Coronavirus is seen as the greatest global challenge of modern times. Because, the death toll in some countries has reached tens of thousands. Just as important is the shock of unpreparedness, helplessness and vulnerability of a technologically advanced world under attack. A second wave is looming, but second-strike capability is of no consequence. Nonetheless, countries including those hardest hit are planning to ease restrictions because the economy matters.
With the pandemic, conflicts which have for long remained high on the international agenda temporarily receded. One heard less about Syria, Libya, Yemen even the Islamic State. However, as the world adapts to a new way of life, these will surface again with an added corona threat dimension. In Turkey, for example, our problem will again be Idlib. Of course, our democratic and economic decline are also problems but that those are now a given.
To begin with, I would say for the umpteenth time that the contrast between the bombast of eight years ago and today’s realities unmistakably shows that Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party’s (JDP) foray into the Syrian conflict has been the worst strategic blunder in the history of the Republic.
In Idlib the government has kept struggling, hoping that things would somehow work out. The “Additional Protocol to the Memorandum on Stabilization of the Situation in the Idlib De-Escalation Area” was a respite. It will not resolve the problem. Moreover, Idlib has now become the key to dealing with our other challenges in Syria and the future of our relations with Damascus. Continuing to reinforce our military presence there is only “more of the same” and will not get us anywhere.
To move forward the government must admit that our taking a leading role in the regime change project in Syria was a mistake. Because, this is the dictate of common sense. But it is easier said than done.
In a remarkable New York Times article titled “Why It’s So Hard to Admit You’re Wrong” Kristin Wong said the following on May 22, 2017:
“Despite your best intentions and efforts, it is inevitable: At some point in your life, you will be wrong.
“Mistakes can be hard to digest, so sometimes we double down rather than face them. Our confirmation bias kicks in, causing us to seek out evidence to prove what we already believe. The car you cut off has a small dent in its bumper, which obviously means that it is the other driver’s fault.
“Psychologists call this cognitive dissonance — the stress we experience when we hold two contradictory thoughts, beliefs, opinions or attitudes. For example, you might believe you are a kind and fair person, so when you rudely cut someone off, you experience dissonance. To cope with it, you deny your mistake and insist the other driver should have seen you, or you had the right of way even if you didn’t.”
The problem is the Turkish government is suffering from chronic cognitive dissonance. It loathes admitting mistakes. The best it can do is to say that it has been deceived or misled, that its goodwill has been abused. Nonetheless, there are things it can do short of outright admission of fault.
Like many other countries Turkey is busy fighting the corona pandemic, so far it seems rather successfully. And, right across the border is Idlib, home to over three million people, half of whom have been displaced from elsewhere in the country. Washington Post’s Sarah Dadouch related on April 18 that according to a report released by United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the health system in Idlib is in ruins; weak disease surveillance, population density, low levels of sanitation services, poor response capacity and suboptimal levels of public health preparedness are all factors that are likely to trigger a rapid transmission of the virus in the region.
The Turkish government has sent medical equipment to a few countries to help them fight the pandemic. Perhaps it can also consider extending a generous helping hand to the people of Syria also. After all, we always claimed that we were a friend of the Syrian people. We were at the forefront of long-gone groups claiming such titles. This could be a first act of good neighborliness after eight long years of confrontation and may pave the way for the resumption of relations with Damascus. It would also be less costly than maintaining our military presence there. At some point this is going to happen anyway. Covid-19 cooperation may make the inevitable more palatable for both sides.
Emekli tümamiral
Cem Gürdeniz’in,”Tarihi değiştiren mektup 100 yaşında” başlıklı, 26 Nisan 2020
tarihli yazısı.
Tarihimizde devlet kaderini
etkileyecek öyle mektuplar vardır ki, yeni rotalar belirlemiş, yeni fırsatlar
çıkarmış kısacası bugünümüzü şekillendirmiştir. Bunların içinde şüphesiz en
önemlisi Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk)’ün Rusya lideri Lenin’e yazdığı 26 Nisan 1920
mektubudur. Büyük Millet Meclisinin açılışından 3 gün sonra Meclis Başkanı
sıfatı ile Mustafa Kemal, TBMM’nin Moskova Hükümetine Birinci Teklifnamesi
mektubunu imzalar. Bu belge milli iradenin resmi ilk dış politika girişimi,
aynı zamanda Meclisin ilk görüştüğü konulardan biridir. Milli hükümet (İcra
Vekilleri Heyeti) 4 Mayıs 1920’de kurulur. 5 Mayıs’taki ilk toplantısının
birinci gündem maddesi Rusya ile ilişkiler konusudur. 26 Nisan mektubu
emperyalizme karşı girişilecek ortak mücadeleden bahisle Rusya’dan 5 milyon
altın, silah, cephane ve malzeme talep eder. Mektuba cevap, 3 Haziran 1920'de
Dış İlişkiler Komiseri Georgiy Çiçerin imzasıyla gelir. Böylece emperyalizm ile
eş zamanlı mücadele eden iki ülke arasında ilk resmi ilişki başlamış olur.
MEKTUP VE ANADOLU’NUN BEKA SORUNU
Mektubun Meclisin açılışından 3 gün
sonra çok büyük bir öncelikle gönderilmesi ve bakanlar kurulunun (icra
vekilleri heyeti) kurulduktan bir gün sonra Rusya ilişkileri gündemiyle
toplanmasının pek çok nedeni vardır. Ancak en büyük neden ‘Beka’dır. Hayatta
kalma gereğidir. Aynı sorun, Rusya için de geçerlidir. Zira iç savaş ve işgal
altındadırlar. Her iki devletin birbirine ihtiyacı vardır. Emperyalizm
Ankara’yı hem batıdan hem doğudan sıkıştırmaktadır. Anadolu topraklarında emperyalist
devletlere ait 100 bin üzerinde bir işgal ordusu mevcuttur. Her coğrafi
sektörde istila ve zulüm başlamıştır. Bu güçlerin yanında Damat Ferit’in Kuvayı
İnzibatiyesi, millicilere karşı isyanlar ile Ermeni, Rum çeteciler Ankara’yı
sıkıştırmaktadır. Meclis’in toplanması bile sonradan Mustafa Kemal’e isyan ve
ihanet eden Çerkez Ethem gibi düzensiz çete gücünün taktik başarısı sayesinde
mümkün olabilmiştir. Doğuda ise Kafkas Seddi vardır. Durum ümitsizdir. Batıda
savaşmak için, doğuya sırtını yaslamak isteyen Mustafa Kemal, Kafkas Seddini
yıkmalıdır. Doğu sınırları halledilmelidir. Komutanlara çektiği 5 Şubat 1920
tarihli telgrafında, “Kafkas Seddi’ni Türkiye’nin kati mahvı projesi sayıp bu
seddi İtilaf Devletleri’ne yaptırmamak için en son vasıtalara müracaat etmek ve
bu uğurda her türlü tehlikeleri göze almak mecburiyetindeyiz” demişti.
ERMENİSTAN’A ABD DESTEĞİ
1920 yılının Nisan ayında
emperyalizm acımasızca ilerliyordu. Büyük Ermenistan için düğmeye çoktan
basılmıştı. 23 Nisan 1920 yani TBMM’nin ve milli iradenin dünyaya ilan edildiği
gün, ABD Ermenistan hükümetini resmen tanıdığını ilan etmişti. Halbuki
Ermenistan, Taşnak Partisinin iktidarında 28 Mayıs 1918’de kurulmuştu. Ancak
ABD özellikle bugünü seçmişti. Mustafa Kemal’in Lenin’e mektup gönderdiği 26
Nisan 1920 tarihinde de San Remo/İtalya’da toplanan Müttefik Güçler Yüksek
Konseyi ABD Başkanı Woodrow Wilson’a Erzurum, Trabzon, Van ve Bitlis’i içine
alan ve denize çıkan Ermenistan sınırlarını çizme sürecinin hakemliğini yapma
görevini teklif etmişti. ABD Başkanı, bu görevi 17 Mayıs 1920'de kabul etti.
Birinci Dünya Savaşı sonrası yorgun ve zayıflamış Avrupa emperyalizmi,
Ermenileri koruma ve kollama görevini ABD’ye vermişti. Wilson, 24 Kasım 1920’de
bu görevi yerine getirdi. Osmanlı hanedanının imzaladığı Sevr Anlaşmasının
hükümleri en büyük gerekçesiydi.
TOPLANTI TALİMATININ DETAYLARI
Mustafa Kemal strateji dehası idi.
Henüz 4 yıl önce Birinci Dünya Savaşında Muş ve Bitlis’in geri alınmasında Çar
Ordularına karşı savaşan Mustafa Kemal, bu kez devrim sonrası Bolşevik
Rusya’dan destek talep ediyordu. Neticede mektuptan 15 gün sonra 11 Mayıs’ta
Dışişleri Vekili Bekir Sami Bey başkanlığındaki heyet, Moskova’ya hareket etti.
Ancak 19 Temmuz 1920 tarihinde varabildiler. Yanlarında 8 Mayıs 1336 (1920)
tarihli 7 maddelik bir Toplantı Talimatı vardı. Bu gizli talimatın iki nüsha
yazıldığını ve bir nüshasının Doğu Cephesi Komutanı (Eski adıyla 15. Kolordu)
Kazım Karabekir Paşa’da kaldığını 1960 yılında yayınlanan İstiklal Harbimiz
isimli hatıratından (Türkiye Yayınevi, Sayfa 769) öğreniyoruz. Talimatın
lafzı ve ruhu, o dönem Türk-Rus ilişkilerinin omurgasını çatan Mustafa Kemal,
Kazım (Karabekir), Ali Fuat (Cebesoy) Paşalar ile Dışişleri Vekili Bekir Sami
ve İktisat Vekili Yusuf Kemal’in gelecek günlerde Türkiye’nin kaderini
belirleyecek ilişkiye bakışının teorisini vermektedir. 7 madde içinden üç madde
dikkat çekicidir. İkinci madde: “Türkiye’nin isteği, milli sınırları içinde iç
ve dış tam bağımsızlık içinde yaşamak ve bu temel isteğin sağlanması şartıyla
Rusya ile kader ve gelecek birliğini (Tevhid-i Mukadderat ve İstikbal)
kurmaktır.” Dördüncü Madde: “Boğazlardan yararlanma tüm Karadeniz ülkelerine
serbest olacaktır. Bunu sağlamak için İstanbul Boğazına tahkimat yapılmamak,
İstanbul’a Rus Donanmasının gelmesinin bizim takdir ve isteğimize bağlı olmak
üzere Çanakkale Boğazı tahkimatını Ruslarla birlikte savunmamızdır. Bu
koşullardan daha fazlası Rusların Çanakkale tahkimatını bağımsız ellerinde
bulundurmaları ya da İstanbul’a istedikleri zaman donanma göndermeleridir ki
her iki durum da İstanbul’un elimizde bulundurulması kuralını bozar. Ruslara
boğazların tam serbestiyetini anlaşma ile sağlamak ya da boğazların savunma ve
denetimini Karadeniz sahildarlarının ortak meselesi olarak kabul ettirmek iyi
bir çözüm yoludur.”
Altıncı Madde: “Dışarıdan yapılacak
yardım: Para, savaş araçları, makineler, gerekirse askeri birlikler (indelhace
kıtaat-ı askeriye)”
KARABEKİR’İN YAKLAŞIMI
Karabekir hatıratında talimatın
ikinci maddesini eleştiriyor. “Burada en göze çarpan ikinci maddedeki Rusya ile
kader ve gelecek birliği konusudur. Eksikliği aranan madde de doğu
sınırlarımızın durumudur. Kader birliği meselesi pek kapsamlı ve karmaşıktır.
Heyette bulunan iki vekilin de kafası karışıktır. Bana şunu sordular: Her neye
mahal olursa olsun batı devletleri ile mi anlaşmalı? yoksa Bolşeviklerle mi
birleşmeli? Yani açıkçası batı devletlerinin idaresine mi girmeli? Yoksa
Bolşevik olup Sovyet hükümeti ile mi birleşmeli? Bu da Rusların idaresine
girmek demektir. Kendilerine ne o ne de öteki dedim. Meselenin iki değil,
üçüncü yolu vardır. Her iki şekil de bağımsızlığımızı kaybetmek, yani ölmektir.
Ölümün hançerle mi? Tabanca ile mi tercih olunmalıdır diye münakaşası
faydasızdır…. Ruslarla yapılacak şey, madem ki ikimizin de düşmanı müşterektir şu
hâlde tabii dostuz ve müttefikiz. Aramızda hudutlarımızı ve yapabileceğimiz
işleri tespit edelim maddi manevi mütekabil yardımları taahhüt altına alarak,
zaten ayrı ayrı başladığımız işlerimizi yürütelim. Bizim ihtiyacımız para,
savaş malzeme ve araçlarıdır. Yapabileceğimiz ise dindaşlarımızın üzerine tesir
ve Ermeni engelini kaldırmaktır.”
ZORLUKLARIN DAYATMASI
Diğer yandan 4. ve 6. Maddeler milli
güçlerin kurtuluş savaşını devam ettirebilmek için ne denli zor durumda
olduklarının göstergesidir. Çanakkale’nin tahkimatının gerekirse birlikte
yapılmasının düşünülmesi donanma yokluğunun ve 1,5 yıl önce biten Birinci Dünya
Savaşında yaşananların kurucularımız üzerinde yarattığı psikolojinin bir
sonucudur. (Mondros’tan 3 gün sonra 3 Kasım 1918’den itibaren boğazdaki
mayınların taranması, tüm bataryaların imhası başlamıştır.)
SAĞLAM TEMELLER
Birinci ve 1921 Ocak ayındaki ikinci
görüşmeden sonra artık sağlam temeller atılmıştır. Her iki taraf da aklın,
karşılıklı saygı ve erdemin gereği bir nevi Karabekir’in üçüncü yoluna sadık
kalır. Rusya, Türkiye’de Bolşevizm hareketlerini desteklemez. Türkiye,
Sakarya’nın doğusuna çekilecek kadar zor durumda kalsa da emperyalizmle
mücadeleden ödün vermez. Dişi ile tırnağı ile savaşır. 16 Mart 1921’de
Moskova’da Türk-Sovyet Antlaşması imzalanır. 16 Mart tarihi bilhassa
seçilmiştir. Şehzadebaşı Katliamı ve İstanbul işgalinin yıldönümüdür.
ÇOK ÖNCEDEN BAŞLATILAN YARDIMLAR
Diğer yandan anlaşmanın
imzalanmasından 9 ay öncesinde Rusya, milli güçlere ilk deniz sevkiyatını
başlatır. Bu bile iki devrimci liderin birbirine olan güveninin bir işaretiydi.
Rusya’dan 300 bin tona yakın silah ve cephane taşıyan sevkiyatlar büyük
taarruza kadar devam etti. “Gözüm Sakarya’da Kulağım İnebolu’da” diyen Mustafa
Kemal’in süvarileri, 9 Eylül 1922 sabahı İzmir’e girdi. Savaş bitmişti. Mustafa
Kemal büyük zaferden emin olarak 8 ay önce, 4 Ocak 1922’de Lenin’e son
mektubunu yazar. Şöyle der: “Türkler ve Rusların, tarihi, yüzyıllarca süren
kanlı savaşların gürültüsüyle doldurduktan sonra, bu kadar çabuk ve bu kadar
bütünsel bir şekilde uzlaşmaları, öteki milletleri şaşkınlığa uğratmıştır. Bu
anlamda da Türkiye, Rusya’ya, bilhassa son birkaç ayın Rusya’sına Batı
Avrupa’ya olduğundan çok daha yakındır… Türkiye, Sovyet Rusya’ya karşı takip
ettiği siyasetten geri adım atmayacaktır ve bu konuya dair yayılmış bütün
söylentiler katiyen yanlıştır… Yine aynı şekilde sizi temin ederim ki, Sovyet
Rusya’ya karşı doğrudan veya dolaylı olarak asla hiçbir anlaşmaya ve ittifaka
dâhil olmayacağız.”
GÜNÜMÜZE DERSLER
Atlantik sistemin ve Washington
Konsensüsünün derinden çatırdadığı, Asya yüzyılının başladığı, Kovid-19 sonrası
yeni küresel sistemin oluşmaya başladığı günümüzde, tam tamına 100 yıl önce
bağımsız Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nin imkânsız gibi görünen kurtuluş ve kuruluşunu
mümkün kılacak süreci başlatacak bir mektubun yazıldığı yakıcı ve öldürücü koşulları
düşünürsek, bugün umutlu ve ümitli olmak için pek çok nedenimiz vardır.
Devletlerin ebedi düşman veya dostları yoktur.
Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun 16 kez,
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’ün ise 1916 Mart’ında savaştığı Ruslarla, cumhuriyetin
kuruluşunun yolunun taşlarının döşeneceğini kim düşünebilirdi? Demek ki tarihin
yaratıcılığı insanın önünde. 23 Nisan 1920 koşullarında sorulsa, mecliste
sadece bir kişi bugünleri hayal edebilirdi. Yaşayan kuşaklar 100 yıl öncesinden
ders almalı, Atatürk’ün bağımsız Türkiye’yi kurarken verdiği mücadeleyi
hatırlamalıdır. Onun stratejik zekâsı ve jeopolitik aklının ürünü olan Moskova
ile pragmatik işbirliğinin en sonunda kendine özgü ulus-devlet modeline hayat
verdiği gerçeği geleceğimize rehberlik etmelidir.
Everything will be different after the COVID-19 pandemic. But how? Who will emerge as a winner amid all the changes sweeping the globe? Six economists, diplomats and pollsters share their prognoses for the post-coronavirus future.
A man with an improvised mask
ARMANDO BABANI/EPA-EFE/Shutterstock
One needn't look far for signs of the apocalypse. The world is facing the most dramatic economic crisis since the Great Depression, according to the International Monetary Fund, and the pandemic will change the planet from the ground up, writes the newsmagazine Foreign Policy. Are things really going to get that bad everywhere?
At the moment, the world is still in crisis mode and governments remain primarily focused on containing the pandemic. Meanwhile, trends and developments are emerging that provide a glimpse into the future. A decline in globalization seems inevitable. Nation states will be among the winners of the crisis, while international organizations will be among the losers. A more rapid withdrawal of the United States from the world stage is practically a foregone conclusion -- while China is trying to leverage the pandemic to further expand its power.
But Marta Lagos, a public opinion pollster from Chile, also sees an opportunity in the pandemic, with people now seeing that governments are fighting for the common good, not just for a small elite. Jakkie Cilliers, a geopolitical analyst from South Africa, sees the African continent as a potential source of increasing instability, but she also sees opportunities for democratization. Still, there aren't only optimists.
"The Year of the Rat" is the title chosen by the French foreign policy expert Bruno Tertrais for his essay about the post-coronavirus world, named after the current year on the Chinese Zodiac calendar. Tertrais is more of a pessimist, fearing an expansion of state surveillance and hyperinflation if an economic recovery is not forthcoming.
"What Little Was Left of Multilateralism Has Failed"
We are headed for a poorer, meaner and smaller world. In fact, it is already here.
The global economy is supposed to shrink. Countries are fighting over medication and protective equipment. Instead of recognizing that they can only fight the pandemic together, they are choosing to blame each other and close borders. These are the times of everyone for themselves and themselves alone.
The pandemic could have served as a beneficial shock, by bringing the world closer together. Instead, COVID-19 will further deepen the fault lines that have been emerging since the financial crisis. We will see an increase in protectionism, the polarization of society and a further shift to the right. What little was left of multilateralism has failed. We are experiencing the return of power politics.
The problem is that there are too many alpha men in the room. Authoritarian rulers, whether in Japan, China, the United States or India, base their legitimacy on ultra-nationalism. The give and take of diplomacy proves much harder for them as they fear that compromises would make them appear weak.
It will become much tougher for India to achieve her goals in this new world. We want to transform India into a country where every Indian can achieve his or her potential. India’s success in doing so depends on an open world -- and on peace. Both could be in short supply in the future.
There are two worrying prospects: First, India was able to take advantage of the opportunities of globalization. The past 30 years have been the best in our history and poverty has decreased significantly. Today, almost half of our gross domestic product depends on the external sector. We cannot lock ourselves up, we rely on the rest of the world, be it in terms of energy, technology or capital. I do not expect the end of globalization: The virus is proof of our interdependence. But we will experience a new kind of globalization, one that may be less open to goods and investment and largely closed to ideas and workers.
Second, it is still too early to identify who will emerge from the crisis as a winner. But the struggle between the two great powers, China and the United States, and their intentions to rewrite the old order, can be a major source of instability.
New Delhi needs to prepare for these changes. First of all -- and the government has already made a good beginning here -- it must support its neighbors in the crisis. As the biggest country in South Asia, India must be a provider of security, stability and prosperity. Not only to the subcontinent, but to the entire rim of the Indian Ocean, which includes parts of Africa and Southeast Asia.
India can turn this crisis into opportunity. We are good at crises, something that we have proven time and again. Our major reforms, the liberalization of our economy and the related rise of India, have all come at times of crisis.
Shivshankar Menon, a former Indian diplomat, was national security adviser in the government of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. He currently teaches at Ashoka University near New Delhi.
"Our Democracies Will Benefit in the Long Run"
When we look at this crisis, we have a feeling that the so-called First World has failed. The images from New York or Bergamo show us that the U.S. and Europe are not the perfectly sparkling gems we thought they were. The North has always been very hard on us, reproaching us for our mistakes. Now, it turns out that the emperor has no clothes. Many of the migrants who recently wanted to go north will change direction. The migration routes of the future will run within the South.
This loss of prestige of the North is also reflected in the fact that no country is capable of assuming a global leadership role. The U.S. is no longer a global power, and China is no longer a role model. What we see instead are nation states going their own way. The question of how they will emerge from this crisis will determine who we will look to for guidance in the future.
I believe that our democracies, flawed as they are, will benefit from the crisis in the long run. For the first time, the restrictions we are currently experiencing affect the entire population and not just a part of it. And they're not being imposed in an authoritarian manner, but instead they're taking place within democratic systems that recognize the rule of law.
In many countries, people are experiencing for the first time that their governments are concerned about the common good and not just the interests of a small, powerful elite. Countries in Latin America will demand more freedom and equality, more democracy. This could lead to social uprisings, not in the form of revolutions but as a redefinition of the democratic exercise of power. We will have to reorganize our economies and establish social protection systems for the unemployed and people who just barely get by at the end of the month.
The most important people in the fight against the virus are garbage collectors and nurses -- all those who previously enjoyed little recognition in society and are now indispensable. This will lead to a new social balance.
Marta Lagos is the founder of the opinion research institute Latinobarómetro in Chile.
"A Missed Opportunity to Find Cooperation With China"
Coming out of this pandemic, the U.S. will be judged by two primary factors: First, how well did we handle the pandemic domestically, both in terms of public health outcomes and the economic impact? Secondly, what role did the U.S. play on the global stage orchestrating the international response to the pandemic?
If you look at the U.S. role historically, you can see that previous administrations stepped up to deal with the AIDS epidemic and led the international community in addressing that. The same goes for the financial crisis. In the Ebola crisis, the U.S. helped orchestrate Europe and others to donate resources to help affected countries in Africa. So the expectation is established across multiple administrations, Republican and Democrat, that the U.S. has a leadership role to play, particularly in coordinating actions across the developed world and among its allies and partners.
This time though, the U.S. has been largely absent and has created a vacuum - and even worse. In some cases, it has actually competed directly with its allies and partners in the chaotic scramble for medical equipment.
It's been a real failure of leadership, and that will color perceptions of the U.S. in many parts of the world going forward, unless that approach is repudiated in our election in November.
Generally, I don't think a majority of people in this country support a retreat from the world stage. If you look at polling, most Americans understand the critical importance of alliances and U.S. engagement in the world to protect our interests at home.
People here are reacting to a couple of things, though. Some of the negative attitudes towards a global leadership role come from a series of military interventions that have not panned out the way they were originally envisioned, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan. There is, on both the left and the right, a reduced appetite for large scale use of the military for things like regime change.
Many Americans, particularly labor workers in highly globalized sectors, have been more skeptical of free trade agreements, because in some cases these agreements have contributed to a loss of U.S. jobs. Globalization has pros and cons. Coming out of this pandemic, we have to think about medical supply chains in national security terms. Can we really be dependent on equipment manufactured in China if it's vital to saving American lives in a crisis? We will likely see greater diversification in health care related supply chains.
The fact that the American electorate has put someone like Trump with his America First policy in place has sown doubt in the minds of our allies. They ask: Will the U.S. turn inward again? It's going to take a series of elections that continue to put pragmatic internationalists in place in order to reassure our partners around the globe. Our allies have to realize that Trump was an anomaly. The only way we can solve big problems like climate change or nuclear proliferation or a pandemic like this is through international engagement informed by a clear-eyed pragmatism about what works and what doesn't.
I do think that we could elect a president that understands and acts on the understanding that U.S. leadership is essential, and who is able and willing to bring the international community together. But that is not saying we're going to go back to the Pax Americana of the 20th century and the uni-polar moment of the post-Cold War period.
It's not just that U.S. leadership has wavered, the world is also changing. The international system is becoming more multi-polar with the rise of China. The diffusion of power is ongoing.
U.S. leadership in a more multi-polar, more contested global environment means we have to better leverage our alliances and partnerships with other democracies who share interests and values with us. We will also need more robust mechanisms than the G-7, G-20 or the United Nations for coordinating action among the democracies, in the Americas, Europe and Asia. We will see a number of ad hoc measures.
Bodies like the World Health Organization are absolutely critical, particularly for the developing world and countries that don't have capable disease control agencies of their own. They look to the WHO, it plays a very critical role especially in times when forums like the UN Security Council are largely absent. The fact that Donald Trump announced cutting funds for the WHO in the middle of a pandemic does not make sense. The U.S. has not done enough to show up and exert influence in the WHO. We should try to fix the organization, not abandon it.
I would also like to see much more of a strategic dialog reopened with China to address some of the most pressing issues in a more straightforward and holistic manner.
This pandemic won’t necessarily strengthen China’s standing, given that in the early stages of the outbreak it didn't share information, falsified facts and punished the folks who were trying to provide early warning. Nevertheless, this was a missed opportunity to find ways to cooperate with China, to address the broader international dimensions of the crisis and to coordinate a more orchestrated effort. The right thing for the U.S. president to do would have been to call a G-7 or G-20 meeting, and to use those forums to coordinate an international response, including China, as opposed to allowing a power vacuum to open up.
Michèle Flournoy, co-founder of the Center for a New American Security think tank, is a director of the political consultancy WestExec Advisors in Washington, D.C.
"The Virus Will Also Threaten the Stability of States"
The pandemic will not constitute a break from the past for Africa. It will be an accelerator of existing trends. This applies to the importance of China, it also applies to Africa's dependence on China, it applies to migratory flows and it applies to terrorism and wars.
It's still early to make accurate forecasts, as Africa lags behind other regions of the world in terms of the spread of the virus. But there are already clearly foreseeable consequences. Africa would need annual economic growth between 10 and 14 percent to eliminate existing absolute poverty. And even with such growth rates, it would take more than a decade. A severe global recession will have fatal consequences for Africa's ability to grow fast enough.
We will see a more rapid increase in absolute poverty this year and next year. And a decrease in income. If growth in South Africa declines by 5 percent, there will be an additional 2.1 million people living in absolute poverty here alone. But even here I see the danger of unrest when the poor reach a certain level of despair. And it’s no less likely in other African countries, which do not offer even this rudimentary safety net.
Many economies will suffer as Africa is heavily dependent on commodity exports. The slowdown in growth in the rest of the world means that Africa will see a significant decline in these exports. In the end, the result could be greater dependence on China. I see great efforts from the Chinese side to help Africa. And I think this will pay off in the end, because America is currently doing nothing to help and Europe is doing very little. China will be an even more important trading partner in the future than it already is.
But the virus will also threaten the stability of states. Peacekeeping missions under the umbrella of the United Nations may have to be scaled down. UN missions as in the Central African Republic, South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo could be weakened. Troop withdrawal or the downscaling of these missions could endanger the slow, steady progress that has been made in stabilizing countries across a belt of countries from the Sahel to Central Africa and the Horn. The impact could be to reignite regional instability as increased instability again spreads to neighboring countries.
The virus will also weaken governments in their fight against organized crime, rebels and terrorists. The capacity of the armies involved will be tied up in the fight against the pandemic. They will have to leave the field, in part, to terrorist groups, who will engage even more robustly than we've seen to date. This is another reason why there will probably be greater migration flows toward Europe.
But I do not think that the autocrats in Africa will benefit in the long term. Of course, this crisis highlights the blatant abuses, the lack of state structures, the inability to even guarantee the supply of water. In contrast to the situation elsewhere there is a general trend towards more democracy in Africa and I think that COVID-19 will reinforce this trend. The finger will now be put on the sore spot, the mistakes of the past will become abundantly clear and people will demand accountability.
Jakkie Cilliers is chairman of the board of trustees at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) and the head of the African Futures and Innovation Team in Pretoria.
"Hyperinflation Could Lead to Social Unrest"
We're still at the stage in which everyone sees their views and assumptions as being confirmed by the corona crisis. This is true in the West and East, on the left and on the right. But the possible consequences of this crisis are already becoming apparent.
One of them will be a decline in globalization. Its slowdown had already begun before the outbreak of the pandemic. For economic reasons, but also for reasons of security policy, Western countries have long wanted to reduce their dependence on China. The COVID-19 crisis is now accelerating this trend and economic interdependence will decrease. In the medium term, "just in time" production will decrease. Especially in the health care sector, the emphasis will be on stockpiling.
The interesting question here is: Will this be solved nationally or in cooperation with other countries? Will we act nationally and alone in the health-care sector or together with our European partners?
Another consequence will be a decline in populism and an increase in souverainism. Once an end to the acute pandemic is in sight in most countries, people will see that populist governments were worse crisis managers when compared to others. The majority of populist leaders, most of all Donald Trump, have so far demonstrated an astonishing inability to respond to the most pressing concerns of their citizens and to show at least some degree of empathy.
But there is one danger to all this: If we do not succeed in achieving an economic recovery after the crisis, the populists will gain new support. The return of hyperinflation, for example, could lead to social unrest.
The nation state, on the other hand, is likely to be one of the big winners of the crisis. Like the health sector, our food supply will benefit from re-localization. Nation states will tend to withdraw into themselves and demand increased protection against external threats. This could come at the expense of Europe's Schengen system of open borders. Here, too, the question arises: Will this new sovereignty be national or European?
Will we also enter an era of digital authoritarianism and sacrifice certain freedoms? I'm a pessimist. In any case, it is likely that most of the population will be prepared to accept major restrictions on their freedoms, as they were after Sept. 11. We will accept more control.
Will some major powers emerge victorious from this pandemic? I don't think so, at least not for the next two years. Even if the U.S. no longer has a leading role, no other power will take over this role either. No country will emerge stronger from this crisis. In five years' time, of course, things may look different, but the U.S. will have repositioned itself by then. We're always too quick to bury Europe. After all, Europe has demonstrated a certain ability to adapt to crises.
Bruno Tertrais is deputy director of the foreign policy think tank Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique in Paris.
"China No Longer Seems to Be in This Defensive Position"
My opinion is that this pandemic -- provided it lasts only one year or so -- will not fundamentally change the geo-economic balance of power between the United States and China. In both countries, we will probably see a robust economic recovery, eventually. What the pandemic might very well contribute to, though, is a downward spiral in relations between China and Western democracies. There will be exacerbated misperceptions and an increased lack of trust. It could even lead to a new Cold War in U.S.-China relations. That is certainly not good news for China’s aim to assert global leadership.
In the beginning of the outbreak, the common perception was that the epidemic revealed the pathologies of the Chinese political system, and that the legitimacy of the Chinese leaders was at stake. But in a strange turn of events, China no longer seems to be in this defensive position. While the U.S. is following an "America First" approach -- snatching up medical supplies, failing to launch an initiative to help the developing world -- China appears more like a benevolent partner, if not a leader in the international system.
This narrative certainly resonates with the Chinese public: Domestically, President Xi Jinping has emerged stronger and more forceful and there has been a shift of public opinion toward the political system and the leadership. Citizens who were once critical of the government have become supporters. Even among the global public, the impression is that Western democracies like Germany or the U.S. have not done a better job than China in dealing with the outbreak. This perception potentially can make the so-called China model -- defined by one-party rule and a state-dominated economy -- more appealing in the developing world.
In the West, however, there is a continuing crescendo of allegations against China -- of an initial cover-up, of underreporting case numbers, of disinformation. There were even calls in the U.S. to hold China financially accountable for unleashing this pandemic. If you look at the responses from Western societies, "mixed" would be too polite a term.
The outcome of the battle for global leadership will also depend on how the pandemic unfolds. In China particularly, the concern about a second wave of the virus is real. The government is already planning for a resurge of cases in the summer. In other countries, a majority of the population might become infected and then recover, and thus achieve what we call herd immunity. In China, most of the people have not been exposed to the virus, which creates what we call an immunity gap.
That is dangerous to China, unless a vaccine becomes widely available. When other countries will be able to reopen their economies, China might still have to continue its draconian containment measures. But if China wants to engage in international society, they will have to reopen their borders. As an aspiring global leader, China cannot remain a fortress forever.
Yanzhong Huang, a Chinese-American, is a senior fellow for global health at the Council on Foreign Relations, a New York-based think tank.
