2019 : The Year in Review by Ali Tuygan

2019: The Year in Review

Posted on December 22, 2019 

by Ali Tuygan
by Ali Tuygan

December 22, 2019

During the past year, climate change, corruption, street protests, polarization and disarray in the West dominated the global agenda.

Frequent fires are part of California’s natural state but since the 1970s, the amount of area burned in the state has increased by a factor of five. As the National Geographic has reported, climate change’s stamp is evident in many of the fires, scientists say, primarily because hotter air means drier plants, which burn more readily. Australia too has always had devastating bushfires, but experts say climate change can and does makes bushfires worse. Despite the evidence, however, the UN climate conference in Madrid could only achieve modest results.

The CCPI (Climate Change Performance) Index 2019 is an independent monitoring tool of countries’ climate protection performance. It aims to enhance transparency in international climate politics and enables the comparability of climate protection efforts and progress made by individual countries. In this year’s index, Sweden leads the ranking, followed by Morocco and Lithuania. No wonder Greta Thunberg, the sixteen-year-old environmental activist is a Swedish national. Hopefully, the world would start to listen and act. Otherwise, with climate change and the head-spinning advance of technology, today’s futuristic disaster movies may prove to be more than entertainment.

A telephone call between presidents Trump and Zelensky brought corruption in Ukraine once again to world’s attention, a most unfortunate development for the latter who emerged as a ray of hope for his people. In reality, corruption is not endemic to Ukraine but it is an epidemic, if not pandemic.

Gretta Fenner, Managing Director of the Basel Institute on Governance, describes the following as some of the root causes of corruption[i]:

• Greed for money and power,
• A normalization of corruption,
• Rampant bribery,
• The failures of democracy,
• Use of anonymous shell companies, money laundering, illegal tax evasion,
• Cryptocurrency,
• International cooperation system largely defunct,
• Lack of level playing field among financial centers,
• Social acceptance, and
• Whistleblowers unprotected with or without laws.

In other words, “corruption” is not only a huge problem in itself but also an error-free indicator of the sum of all failures of a country.

REPORT THIS AD

REPORT THIS AD

December 9 was “International Anticorruption Day”. For now, at least, a day of outrage rather than celebration.

Anti-government protests from one end of the world to the other continued throughout 2019. Most street protests witnessed in the Middle East were triggered by frustration with corruption and lack of political reform. Protests in some countries resulted in great loss of life like in Iraq. Will the inevitable fate of the region’s gone corrupt leaders and Ukraine’s corruption problem being put on global display have a sobering effect on others? Let’s hope so.

In October, Thomas Carothers and Andrew O’Donohue of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace spoke about their new book “Democracies Divided”[ii]. Among the countries they mentioned were Brazil, India, Poland, Turkey and the US.

They said, “Once a society becomes deeply divided, it is very difficult to heal… Polarization tends to escalate at a dizzyingly fast pace, often in the span of just a few years… Polarization then entrenches itself and becomes self-perpetuating. Polarizing actions and reactions feed on each other, dragging countries into a downward spiral of anger and division…”

And, this is how they responded to the question, “what happens to democracies when polarization intensifies?”:

“Severe polarization damages all institutions essential to democracy.

“It routinely undermines the independence of the judiciary, as politicians attack the courts as biased or pack them with loyalists. It reduces legislatures either to gridlock or to a rubberstamp function. In presidential systems, it frequently leads to the abuse of executive powers and promotes the toxic view that the president represents only his or her supporters, rather than the country as a whole.

“Perhaps most fundamentally, polarization shatters informal but crucial norms of tolerance and moderation—like conceding peacefully after an electoral defeat—that keep political competition within bounds.”

Moreover, one may add, polarization disease can lead to immune system failures making a country vulnerable to internal and external threats.

Will the US and Turkey be able to address their problem of polarization in the foreseeable future? I can only speak for Turkey and I wish I could answer in the affirmative.

Finally, disarray in the West. The London summit which brought NATO countries’ leaders together to celebrate the seventieth anniversary of the Alliance ended with a strong Declaration. But what transpired before and during those two days overshadowed the joy, satisfaction and pride leaders could have drawn from the occasion. And, differences regarding the future of the Alliance remain.

With President Trump’s impeachment, Brexit, Europe’s unity and leadership problems, yes, the West is in disarray.

Last Wednesday millions both in the US and beyond watched the debate on impeachment with House members delivering one- to two-minute speeches one after the other. Many used the words “solemn” and “sad” to characterize the day.  It was more. It was a most unfortunate day for democracy at a time when many are worried about its decline and authoritarianism’s rise even in the EU.

On November 3, 2020 the US will hold a presidential election which is likely to be preceded by a tough, perhaps ugly and more polarizing election campaign. And what if Mr. Trump wins the election? Will continuing distraction make it increasingly difficult for Washington to play a consistent global role?

By contrast, Russia and China, leaders of the authoritarian world, appear to steer a steady course.

One thing is certain: The greatest party welcoming the new year will take place in Moscow.

As for Turkey, 2019 was another lost year with deepening polarization, democratic decline and a host of internal and external challenges, among them the economy, Syria, the likelihood of getting more involved in the Libyan war, questions regarding Turkey’s place in the West and Ankara’s diplomatic isolation. The Turkish lira is dropping on threat of US sanctions. This is yet another indication of the sad state of the economy. However, the government may see it as a welcome opportunity to blame again foreign enemies, in this case the US Congress, for our economic woes. Turkey’s Middle Easternization is transforming the country. Soon, some may even advocate going back to the Arabic script.

Turkish foreign policy, at present a tool of domestic politics, lacks transparency. If Ankara is indeed playing the US and Russia against one another as some suggest, we may soon realize that such a policy is not sustainable because of the high cost.

The government says that the purchase of Russian S-400 antimissile systems was dictated by Turkey’s security needs. Generally, countries do not publicize their threat analyses but even so people do have an understanding. We Turks still do not have a clue as to against whom the S-400s will protect us.

A debate is now underway on the future of the 1936 Montreux Convention in the context of canal Istanbul, first presented to the public as a “crazy project”. Again, not a word from the government. This Convention becoming a topic of controversy would indisputably prove that the project was more than crazy.

T.S. Eliot said, “For last year’s words belong to last year’s language. And next year’s words await another voice. And to make an end is to make a beginning.”

Although Eliot mentions “last year” and “next year”, his emphasis was on making a beginning. We Turks remember the ends and beginnings we made as a nation and these were not conceived or made necessarily at the end or the beginning of the calendar year. They were made on May 19, August 26, April 23, October 29. Nonetheless, end-December is the time when countries and peoples draw a balance sheet of the gone year, perhaps more. Thus, some with fond memories of the past feel nostalgic, while others simply wish to forget the past and hope for a new beginning. And some of us in Turkey do both, longing for the long past and yearning for a new beginning.

—————————————————————————-

Resolution of the Grand National Assebly of Turkey (TBMM)

RESOLUTION OF THE GRAND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF TURKEY

RESOLUTION ON THE CONDEMNATION AND REJECTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA SENATE RESOLUTION AND DECLARATION OF THE SAID RESOLUTION BEING DEEMED NULL AND VOID

Resolution No. 1237 / Resolution Date: 13.12.2019

As the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, we strongly condemn and reject the resolution regarding the Armenian genocide claims approved by the US Senate by means of distorting historical facts and disregarding the fundamental rules of international law.

This resolution, which has no legal significance and will not be binding to the Senate after the following election period, is clearly part of a dirty political machination. This constitutes a worthless posture on the interpretation of history based on the petty interests of arbitrary and daily politics.

The Grand National Assembly of Turkey reiterates the standpoint that delivering judgements on historical events is not the duty of parliaments. The so-called Armenian genocide draft resolution had previously been brought to the US Senate many times and had been rejected. It is worth noting that whenever the US’ interests come into conflict with Turkey’s politics, this subject is brought to the Senate’s agenda. Fundamentally, the issue here is not the 1915 events, and in truth, the US Senate does not in any way care about either the Armenians or historical events. If Turkey develops policies favorable to the US’ demands and not according to our Noble People’s will, neither the Armenians nor the 1915 events would be brought to the US Senate’s agenda.

Turkey’s stance regarding this subject is clear and obvious: If historical facts are earnestly of interest and deemed important, scholars can inform the world opinion on these facts with reliable research. Turkey has opened her rich archives to all researchers, including the Armenians; however, the archives of Armenia have not been opened, even to the most prominent researchers. Deferring to black propaganda and racist approaches by hiding information and documents is not befitting of any parliament, including the US Senate.

We feel great sorrow due to the strategic alliance and friendship between Turkey and the US of many years being harmed by and made into the subject of nefarious calculations. The US Senate must now live with the burden of this guilty conscience that it has added to its own history.

Paying no heed to this resolution of the US Senate or similar tools of pressure, Turkey will, with determination, continue to protect its national interests and security in its region.

This resolution of the US Senate, in terms of history and law, is deemed null and void by our Noble People and peoples of the world with reason, conscience, and fairness.

We announce to the public opinion that we express our people’s common determination and solidarity against this resolution and that it a natural right for Turkey to give the necessary response within the framework of international reciprocity.

With these thoughts, it has been approved by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey General Assembly’s 32nd Session dated 13 December 2019 that the US Senate’s aforementioned resolution is fully condemned, rejected, and declared null and void and that this resolution of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey is to be published in the Official Gazette.

[end of translation]

The problem with Xi's China Model

Wednesday, March 6, 2019 - 12:00am

The Problem With Xi’s China Model

Why Its Successes Are Becoming Liabilities

Elizabeth C. Economy

ELIZABETH C. ECONOMY is C.V. Starr Senior Fellow and Director for Asia Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and a Distinguished Visiting Fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution.

As China’s National People’s Congress and its advisory body, the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, gather this March (2019)in Beijing for their annual two-week sessions to discuss the country’s challenges and path forward, President Xi Jinping may well be tempted to take a victory lap. Within his first five years in office, he has pioneered his own style of Chinese politics, at last upending the model Deng Xiaoping established 30 years ago. As I wrote in Foreign Affairs last year (“China’s New Revolution [1],” May/June 2018), Xi has moved away from Deng’s consensus-based decision-making and consolidated institutional power in his own hands. He has driven the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) more deeply into Chinese political, social, and economic life, while constraining the influence of foreign ideas and economic competition. And he has abandoned Deng’s low-profile foreign policy in favor of one that is ambitious and expansive.

And yet the mood in Beijing is far from victorious. As Xi begins his second five-year term as CCP general secretary and (soon) president, there are signs that the new model’s very successes are becoming liabilities. Too much party control is contributing to a stagnant economy [2] and societal discontent, while too much ambition has cooled [3] the initial ardor with which many in the international community greeted Xi’s vision of a new global order “with Chinese characteristics.”

Xi has given few signals publicly that anything has gone awry: the first speeches [4] of his second term even suggest that he is doubling down on his current approach. Doing so will only exacerbate the challenges that are emerging. But fortunately, because most of the country’s current problems are of Xi’s own making, he still has both the time and the power to correct his course.

HE’S GOT THE WHOLE WORLD IN HIS HANDS

Xi’s accomplishments to date are undeniable. His efforts to consolidate institutional power paid off in March 2018, when he successfully maneuvered to eliminate the two-term limit [5] on the presidency, ensuring that he could continue to hold three of the country’s most powerful positions—CCP general secretary, chairman of the Central Military Commission, and president—through at least 2027, if not beyond. His anticorruption campaign also continued to gain steam: in 2018, 621,000 officials were punished, a marked increase [6] over the 527,000 detained in 2017. And dozens of universities have raced to establish [7] new institutes and departments devoted to the study of Xi Jinping thought, a 14-point manifesto that includes the inviolability of CCP leadership, the rule of law, enhanced national security, and socialism with Chinese characteristics, among other broad commitments.

Under Xi’s leadership, the party now has eyes everywhere—literally. As many as 200 million [8] surveillance cameras have already been installed in an effort to reduce crime and control social unrest. The surveillance technology will also play an essential role in the 2020 national rollout of the country’s social credit system, which will evaluate people’s political and economic trustworthiness and reward and punish them accordingly. The CCP has now established party committees within nearly 70 percent [9] of all private enterprises and joint ventures, in order to ensure that the businesses advance the interests of the state. Beijing has also succeeded in constraining outside influences: thanks to a law passed two years ago, for example, the number of foreign nongovernmental organizations operating in China has fallen from more than 7,000 [10] to just over 400. And “Made in China 2025”—China’s plan to protect its domestic firms from foreign competition in ten areas of critical cutting-edge technology—is well under way. The Sichuan provincial government, for example, has stipulated [11] that for 15 types of medical devices, hospitals will be reimbursed only for procedures that use Chinese-manufactured devices.

Xi’s efforts to establish greater control at home have been matched by equally dramatic moves to assert control over areas China considers its sovereign territory. Xi has militarized seven artificial features in the South China Sea, and in January 2019, a Chinese naval official suggested [12] that China might “further fortify” the islets if it feels threatened. As Beijing negotiates a South China Sea code of conduct [13] with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, it seeks to exclude non-ASEAN or Chinese multinationals from oil exploration and to bar foreign powers from conducting military drills, unless agreed to by all signatories. Meanwhile, Xi has increased the mainland’s political and economic control over Hong Kong, banning [14] a pro-independence political party, calling [15] on the Hong Kong media to resist pressure from “external forces” to criticize or challenge Beijing, 

and constructing [16] a rail terminal on Hong Kong territory, which includes a customs check by China for travel to the mainland. Xi has also adopted a range of coercive economic and political policies toward Taiwan, including reducing [17] the number of mainland tourists to the island, successfully persuading [18] multinationals not to recognize Taiwan as a separate entity, and convincing [19] five countries to switch their diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the mainland, to try to advance his sovereignty claims. The Belt and Road Initiative—Xi’s grand-scale connectivity plan—now extends beyond Asia, Europe, and Africa to include Latin America. A little more than a year ago, the People’s Liberation Army set up a logistics base in Djibouti, and in private conversations, Chinese military officials acknowledge [20] that scores more could follow.

Even as China expands its hard infrastructure—ports, railroads, highways, and pipelines—it has become an increasingly essential player in the technology sphere. Brands such as Alibaba, Lenovo, and Huawei have gone global, and more are on the horizon. A book [21] by the Chinese tech guru Kai-Fu Lee proclaims that China will inevitably dominate in artificial intelligence—unsurprisingly, the book has become an international bestseller. Although Lee’s prediction may yet fall short, China is laying the foundation for AI leadership: two-thirds [22] of the world’s investment in AI is in China, and China already boasts a commanding presence in areas such as drone and facial recognition technologies. 

All these successes have made China attractive to smaller countries not only as an economic partner but as an ideological standard-bearer. Xi has admonished that the so-called China model offers countries disenchanted with Western-style market democracy a different path to development. In countries such as Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Uganda, the message resonates, and officials are learning [23] from their Chinese counterparts how to control the media and constrain political dissent.

WITH GREAT POWER COMES GREAT PROBLEMS

For all its successes so far, however, the Xi model, fully realized, may simply be too much of a good thing. Too much party control—perhaps too consolidated into Xi’s hands—has contributed to economic stagnation. The constant stream of often competing directives from Beijing has produced paralysis at the local level. In August 2018, China’s Finance Ministry reinforced [24] an earlier directive calling on local governments to issue more bonds to support infrastructure projects to help boost the slowing economy; many local governments had been resisting the government’s call because the projects have low returns. That same month, however, Beijing announced that officials who failed to implement Beijing’s policies could lose their jobs or be expelled from the party.

Xi’s predilection for state control in the economy has also starved the more efficient private sector of capital. His desire for enhanced party control within firms led one state-owned enterprise head to quit; he commented privately that the party committees wanted to make decisions but wouldn’t take responsibility when they failed. Evidence of economic distress abounds. The government is deleting statistics from the public record, a sure sign that things are not moving in the right direction. One economist has suggested [25] that growth in 2018 fell to 1.67 percent, and the Shanghai stock market turned in the worst performance of any stock market in the world. Birthrates, which correlate closely with economic growth and optimism, fell [26] to their lowest rate since 1961. Beijing has pulled back [27] on its air pollution reduction targets—after some noteworthy initial success—out of concern that pollution control measures might further slow the economy.

The economic downturn has also stoked social discontent. Multiprovince strikes have galvanized crane operators as well as workers in food delivery [28] and van delivery. A nationwide trucker strike erupted in the summer of 2018, as the online platform Manbang established a competitive bidding system that exerted downward pressure on haulage fees, highlighting the potentially disruptive effect [29] of the gig economy on the Chinese work force. Most troubling to Xi, however, was likely the news that university Marxist groups were converging [30] on Shenzhen’s Jasic Technology plant to stand beside workers and retired party cadres in support of efforts to organize independent labor unions. The protest was quickly shut down, but the moral legitimacy of its demands remains to be addressed. At the same time, broad social movements that cross age, gender, and class, such as those advocating women’s and LGBTQ rights, have arisen alongside the traditional protests around the environment, wages, and pensions.

Xi’s consolidation of power has not only cost China’s economy but raised suspicions around its enterprises abroad. The deepening penetration of the party into Chinese business has caused all Chinese companies to be viewed as extended arms of the CCP. Foreign firms and governments no longer have confidence that a Chinese company—private or not—can resist a CCP directive. Because of this assessment, they are cautious about drawing technology made by the Chinese national champion Huawei [31] into their critical infrastructure.

Even the Belt and Road project risks bending under the weight of its ambitions. Some countries, including Bangladesh, Malaysia, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Sierra Leone, among others, have reconsidered the deals they’ve made with China as their debts have mounted and/or environmental, labor, and governance concerns go unaddressed. Some experts within China now question [32] the wisdom of the country’s foreign investments as many of the large state-owned enterprises driving the Belt and Road projects dramatically increase [33] their debt-to-asset ratios—well beyond those incurred by other countries’ firms.

Amid all this turmoil, Xi’s efforts to project Chinese soft power have fallen flat [34]. Beijing’s draconian treatment of its Uighur Muslim population in Xinjiang and its abduction of foreign citizens in China, such as the Swedish citizen Gui Minhai or the Canadians Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor, undermine its efforts to shape a positive narrative of international engagement and leadership. In addition, Beijing’s mobilization of its overseas students globally for political and economic purposes, such as informing on other students who do not follow the Communist Party line, has led to a backlash [35] in a number of countries. Moreover, Xi’s regulations have created a difficult operating environment for foreign nongovernmental organizations and businesses, the two constituencies most supportive of deeper engagement with China.

THE TRUMP FACTOR

The Trump administration’s reaction to Xi has only made things worse for Beijing. Most obviously, the U.S. government’s enforcement of tariffs on $250 billion [36] in Chinese exports to the United States has weakened Chinese consumer confidence and caused some multinational corporations to shift or consider shifting manufacturing out of China to other countries. More profoundly, however, the administration and Congress have adopted a more bare-knuckled approach to Chinese global assertiveness. The White House has enhanced relations with Taiwan, increased the number [37] of freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea, constrained [38] Chinese investment in areas of core U.S. technology, elevated international attention to Chinese human rights practices, and begun to compete directly with the Belt and Road Initiative through infrastructure investments in partnership with other countries, such as Australia, Japan, and New Zealand, as well as through the establishment of a new development finance institution [39], the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation.

The United States is not alone in resisting Xi’s charms. In the spring 2018 Pew Research Center polls [40], a 25-country median of 63 percent said they preferred a world in which the United States was the leading power, while 19 percent favored China (although Donald Trump himself fared poorly in the polls in comparison with Xi Jinping). Market democracies collectively have adopted a number of measures similar to those of the United States, and despite Trump’s questioning of the importance of partners and allies, his team has proved remarkably adept at coordinating approaches to many of these countries. Even in China, some intellectuals and entrepreneurs quietly state to visiting foreigners that the Trump administration provides an important bulwark against the worst excesses of the current Chinese model.

XI 2.0

For Xi to tackle the rapidly mounting problems his political model has created, he will need to undertake a significant course correction and modify many of his first-term initiatives. On the economic front, his priorities should include structural economic reform that gives preference to the private sector over state-owned enterprises and provides a level playing field for multinationals that want to do business with China. He should also take a revised approach to the Belt and Road Initiative that adopts international standards around governance—including transparency, risk management, and environmental and labor practices. Politically, China’s image and soft power would be greatly enhanced by a reduction in the government’s use of Chinese citizens abroad as tools of its political and economic objectives, a step back from its coercive policies toward Hong Kong and Taiwan, and a sharp reduction in its repressive policies toward its own citizens in Xinjiang and Tibet.

In his description of leadership, Xi is fond of using the analogy of a relay race: a baton is passed from one runner to the next, and each runner builds upon what has come before while delivering his own contribution. With the baton in Xi’s hand, the Chinese government has expanded its reach and influence at home and abroad. Yet the negative consequences of Xi’s approach—local government paralysis, a declining birthrate, and international opposition, among others—have begun to hold China back from the finish line. Xi needs to course correct—or perhaps pass the baton to the next runner.

Rıza Türmen : Kanal İstanbul ve Montreux Sözleşmesi

18 Aralık 2019

Kanal İstanbul ve Montrö Sözleşmesi

AKP iktidarının dış politikası, ülkenin başına yeni sorunlar çıkarmak için sanki özel bir çaba içinde; Kanal İstanbul da bunlardan biri

Montrö Boğazlar Sözleşmesi, Lozan Antlaşması'yla birlikte, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin kurucu anlaşmasıdır. 1923 Lozan Antlaşması'nda İstanbul ve Çanakkale boğazlarının yönetimi bir uluslararası komisyona bırakılmıştı. 1936 Montrö Sözleşmesi'yle uluslararası komisyonun yetkileri Türkiye'ye devredildi. Boğazların silahsızlandırılmış statüsüne son verildi. Boğazlar üzerinde Türkiye'nin egemenliği kuruldu.

Montrö Sözleşmesi, Türkiye'nin ve Karadeniz'de kıyısı olan devletlerin güvenliği ile Karadeniz'de kıyısı olmayan devletlerin çıkarları arasında kurulan hassas bir üçlü dengeye dayanır.

Türkiye, Sözleşme'de de belirtildiği gibi, sözleşme hükümlerini uygulayan ve uygulamaları denetleyen taraftır. Türkiye'nin güvenliği, savaş gemilerinin geçişinin önceden Türkiye'ye bildirilmesi, boğazlardan geçen savaş gemilerine tonaj ve sayı bakımından getirilen sınırlamalar, geçişin gündüz yapılması, boğazların üstünden savaş uçağı uçmasının yasaklanması, Karadeniz'e kıyıdaş devletlerin denizaltılarının ancak Karadeniz'deki üslerine gitmek amacıyla, gündüz ve su yüzünde seyretmeleri koşuluyla geçmesi, Türkiye'nin girdiği bir savaş durumunda boğazlardan geçiş rejiminin Türkiye'nin takdirine bırakılması gibi hükümlerle korunur.

Karadeniz devletlerinin güvenliği, Karadeniz'e kıyısı olmayan devletlerin savaş gemilerine getirilen sınırlamalarla sağlanır: Bulunduracakları gemilerin toplam tonajının 45 binden fazla olmaması, 21 günden fazla Karadeniz'de kalamamaları, 15 bin tondan fazla gemi geçirememe gibi.

Karadeniz'e kıyısı olmayan devletlerin çıkarları ise ticaret gemileri için serbest geçiş rejimiyle, savaş gemileri için ise, Karadeniz'in kapalı bir deniz olmaması, boğazlardan geçerek Karadeniz'e savaş gemisi gönderme hakkının bulunmasıyla sağlanır.

1936'dan bu yana geçen 83 yıl içinde, savaş gemilerinin kategorileri, tonajları büyük değişikliklere uğramasına karşın, Türkiye'nin üçlü dengeyi dikkatle koruması, Sözleşmeyi bu dengeyi göz önünde tutarak uygulaması sayesinde Montrö Sözleşmesi bir değişikliğe uğramadan ayakta kalabildi.

Şunu da belirtmek gerekir ki, 1983 Deniz Hukuku Sözleşmesi'nde uluslararası boğazlardan geçiş rejimi, kıyı devletine yukarda değinilen yetkilerden hiçbirini vermez. O nedenle, Türk heyetinin çabaları sonucu Deniz Hukuku Sözleşmesi'ne, rejimi uluslararası anlaşmalarla düzenlenen boğazların statülerinin saklı tutulacağı, Sözleşme hükümlerinin uygulanmayacağı yolunda bir madde eklenmiştir. Başka bir deyişle, Montrö Sözleşmesi ortadan kalkarsa, Türkiye'nin bugün boğazlardan geçiş konusunda sahip olduğu yetkilere sahip olması beklenemez.

Kanal İstanbul projesi, bölgenin ekolojisi bakımından doğuracağı sakıncalar yanında, Montrö Sözleşmesi'nin dayandığı üçlü dengeyi bozma tehlikesini taşımakta.

Türkiye'nin önünde böyle bir kanal açmasını önleyecek bir hukuksal engel yok. Her devlet, kendi ülkesini istediği gibi kazabilir, çukurlar açabilir. Bu bir egemenlik hakkı. Ancak bunu yapmak, Türkiye'nin çıkarları bakımından ne denli doğru? Kanal, Montrö Sözleşmesi'ni nasıl etkiler? Bu soruya yanıt ararken, şu üç faktörü göz önünde bulundurmak gerekir:

Birincisi, Montrö Sözleşmesi'ndeki "Boğazlar" sözcüğü, İstanbul Boğazı, Marmara Denizi ve Çanakkale Boğazı'nı kapsar. Montrö Sözleşmesi'ndeki "Boğazlar" yani İstanbul Boğazı, Marmara Denizi ve Çanakkale Boğazı bir bütün ve tek bir su yolu. Kanal İstanbul ise, Montrö Sözleşmesi dışında kalan başka bir alternatif su yolu.

O nedenle Kanal İstanbul'dan geçerek, Montrö Sözleşmesi'ne tabi olmayan bir gemiye Marmara Denizi ve Çanakkale Boğazı'ndan geçerken Montrö hükümleri uygulanamaz. Kanal İstanbul'dan geçerken Montrö Sözleşmesi dışında kalan bir gemi, Marmara Denizi ve Çanakkale Boğazı'ndan geçerken de Montrö Sözleşmesi dışında kalır.

İkincisi, Türkiye'nin İstanbul Boğazı'ndan geçen gemileri Kanal İstanbul'a yönlendirme yetkisi bulunmamakta. Montrö Sözleşmesi'nin temel ilkesi geçiş serbestliği. Türkiye, serbest geçişi engelleyemez. Engellerse Montrö Sözleşmesi'ni ihlal etmiş olur. Kanal İstanbul'u kullanıp kullanmamak her geminin kaptanının vereceği karara bağlı olacak. Bu kararı verirken kaptan, geçiş süresi, emniyet, geçişin maddi yönü gibi unsurları dikkate alacak. Ona göre karar verecek. Bundan da anlaşılıyor ki Kanal İstanbul'un devreye girmesiyle İstanbul Boğazı trafiğinin azalması arasında otomatik bir bağlantı yok.

Üçüncü husus, Kanal İstanbul'un rejimi ve savaş gemilerinin geçişiyle ilgili. Kanallar, denizleri birbirine bağlayan insan yapımı bir su yolu. Denizleri bağlayan doğal bir boğaz varken bir de yanına insan yapımı bir kanal açılması dünyada pek görülmüş bir şey değil. Bunu yapan ilk biz olacağız. Denizleri bağlayan bu tür kanalların sayısı fazla değil. Süveyş Kanalı'nın hukuksal durumu, 1888 İstanbul Sözleşmesi ile düzenlenmiş. Birinci maddesi, kanalın savaş gemilerinin ya da ticaret gemilerinin serbest geçişine savaş ya da barış zamanlarında açık olduğu belirtiliyor. Kanal, Mısır tarafından milleştirilmesine karşın bu ilke bugün için de geçerli.

Panama Kanalı ile ilgili olarak ABD ile Panama arasında yapılan 1903 ve 1977 Antlaşmaları'nda, kanala tarafsızlık statüsü veriliyor, gerek savaş, gerek ticaret gemilerinin geçişi için serbest geçiş ilkesi öngörülüyor.

Aynı ilkeler Kiel Kanalı için de geçerli.

Kanalların hukuksal durumuyla ilgili olarak uluslararası hukukda açık kurallar bulunmamakta. Kanala ilişkin uluslararası anlaşmalar kanalın hukuksal statüsünü saptıyor. Genel olarak kanalların içinden geçtiği ülkenin egemenliğine tabi olduğu ve iç sular statüsünde bulunduğu ancak aynı zamanda uluslararası bir su yolu olduğundan kanaldan geçiş rejiminin serbest geçişi öngören uluslararası bir nitelik taşıdığı kabul ediliyor.

Daimi Adalet Divanı 1921'de Kiel Kanalı'na ilişkin bir anlaşmalıkla ilgili olarak verdiği Wimbledon Kararında şöyle der:

"…Genel kanı, iki açık denizi birleştiren yapay bir su yolunun bütün dünyanın kullanımına adanması durumunda, bu su yolunun doğal boğazlara benzerlik gösterdiği…" yolunda.

Yukarıda değinilen uluslararası anlaşmalardan ve Daimi Adalet Divanı'nın kararından alınan ifadelerden de anlaşılabileceği gibi, uluslararası deniz yollarını birleştiren bir kanal, bir yandan kıyı devletinin egemenliğine tabi, öte yandan uluslararası statüye sahip. Başka bir deyişle, kıyı devleti kanalı keyfi bir biçimde yönetemez, istediği zaman geçişe kapayamaz. Geçen gemiler arasında ayrım gözetemez. Önemli olan kanaldan geçiş rejiminin, kanalın ulusal ve uluslararası özelliklerini birleştiren bir nitelik taşıması.

Öte yandan uluslararası kanalları düzenleyen anlaşmalarda görüldüğü gibi, serbest geçiş hakkı sadece ticaret gemilerini değil, aynı zamanda savaş gemilerini de kapsıyor. Daimi Adalet Divanı'nın Wimbledon kararından alınan alıntı da bu yönde.

Bu durumda Türkiye, "Kanal İstanbul'dan sadece ticaret gemileri geçebilir. Savaş gemilerinin geçişi Montrö Sözleşmesi'ne tabidir." diyebilir mi? Derse, başka devletler tarafından kabul edilmeyebilir. Kabul edilmezse, uluslararası anlaşmazlık doğar. Bunu çözmek için Uluslararası Adalet Divanı'na ya da uluslararası hakeme gitmek gerekir.

Kanaldan geçiş için, karasularından geçişi düzenleyen "zararsız geçiş hakkı" kuralları geçerli olabilir. Karasuları da devletlerin egemenliğine tabi. Ama buradan geçişler için Deniz Hukuku Sözleşmesi'ne bir uluslararası düzenleme var. Bu düzenlemeye göre, savaş gemileri, kıyı devletlerinin yasalarına uymak ve kıyı devletlerinin barış ve güvenliğini tehlikeye atmamak koşuluyla, karasularından zararsız geçiş hakkına sahip.Kanallar için de benzer bir durum söz konusu.

Kanal İstanbul'un savaş gemilerinin geçişine açık olması, Montrö rejimin sonu demek olduğunu söylemek yanlış olmaz.

Böyle bir durumda gerek Karadeniz'e kıyıdaş devletler, gerek Karadeniz'de kıyısı bulunmayan devletler, Montrö'nün getirdiği savaş gemilerine getirdiği sınırlamalara tabi olmadan Boğazlar'dan geçme olanağına kavuşacaktır. Montrö'nün savaş gemilerine getirdiği sınırlamalardan en fazla ABD şikâyetçidir. ABD'nin elinde 15 bin tonun altında savaş gemisi neredeyse bulunmamakta. Bir anda 45 bin tondan fazla gemi ya da uçak gemisi geçirememekte. Kanal İstanbul, savaş gemilerine açık olunca bütün bu sınırlamalardan kurtulacak. Rusya da özellikle denizaltılara getirilen, gündüz, su yüzünden geçme, Karadeniz'de denizaltı üssü kuramama gibi sınırlamalardan rahatsız. O da bu sınırlamalardan kurtulacak.

Kanal İstanbul'un savaş gemilerince kullanılması Türkiye bakımından olumsuz sonuçlar doğuracak. Bugün sahip olduğu Boğazları Kontrol etme yetkisinden yoksun kalacak. Örneğin, Karadeniz'e kıyıdaş devletlerin geçişten 8, kıyıdaş olmayan devletlerin geçişten 15 gün önce Türkiye'ye ihbarda bulunma yükümlülüğü ortadan kalkacak. Bunun kalkmasıyla Türkiye'nin geçişe itiraz etme olanağı da kalmayacak. Rusya'nın denizaltılarla ilgili bilgi verme yükümlülüğü kalkacak. Karadeniz'de denizaltı üssü kurulabilecek. Karadeniz'in kıyıdaş ve kıyıdaş olmayan devletlerin, savaş gemileriyle dolu olmasının, ABD ile Rusya arasında bir rekabet alanına dönüşmesinin Türkiye'nin güvenliği açısından doğuracağı olumsuz sonuçları uzun boylu açıklamaya gerek var mı?

Dış politikanın birinci amacı, devletin ve ulusun başını derde sokmamak, yeni sorunlar çıkarmamak, sonra da mevcut sorunları çözmek. AKP iktidarının dış politikasına baktığımızda ise, ülkenin başına yeni sorunlar çıkarmak için sanki özel bir çaba içinde. Kanal İstanbul da bunlardan biri.