operations in warfare. For the first five decades of the PRC, the Chinese military utilized the Russia military model, which heavily emphasized the use of land forces. Until around the turn of the century, especially during the past decade under Xi’s leadership, the Chinese military has placed a high priority on joint operations among various forces, largely following the U.S. military model. Former Party leader Jiang Zemin declared that the mission of the PLA is to win high-tech local wars over Taiwan. Xi Jinping’s emphasis on the leapfrog development of aerospace and AI through the military reforms over the past few years has accelerated the country’s military modernization.

It is interesting to note that the Chinese space military corps –– the Space Systems Division (hangtian xitong bu) under the PLA Strategic Support Force –– was founded at the beginning of 2016, about four years prior to the creation of the United States Space Force (USSF). In December 2019, President Donald Trump signed the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for fiscal year 2020 and established the USSF, the sixth branch of the American armed forces. Similarly, the Japan Air Self-Defense Force recently formed a space warfare squadron. The Japanese government also established an electronic warfare corps in 2021 and a networks security corps in 2022.

More significantly, under the leadership of Xi Jinping, China has adopted a military–civil fusion (MCF, junmin ronghe) development strategy, which blurs the distinction between the military and civilian applications of many leading technologies, including big data, semiconductors, nuclear technology, aerospace technology, aircraft engines, shipbuilding, 5G, robotics, and AI. According to a recent report by Graham Allison, in the U.S.-China competition in these areas, China has already become No. 1 in the world or will overtake the U.S. within the next decade. Perhaps more accurately speaking, the United States and China are co-leaders in most of these areas in the world today.

China-US AI competition: Research, applications, and resources

In the area of AI, the Chinese government and the private sector both have made huge investments over the past decade. Consequently, China and the United States have been seen as two AI superpowers because of their leadership in research, publications, patents, and applications. Chart 1 shows the dominant roles of China and the United States in terms of scholarly journal articles published on “machine deep learning” and “deep neural networks.” In 2015, China and the United States were in the first tier, which was far ahead of the second tier of other developed countries.

Chart 1 AI WAR.png

A 2022 report on AI published by Stanford University’s Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence presents the rapid growth of AI patent filings in the case of China (see Chart 2). In 2010, the patent filings from China accounted for only about 12 percent of the global total and rose to 52 percent in 2021, compared with the United States (17 percent) and the EU and UK (4 percent). The percentage of patent filings by other countries, including Japan, India, Australia, Canada, Russia, Singapore, and South Korea, was insignificant.

Chart 2 AI WAR.png

In terms of private investment in AI, the United States has been way ahead of other countries including China. Chart 3 shows that the amount of private investment in the United States (US$149 billion) has been double that of China (US$62 billion) over the past decade. Other countries such as the UK, India, Israel, Canada, Germany, and France were even further behind. It should be noted, however, that among those private investors in AI in the United States, a significant number have PRC backgrounds according to the FBI and some U.S.-based researchers.

Chart 3 AI WAR.png

This certainly explains the Biden administration’s selective decoupling with China in the science and technology area. Geopolitical fault lines are beginning to form, with AI technology being a central domain of competition and conflict. Such vicious competition crystalizes an already threatened bifurcation of the world and seems to reaffirm the reemergence of two military and ideological blocs.

Preventing the first AI war in history

Just as Russia’s horrific invasion of Ukraine has evoked memories of the Cold War in Europe, China’s pressure campaign over Taiwan and the new U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy against China –– including the provocative moves to change the “one China policy” as evidenced by Speaker Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan –– are part of a vicious cycle leading toward the end of four decades of precious peace in the Asia-Pacific region.

If we cannot stop that trend, we may face a hot war that may escalate very quickly to an AI war between the United States and China — a potentially horrible machine to machine war resulting from lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS). One does not need to be a military expert to understand that, in the present-day Taiwan Strait with frequent military drills by all parties, the risk of accidents has been increasing exponentially.

Anyone should realize that a war over Taiwan, if it occurs, will have a far more catastrophic impact on the world than the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war. One may reasonably argue that neither China nor the United States is ready for an AI war, at least for now. But the sad truth is that the better prepared both sides are for a possible AI war, the more tragic the outcome may be.

Since 2019, the Brookings Institution and Tsinghua University have co-sponsored a U.S.-China Dialogue on Artificial Intelligence and National Security, a series of track-II (unofficial) dialogues. The project includes top AI experts, former government officials, retired military generals, and think tank scholars from both countries, who hope to help guide decision-makers in their respective countries to develop sound policy in the new AI era.

The Dialogue focuses on the key question: What role, if any, should the United States and China play in international norm-building and risk-reduction efforts related to AI-enabled military systems? The dialogue has explored issues and possible areas of consensus such as off-limits targets, off-limits data, proportionality and human oversight, and international norm-building. These kinds of bilateral engagements are critical to ensuring that thought leaders on both sides are speaking with each other and providing hope for future coordination — and even cooperation — on AI.

It is imperative for the international community, including citizens of the two AI superpowers, to work together to address various highly consequential challenges relating to AI in our time. These issues range from ethics, common norms, law, risk prevention for AI-enabled weapons, the security of AI data, mechanisms to prevent attacks on critical infrastructure, and protections for the integrity of global financial data, to public awareness and civil discourse.

Winston Churchill once said: “You can always count on Americans to do the right thing –– after they’ve tried everything else.” In the AI era, with the absence of the “revolving mechanism” or what President Biden has called “the guardrail of commonsense” in the U.S.-China relationship, we may not have the luxury to “have tried everything else.”

Foreign Policy

Press statement by President Charles Michel following the trilateral meeting with President Aliyev of Azerbaijan and Prime Minister Pashinyan of Armenia, 31 August 2022

31/08/2022 17:53 | Statements and remarks |

Press statement by President Charles Michel following the trilateral meeting with President Aliyev of Azerbaijan and Prime Minister Pashinyan of Armenia, 31 August 2022

As agreed during our last meeting in May, I hosted President Aliyev of Azerbaijan and Prime Minister Pashinyan of Armenia today.

This was our fourth discussion in this format. Our discussions focused on recent developments in the South Caucasus and the relations between the EU and both countries.

Our exchanges were open and productive - and I would like to thank both leaders for that. We reviewed the entire set of issues on our agenda.

It is positive to see that quite a few steps have been taken to take forward the agreements reached during our last meeting.

Peace Agreement

Today we agree to step up substantive work to advance on the peace treaty governing inter-state relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan and tasked the Foreign Ministers to meet within one month to work on draft texts.

Humanitarian issues

We also had a detailed discussion on humanitarian issues, including demining, detainees and the fate of missing persons.

President Michel stressed to Azerbaijan the importance of further release of Armenian detainees.

The EU will continue to be engaged in these questions.

Border issues

We reviewed progress on all questions related to the delimitation of the border and how best to ensure a stable situation.

We agreed that the next meeting of the Border Commissions will take place in Brussels in November.

Connectivity

We reviewed progress of discussions on the modalities for unblocking the transport links.

With all these discussions, I would like to underline that it is important to take the population along on both sides and prepare them for a long-term sustainable peace.

Public messaging is critical in this regard – in a sensitive situation like this every word spoken in public is obviously listened to by the other side and weighed.

The EU is ready to further step up its support towards a long-term sustainable peace. The EU will also continue to push for the advancement of economic development for the benefit of both countries and their populations.

We have agreed to meet again in this format by the end of November.

Visit the website

ABD DB Blinken : Statement on the Passing of President Mikhail Gorbachev 08/31/2022 12:21 PM EDT

Statement on the Passing of President Mikhail Gorbachev

08/31/2022 12:21 PM EDT

Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State

We join people around the world in mourning the passing of Mikhail Gorbachev. Perhaps no word is more closely associated with Mr. Gorbachev than glasnost, or openness. That’s fitting for a man whose openness changed the course of human history.

Mr. Gorbachev was open to acknowledging his country’s history – not just its triumphs, but its tragedies – what he called the “blank spots” of the Soviet Union’s past. He created space for dissenting views, and freed dissidents who had spent years in exile or prison. He was also open to working with other nations, including adversaries like the United States, driven by the conviction that dialogue was in the interest of his people – and all people.

It’s tempting to see the massive achievements of that engagement – including the end of the Cold War, the fall of the Berlin Wall, the first-ever agreement to reduce the nuclear arsenals of the U.S. and the USSR – as inevitable. But those achievements would have been unimaginable without the courage and determination Mr. Gorbachev brought to his pursuit of openness, and the trust he built with Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush.

He never lost faith in the transformative power of such engagement, even as some of his greatest accomplishments were weakened. In 2018, he wrote, “Is it too late to return to dialogue and negotiations? I don’t want to lose hope…We must not resign, we must not surrender.” He was right, and his life is a powerful reminder of all that can be achieved when we make those ideals a reality.

Büyük Zafer’den 100 yıl sonra Türk-Yunan ilişkilerinin geleceği - Sedat Ergin

Büyük Zafer’den 100 yıl sonra Türk-Yunan ilişkilerinin geleceği

Ağustos 31, 2022 09:01

"Büyük Zafer"in 100’üncü yıldönümünü coşku ile kutluyoruz

Bu vesileyle yapılan yayınlarda, mülakatlarda paylaşılan bilgiler, ayrıntılar, zafere giden “Büyük Taarruz”un planlaması ve icrası üzerinde hayranlığımızın daha da artmasına yol açıyor. Mustafa Kemal’in önderliğinde sahada gerçekleştirilen emsalsiz askeri başarı, yüzyıl sonra bugünkü kuşaklar için de bir gurur kaynağıdır.

30 Ağustos 1922 tarihinde gerçekleşen Dumlupınar’daki “Başkumandanlık Meydan Muharebesi”nin sonraki aşaması, İzmir’e doğru yakıp yıkarak, katliamlar yaparak kaçan işgalci Yunan ordusunun kovalanması ve nihayetinde 9 Eylül 1922 tarihinde İzmir’in kurtarılmasıyla son bulmuştur.

Bizler sahadaki çatışma hattının Türk ordusu tarafından bakıyoruz bu tarihi hadiseye. Tabii cephenin bir de diğer tarafı var. Peki “kaybeden” taraf olarak Yunanistan bu hadiseyi nasıl yaşamıştı?

Değerli meslektaşım Stelyo Berberakis’in geçen hafta sonunda T-24’te yayımlanan “100 yıl önce, 100 yıl sonra/Garp Cephesi’nde yeni bir şeyler olmuştu” başlıklı yazısı, bu kez cephe hattının diğer tarafına geçmemizi sağlıyor. Savaşın Yunanistan açısından seyrini ve Türklerin zaferinin Ege’nin karşı kıyısında yol açtığı sonuçları büyüteç altına yatırıyor.

Berberakis, yazısının girişinde Türkiye “Zafer Bayramı”nın 100’üncü yıldönümünü kutlarken, Yunanistan’ın da ordularının Anadolu’da uğradığı “hezimet”in 100’üncü yıldönümünü andığını hatırlatıyor. Yüz yıl önce Anadolu topraklarında yaşanan hadise, Türkler için “Kurtuluş Savaşı”, Yunanlılar için “Küçük Asya Felaketi”dir.

Bu felaketin başlangıç adımı “İngiltere’nin teşviki ve desteği” ile Yunanistan’ın 15 Eylül 1919 tarihinde İzmir’i işgal etmesidir. Yunanistan’ın o dönemdeki başbakanı Eleftherios Venizelos, “İzmir’e Helen kökenlileri korumak/kurtarmak için çıktık. Ülkemizi beş denizli, iki kıtalı bir ülke yaptık” diyerek, hayalindeki “Megali İdea”nın, yani Osmanlı öncesindeki Helen topraklarının geri alınması hedefinin gerçekleşmeye başladığını ilan eder.

Berberakis’in özellikle dikkat çektiği bir nokta var. Venizelos’un amacı Ankara’ya kadar ilerlemek değildir. Kraliyet düşmanı bir Cumhuriyetçi olan Venizelos, yakaladığı bu avantajı sandıkta oya tahvil etmek hedefiyle bir yıl sonra 1920 kasım ayı için erken seçim ilan eder, ancak evdeki hesap çarşıya uymaz. Seçimi Kraliyet taraftarlarından oluşan koalisyon partisi büyük bir çoğunlukla kazanır. Muhalefet, seçimde “Yunan evlatlarının Anadolu’da ne işi var?” temasını kullanır.

Seçimden sonra kurulan Dimitris Gounaris’in başbakanlığındaki hükümet, Kral Konstantin’i sürgünden geri getirirken, İzmir’in işgali konusunda seçim vaatlerinin aksi yönünde davranır. Anadolu cephesinin çökmekte olduğu şeklindeki bir değerlendirme hatasıyla Yunan ordusuna Ankara’ya doğru ilerlemesi emri verilir. Bu arada, Ordu içindeki Cumhuriyetçi komutan ve subaylar, Kralcı komutan ve subaylarla değiştirilir. Bu değerlendirme hatası büyük bir hezimetle sonuçlanacaktır.

“Büyük Taarruz” sonrasında uğradıkları bozgun yaşanırken Yunan ordusunun geri çekilmesine komuta eden Albay Nikolaos Plastiras bir Cumhuriyetçidir. Türk Ordusu 9 Eylül 1922 tarihinde İzmir’e girdikten dört gün sonra 13 Eylül 1922’de Sakız Adası’na çıkar Plastiras ve ardından hükümete karşı darbe düzenler.

Darbenin ardından parlamento içinde kurulan askeri mahkeme, eski başbakan Gounaris dahil beş hükümet üyesi ve Anadolu Cephesi Başkomutanı General Georgios Hacıanestis olmak üzere 6 kişi hakkında idam kararı verir. Yunan güçlerini Ankara’ya göndererek kıyımlarına yol açtıkları, asırlarca Anadolu’da yaşayan yüz binlerce Helen’in hayatlarını tehlikeye attıkları ve “Küçük Asya Felaketi”ne neden oldukları için “Vatana İhanet”ten suçlu bulunmuşlardır. Hükümlüler 15 Kasım 1922 tarihinde kurşuna dizilirler.

Ardından 1923 Lozan Barış Antlaşması uyarınca 1.5 milyon Anadolulu Rum Yunanistan’a, Yunanistan’da yaşayan yaklaşık 400 bin Müslüman Türk de Türkiye’ye göç etmek zorunda kalır.

Savaş sonrası Türk-Yunan ilişkilerinde bir barış dönemini beraberinde getirir. Bir süre sonra yeniden Başbakan seçilen Venizelos, 1930 yılında Ankara’yı ziyaret ederek Mustafa Kemal Atatürk ile bir barış anlaşması imzalar. Ayrıca, 1934 yılında Atatürk’ü Nobel Barış Ödülü’ne aday gösterir.

Stelyo’nun yazısının en çarpıcı kısmı, final paragrafında yönelttiği şu soru: “Birbirleriyle savaşmış, kanını dökmüş, savaşın gerçek yüzünü görmüş iki ulusun önderleri bu denli bir dostluk inşa etme büyüklüğünü göstermişken, aradan geçen 100 yılın sonunda yeni ve özlü bir anlaşma yapılması için illa bir savaş mı çıkması gerekiyor?”

Ne kadar düşündürücüdür ki, “Büyük Zafer”in 100’üncü yıldönümü haberleri Türkiye ile Yunanistan arasında Ege’de patlak veren gerilim haberleriyle iç içe geçmiştir. Gazete sayfalarında 1922 yılı ağustos sonunda “Büyük Taarruz”da Afyon cephesinden başlayan topçu ateşini anlatan yazılardan, tam bir asır sonra aynı günlerde Yunanistan’ın Girit’teki S-300 radarlarının Türk-F-16 uçaklarına kilitlendiği bildiren haberlere geçiş yaptık.

Bu haberler, geride bırakılan bütün zamana karşılık, iki komşunun aralarındaki anlaşmazlıkları çözüme kavuşturup ilişkilerini gerilimden arındırdıkları mutlak bir barış ortamını inşa edemediklerini anlatıyor.

Geçen yüz yıla baktığımızda, Yunanistan’ın 1974’te Kıbrıs’ta gerçekleştirdiği darbe girişimi ve onu izleyen Türkiye’nin Barış Harekâtı hariç tutulursa, iki ülke arasında ilişkiler aslında ana doğrultusu itibarıyla bir çatışmasızlık dönemi izlemiştir. Gelgelelim özellikle 20’nci yüzyılın son çeyreğinde Ege Denizi üzerinde ortaya çıkan sorunların hiçbirinde çözüm yönünde özlü bir ilerleme sağlanamamıştır.

Türkiye ile Yunanistan, hava sahası, kıta sahanlığı, karasuları, adacık ve kayalıkların aidiyeti, adaların silahlandırılması dahil olmak üzere Ege Denizi’nin hemen hemen her noktasında, her köşesinde anlaşmazlık halindedirler.

Ege Denizi üzerindeki görüş ayrılıklarına son dönemde hidrokarbon kaynaklarını da içine alacak şekilde Doğu Akdeniz bölgesindeki büyük çekişme de eklenmiştir.

Durumu zorlaştıran bir başka gelişme, Yunanistan’ın Avrupa Birliği’ne tam üyeliği nedeniyle artık Türkiye’nin karşısına tek başına değil, çoğunluk AB’yi de yanına alarak çıkma imkânına sahip olmasıdır.

ABD Yönetimi ve özellikle de ABD Kongresi’nin desteğini açıkça Yunanistan’dan yana koyması, Batı dünyası cephesindeki tabloyu daha da ağırlaştırıyor Türkiye açısından. Yunan hükümeti, bir yandan silahlanma yönünde ciddi adımlar atarken, Washington’daki desteklerinden yararlanarak Türkiye’ye silah satışlarını engellemeye, Ege’deki güç dengesini kendi lehine değiştirmeye çalışıyor.

Kuşkusuz, son dönemde Türkiye’nin Batı ile ilişkilerinin -doğrudan kendisinden kaynaklanan nedenler de dahil olmak üzere- birçok faktörün bileşimiyle bir bütün olarak kuvvetli bir irtifa kaybına uğraması da Yunanistan’ın pekâlâ yararlanabileceği bir iklim yaratıyor.

Atina, Batı’da sağladığı desteklerle Türkiye’yi köşeye sıkıştırıp Ege’de ve Doğu Akdeniz’de geriletebilmeyi hedefliyor. Bu noktada hem AB hem de ABD’nin ağırlıklarını Yunanistan’dan yana koymaları, ne yazık ki komşumuzu Türkiye ile bir uzlaşıya girme ihtiyacından uzaklaştırıyor. Batı, buradaki taraf tutumuyla Türkiye ile Yunanistan arasında uzlaşıya hizmet etmediğini görmek durumundadır.

Ayrıca, Batı’dan uzaklaşmış bir Türkiye’nin mi, yoksa Batı ile bütünleşmiş bir Türkiye’nin mi Yunanistan açısından daha tercihe şayan olacağı da Yunan karar vericilerin yanıtlamaları gereken bir sorudur.

Şimdi başa dönelim. Bulunduğunuz konuma göre adı ister “Büyük Zafer”, ister “Küçük Asya Felaketi” olsun, geçen yüzyılın başında yaşanan tecrübenin mirası iki komşuya tarihi bir görev yüklüyor. İlişkileri bugün için ne kadar olumsuz bir doğrultuya girmiş olsa da, Türkiye ile Yunanistan, aralarındaki sorunları eninde sonunda barışçı yöntemlerle çözüme kavuşturacak olgunluğu sergilemek sınavıyla karşı karşıyalar.

Tarihin akışında bundan sonra iki ülke arasında bir zaferden söz edilecekse, artık bunun adı “Barışın Zaferi” olmalıdır. Atatürk ile Venizelos’un yaklaşık bir yüzyıl önce oluşturdukları emsal bugüne de ışık tutuyor.

Hürriyet -31 Ağustos 22022