U.S. to Reimpose Sanctions on Belarus Over Forced Plane Landing

 The New York Times

U.S. to Reimpose Sanctions on Belarus Over Forced Plane Landing

Mike Ives  1 hr ago  (MAY 29, 2021)

Biden thinks China hid COVID-19 origin info, China sees 'political virus'

Trump pours scorn on Paul Ryan as 'a curse' to the Republican Party after

The Biden administration said late Friday that it would reimpose economic sanctions on certain state-owned companies in Belarus, the latest diplomatic pushback from a Western government after the country’s authoritarian leader forced down a European passenger jet last weekend.

President Biden has denounced Belarus for forcing a passenger jet to land in Minsk and arresting a dissident journalist who was onboard.© Doug Mills/The New York Times President Biden has denounced Belarus for forcing a passenger jet to land in Minsk and arresting a dissident journalist who was onboard.

The plane, a Ryanair Boeing 737 headed from Greece to Lithuania, was traveling through Belarusian airspace on Sunday when it was diverted and forced to land in Minsk, the capital, with an escort from a fighter jet. Roman Protasevich, a Belarusian opposition journalist who had been living in exile abroad, was detained along with his girlfriend after the plane landed.

Belarus’s president, Aleksandr G. Lukashenko, a brutal and eccentric strongman, has claimed that he rerouted the plane because of an emailed bomb threat, not to seize Mr. Protasevich. But a Swiss email provider has said that the email cited by the Belarusian authorities was sent after the plane had already been diverted.

Leaders of European Union countries, outraged by what some called a state hijacking, have pledged to impose new economic sanctions against Mr. Lukashenko’s government and have begun severing direct air links to Belarus. President Biden this week directed his team “to develop appropriate options to hold accountable those responsible” for the forced landing, in coordination with the European Union and other partners.

The European Union has been severing direct air links to the country since the forced landing.© Associated Press Boarding a train to Moscow in Minsk, the capital of Belarus, on Friday. The European Union has been severing direct air links to the country since the forced landing.

Jen Psaki, the White House press secretary, said in a statement on Friday night that sanctions on nine state-owned Belarusian enterprises that had been lifted by the Treasury Department would be reimposed on June 3.

The United States, along with the European Union and other allies, is also developing a list of sanctions to be imposed on members of Mr. Lukashenko’s government associated with “ongoing abuses of human rights and corruption, the falsification of the 2020 election and the events of May 23,” she added.

The claim of election fraud was a reference to last summer, when Mr. Lukashenko, who has been in power since 1994, claimed to have won 80 percent of the vote in what many Western governments said was a sham election. His claim prompted mass demonstrations that were met with a police crackdown.

Spokespeople for Mr. Lukashenko’s government could not immediately be reached for comment on Saturday.

Mr. Protasevich, the detained journalist, co-founded a Telegram channel that is a popular opposition outlet in Belarus and was used to help mobilize the protests last year. Mr. Biden has called for the release of the 26-year-old, saying that his arrest and a video that he made recently while in state custody — apparently under duress — were “shameful assaults on both political dissent and the freedom of the press.”

On top of the sanctions announced on Friday, the United States will also suspend its application of a 2019 air services agreement with Belarus, and it recently advised American citizens not to travel to the country, Ms. Psaki said in the statement.

“We take these measures, together with our partners and allies, to hold the regime accountable for its actions and to demonstrate our commitment to the aspirations of the people of Belarus,” she said.

TOURİSM IN EUROPE : A NEW MODEL

 Tourism in Europe: a new model

by Malin Ackholt, Kerstin Howald and Pilar Rato on 25th May 2021

Rebuilding tourism is a priority but the sector must become more sustainable and resilient, with workers and quality jobs at the heart of recovery.

Tourism is one of the world’s most important industries. It employs one in every ten on earth and provides livelihoods for hundreds of millions more. As the world’s leading tourism destination, Europe is no exception: the sector gives work to over 13 million people.

The Covid-19 pandemic has however plunged tourism into paralysis, inflicting tremendous hardships on the European tourism workforce. Virtually no one is working as usual. Workers on temporary or zero-hours contracts and the bogus self-employed in the ‘gig’ economy have been among the worst hit, as many government income-support measures have not provided them with adequate cover. Thousands of companies are struggling to survive and more than six million workers in Europe are estimated to have lost their jobs or gone into job-retention schemes.

The crisis has also had a dramatic knock-on effect on jobs in the food-supply chain, which is intrinsic to the functioning of hospitality. The International Labour Organization estimates that every job in hospitality supports 1.5 elsewhere.

Many skilled workers are leaving the industry, which risks emerging from the shutdown only to face the challenge of inadequate staffing. In France alone, nearly 100,000 employees are expected to be missing when business reopens. In the United Kingdom, one in ten hospitality workers are believed to have left in the last year. In countries, such as Spain, which rely extensively on tourism, temporary employment schemes have helped avert massive job destruction.

Not only is the economic capacity of tourism shaky. With a high proportion of its workforce young (13 per cent), foreign (15.6 per cent) and/or female (59 per cent), the social role tourism plays in accompanying young people into the labour market, integrating migrant workers and enhancing gender equality has also been put on hold.

Opportunity to reconsider

This moment provides an opportunity to reconsider the European tourism policy we want. On the basis of a radical and ambitious stimulus plan for the European economy, policy-makers—in concert with sector stakeholders—must drive investment into sustainable growth channels for tourism, marking out Europe as a safe, resilient destination which benefits communities, visitors and tourism workers.

The European Federation of Food, Agriculture and Tourism (EFFAT) Trade Unions values highly the capacity of many actors in the supply chain to come together and speak with one voice—on short-term measures to get out of the crisis and on long-term visions to build a resilient sector. Through social dialogue, EFFAT has teamed up with social partners and committed stakeholders, to call for measures to stabilise the sector and put it on a path towards sustainable recovery.

We have sought to retain as many jobs as possible. From that stems our demand to extend all emergency measures, such as short-time work and wage-compensation schemes, as long as needed, ensuring fair allowances for all workers—including seasonal and temporary workers and others in non-standard employment, whether part-time, zero-hours or in a subcontracting chain.

EFFAT has asked EU member states to place hospitality tourism at the heart of their National Recovery and Resilience Programmes—to secure maximum jobs, support the sector and strive for swift, co-ordinated and safe travel. We call on the European Commission to assess these plans not just with an administrative mindset but with a strategic, 360-degree view, which recognises the recovery of tourism as functional to the revival of other sectors (including agriculture, food and beverages) and the economy at large.

Strong and responsible

Looking to the future, EFFAT is very clear about its vision for the relaunch of tourism—a renewed, strong and responsible model, which has learnt from the weaknesses brought to light by Covid-19 and which places workers at its core.

While for a long time travel and tourism have pursued indefinite growth—globally as well as in Europe—they have mainly relied on an economic model based on short-term financial interests and profit maximisation. Hence a focus on minimum costs, with little investment in the workforce and increasingly precarious employment.

In many places, unsustainable tourism has resulted in destruction of natural habitats. Tourism is a significant contributor to global CO2 emissions and consequently to global heating. And marketing accommodation via platforms—often unregulated—has made competition increasingly unfair, exacerbated housing shortages in urban centres and contributed to ‘overtourism’.

This is a lethal cocktail which has undermined a quick recovery of European tourism from the pandemic. Its relaunch cannot be based on the paradigms of the past. The goal should be a threefold sustainability: economic, environmental and social—including greater attention to the stability and quality of employment.

Valuing workers

We must strive for a new model based on decent and secure employment, investment in human resources and reinvestment of profits, to ensure sustainable growth, visitor loyalty, diversification of the offer and a reduction of seasonality. We should promote proximity-based and domestic tourism—especially in countries, regions and cities where the sector upholds many jobs and businesses, offering a principal avenue for recovery, allied to lower environmental impact and support for communities and workers.

Companies should be assisted but on conditional and reciprocal terms, where workers are valued. Any financial support—state aid, loans or tax exemptions—should only be granted to businesses which play by the rules, pay their fair share to society and respect labour standards.

And tourism should be socially sustainable. All classification and certifications, such as stars and eco-labels, must take the quality of employment into account. Social labelling campaigns, such as Fair Hotels and Restaurants, should be developed and promoted in all EU member states, ensuring customers can choose establishments by reference to such criteria as decent working conditions and respect for workers’ rights.

Domino effect

With vaccination programmes rolling forward, the proposed EU Digital Green Certificate will hopefully pave the way towards a smooth and safe reopening of European travel and tourism in the summer. But all sectoral actors should reflect on the domino effect of this devastating crisis and glimpse ways to build resilience.

As EFFAT underlined before the Social Summit in Porto, tourism needs a co-ordinated EU relaunch. Given its importance to the European economy and potential social and environmental contributions, the sector should become a shared competence of the EU. The aim should be to ensure a resilient and sustainable European tourism which values, protects and retains its most precious resource—its workers.

Malin Ackholt

Malin Ackholt is president of the European Federation of Food, Agriculture and Tourism Trade Unions and of the Swedish Hotel and Restaurant Union, HRF.

Kerstin Howald

Kerstin Howald is tourism-sector secretary at EFFAT.

Pilar Rato

Pilar Rato is international secretary of the Service Federation of Comisiones Obrera (CCOO Servicios) in Spain and president of the EFFAT tourism secto

The U.S. President's Budget for Fiscal Year 2022

 

The President’s Fiscal Year 2022 Budget 05/28/2021 02:05 PM EDT Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State The Administration has submitted to Congress the President’s Budget for Fiscal Year 2022. As we continue to make progress defeating the pandemic and getting our economy back on track, this budget makes historic investments that will help us build back better, leaving us stronger at home and on the world stage. The President’s Budget for FY 2022 requests $58.5 billion for the Department of State and USAID, a 10 percent increase over FY 2021 as enacted. These resources will position us to advance the Administration’s foreign policy agenda on behalf of the American people. It also reflects the importance the Administration places on U.S. global leadership and the fact that diplomacy and development are vital tools for advancing U.S. interests. These increased diplomatic and foreign assistance resources will enable us to deliver for the American people by bolstering global health security, addressing the climate crisis, helping tackle the root causes of irregular migration from Central America, reasserting American leadership to promote democracy and counter rising authoritarianism, providing international humanitarian leadership, and meeting competition head on from nations that do not share our values of freedom, democracy, and respect for human rights. This budget supports the Department’s consular activities that protect Americans. It also invests in our foreign policy and development workforce to ensure that it fully represents America in all its talent and diversity and that it has the necessary 21st century tools and technology at its disposal to deliver results for American taxpayers. More generally, the budget includes the two historic plans the President has already put forward — the American Jobs Plan and the American Families Plan – and reinvests in education, research, public health, and other foundations of our country’s strength.  Enacting this budget this year will strengthen our Nation’s economy and lay the foundation for shared prosperity, while also improving our Nation’s long-term fiscal health.

Un Peuple debout par Serge Halimi

 

Un peuple debout

İe Monde diplomatique

par Serge Halimi 

 

Depuis quinze ans, Gaza a subi cinq expéditions punitives : 2006 (« Pluie d’été ») ; 2008-2009 (« Plomb durci ») ; 2012 (« Pilier de défense ») ; 2014 (« Bordure protectrice ») ; et 2021 (« Gardien des murailles »). Israël a choisi ces noms pour mieux maquiller les assaillants en assiégés. Et, depuis quinze ans, les mêmes personnages débitent les mêmes slogans pour légitimer les mêmes châtiments. Car le déséquilibre des moyens engagés rend le terme de « guerre » inapproprié. D’un côté, une des armées les plus puissantes et les mieux équipées du monde, qui dispose de l’appui sans limites des États-Unis, qui soumet ses adversaires à un blocus terrestre et maritime de chaque instant (1). En face, pas un char, pas un avion, pas un navire, pas de soutien (autre que verbal) d’une seule capitale. Il fallait par conséquent tout l’aplomb d’un ambassadeur israélien en France pour reprocher aux Palestiniens « l’un des crimes de guerre les plus abjects du XXIe siècle (2) ». Le nombre de victimes respectif lors de ces cinq conflits est une réponse qui suffit.

Depuis quinze ans, comme chacun sait, les Israéliens « ripostent » ou « répliquent » aux agressions dont ils sont l’objet. Car l’histoire qu’ils racontent ne démarre jamais une seconde avant l’enlèvement d’un de leurs soldats ou un tir de roquettes qui les vise. La chronologie des affrontements omet ainsi les vexations ordinaires infligées aux Palestiniens, les contrôles permanents, l’occupation militaire, le blocus d’un territoire qu’aucun aéroport ne dessert, le mur de séparation, le dynamitage de leurs maisons, la colonisation de leurs terres.

Or, à supposer que demain le Hamas disparaisse, tout cela subsisterait. Israël, qui a aidé ce mouvement à prendre son envol et qui contribue à son financement, le sait. Mais mettre en avant un tel adversaire le sert. Et lui permet de présenter le combat d’un peuple pour disposer d’un État comme l’agression terroriste d’une organisation religieuse messianique. En intervenant avec brutalité à Jérusalem contre des fidèles sur l’esplanade des Mosquées, les autorités israéliennes ne pouvaient ignorer qu’elles feraient l’affaire du mouvement islamiste.

Pour cynique et transparente qu’elle soit, l’opération du premier ministre Benyamin Netanyahou s’est poursuivie sans encombre. Ni résolution des Nations unies (qu’Israël aurait pu ignorer une fois de plus), ni mesure de sanction, ni rappel d’ambassadeurs, ni suspension des livraisons d’armes. Tout comme Washington, l’Union européenne a repris les éléments de langage de la droite israélienne ; le gouvernement français — soutenu par Mme Marine Le Pen, par Bernard-Henri Lévy et par la maire socialiste de Paris Anne Hidalgo — ne s’est réveillé que pour interdire une manifestation de solidarité avec les Palestiniens. À croire que plus Israël est puissant et dominateur, moins il est démocratique, et plus le monde entier est à ses pieds.

Toutefois, comme cinq « guerres » viennent de le prouver, ce « Dôme de fer » diplomatique ne garantira pas sa tranquillité. La violence de la résistance répond toujours à la violence de l’oppression, sauf quand un peuple est écrasé et soumis. Le peuple palestinien est debout.

Serge Halimi

China's Ongoing Oppression of the Uighurs (Der Spiegel)

 In the Sinister Disneyland of Xinjiang

China's Ongoing Oppression of the Uighurs

Western countries have accused China of genocide for its treatment of the Uighurs in Xinjiang. Beijing claims that everything is just fine in the homeland of the Muslim minority. We went there to take a look for ourselves.

By Georg Fahrion in Xinjiang

27.05.2021, 12.49 Uhr

The images seem made-to-order, and they are. Following prayer, the Uighurs of Kashgar dance in the square in front of the Id Kah Mosque, one of the largest in the Xinjiang region. They spin by the hundreds, throwing their hands in the air, performing the Sema, a traditional dance of the Muslim Sufi brotherhoods, as drummers on the mosque’s huge portal beat out the rhythm. It is the morning of May 13, the date of this year’s Muslim festival of Id al-Fitr, the end of Ramadan.

Two drone cameras from Chinese state television buzz over the scene. Later, Chinese propagandists will disseminate the footage over social media channels – welcome images to the leadership in Beijing. They seem to prove, after all, that Uighurs can spontaneously and freely observe their traditions.

There is, however, nothing spontaneous about them. In previous days, the men had practiced the performance on the same square. One Uighur man says that he had been summoned for the occasion by a "lingdao,” a person of authority. A producer for state television shared the information in advance that the performance was scheduled for 11 a.m. Dozens of agents in civilian clothing are out on this holiday, standing in dark alcoves around the mosque even before sunrise. Stewards direct the dancing crowd.

Geschichten vom Leben und Arbeiten am anderen Ende der Welt, die inspirieren! Mit Tipps, Tricks und Selbsttest für den eigenen Neustart in der Ferne. Oder im mobilen Homeoffice.

Videos of earlier Id celebrations from Kashgar show that the Sema has been performed by Uighurs in previous years, so the staging isn’t completely improbable. And many of the children do look like they’re having fun. But upon closer inspection, many of the dancers look more discontented than joyful. One old man, moving along with labored, scurrying steps, seems almost out of breath, but he keeps on dancing anyway.

Is participation compulsory? Can those who have had enough simply leave? We’d like to ask the participants, but the state informers are listening in. This is how things always go in Xinjiang for journalists: Even as we observe something with our own eyes, we can’t be sure of what we are seeing. People cannot speak freely, and state control is omnipresent. But there are signals, gestures, contradictions everywhere. And so the impression grows that Xinjiang, four-and-a-half times the size of Germany, is little more than a Potemkin village, a make-believe world.

We spend a week travelling through the region, with stops in the capital of Urumqi, the rural area of Shanshan, the sleepy town of Yarkant and the oasis city of Kashgar.

The last time a team from DER SPIEGEL visited Xinjiang was in 2018. My colleague Bernhard Zand described Kashgar as being like "Baghdad after the war.” He wrote of museum guards in flak jackets and imperious policemen everywhere – he described a region that seemed to be under siege.

Three years later, that’s no longer the case. The repression has changed and become less obvious. There are uniformed men patrolling here and there, but they carry batons instead of firearms. The density of security cameras isn’t higher than in Beijing and we are only stopped once at a checkpoint – and allowed to pass without much fuss. It seems like Chinese leaders believe that they have broken all resistance and can therefore allow things to relax. But the oppression of Muslims in Xinjiang isn’t over. It has merely entered a new phase.

This area of Central Asia has always been a place where different populations have mingled. Xinjiang means "new frontier”: Emperor Qianlong didn’t force it into the control of the Qing Empire until the middle of the 18th century. Purposely settled Han Chinese are now the second-largest population group here after the Uighurs, but the region is also home to Kazakhs, Mongols and Russians.

Following riots and terror attacks involving Uighur extremists, Beijing intensified a campaign against Muslims in 2017. According to estimates, up to one million people have been interned in camps – facilities leaders in Beijing denied existed before declaring them "vocational training centers.” There have been reports of forced labor and forced sterilizations, and according to China’s own statistics bureau, Xinjiang’s birth rate nearly halved between 2017 and 2019 alone.

The parliaments of Canada, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Lithuania as well as U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken have designated China’s behavior as a "genocide” – an accusation that Beijing has angrily rejected. The fate of the Uighurs is also an issue in Germany. Just last week, the Human Rights Committee in German parliament, the Bundestag, spent three hours discussing the situation in Xinjiang and how it should be viewed under international law. The discussion came ahead of a vote on a new supply-chain law, which provides for sanctions against companies whose suppliers use forced labor. The vote was ultimately postponed, but if the law passes, it will impact German companies like VW, which operates a plant in Xinjiang.

Recently, the Bundestag’s Research Services established in an analysis that China’s campaign in Xinjiang fulfills the criteria for genocide. Should this become the accepted view among Germany’s political leadership – once pro-Beijing Chancellor Angela Merkel’s tenure comes to an end this fall, for example – it would have grave consequences for Germany’s relationship with its most important trading partner.

It isn’t long after landing in Urumqi on our flight from Beijing that we discover our first tails. The men from state security always look the same: Between 20 and 40 years of age, physically fit enough to follow their targets for a couple of hours at a time, and dressed in a baseball cap, facemask and sunglasses. Their favorite accessory is a men’s handbag.

DER SPIEGEL 21/2021

The article you are reading originally appeared in German in issue 21/2021 (May 22, 2021) of DER SPIEGEL.

SPIEGEL International

As we step out of the arrivals hall, a man wearing a wine-red T-shirt stares at me for a few seconds before turning away and raising his smartphone to his ear. At the taxi stand, he is a couple spots behind us in line. When we get a car after a 15-minute wait, he steps out of line and wanders away speaking into his phone, likely passing along the license plate number of our taxi. We’ll see him again that afternoon, seemingly randomly running into him in the center of the city – population 3.5 million. He follows us at a distance of 20 to 30 meters. It’s all rather obvious, a message to us that we are being watched.

Such shadows will be our constant companions in Xinjiang. In Urumqi, they follow us in a metallic-brown SUV. In Shanshan, it’s a white VW. In Yarkant, we are able to pinpoint five men who follow us on foot and on a moped. One of them is clearly not Han Chinese, and we guess that he might be Uighur. We are sometimes able to shake them: In Urumqi, for example, we suddenly cross the street through stop-and-go traffic and enter a shopping center, before then going out the back entrance. We turn around at each corner and see nobody following us. Later, though, they’re suddenly there again. We can only assume that they found us with the help of cameras and facial recognition technology.

They follow us everywhere, but they don’t interfere – a rather reserved approach compared to years past. Still, normal reporting isn’t possible under such conditions. Normally, we would speak with community leaders, clerics and intellectuals, but internal government documents – the so-called Karakax List – makes it clear that Uighurs have been interned for far milder infractions than speaking with foreign journalists. Things like phoning family members abroad, wearing beards or simply being seen as "unreliable” by state agencies. We don’t want to put anybody in danger. Our discussions are limited to random encounters and our impressions are thus inevitably incomplete.

Among Patriots

The vineyards shine bright green, interspersed with rows of darker poplars, with the desert starting just behind the last irrigation ditch. It’s 39 degrees Celsius (102 degrees Fahrenheit). A region of sand dunes and barren mountains and dotted with oil rigs. Shanshan, a rural area in eastern Xinjiang, is home to a breathtaking landscape. Our Uighur driver Ayni – a self-confident 31-year-old who likes to talk – is playing Turkish pop music on the car stereo.

He says that life here has become more relaxed in recent years. The police used to stop him all the time, he says, with roadblocks everywhere. Luckily, he says, that is now over. Indeed, we don’t have to stop once until we run low on fuel.

In front of the gas station is a gate manned by two men in uniform. One of them opens all of the doors of our car, including the trunk and the hood. The other notes down the number of Ayni’s driver’s license. All passengers have to get out and Ayni has to have his ID scanned before the gate is opened and he can drive in – alone in the car. He seems to accept the procedure as a completely normal part of his daily life.

In fact, Ayni seems to have no shortage of patience when it comes to his encounters with the state. He emphasizes, for example, that the police who suddenly showed up in front of the door of his hotel room to examine his ID during his 2019 vacation in Beijing were extremely polite. And the fact that he was unable to travel to the national boxing championships in 2009 because there had been unrest in Urumqi a short time before was a pity, he says. "But on the other hand, our own people brought this upon us.”

In Xinjiang, we frequently encounter Uighurs who announce unprompted their loyalty to the party.

He loves the action movie "Wolf Warrior,” in which a Chinese hero routs his Western foes. During his drives, he listens to audio books to improve his Chinese. The Communist Party, he says, did a fantastic job during the pandemic – just look at India or the U.S. "I am proud to be Chinese.”

In Xinjiang, we frequently encounter Uighurs who announce unprompted their loyalty to the party. It could be that it is a genuine emotion. It could also, however, be a preventative step to ward off any potential suspicion.

In the train to Yarkant, an old man shows us pictures of a piece of woodwork he produced – apparently a hobby of his. It was not a mosque or anything like that, but the Gate of Heavenly Peace, a symbol of Beijing’s power. It bears Mao’s portrait, and it also features on the national coat of arms. The man’s model includes five wooden figures intended to represent the leaders of the People’s Republic: "Mao Zedong, Den Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, Hun Jintao,” he recites eagerly. "And this is Xi Jinping.”

In Kashgar, we are happy to see that the city is so much livelier than in 2018. Back then, many of the shops in the old town were closed up, and when asked why, people would frequently respond: "The owners have gone to school to study,” a common euphemism for the re-education camps.

"You must have misheard,” says a young Uighur man.

A mosque in Yarkant: "Love the Party, Love the Fatherland.”

Bild vergrößern

A mosque in Yarkant: "Love the Party, Love the Fatherland.” Foto: Roman 

Apparently, everyone has taken to heart a message that can be read on red banners hanging from several mosques in Yarkant: "Ai dang, ai guo” – "Love the Party, Love the Fatherland.”

Uighur Culture – in Beijing Style

The city of Kashgar is located between the Taklamakan Desert and the snow-covered Pamir Mountains. For centuries, Kashgar was an important hub on the old Silk Road, a place of bazaars and caravanserais, a mud-brick maze of alleys, courtyards, passageways, staircases and squares. In 2006, director Marc Foster filmed "The Kite Runner” here because of its resemblance at the time to prewar Kabul.

Now, with Xinjiang largely pacified in the eyes of Chinese officials, they are hoping to leverage the city’s potential. Kashgar is being developed into a mecca of tourism, a destination with an oriental flair. "It’s great, like Morocco,” says a visitor from the southwestern Chinese city of Guiyang. The old, mud-brick walls have disappeared behind a uniform coat of plaster, with walls now decorated with wagon wheels and amphoras. Tourists now wander through gates with pointed arches like in Baghdad and a city wall of concrete has been built on the clay cliffs. A Chinese temple with its curved roofline now graces the highest point of the old town. A tout tries to lure guests into a restaurant – dressed as the monkey king from "Journey to the West,” a classical novel of Chinese literature.

"I came for the spectacle. I think it’s great,” says one Chinese visitor as the Uighurs are dancing the Sema. He introduces himself as Yann and says that he studies philosophy in France. Because of the pandemic, though, he has taken a year off, which he is using for travel. By the way, he adds, "there will be a spectacle with a princess later in the old town.” As it turns out, it involves five princesses. They arrive on camelback, dressed in colorful costumes, before they perform a dance – as they do every day.

Uighurs as obedient extras in a portrayal of their own lives, a religion without passion or youth, a culture reduced to Disney-esque exoticism, easily digestible for the masses: This version of Uighur existence appears to be the one desired by China’s leaders.

Behind the colossal gate of the Id Kah Mosque – flanked by two squat minarets – is a roomy ground shaded by poplars, the wind rustling through the branches. A few old men are sweeping up fallen leaves, the only people here aside from a small group at the entrance.

The All-China Journalists Association, which is overseen by the Communist Party’s propaganda unit, is currently leading a tour through Xinjiang. In contrast to correspondents traveling on their own, such politically backed organizations are able to set up interviews, but only under official surveillance. The association has invited the Russian broadcaster RT, the Brazilian newspaper O Globo and Dutch television. They are currently interviewing the mosque’s Friday preacher. We join them.

Abbas Muhammat is 55 years old, a clean-shaven man wearing a Doppa, the traditional Uighur head covering. He has apparently been well briefed, not even pausing for thought at the more sensitive questions.

According to a recent report by the Uyghur Human Rights Project, an NGO based in Washington, D.C., China has arrested at least 1,046 imams and religious figures in Xinjiang since 2014. "Those weren’t real Islamic clerics, but pseudo-clerics,” Muhammat says through an interpreter. "These imams spread extremism and soiled our reputation. They misled people.”

Yes, he says, one of his predecessors at the Id Kah Mosque had been arrested and sentenced to 15 years in prison. Yes, some members of the parish were also interned. "Some people followed this imam, they were his victims, so to speak. There were a couple such incidents, yes.”

Muhammat seems unconcerned by how empty his mosque is: "It’s a common global trend that young people are increasingly focused on earning money. For them, employment is the priority,” he says. "But if they have a bit of spare time, they can come here to pray. There are no restrictions in place to keep the younger generation from praying.” He urges the group to return during prayer if they want to see worshippers. They can even hear the call of the muezzin, he says.

In contrast to everywhere else in the world, not a single child or teenager was accompanying his father.

A few of the preacher’s claims are not borne out by our observations. We don’t hear a single call to prayer during our trip, not even on Id al-Fitr, the day marking the end of Ramadan. Thousands streamed into the mosque for morning Id prayers, that is true. But in contrast to everywhere else in the world, not a single child or teenager was accompanying his father. And among all of the faithful Muslims, only a few elderly men wore a beard.

"In China’s constitution, it says that every Chinese citizen has the right to believe in a religion or not. The laws are very well implemented here,” says Muhammat. "There is no such thing as a crackdown or discrimination.”

The streets speak a different language. According to Muhammat, there are at least 150 mosques in Kashgar. Yet the doors of many of the neighborhood mosques are padlocked shut and the minarets have been stooped. The mosques are no longer in use.

Converted mosque in Kashgar: "Tourist toilets." Foto: Roman Pilipey / epa / DER SPIEGEL

Officials have repurposed one of the houses of prayer. Through a side door, passersby can walk into the room where the devout used to wash themselves before prayer: masonry benches for sitting facing a wall lined with water faucets and a long, tiled basin. Today, it is used as a urinal. Outside hangs a wooden sign reading in Chinese, Uighur and English: "Tourist toilets.”

Fear

On the morning that we set out to look for the camps, our minders are surprisingly nowhere to be seen. We spent most of the past few days walking – perhaps they have grown a bit inattentive and didn’t notice that we’ve had a rental car delivered to the front of our hotel.

In 2020, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) published a much-cited study on the camp system in Xinjiang. The researchers examined satellite images from the entire region and were thus able to identify at least 380 facilities. We have set out to track down a few of the coordinates from the study.

A 27-minute drive south of Kashgar’s center, a uniformed guard patrols on a walkway on top of a wall roughly eight meters (25 feet) high. Google Earth shows that there are around two dozen structures behind it. Through a telephoto lens, we can see that the guard has a rifle slung over his shoulder. He approaches a watchtower that juts up from the wall.

A camp in Xinjiang: Reports of forced labor and forced sterilization 

Is it a high-security prison of the kind to be found everywhere in the world? Or is it one of the region’s infamous camps? Chinese authorities leave our inquiries about the facility unanswered. ASPI analyst Nathan Ruser says that it is, in fact, a camp – inaugurated in 2020, at a time when China was claiming that it had already released all interned Uighurs.

The wall is blindingly white and the parallel, razor-wire fences glitter in the sunlight. It certainly looks as though the complex hasn’t been here for long. And from the road, it is possible to read slogans affixed on one of the roofs in large, red characters, including "qu ji duan hua” – which means "deradicalization.”

The system of surveillance has been perfected and the populace brought into line.

We also find another facility listed in the ASPI database – a similar ensemble of buildings set up parallel to each other. As we slowly drive by the entry gate, we can see two watchtowers in the back of the compound. But there is no razor wire on the wall circling the compound and the gate is only secured with a roll shutter. According to the signs, the facility is now a party school.

This building complex on the outskirts of Kashgar is thought to have been a re-education center for Uighurs. Today, it is home to a party school.

Bild vergrößern

This building complex on the outskirts of Kashgar is thought to have been a re-education center for Uighurs. Today, it is home to a party school. Foto: Roman Pilipey / epa / DER SPIEGEL

These are just two cursory observations, but they do not contradict the conclusions reached in the ASPI study – namely that fences and watchtowers have been removed from some of the complexes as they have been repurposed, with security at others having been intensified.

One possible interpretation: Those who China has deemed incorrigible may have since been sentenced and transferred to regular prisons. Many of those who officials believe had assimilated to a sufficient degree could very well have been released – or put into the Labor Transfer Scheme that has distributed Uighurs among factories across the country. The system of surveillance has since been perfected and the populace brought into line.

A sandstorm kicks up as night falls on our final evening in Kashgar. Visibility is poor as we step out of a restaurant and wave down a taxi. Plus, we are all wearing facemasks. The driver cannot clearly see who is stepping into his vehicle.

As we drive off, he says cheerfully that he is a Uighur, before asking what ethnicity we belong to. We answer that I am a German and my photographer a Ukrainian. "Foreigners?” the driver blurts, suddenly seeming uncomfortable. "Oh no. If I had known that, I wouldn’t have picked you up. I thought you were maybe Tajiks!” Xinjiang borders Tajikistan and there is a Tajik minority in the region, many of whom have Caucasian features similar to our own – and they make for much less-sensitive fares for a taxi driver than we Europeans.

We try to calm him by telling him that we have taken a number of taxis in Xinjiang and none of the drivers have voiced similar concerns. "But you have no idea what happens to us once you get out,” he replies. "Look, there are two cameras here in the car!” He does drive us the few hundred meters to our hotel but asks that we pay him cash instead of via WeChat, as is standard. He doesn’t want a data trail.

The image that we take home with us from Xinjiang remains a bit fuzzy. But one thing is clear: The fear persists.

What Is U.S. Policy on the Israeli - Palestinian Conflict

 What Is U.S. Policy on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict?

The United States has long tried to negotiate a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but several factors, including deep divisions between and within the parties and declining U.S. interest in carrying out its traditional honest-broker role, hurt the chances of a peace deal.

Summary

The decades-long conflict between Israelis and Palestinians is rooted in competing claims to the Holy Land, and includes disputes over borders, Jerusalem, security, and Palestinian refugees.

The United States has long sought a solution to the conflict that results in two states, although the Trump administration adopted policies that diverged from that goal.

An outbreak of violence between Israeli forces and Palestinian militant groups in 2021 was an early test for the Biden administration’s diplomatic approach to the region.

Introduction

Israelis and Palestinians have clashed over claims to the Holy Land for decades, a conflict that has long been one of the world’s most intractable. Although the United States is a strong supporter of Israel, it has traditionally tried to advance a diplomatic solution that would reconcile the competing claims of the two parties.

Multiple U.S. administrations have proposed road maps for a peace process that would result in two states, one Israeli and one Palestinian. However, critics say prospects for a two-state solution dimmed under President Donald Trump, who implemented a slew of controversial policies regarding core components of the conflict. The Joe Biden administration has reversed some of those changes but left others in place, including Trump’s decision to recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital.

What is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict about?

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is rooted in a century-long territorial dispute over the Holy Land, a Middle Eastern region with great religious and historical significance to Christians, Jews, and Muslims.

Increasing numbers of Jews began moving to Ottoman Palestine—a predominately Arab region—following the 1896 publication of Theodor Herzl’s The Jewish State, which promoted the idea of a haven for Jews in their ancient homeland to escape anti-Semitism in Europe. The migration accelerated after the Holocaust of World War II, in which Nazi Germany killed six million Jews.

In 1947, after years of Arab-Jewish violence, the UN General Assembly voted for the establishment of two states in Palestine, one Jewish and the other Arab. Shortly after, the Jewish community in Palestine declared Israel an independent state, prompting hundreds of thousands more Jews to emigrate, and precipitating a war launched by neighboring Arab states.

For their part, Palestinian Arabs say Jews have usurped their ancestral homeland with help from Western powers, including the United States and the United Kingdom. They refer to Israel’s establishment and its defeat of allied Arab armies in the 1948 war as the Nakba, or catastrophe, which the United Nations estimated uprooted more than seven hundred thousand Palestinians.

In the decades since, the Israeli-Palestinian dispute has continually flared into conflict, including multistate wars, armed uprisings (intifadas), and terrorist acts. A major turning point was the 1967 Six-Day War, which culminated in Israel’s occupation of East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza. In its aftermath, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 242, which called for Israel to withdraw from occupied lands to secure and recognize borders in exchange for peace. The resolution lacked details, but nonetheless was a milestone, becoming the basis for future diplomacy to end the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Today, the region is home to some two million Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and three million in the West Bank. Although most of Israel’s 9.2 million residents are Jewish, there are around two million Arab citizens. International diplomatic efforts to broker a political settlement have made limited headway. More recent U.S.-led diplomacy has focused on resolving several core issues:

Borders. The notion of having two separate states, one Israeli and the other Palestinian, commonly referred to as the two-state solution, has had significant international support for decades. It would establish a Palestinian state that includes most of the West Bank—with land swaps to compensate it for Israel’s absorption of some Jewish settlements there—and Gaza, which Israel unilaterally withdrew from in 2005. Most international diplomacy promoting a two-state solution favors Israel’s reverting to a version of its pre-1967 borders, but there is no consensus on how doing so could account for Palestinians within those borders and Jewish Israelis living beyond them.

A map of Israel and the Palestinian Territories.

LEBANON

Golan

Heights*

SYRIA

MEDITERRANEAN SEA

Sea of  Galilee

West  Bank

Jordan River

Tel Aviv

Ramallah

PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES

Jerusalem

Dead  Sea

Gaza City

Gaza

ISRAEL

JORDAN

EGYPT

*In March 2019, the United States recognized Israel’s sovereignty over the Golan Heights, but as of June 2020, it is the only country to do so.

Jerusalem. The disputed city straddles the border of Israel and the West Bank. Israel has annexed the whole city as its capital; the Palestinians claim East Jerusalem for the capital of their state. A two-state solution would require a Palestinian capital in East Jerusalem.

Refugees. The wars in 1948 and 1967 created some one million Palestinian refugees. The survivors and their descendants, mostly living in Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria, claim the right to return to Israel, as supported by a 1948 UN General Assembly resolution. Debate continues on whether survivors’ descendants should also be considered refugees with that right. Israel sees the right to return as a threat to its existence as a Jewish state, and believes the refugees should go to the Palestinian state that would be created as part of a two-state solution.

Security. Israel views some Palestinian militant groups as existential threats [PDF], particularly Hamas, the Islamist organization that governs Gaza and has vowed to destroy Israel. Its suicide bombings and rocket attacks usually target Israeli civilians. Israel wants these groups to disarm and the Palestinian state to be demilitarized, but accepts that Palestinians should have a strong police force. The Palestinians seek an end to Israel’s military occupation and want full control over their own security, but accept limitations on their arms. Israel wants to maintain the ability to act in Palestinian territory against threats to its security.

Mutual recognition. Each side seeks recognition of its state by the other, as well as the international community. Most Israeli Jews want to see Israel recognized as a Jewish state, while Palestinians want Israel to acknowledge their forced displacement under the Nakba.

End of conflict. Both sides seek a peace agreement that would end their conflict and honor the claims of each side, and lead to peace and normalization of Israel’s relations with all Arab states, as provided for in the Arab League’s Arab Peace Initiative.

What are U.S. interests in the dispute?

The Middle East has long been of central importance to the United States as successive administrations pursued a broad set of interrelated goals including securing vital energy resources, staving off Soviet and Iranian influence, ensuring the survival and security of Israel and Arab allies, countering terrorism, promoting democracy, and reducing refugee flows. Correspondingly, the United States has sought to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which has been a major driver of regional dynamics, with an eye toward obtaining these strategic objectives while balancing its support for Israel and pushing for broader regional stability.

At the same time, the dispute has been a core concern of the American Jewish community and Christian Evangelicals, both strong supporters of Israel.

Some experts say U.S. interest in resolving the conflict has waned in recent years.

However, some experts say U.S. interest in resolving the conflict has waned in recent years. After the start of the Arab Spring in 2011, other regional conflicts, such as wars in Syria and Yemen; Iran’s push for dominance in the region; and terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda and the self-proclaimed Islamic State posed more immediate threats to U.S. interests. Additionally, U.S. relations with Iran and the Arab Gulf states no longer seem to hinge on Israeli-Palestinian issues, making the conflict even less of a priority, said former CFR Fellow Philip H. Gordon, who worked on Middle East peace negotiations at the White House during the Barack Obama administration. (In January 2021, Gordon was appointed deputy national security advisor to Vice President Kamala Harris.) U.S. interest in the greater Middle East also faded as other regions gained priority, as highlighted by the Obama administration’s “Pivot to Asia.”

The Trump administration reignited controversy over the disputed region by siding with Israel on various matters, breaking with decades of U.S. policy aimed at serving as a neutral broker in negotiations. The Biden administration has so far signaled that it will promote equal rights for Israelis and Palestinians rather than focus on resolving the overarching dispute.

How has the U.S. been involved in the conflict?

The United States has been a central player in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for more than half a century. It became involved shortly after World War II, joining the United Kingdom in a 1946 inquiry [PDF] that recommended one hundred thousand Holocaust survivors relocate to Palestine, which would be neither a Jewish nor an Arab state. The United States then became the first country to recognize Israel as a sovereign nation in 1948.

After the 1967 Six-Day War, the United States attempted to mediate the broader Arab-Israeli conflict along with Britain, France, Russia, and the United Nations. However, it was the 1973 war, in which Israel struggled early on to defend itself against invading Egyptian and Syrian forces, that compelled the United States to take the lead in future diplomacy. Although Israel won the conflict militarily, the Arab powers delivered a major psychological blow.

The war was also a major turning point for U.S. foreign policy in that it prompted Arab oil producers to impose a harmful oil embargo on the United States, and it brought the United States—which supported Israel—and the Soviet Union—which armed Egypt and Syria—close to a nuclear confrontation after a period of détente. The war also proved a boon for the Palestinian cause, with the Arab League recognizing the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as the “sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people” in 1974.

Timeline of Israeli-Palestinian Relations

A timeline of Israeli-Palestinian relations from 1947 to 2020.

1947: UN General Assembly Resolution 181 calls for Palestine to be divided into Jewish and Arab states and designates the city of Jerusalem as a separate entity.

1948: Israel accepts UNGA Resolution 181 and declares its independence. It repels armies from nearby Arab countries that oppose its existence. UNGA Resolution 194 establishes Palestinians’ right of return.

1950

1967: Responding to a mobilization by Arab states, Israel launches preemptive strikes and captures the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and the Sinai Peninsula. UN Security Council Resolution 242 enshrines the “land for peace” vision that becomes the basis of future Arab-Israeli negotiations.

1970

1973: During the Third Arab-Israeli War, the United States backs Israel against a coalition of Arab states attempting to regain lost territory, arranges a cease-fire, and launches the U.S.-led peace process.

1978–1979: U.S. President Jimmy Carter hosts Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin at Camp David, where they lay out a framework for peace in the Middle East that includes Palestinian autonomy. After further negotiations, Egypt and Israel sign a peace treaty.

1980

1987–1993: The first intifada leads to widespread violence, resulting in the deaths of several hundred Israelis and nearly two thousand Palestinians.

1988: Palestinian Liberation Organization leader Yasser Arafat accepts UNSC Resolution 242 as the basis for Israeli-Palestinian negotiation.

1993: Secret Israeli-Palestinian negotiations held in Norway result in the Oslo Accords, which call for the withdrawal of Israeli troops in stages from the West Bank and Gaza, and Palestinian self-government. The PLO recognizes Israel’s right to exist, and Israel recognizes the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people.

1994: Israel and Jordan sign a peace treaty brokered by the United States.

1995: The Oslo II Accords establish Palestinian self-government in Gaza and 40 percent of the West Bank.

1990

1991: The Madrid Conference, cohosted by the United States and the Soviet Union, opens negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians for the first time.

2000: Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Arafat attend a Camp David summit convened by U.S. President Bill Clinton to discuss borders, settlements, refugees, and Jerusalem, but talks end without an agreement. Clinton announces parameters for an independent Palestinian state living in peace with Israel.

2002: The Arab Peace Initiative offers Israel peace and normalized relations with the Arab world after a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. After terrorist attacks inside Israel, its army retakes control of Palestinian-governed territory in the West Bank and later begins building a security barrier around settlement blocs in East Jerusalem.

2000

2000–2005: After the 2000 peace process collapses, mistrust on both sides sparks the second intifada, in which one thousand Israelis and more than three thousand Palestinians are killed.

2003: U.S. President George W. Bush announces a road map to end violence and restart Israeli-Palestinian negotiations leading to a Palestinian state.

2005: Israel withdraws from Gaza, including from all settlements there. President Bush sends a letter to Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon recognizing the reality of settlement blocs in the West Bank.

2008–2009: After Hamas launches rocket attacks on Israeli civilians from Gaza, Israel goes to war with the Palestinian militant group there. The weekslong conflict kills over one thousand Palestinians and thirteen Israelis.

2013–2014: The Barack Obama administration relaunches Israeli-Palestinian final status negotiations, but talks break down over disagreements on settlements, the release of Palestinian prisoners, and other issues.

2010

2017: U.S. President Donald J. Trump announces his decision to relocate the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem, recognizing the city as Israel’s capital.

2018: The United States slashes bilateral aid to the Palestinians and the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA), closes the PLO office in Washington, DC, and opens its embassy in Jerusalem.

2019: The Trump administration recognizes Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights and voices its disagreement with a decades-old State Department opinion that says Israel’s West Bank settlements are inconsistent with international law.

2020: President Trump announces his vision for Israeli-Palestinian peace, which provides for Israel to annex 30 percent of the West Bank and for a smaller Palestinian state. Later, his administration brokers deals for multiple Arab states to normalize relations with Israel.

2020

Source : CFR research.

In the months after the fighting, U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger served as the principal intermediary between the Arab states and Israel. His shuttle diplomacy among Middle East capitals in 1974 and 1975 helped de-escalate the war and disentangle the combatants.

In 1978, U.S. President Jimmy Carter hosted the Camp David peace talks between Israel and Egypt, which produced two frameworks that would lay a foundation for future Mideast diplomacy. The first called for talks involving Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinians about Palestinian self-rule in Gaza and the West Bank. The second called for a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, which the two governments signed in 1979 at the White House. Though Jordan was also a party in the 1973 war, it did not join the talks, fearing condemnation from other Arab nations. A separate Israel-Jordan peace treaty was signed in 1994.

Although the United States was left out of negotiating the 1993 Oslo Peace Accords—under which Palestinian leaders recognized Israel’s right to exist, and Israel recognized Palestinian autonomy in Gaza and the West Bank—the disputing parties signed the final agreement at the White House. The United States and the Bill Clinton administration played a larger role in 1998, when it sponsored negotiations between Israel and the PLO that led to the Clinton Parameters for the establishment of a two-state solution. Since then, successive administrations have proposed their own plans for a two-state solution: George W. Bush’s Road Map to Peace, Secretary of State John Kerry’s Six Principles, and Trump’s Peace to Prosperity.

While trying to broker a deal between the parties, the United States has shielded Israel from international criticism, which some say has hindered diplomacy to resolve the conflict. Since 1970, the United States has used its veto power as a permanent member of the UN Security Council to block resolutions censuring Israel dozens of times because it sees the United Nations as a forum that is biased against Israel. Since 1980, the United States has only once allowed the Security Council to condemn Israel for its settlement construction, in late 2016, when the outgoing Obama administration abstained from a vote on the matter.

Many analysts say Trump abandoned the role of honest broker between Israel and the Palestinians and adopted a firmly pro-Israel stance. In August 2020, the Trump administration mediated an agreement between Israel and the United Arab Emirates, known as the Abraham Accords, in which the two countries pledged to begin normalizing ties. Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco later announced similar U.S.-brokered deals. Opponents of normalization say these moves betray the Palestinian cause, as the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative stipulates that Arab League members will establish relations with Israel only after the creation of a Palestinian state, among other conditions. The Biden administration welcomed the accords and said it will encourage other nations to seek normalization with Israel, but noted such agreements are not a substitute for Israeli-Palestinian peace.

Get Up to Speed

Transition 2021 Series: The Abraham Accords

In 2021, after days of renewed violence in which Israeli air strikes destroyed targets in Gaza and Hamas and other Palestinian militant groups fired rockets at Israel, the Biden administration reportedly worked behind the scenes to help establish a cease-fire between Israel and Hamas. Biden reiterated U.S. support for Israel’s right to defend itself while vowing humanitarian assistance for Palestinians in Gaza.

What is the U.S. position on Palestinian statehood?

Biden has said he will continue the nearly two decades of U.S. support for a two-state solution, which calls for separate Israeli and Palestinian states with borders resembling those that existed before the 1967 war; this territory includes the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and parts of East Jerusalem. The Clinton Parameters provided the outlines for the establishment of a Palestinian state and the resolution of the other final status issues. George W. Bush became the first U.S. president to publicly endorse a Palestinian state, which was represented in the 2003 Road Map for Peace plan put forth by the United States, the European Union, Russia, and the United Nations. The Obama administration also tried to advance a two-state solution, but talks collapsed in 2014 over disagreements on settlements, the release of Palestinian prisoners, and other issues. In 2016, Secretary Kerry outlined principles for a two-state solution based on those final status talks.

Trump’s plan, dubbed Peace to Prosperity, would have established a Palestinian state but given Israel sovereignty over an essentially undivided Jerusalem, including the Old City and the holy sites, relegating the Palestinian capital to a sliver of East Jerusalem. The plan did not grant Palestinian refugees the right to return to their former lands but promised some $50 billion worth of investment in a developing Palestinian state. The conceptual map provided in Trump’s plan suggested that the Palestinian territory in the West Bank would shrink to 70 percent as Israel annexed the Jordan Valley and all its settlements there. Critics called the plan—which was created without consulting Palestinian leaders—a win for Israel on all the major final status issues, and the Palestinian Authority (PA) rejected it.

Despite its long-standing support for a two-state solution, the United States has traditionally not supported Palestinian bids for statehood at the United Nations, saying this matter should only be decided through negotiations with Israel. The PA has pursued full membership for Palestine at the United Nations since 2011, a move that requires approval by the Security Council, where the United States has a veto. The PA has yet to garner enough support for the bid, but in 2012, 138 countries at the UN General Assembly voted to recognize Palestine as a nonmember observer state.

What is the U.S. position on Jerusalem?

When the UN General Assembly voted to divide British-controlled Palestine into separate Arab and Jewish states in 1947, it set aside the city of Jerusalem as a corpus separatum, or separate body, recognizing its shared religious significance for Christians, Jews, and Muslims. However, newly independent Israel established its seat of government in the western half of the city and later captured East Jerusalem from Jordan in 1967. Israel then expanded the municipal borders of Jerusalem to incorporate neighboring Palestinian towns and effectively annexed it. 

As part of the 1993 Oslo Accords—the last significant agreement on the dispute—Israel and the PLO affirmed that claims to Jerusalem would only be decided in final status negotiations. Today, Israel views all of Jerusalem as its capital, while the PA claims East Jerusalem as the seat of a future Palestinian state, viewing Israel’s hold on the land as an occupation.

For decades, the United States and most other countries that have relations with Israel kept their embassies in Tel Aviv, so as not to preempt a future peace deal. Although a 1995 U.S. law [PDF] required the relocation of the American embassy to Jerusalem, successive presidents waived the requirement “to protect the national security interests of the United States.” However, Trump declined to do so in 2017, instead moving the embassy to Jerusalem and recognizing the city as Israel’s capital. Supporters of the relocation argued there was no national security imperative prohibiting the move, and that U.S. diplomatic representation to Israel ought to be based at the country’s seat of government. The announcement prompted Palestinian officials to break off relations with the Trump administration. Although President Biden has reestablished these ties, he has said the U.S. embassy will remain in Jerusalem. Biden also announced his intention to reopen the Palestinian mission in Washington and the U.S. consulate in East Jerusalem, both of which Trump closed. However, doing so will be difficult: A 1987 law circumvented by Trump’s predecessors bans the Palestinians from having a mission in the United States, and the Trump administration passed legislation to block future leaders from waiving the restriction.

What is the U.S. position on Israeli settlements?

Shortly after the 1967 war, Israel began building settlements in some of the territories it had seized. Settlement construction began under Labor party governments seeking to strengthen defense in parts of the West Bank that had seen heavy fighting during the Arab-Israeli wars, but it increased rapidly as some settlers viewed the land as their religious and historical right, and others found economic incentives to live there. By 2019, some six hundred thousand Israelis were living in settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem.

For years, the United States officially condemned these settlements—branding them an obstacle to peace—but avoided outright calling them illegal to avoid the possibility that Israel would face international sanctions. A 1978 State Department legal opinion stated that Jewish settlements in occupied territory are not admissible under international law, yet President Ronald Reagan stated in a 1981 interview that the settlements were “ill-advised” but “not illegal.” George H.W. Bush was the first president to link the amount of aid that Israel would receive to its settlement building, deducting the cost of settlement construction from U.S. loan guarantees. However, Clinton later allowed exemptions for settlement construction in East Jerusalem and for “natural growth.” In 2004, George W. Bush wrote a letter to Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon recognizing that the “new realities,” or settlements, would make it impossible for Israel to revert to pre-1967 borders in any peace agreement. Most administrations came to believe that Israel would keep its three largest settlement blocs in exchange for ceding other land to the Palestinians in any peace deal, thinking it unrealistic that Israel could force so many of its citizens to leave the settlements. While the Obama administration took actions to shield Israel from political movements that sought to penalize Israeli businesses operating in the West Bank, it also delivered a rebuke of Israel’s settlements by abstaining from a UN Security Council vote declaring the settlements illegal.

As it did with other components of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Trump administration pivoted to a view of Jewish settlements that was markedly pro-Israel. In November 2019, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo voiced disagreement with the 1978 State Department opinion, saying civilian settlements in the West Bank are “not, per se, inconsistent with international law,” and not an obstacle to the peace process. The announcement prompted more than one hundred members of Congress to sign a letter of disapproval [PDF]. Then CFR Fellow Gordon wrote that “if there was already a yellow light from the United States for settlement expansion, the [Trump] administration just turned it green.”

Under Trump’s peace plan, Israel would have absorbed about 30 percent of the West Bank by extending sovereignty to all Jewish settlements there and to the Jordan Valley. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was expected to move forward with annexation in July 2020, a proposal condemned by U.S. lawmakers from both major parties, human rights experts, and leaders worldwide. However, as part of the Abraham Accord with the UAE, Israel agreed to halt annexation temporarily.

How much U.S. aid goes to Israelis and Palestinians?

The United States has long been Israel’s ally and its leading security collaborator because the United States supports the existence of a Jewish state. During the Cold War, many U.S. defense strategists saw Israel as the best partner in the fight against Soviet influence in the Middle East, and it later proved to be a strong contributor to U.S. counterterrorism efforts.

Today, Israel remains the United States’ closest strategic partner in the Middle East. Both countries are concerned about Iran’s nuclear ambitions and its support for Islamist militants, particularly Lebanon’s Hezbollah and Hamas. As a result of these shared interests, the United States has pledged to help safeguard Israel’s military superiority over any hostile combination of countries in the region. By law, the U.S. government must ensure that any arms sales to other Middle Eastern states do not “adversely affect Israel’s qualitative military edge over military threats to Israel” [PDF].

The United States began providing Israel with military assistance after its withdrawal from Arab territories as part of the peace process. Washington considered it a responsibility to provide this security aid because Israel was taking risks for peace. The United States also gave large aid packages to Egypt and Jordan in exchange for their commitments to the peace process.

Since the end of World War II, the United States has provided more cumulative foreign aid to Israel than it has to any other country.

Since the end of World War II, the United States has provided more cumulative foreign aid [PDF] to Israel than it has to any other country. The United States gave Israel significant economic assistance from 1971 to 2007, but due to Israel’s considerable economic growth beginning in the 1990s, it now receives mostly military aid. In fiscal year 2020, more than half of all U.S. foreign military aid [PDF] was headed to Israel, which uses most of it to purchase U.S. arms. Under a 2016 memorandum of understanding, the United States is committed to providing nearly $4 billion to Israel each year, including $500 million for missile defense.

U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel and the Palestinian Territories

Constant 2017 dollars

A line chart of U.S. foreign aid to Israel ($3.3B in 2019) and the Palestinian territories ($0.1B in 2019)

$5 billion

$4

Israel

$3

$2

$1

Palestinian territories

$0

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

2016

2018

Source:  U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).

The United States also provides aid [PDF] to Palestinians, mostly to support government and humanitarian programs. Washington gave more than $5 billion total between 1994 and 2018. The United States has also provided more than $6 billion in aid to the UN Palestinian refugee agency (UNRWA) since 1950. Aid flows were restructured in 2007, after Hamas broke violently with the PA⁠—⁠led by the rival Fatah party⁠—and seized control of the Gaza Strip. The United States considers Hamas a terrorist organization and takes measures to prohibit it from receiving any assistance.

U.S. aid to the Palestinians began shrinking under the Trump administration in 2018, as it reduced assistance to the West Bank and Gaza and discontinued contributions to UNRWA. In 2019, Trump signed an antiterrorism law that allowed Americans to sue recipients of U.S. foreign aid, including the PA, over alleged complicity in acts of war. Fearing lawsuits, the PA requested that Washington cut off its aid. Though the antiterrorism law remains in effect, the Biden administration has resumed aid to the West Bank and Gaza. Pending congressional approval of some funds, this could amount to more than $360 million in 2021 for economic support, pandemic-related assistance, funding through UN agencies, and humanitarian aid following the recent Israel-Hamas conflict.

What are the prospects for a resolution to the conflict?

The outlook for Israeli-Palestinian negotiations is bleak. It’s highly unlikely that the Palestinians will receive a package of concessions from Israel that is more favorable than those that the Palestinians have rejected in the past. Some experts have suggested that the prospects for a two-state solution will continue to fade, especially if the Israeli government annexes settlements in the West Bank and the Jordan Valley, actions it agreed to suspend as part of the Abraham Accord with the UAE. And many analysts say the recent Arab-Israeli normalization deals, as well as the 2021 Israel-Hamas conflict, have reduced the likelihood of new talks between Israel and the PA. Meanwhile, political divisions between Hamas and the PA remain a challenge to any future negotiated settlement.

Experts say these dynamics have raised the prospect of a one-state outcome, which many view as perilous given the possibility that, with Arabs forming at least half the population, Israel will no longer be a Jewish state. And if Israel were to deny Palestinians equal rights in order to remain a Jewish state, that would undermine its future as a democracy. Despite these concerns, there’s growing interest in the notion of a one-state solution. It has become more popular among Israelis [PDF], and a 2020 poll [PDF] of Palestinians showed that just over one-third would support it. 

Recommended Resources

CFR’s Robert D. Blackwill and Philip H. Gordon discuss how to repair the U.S.-Israel relationship in this Council Special Report.

For Foreign Affairs, CFR’s Martin Indyk looks at the shortcomings of Trump’s Middle East policy.

Mohammed Haddad compares Trump’s peace plan to previous proposals in this data visualization for Al Jazeera’s AJ Labs.

At this April 2021 meeting, CFR’s Martin Indyk, the Wilson Center’s Dalia Dassa Kaye, and the Institute for National Security Studies’ Daniel Shapiro discuss the Biden administration’s approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Middle East and North Africa

Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

Israel

Palestinian Territories

United States

U.S. Foreign Policy

Corrections: A previous version of this article incorrectly referred to Ottoman Palestine as the “British Mandate of Palestine,” which was not established until 1920. The article also incorrectly said the UN General Assembly voted for the partition of Palestine in 1948. These errors were corrected on July 28, 2020.

Will Merrow created the graphics for this article.

The Quad in the Indo - Pacific: What to know

 The Quad in the Indo-Pacific: What to Know

By Sheila A. Smith, CFR Expert

May 27, 2021 2:30 pm (EST)

The Quad, composed of the United States, Australia, India, and Japan, is not a formal alliance. Still, the group has intensified its security and economic ties as tensions with China rise.

What does the Quad do?

The Quad, officially the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, is a group of four countries: the United States, Australia, India, and Japan. Maritime cooperation among them began after the Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004. But today the countries—all democracies and vibrant economies—work on a far broader agenda, which includes tackling security, economic, and health issues.

Over the years, the Quad’s diplomacy has waxed and waned. It is a loose grouping rather than a formal alliance. Japan initially emphasized the democratic identity of the four nations, whereas India seemed more comfortable emphasizing functional cooperation. Australian leaders have been reluctant about creating the impression that the group is a formal alliance.

President Biden sits at a table and the leaders of Japan, India, and Australia appear on video screens.

Leaders of the Quad countries meet virtually in March 2021. Olivier Douliery/AFP/Getty Images   Share

As of 2021, leaders in all four countries have become more aligned in their shared concerns about China’s increasingly assertive behavior in the region and are more willing to define a constructive agenda of cooperation. All four navies participated in their first joint exercise in over a decade in November 2020. And in March 2021, U.S. President Joe Biden convened a virtual Quad meeting attended by Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga. They formed working groups on COVID-19 vaccines, climate change, and technological innovation and supply-chain resilience.

What are U.S. interests in the Quad?

Working closely with these countries is natural for the United States. Australia and Japan are U.S. treaty allies, and India is an important strategic partner. The Donald Trump administration worked closely with these countries, and the Biden administration is expanding the Quad’s agenda.

The Indo-Pacific spans two oceans and several continents, making it important to U.S. maritime interests. In 2019, $1.9 trillion [PDF] worth of U.S. trade passed through the region. This year, 42 percent of the world’s exports and 38 percent of global imports are expected to pass through, according to a UN report.

China’s growing willingness to challenge the regional status quo worries Washington, and Beijing’s challenging of democratic values over the past year has deepened other Quad partners’ concerns as well. China’s pursuit of its regional interests—including its crackdown on Hong Kong’s freedoms and criticism of nations that take issue with its actions—has not been slowed by the COVID-19 pandemic. However, the Quad’s agenda is not all about China. Leaders of the four nations also see a need for a more proactive approach to solving humanitarian and economic challenges caused by COVID-19.

What are Japan’s aims for the Quad?

Former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe was a strong believer in the Quad’s power to ensure a “free and open Indo-Pacific.” Abe worked to persuade the Trump administration of the value of this coalition approach across the Indo-Pacific. 

Japan depends heavily on open sea lanes for its trade with the world. The U.S. and Japanese militaries already work closely across the region, and Japan’s Self-Defense Forces have slowly built relationships [PDF] with their Australian and Indian counterparts. Similarly, Japan has played an important role in supporting investment [PDF] in manufacturing, trade, and infrastructure development across the region. 

Japan and its Quad partners share concerns about China’s role in the region and Beijing’s challenges to the rule of law. Beijing’s assertion of its sovereignty in the South China Sea, as well as Chinese provocations toward islands China and Japan both claim in the East China Sea, has made Tokyo wary of China’s military build-up. Strategic consultations with other Quad partners are vital.

Similarly, Japan is watching carefully as China imposes economic conditionality on countries in the Indo-Pacific, and it wants to offer Southeast Asian countries alternative sources of assistance and commerce to offset China’s growing influence. Tokyo has joined with Washington and Canberra to deepen the funds available for quality infrastructure. Bolstering the resilience of the Quad nations, especially for critical supply chains for goods such as semiconductors, will also be a Japanese priority.

How has China responded?

China’s relations with each of the Quad members have become more tense during the pandemic. U.S.-China tensions remain high; Beijing’s frustration was conspicuous when the new Biden foreign policy team had its first meeting with its Chinese counterpart in Alaska in March. Australia continues to bear the brunt of Chinese economic sanctions after suggesting a World Health Organization investigation into the origins of COVID-19 last year. India and Japan have clashed with China over territorial disputes. China’s ambassador to Tokyo has publicly criticized Prime Minister Suga, claiming that the new Quad diplomacy reflects a “Cold War mentality” and that it is “100 percent outdated.” In addition, recent polls have shown negative views of China have soared among publics across the region.

Yet, few policymakers in the Quad countries see an advantage in trying to contain Chinese influence militarily. Instead, the Quad leaders have emphasized cooperation across areas of shared interest to bolster confidence in the democracies’ ability to counter China’s assertion of regional influence. As long as tensions with China remain, the Quad’s agenda is likely to expand as the democracies of the Indo-Pacific seek to balance China’s growing power