Thursday, March 30, 2017

The two sides of India's PM or to mix ethnic majoritarianism with economic reform.

Thursday, March 30, 2017
Who Is Narendra Modi?
The Two Sides of India's Prime Minister
Kanchan Chandra
KANCHAN CHANDRA is a Professor of Politics at New York University and the editor of Democratic Dynasties: State, Party, and Family in Contemporary Indian Politics [1].
On March 19, a short man in saffron robes and a monk’s shaven head was sworn in as chief minister of the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh. UP is India’s largest state, with a population larger than that of Russia. It had just held elections for its legislative assembly, and Prime Minister Narendra Modi’ [2]s Bharatiya Janata Party [3] (BJP) had taken 312 of 403 seats [4], securing the biggest majority any party had won in the state in four decades. Yogi Adityanath, as the saffron-robed monk is known, was Modi’s hand-picked nominee to lead Uttar Pradesh’s new government. He is the head priest of a monastic order in northeastern India [5] and an aggressive advocate for Hindu nationalism [6].
The appointment of a religious leader as the chief of a state government is unprecedented in Indian politics. The BJP has often included members of the Hindu clergy in its mobilization campaigns, but it has generally kept religious figures away from executive positions. (An exception is the Hindu nun Uma Bharti, who is now a cabinet minister in Modi’s government and served as chief minister of the state of Madhya Pradesh from 2003 to 2004; unlike Adityanath, Bharti does not head a religious organization.)
Indian newspapers [7] exploded [8] with [9] astonishment [10] when the BJP announced Adityanath’s appointment—not only because of his background but also because of the timing of his selection. The elections in Uttar Pradesh were the first state contest since November, when the Modi government demonetized high-value Indian banknotes [11] in an attempt to curb illicit transactions, and the BJP’s victory seemed to reflect a popular endorsement of Modi’s reforms. Modi himself suggested as much: the election, he said in a speech in Delhi [12], marked the dawn of a new India, in which citizens would vote to advance development rather than identity-based issues.
Why, then, did Modi choose a chief minister who built his reputation on an extreme form of identity politics? Adityanath [13] founded a Hindu youth group implicated in Hindu-Muslim riots in Gorakhpur and its neighboring districts from 2002 onward (he was personally accused of inciting some of the violence); has led conversion movements in what he calls an attempt to bring non-Hindus “back home”; and has spoken out [14] in support of U.S President Donald Trump’s [15] ban on travelers from several Muslim-majority countries, saying that India needs similar restrictions. In short, he represents the fringe of a movement that is itself extreme. Modi has acted as though he hasn’t noticed. “Our sole mission [and] motive is development,” he declared in a tweet [16] posted [17] after attending Adityanath’s swearing-in ceremony.
The mixed signals have thrown observers into a frenzied search for Modi’s true political identity. “Is he really a reformer focused on generating the jobs the country needs,” an article in Time [18] asked, “or is the language of development, propagated via an unremitting stream of slogans, speeches and tweets by the prime minister and his top officials, actually a cover for Hindutva, an ideology that sees India as a Hindu nation?”
When Modi ran for prime minister in 2014, some commentators thought that he was beginning to moderate his commitment to Hindu nationalism [19], in line with what the political scientists Lloyd and Susanne Rudolph have called the “centrist equilibrium [20]” of Indian politics. His speech reacting to the BJP’s victory in Uttar Pradesh fed the same expectation. In fact, Modi has always been both a reformer and a Hindu nationalist, and this two-dimensional package is the essence of his appeal.

Mukesh Gupta / REUTERS Counting old bank notes in Jammu, November 2016.
REACTION AND REFORM
Consider first Modi’s commitment to economic reform. From 2001 to 2014, as chief minister of the state of Gujarat, Modi became known for the so-called Gujarat model of economic growth, which involved cutting red tape, cracking down on corruption, and making land available to the private sector at concessional rates. Since he became prime minister in 2014, Modi has gone further, working not only to streamline but to transform the Indian economy. The most ambitious of his plans is to make India’s economy cashless, using the resulting technology to address issues from corruption and clientelism to financial inclusion and social security. One can argue about the content of Modi’s reform policies—the Gujarat model, for example, has been criticized for privileging economic growth at the expense of human [21] development [22], and his policies as prime minister have been criticized for not creating enough jobs. But what is certain is that Modi [23] is committed to reform, and that this commitment is an essential part of his political identity.
Modi’s record as a Hindu nationalist has been similarly consistent. He spent his formative years in the service of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (National Patriotic Organization, or RSS), an umbrella group that presides over a network of Hindu nationalist affiliates and is the BJP’s parent organization. In 1971, at the age of 21, Modi became a pracharak—a member of a bureaucracy of celibate Hindu men working for the RSS. He later entered the BJP as a pracharak on deputation from the RSS. When the senior BJP leader L. K. Advani launched the 1990 Ram Rath Yatra, a cross-country pilgrimage calling for the destruction of a mosque in the north Indian town of Ayodhya and its replacement with a Hindu temple, Modi arranged for the pilgrimage’s kick-off in Gujarat.

Modi has always been both a reformer and a Hindu nationalist, and this two-dimensional package is the essence of his appeal.
In 2001, when Modi became Gujarat’s chief minister, he was still on deputation from the RSS. The next year, under his government’s watch, the worst communal riots that India had seen in at least a decade broke out in the state. More than 1,000 people died [24]—most of them Muslim. (Modi’s government was accused of complicity in the riots; in 2012, an investigative body [25] appointed by India’s Supreme Court said that it had not found evidence of his involvement [26].) In the campaign for the parliamentary elections that brought Modi to power in 2014, the BJP continued to exploit religious divisions when it was expedient: in Uttar Pradesh, for example, it capitalized on communal riots in the town of Muzaffarnagar [27] to obtain Hindu votes.
This year’s BJP campaign in Uttar Pradesh was as much about championing the rights of Hindus as it was about reform. “If land is given for cemetery in a village, it should also be given for cremation,” Modi said at a rally in Fatehpur [28] in mid-February, referring to Muslim and Hindu funerary practices. “If electricity is supplied during Ramadan, it should also be supplied during Diwali. There should not be any discrimination on the basis of religion or caste.” That statement was widely interpreted as an appeal to Hindus under the guise of nondiscrimination.

Pawan Kumar / REUTERS Yogi Adityanath in Lucknow, March 2017.                          
THE WHOLE PACKAGE
What is new about the BJP’s appeals to economic reform [2] and Hindu identity is their simultaneity. The party has previously tended to vacillate between Hindu nationalism [29] and economic reformism, choosing one or the other but not both at the same time. In the 1991 parliamentary elections, for example, the BJP almost doubled its vote share from 11 to 20 percent after running on a Hindu nationalist platform. That was not enough to catapult the party to a winning position, however, so in the years that followed, the BJP started to emphasize good governance and downplay religious identity. Yet the party’s ability to expand was still limited: in the 2009 election, it took just 19 percent of the vote. Only in the 2014 elections did Modi’s combination of reformism and Hindu nationalism help expand the BJP’s vote share [30] to 31 percent.
The package deal works for at least two reasons. First, it allows the BJP to reach a wider following. What is true of voters is also true of the two organizations in which Modi is embedded. Whereas the RSS has a Hindu nationalist agenda, the BJP has plenty of members who do not have a background in the RSS and would prefer to bring the party into the mainstream. Modi has managed to keep both of these constituencies happy. What is more, pursuing nationalism and reformism at the same time offers a kind of insurance: when delivering on reform is difficult, the party can resort to identity-based appeals, and vice-versa. Seen from this perspective, Adityanath’s appointment makes perfect sense. It combined Modi’s message of development with impeccable Hindu nationalist credentials.

Modi is not the only leader to mix ethnic majoritarianism with economic reform.
Of course, Modi is not the only leader to mix ethnic majoritarianism [31] with economic reform. Trump sailed to power in the United States by combining anti-immigrant cultural policies with anti-globalization economic policies. In France, Marine Le Pen [32] has become a viable presidential candidate by combining anti-immigrant policies with promises of protectionism and tax cuts.
The point of similarity between Modi and these other examples of majoritarian nationalism is that all base their appeal on a two-dimensional package: economics plus identity, rather than either alone. In other ways—their leadership styles, the details of their positions, and the constituencies to which they appeal—these figures differ. Modi, for example, does not oppose economic globalization. The fact that the prime minister’s reform policies are not especially nationalist or protectionist—a point of departure from the platforms of figures such as Trump and Le Pen—has encouraged him to turn to questions of pure identity to establish his credentials as a Hindu nationalist.
The trouble is that no matter whether the BJP emphasizes reform or identity, the main losers are India’s non-Hindu minorities—especially Muslims. Even when minorities benefit from Modi’s reformist policies, his majoritarian positions threaten them by placing them in a position of perpetual insecurity. And given that the lines dividing minorities from majorities are fluid, a democracy that is not safe for some minorities is not safe for any majority.

Wednesday, March 29, 2017

Iran's upcoming election and the Arab Gulf Nations

Published on March 29th, 2017 | by Guest                 

Iran’s Upcoming Election and the Arab Gulf Nations


by Jesse Schatz
Ayatollah Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani’s death on January 8 was a major blow for the Islamic Republic of Iran’s traditionally marginalized reformists and moderates. The former Iranian president’s passing raised many questions about how the Iranian regime, without Rafsanjani’s moderating influence, might approach Tehran’s relations with the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members. Iran’s upcoming presidential election, to be held next month, may turn in part on President Hassan Rouhani’s efforts to defuse tension in the Islamic Republic’s relations with the GCC and its Western backers, something Rafsanjani endorsed and pushed for throughout his political career.

The GCC Reaction
Outside of Iran, many Arab leaders expressed their condolences at the news of Rafsanjani’s death, a symbolic gesture of his ability to traverse the Arab-Iranian divide. However, despite the rosy retrospection of Rafsanjani’s role in regional politics, reactions from citizens within the Gulf via social media outlets point to a more complicated legacy for the former president. Rafsanjani was seen by some as a reformer but by others simply as a member of the Iranian regime, which many in the GCC have accused of wreaking havoc and fomenting sectarian tension across the Arab world since its inception in 1979.
Many GCC officials expressed their condolences via Twitter. UAE foreign Minister Anwar Gargash tweeted, “Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani has died, he was one of the voices of Iranian political realism and moderation. His name is linked with the republic and the revolution against the Shah.” Bahrain’s foreign minister also tweeted: “May God have mercy on Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, former president of the Islamic Republic of Iran.” The Emir of Kuwait said he “prayed to Allah the almighty to bestow blessings on the deceased.” While less  than their counterparts, leaders from both Qatar and Oman sent private messages of sympathy to Iranian leaders. Notably absent from these expressions of empathy, however, was any official statement from Saudi Arabia, indicating the extent to which Saudi-Iranian relations are still strained.
Outside the good-will displayed by several Arab government officials, many in the Gulf were less sympathetic towards Rafsanjani’s memory, only further complicating his legacy. Some referenced Rafsanjani’s alleged involvement in disappearing political opponents within Iran, while others highlighted anti-Arab statements that Rafsanjani reportedly made. In fact, rather than expressing condolences, in the days following Rafsanjani’s death Saudi state-run news outlets aired a decades-old interview that accused Rafsanjani of perpetrating a mass execution during the Iran-Iraq war. As rival factions compete to take control over the narrative of Rafsanjani’s politics, what remains to be seen is if his goals (as least as far as they relate to regional politics) will be taken up by a new generation of moderate politicians in both Iran and the GCC.

Rafsanjani’s Death and Iranian Politics
Hoping to unseat Rouhani in the upcoming election, Iran’s hardliners (principlists) have already used anti-American/Western sentiments to advance their agenda. In opposition to Rouhani’s diplomatic overtures to, and compromises with, Washington, many of Iran’s principlists are railing against their president, accusing him of making too many concessions to Iran’s traditional adversaries and naively trusting the West. Consequently, the outcome of this election will bear major implications for the Gulf region and the prospects for a thaw in Iranian-Gulf Arab relations.
Conflicting political factions within Iran quickly worked to ensure that Rafsanjani’s legacy could be used to consolidate popular support for their side. Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khameni expressed sadness over Rafsanjani’s death, calling him an “old friend and comrade.” Privately, however, Rafsanjani’s death comes as a relief for Iran’s conservatives, who now have full control of the Expediency Council–in which Rafsanjani was often a lone voice of moderation. The performative aspects that took place at Rafsanjani’s highly publicized funeral also reiterate the importance of his legacy to Iranian authorities. Using mourning-music to drown out the sound of his protesting supporters shows that the desire to present a sense of false political unity to the Iranian public remains high but tacitly acknowledges that the country remains deeply divided. Without Rafsanjani serving as a bridge between reformers and hardliners, Rouhani may be the only figure respected on both sides. However, without Rafsanjani’s presence many question Rouhani’s ability to challenge the conservative religious establishment.

The State of Iran-GCC Relations
Prior to his death, Rafsanjani played a critical role in attempting to mend relations between his country and the GCC members, most importantly Saudi Arabia. As recently as 2009 Rafsanjani expressed his desire for normalized relations between Tehran and Riyadh, saying, “Iran does not inherently have any issues with Saudi Arabia or other Arab countries.” Later he called cooperative relations with Saudi Arabia “a priority in our constitution.” As a roadmap for reconciliation, he pointed to cooperation between the two nations following the Iran-Iraq War, despite the fact that Saudi Arabia had supported Saddam Hussein during the conflict.
In 2014, a highly publicized kiss between Rafsanjani and Riyadh’s ambassador to Tehran sparked new hopes for reconciliation. Yet in light of political crises in Bahrain, Syria, and Yemen, even Rafsanjani stated that Saudi-Iranian relations may have reached an impasse. Still, Rafsanjani remained hopeful, going as far as devising a ‘roadmap-to-reconciliation,’ which he saw as a solution to conflicts in Bahrain and Lebanon, as well as a launching pad for tackling the Syrian and Yemeni crises.
More recently, Rouhani’s visits to Kuwait and Oman last month underscored his administration’s continued commitment to improving Iran-GCC relations. Rouhani’s visit followed Kuwait’s offer to act as a mediator between Tehran and Riyadh. Signs of improving relations were further signaled in early March when Kuwaiti officials sent Rouhani a follow-up letter reiterating their interest in Kuwaiti-Iranian cooperation. Unsurprisingly, Oman made a similar offer to act as a mediator in the Riyadh-Tehran rivalry. However, despite these two visits, officials within the Rouhani administration made clear that opportunities for cooperation would “pass like a cloud” if not met by similar outreach by the rest of the GCC.

The Post-Election Outlook
With Iran’s next presidential election quickly approaching, the time for a new group of Iranian moderates to pick up Rafsanjani’s mantle is running out. Newly invigorated by the Trump administration’s provocative statements regarding Iran and Islam, conservative Iranian hardliners are busy exciting their core constituents. Although all signs point towards Rouhani’s intentions to run for re-election, he may struggle to build the same coalition without Rafsanjani’s support. As stated by Iranian Professor Mohammad Marandi, “He [Rafsanjani] was a very powerful figure for Mr. Rouhani to rely on… Many worked with him because of that support. The passing of Mr. Rafsanjani complicates the president’s position and make his reelection less certain.”
Those in the region as well as the larger international community who wish to see increased cooperation between Iran and the Arab Gulf states have a much at stake in this election. Iran’s Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif has proven himself to be of the same stock as Rafsanjani, saying as recently as January: “I do not see any reason why Iran and Saudi Arabia should have hostile policies towards each other. We can in fact work together to put an end to the miserable conditions of the people in Syria and Yemen and Bahrain and elsewhere in the region.”
Similar to Rouhani, Zarif has recently visited the Gulf. Most recently he came to Qatar at the beginning of March. While Iran and Saudi Arabia have avoided talking to one another regarding regional conflicts in recent months, the two giants reached an agreement earlier this month concerning protections for Iranian citizens during the upcoming 2017 Hajj. Although that agreement doesn’t address the fundamental issues plaguing the Middle East, any talks between Iran and Saudi Arabia are a necessary first step towards achieving greater stability in the tumultuous region.
The stakes of the upcoming election for Iranian moderates, the GCC, and Washington could not be higher, as the outcome is certain to impact several regional conflicts. If the conservative establishment captures the presidency, the conciliatory positions expressed by Zarif would certainly be drowned out by an increase in Iran’s support for Shi‘ite militants in Iraq and Syria, and the Zaidi Houthi rebels in Yemen, at the expense of Saudi/GCC interests. Already in Trump’s short presidential tenure his hardline position against the Iranian Nuclear Agreement, as well as his (short-lived) appointment of Michael Flynn as National Security Advisor, have ignited Iran’s conservatives at a crucial time.

Considering the complicated and longstanding tensions between the Arab Gulf states (chiefly Saudi Arabia) and Iran, Rafsanjani was perhaps the only Iranian politician with the political capital to make progress on key issues in Yemen and Syria. With Rafsanjani gone, moderates have tried to use his memory to bolster support ahead of the 2017 elections. Rouhani, however, has struggled to build a coalition without Rafsanjani’s support to legitimize his vision for Iran. Meanwhile, encouraged by Trump’s anti-Muslim and anti-Iranian rhetoric, Ayatollah Khamenei hopes to take advantage of the political vacuum. Unquestionably, a Rouhani loss could lead to new complications in the Middle East.
Jesse Schatz is a contributor to Gulf State Analytics (@GulfStateAnalyt), a Washington, DC-based geopolitical risk consultancy.

Tuesday, March 28, 2017

U.S: Policy on Iran (Testimony by Michael Singh to the Senate Foreign Relations Ctte.



The View from Congress: U.S. Policy on Iran



Michael Singh

Lane-Swig Senior Fellow, Managing Director, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy

Testimony submitted to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee

March 28, 2017

Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, and Members of the Committee, thank you for this op-portunity to appear before you today to discuss United States policy toward Iran.

Speculation regarding the new U.S. administration’s policy toward Iran often begins with the question of whether it will keep or scrap the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), as the nuclear deal between Iran and the P5+1 countries—the United States, Britain, France, Russia, and China, plus Germany—is formally known. This, however, would be the wrong question with which to begin craft-ing a new Iran policy. To start from this premise would be to perpetuate a central mistake of the Obama administration: for eight years, the United States has viewed Iran policy through the lens of the nuclear negotiations; it should now instead see the nuclear issue through the lens of broader Iran policy. Iran’s nuclear program is so concerning not simply—or even primarily—because of the general U.S. interest in nuclear nonproliferation but because of the broader threats Iran poses. Iran is the Middle East’s leading revisionist state, determined to alter the regional balance of power in its own favor at the expense of the United States and its allies. Although Iran’s policies are far from the only problem confronting America in the Middle East, they are arguably the most important, and contribute in material ways to many oth-ers: Iran’s efforts to project power have destabilized Lebanon, prolonged the Syrian civil war, and fueled resentment among Arab Sunnis and the rise of jihadist groups like the Islamic State.

In response, the United States should pursue a strategy of deterrence—ensuring Iran’s leadership under-stands the costs of challenging American interests and the benefits of accommodating itself to the pre-vailing international and regional order. Yet Washington must also recognize that Tehran is a difficult foe to deter: while it has proven itself to be a rational actor, weighing costs and benefits and choosing the course of action it deems best for regime interests, its anti-Americanism is not a mere indication of prej-udice but rather an ideological pillar with which it will not easily part. This is why better relations with the United States do not entice Iran, although regime officials do appear to debate vigorously how best to manage ties with Washington in light of Iran’s other interests. Nor is Iran’s desire for regional domi-nance a recent flirtation: it has been one of the region’s most influential states for millennia, and its clashes with the region’s other ancient empires predate the rise of Islam. Any Iranian regime—revolutionary or democratic, pro- or anti-Western—would likely aim to play a leading role in the region. It is this mixture of anti-American revisionism and hegemonic ambition that makes the Iranian chal-lenge so difficult.

A strategy of deterrence toward Iran should seek to advance three broad objectives:

1. Nuclear. Prevent Iran from building or acquiring a nuclear weapon, and from meaningfully ad-vancing its nuclear weapons capabilities (fuel fabrication, weaponization, and delivery). In addi-tion, prevent Iran from sharing nuclear weapons technology with other states or nonstate ac-tors.

2. Regional. Counter and defeat Iranian efforts to challenge American interests in the Middle East and South/Central Asia or to undermine U.S. allies in these regions. In addition, limit Iranian malign influence and power-projection capabilities in these regions.

3. Global. Prevent Iran from mounting terrorist attacks or cyberattacks on the United States or U.S. interests, or from supporting states and nonstate actors that seek to challenge U.S. inter-ests.

The following paragraphs lay out a strategy for achieving these objectives, the obstacles facing it, and concrete actions the new administration can take to advance such a strategy.

BACKGROUND

Former president Barack Obama’s legacy on Iran is contentious, to say the least. His admirers consider not just the JCPOA but the establishment of routine U.S.-Iran engagement to be among his foremost foreign policy achievements. Detractors feel quite the opposite. Yet when President Obama took office in 2009, views on Iran were not nearly so polarized. Iran sanctions legislation enjoyed near-unanimous support in Congress, and the American public consistently ranked Iran’s nuclear program as a top threat. Obama himself largely continued the approach toward Iran developed by his predecessor, Presi-dent George W. Bush—unilateral and international sanctions and threats of military force paired with multilateral diplomacy via the P5+1. Obama, however, supplemented this strategy with a strenuous ef-fort to establish direct bilateral talks with Iran (past administrations engaged directly with Iran, but di-rect U.S. contact on the nuclear issue had been predicated on Iran suspending its uranium-enrichment- and plutonium-reprocessing-related activities) and largely ended official U.S. questioning of the legiti-macy of the Iranian regime.

These departures, though perhaps originally intended to support the preexisting strategy, eventually came to overtake it. Direct U.S.-Iran talks largely supplanted the P5+1 negotiating format, and the agreement that eventually emerged from these contacts fell well short of satisfying longstanding interna-tional demands of Iran. Meanwhile, the talks were pitched not only as a way to resolve the nuclear crisis but also as the opening chapter in a hoped-for U.S.-Iran rapprochement. Along the way, the United States largely refrained from challenging Iranian efforts to project power in the Middle East and else-where and even enjoined its traditional allies to “share” the region with Tehran.

As a result, the Trump administration faces a vastly different strategic landscape from that faced by the Obama administration in 2009. The most obvious difference is the JCPOA itself. Iran’s nuclear pro-gram is larger today than it was in 2009, even as its previous rapid expansion has mostly been halted. Still, Iran continues to engage in centrifuge research and development and to advance its missile pro-grams—the former being explicitly permitted by the JCPOA, the latter having been omitted from it entirely. Iran has largely adhered to the agreement, though a substantial reduction in International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reporting on Iranian nuclear activities and various exemptions granted to Iran by the Joint Commission—a body established by the JCPOA to adjudicate problems and dis-putes under the deal—mean that such judgments must be made with caution. The United States and other P5+1 members have also kept their side of the bargain, despite Iranian complaints likely meant in part to extract additional concessions from Washington, in part to deflect blame for Iran’s continuing economic problems, and in part simply reflecting the ambiguous wording of the JCPOA. The reality is

that while Iran’s reintegration into the global economy has been far from smooth, the country has al-ready reaped tremendous economic benefits from the JCPOA, which stand only to increase as time passes.

Meanwhile, Iran’s regional activities have grown inexorably over the past eight years. The control exert-ed by Hezbollah, an Iranian proxy, and its allies over Lebanon has solidified. Iran’s Islamic Revolution-ary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its proxies—a mix of Hezbollah forces, Syrian paramilitaries, and Shiite militants from Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan—are arguably the strongest force on the ground in Syria. Iran-directed or allied militias in Iraq have assumed a prominent role in the fight against the Islamic State, having gained the official sanction of the Iraqi state and the grudging acceptance of the U.S. mili-tary. In both places, Iran has embarked on a distinct strategic shift—from insurgency to counterinsur-gency, and from maintaining plausible deniability to touting its role by acknowledging its support for Hezbollah and others, publishing details of funerals held for Shiite militants and IRGC fighters, and, most prominently, sponsoring well-publicized, on-the-spot visits by IRGC Qods Force commander Qasem Soleimani. Elsewhere, the Iran-supported Houthis in Yemen overthrew the country’s interna-tionally recognized government, have fought Saudi and UAE forces to a stalemate, and appear to be seeking control of the international Bab al-Mandab shipping channel. Iranian support for the Taliban in Afghanistan has reportedly expanded dramatically. And the IRGC has appeared to play a role in fo-menting and sustaining anti-government violence in Bahrain.

This is not to say that Iran has been successful everywhere. Ties between Tehran and its Palestinian al-lies, especially Hamas, appear to have deteriorated in the wake of the 2011 Arab uprisings. The rise of the Islamic State has threatened Iranian interests in Syria and Iraq, despite indications of limited coop-eration between IS and the Assad regime. Russia’s intervention in Syria has been a mixed blessing, saving the Assad regime—upon which Tehran depends as a channel for projecting power in the Levant—but at the risk of reducing Iran to a junior partner in that conflict. And Iran’s stepped-up aggression, combined with American disengagement, has spurred Gulf Cooperation Council unity and joint action, albeit with mixed results.

Internationally, the JCPOA has not provoked the same internal divisions among U.S. allies as it has in Washington. In Europe, the agreement is hailed on the right and left alike as a signal achievement, even by a French government that clashed with the Obama administration over the latter’s readiness to offer concessions and keep its friends in the dark during talks. U.S. allies in Europe simply do not share the American threat perception with regard to Iran; there is almost no appetite in Europe for abandoning the JCPOA or taking concerted action in response to Iranian regional activities. This is the case even though Europe is arguably more threatened than the United States by Iran, given the proximity of Irani-an missiles and spillover from the conflict in Syria, which is sustained by Iranian power. Russia and Chi-na, for their part, see Iran as an ally, both in the Middle East and internationally, as all three share a de-sire to see the U.S. international role diminished.

This is one of the starkest changes facing the new administration. Upon entering office, Presidents Bush and Obama each benefited from a general strategic convergence with Europe, and even Russia and Chi-na, given the priority each placed on nonproliferation as well as on heading off a U.S.-Iran conflict. Be-cause these states largely agreed with U.S. goals, they could eventually overcome disputes over strategy and tactics (e.g., European objections to the use of extraterritorial sanctions). The Trump administra-tion will face the opposite—a strategic divergence between itself and these states, which pay little heed to Iranian nonnuclear misbehavior and are keen to deepen their relations, commercial and otherwise, with Tehran.

In the Middle East, of course, the situation is far different. U.S. allies there—Israel, Turkey, and Sunni Arab countries alike—lacked enthusiasm for the JCPOA. Even so, none currently advocate its abroga-tion, given worries that the alternative—whether the resumption of Iranian nuclear activities or a U.S.-

Iran military conflict—would be worse. However, all want the United States and others to push back against what they see as Iran’s increasing boldness in the region, and none believe the JCPOA should be a brake on such a response. Among these allies, only Israel has proven equal to the task of countering Iran’s regional activities—Tehran is essentially unchallenged by other regional powers in Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq, and has managed in Yemen and Bahrain to effectively play a spoiler role without attracting direct retaliation. And just like U.S. allies elsewhere, some of these states will develop strong post-sanctions economic ties with Iran (e.g., transshipment via Dubai and energy links with Turkey) that may mitigate their support for any coercive measures contemplated in Washington.

As a result of such developments, any new U.S. strategy toward Iran will have to overcome the following obstacles:

1. Issues regarding the JCPOA

• Should the United States choose to walk away from the JCPOA absent a clear Iranian vio-lation, Washington will be diplomatically isolated and experience significant difficulty ral-lying allies around an alternative approach.

• Adhering to the JCPOA—which only partially addressed U.S. concerns about Iran’s nucle-ar program and ignored entirely Iran’s nonnuclear challenges to U.S. interests—means for-going its most effective sanctions instruments, such as blocking Iranian oil exports or sever-ing Iran from the international financial system.

• Even if the United States does continue to adhere to the JCPOA, its allies outside the Middle East will be reluctant to cooperate in any effort to counter Iran’s regional and glob-al nonnuclear activities.

• The JCPOA, if faithfully implemented by all sides, will permit the growth of Iran’s conven-tional and missile forces—on which UN sanctions lapse after five and eight years, respec-tively—and of its economy and international trading links, which taken together will im-prove Iran’s strategic position and erode U.S. leverage.

2. Increasing Russian or Chinese military links with Iran, together with Russia’s expanded military footprint in the region generally, will reduce U.S. freedom of action and undermine the credi-bility of military options against Iran.

3. Deterioration over the past eight years of U.S. strategic and perhaps operational links with re-gional allies.

A NEW IRAN POLICY

To advance the three pillars of its nuclear, regional, and global objectives with respect to Iran, the Unit-ed States should adopt a strategy of deterrence. Such a strategy requires Iran to believe that challenging U.S. interests will be costly and, conversely, that playing by the “rules” of the regional and international order will be beneficial. But before turning to the specific policies that should constitute such a strategy, discussing some general principles will be useful:

• Foster U.S. capability, credibility, and clarity. Harvard’s Graham Allison has observed that de-terrence requires capability, credibility, and clarity. Particularly vital to maintaining deterrence are continuing to maintain a robust forward-deployed military presence in the Middle East, ex-ercising diplomatic leadership in the region, and continuing to cultivate expertise on Iran throughout the executive branch. The United States and our allies should also avoid responding

reflexively to Iran, instead acting patiently and methodically to address Iranian challenges to American interests.

• Strengthen capabilities of U.S. allies. The United States should aim to deter Iran not only through punitive action after, for instance, a missile test or naval provocation but also by strengthening allies’ offensive and especially defensive capabilities so that Iran will judge poten-tial challenges as having little chance of success.

• Wield policy tools in concert. In this case and others, the United States should wield policy tools in concert rather than sequentially and should take no tools off the table, whether military action or diplomatic engagement; historically, the most effective approach to Iran has been that of diplomacy backed by force or the credible threat of force.

• Preserve international unity. Whatever actions the United States takes, it should aim to pre-serve to the extent possible international unity, and should in turn count on Iran to try to split America from its allies.

• Understand policy trade-offs. While the United States will need to balance its efforts to deter Iran against other foreign policy goals, U.S. officials should ensure they properly understand those trade-offs. For example, pushing back against Iran does not contradict but rather com-plements an effort to counter the Islamic State, because Iran’s activities, such as its support for the Assad regime, have fueled the rise of IS.

• Consolidate responsibility. Bureaucratically, the administration should ensure that a single offi-cial at the State Department oversees all aspects of Iran policy, with the aim of ensuring that JCPOA implementation, regional policy, and other matters are integrated into a single coordi-nated strategy rather than treated separately or competitively.

PILLAR 1: ENFORCING AND ENHANCING THE NUCLEAR DEAL

The JCPOA is a flawed agreement—it permits Iran too much nuclear activity, does not address Iran’s past weaponization activities or missile development, and has insufficient provisions for guarding against clandestine Iranian nuclear work. Moreover, its provisions begin to expire within a decade. Nevertheless, it is part of the reality that confronts the new administration, and Iran and U.S. allies alike would resist its renegotiation. In walking away from the deal, Washington would face the difficult task of devising a new strategy to contain Iran’s nuclear program and rallying allied support for such a strategy in the face of intense international skepticism.

The United States should therefore neither scrap the JCPOA nor make an absolute commitment to it, but rather make plain to Iran and to other diplomatic partners that the deal’s survival will depend on the rigor with which it is enforced. Because those partners are eager to preserve the JCPOA, the prospect of continued U.S. adherence will provide leverage to insist on its enforcement and enhancement—not through reopening the P5+1 process, but through strict interpretation of the deal’s terms and side un-derstandings with European and other allies on related issues. Iran also appears eager to preserve the JCPOA, minimizing any risk that more rigorous enforcement alone would prompt Iran to walk away from the agreement.

In “rigorously enforcing” the JCPOA, the Trump administration should bear in mind that if Iran cheats on the deal, it will likely seek to do so clandestinely, using undeclared facilities rather than those under international monitoring. To guard against such an eventuality, the administration should consider tak-ing steps in the following areas:

Boosting Transparency

• Insist that the IAEA provide greater detail in its public reporting on Iran’s nuclear activities, akin to the reports it published prior to the implementation of the JCPOA. While Iran is likely to protest, such a step would help bolster public confidence that Iran is, in fact, complying with its obligations.

• Provide regular, unclassified reports to Congress on Iran’s compliance with the JCPOA, the progress of its nuclear and dual-use procurement efforts, centrifuge R&D, and missile develop-ment, and other states’ compliance with the JCPOA and remaining international sanctions.

• Insist that any decisions of the JCPOA Joint Commission be made public. According to the agreement, this requires consensus of the group, which includes Iran, Russia, and China. How-ever, the United States and the EU3 (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) can predi-cate their support for Joint Commission decisions on these states’ agreement to transparency.

Intelligence Sharing

• Continue to prioritize the allocation of intelligence resources for monitoring Iran’s nuclear ac-tivities, as well as possible related risks (e.g., nuclear procurement from abroad or the establish-ment of clandestine Iranian nuclear facilities in third countries).

• Establish a continuous intelligence-sharing mechanism with European, Asian, and Middle East allies, as well as analytical exchanges.

• Fully fund intelligence collection on Iran, despite the rising priority of other efforts such as the campaign to counter IS.

Inspections and Verification

• Insist that Iran provide initial baseline declarations for all materiel and components applicable to its nuclear program, such as uranium stocks and centrifuge components. This will help avert any discrepancy between, for example, centrifuge inventories and centrifuge component manu-facturing that could point to an undeclared nuclear effort. Push the IAEA to use its inspection authorities to verify these baselines.

• Likewise, press the IAEA to be aggressive in using its inspection authorities under the Addi-tional Protocol, which complements its Safeguards Agreement, and the JCPOA, especially with regard to possible undeclared nuclear activities and end-use verification for nuclear and dual-use procurement. A norm should be established according to which such inspections are not excep-tional but rather part of the ordinary functioning of the JCPOA, and thus need not precipitate crises.

• Fully fund the IAEA to ensure no shortfall in its capacity to implement the JCPOA.

Procurement and Counterproliferation1

• Work to ensure that UN member states and the international private sector understand their responsibilities with respect to nuclear and dual-use exports to Iran.

• Work to bolster the export-control capacity of all states, especially those with a history of in-volvement in illicit Iranian nuclear and missile procurement.

• Restrict use of the procurement channel by Iranian entities with a history of illicit procurement, or—in the case of nuclear procurement—for civilian end users at unmonitored facilities.

• Urge states to maintain a presumption of denial—rather than a presumption of approval—for procurement-channel requests that cannot be adequately vetted within the thirty-day period specified in the JCPOA.

• Urge states—including Iran itself—to make nuclear and dual-use exports to Iran outside the procurement channel a crime under domestic laws.

• Given the JCPOA’s reliance on suppliers to verify end use of dual-use items, press the IAEA to employ its inspection authorities to conduct end-use verifications in suspicious cases or when the supplier has shown signs of being remiss or unreliable.

• Reinstate the UN Panel of Experts—eliminated with the adoption of the JCPOA—or a similar body to independently assess Iran’s nuclear and dual-use procurement efforts.

Sanctions and Responding to Violations

• The United States should continue to strictly meet its obligations, but should resist any de-mand to exceed those obligations unless Iran is willing to add to its own obligations; the U.S. (and P5+1) commitment is to take certain actions, not to ensure certain outcomes for Iran.

• Make clear to other P5+1 members that Washington expects them to enforce not only the JCPOA but also the wider-reaching requirements of UN Security Council Resolution 2231 (e.g., its prohibitions against certain arms- and missile-related exports to Iran) and any other relevant UNSC resolutions.

• Urge states to enact domestic legislation, as the United States has done, that will allow them to quickly reimpose sanctions should Iran violate the JCPOA or should the deal otherwise unrav-el.

• Together with the EU3 and other allies, develop protocols for responding to violations of the JCPOA or UN resolutions, including a menu of penalties short of full snapback for minor in-fringements. Seek agreement with allies to no longer excuse violations such as exceeding agreed limits on low-enriched uranium stockpiles or skirting restrictions on heavy-water production by storing excess quantities in neighboring Oman.

• Emphasize that the military option remains on the table, and maintain a robust presence and schedule of exercises to lend credibility to that option.

Because the JCPOA does not address certain important aspects of Iran’s nuclear program—e.g., its mis-sile program—simply enforcing the deal rigorously is not enough. Rather, the administration will need also to address critical flaws in the agreement that could permit Iran to advance its nuclear weapons ef-forts even while fully complying with the deal’s terms.

• Access Delays: The JCPOA essentially permits Iran to delay IAEA inspector access to suspect-ed undeclared nuclear facilities for twenty-four days. While it would be difficult to fully eradi-cate evidence of work with radioactive materials in this timeframe, nuclear-weapons-related work does not always require the introduction of such materials; in these cases, twenty-four days would be sufficient to destroy evidence. Even in instances where radioactive materials had been introduced, Iran could use the time to eradicate other evidence critical to determining the purpose of the site in question. To address this problem, the United States should insist that

the relevant timeframe for IAEA access to such sites is the twenty-four-hour limit specified in the Additional Protocol and that delays beyond this limit merit penalties and could be grounds for reimposing sanctions.

• Weaponization Efforts—or Possible Military Dimensions (PMDs): The JCPOA does not require Iran to account for its past weaponization work or to give the IAEA access to the sites, personnel, and documents involved in this work. Rather, it simply closes the IAEA’s past PMD investigation in the interest of moving forward. While there is no reason at this stage to seek to penalize Iran for its past weaponization work, U.S. (and P5+1) officials must act to fill any knowledge gaps regarding how far that work progressed and to ensure that weaponization-related sites and personnel have not resumed their work. To that end, the IAEA should use its inspection authorities to request access to the relevant sites and personnel, not to reopen past investigations—which would be inconsistent with the JCPOA—but to ascertain their current activities.

• Missiles: Arguably the biggest omission in the JCPOA concerns Iran’s missile activities. The JCPOA does not address them at all, and UNSC Resolution 2231 scales back the previous ban on missile testing by Iran and extends the prohibition on other states assisting Iran with its mis-sile development efforts only until 2023. Because Iran will likely require international assistance should it seek to develop an intercontinental ballistic missile, this provision represents a signifi-cant achievement for Tehran. The United States should seek allied support for a fourfold re-sponse: (1) stricter enforcement of existing sanctions targeting Iran’s missile activities and the adoption of new ones as needed; (2) a commitment to intercept or otherwise respond to any Iranian missile test that endangers the territory or forces of the United States and its allies; (3) stepped-up efforts to interdict missile-related shipments to and from Iran, as well as to gather and share the intelligence required to engage in such interdictions; and (4) strengthened and better-integrated missile defense in the Middle East and Europe to negate any advantages Iran seeks to gain by improving its missile capabilities.

• Sunset: Whatever the JCPOA’s strengths and weaknesses, it is a temporary accord. Its re-strictions, and those added by UNSC Resolution 2231, begin to phase out as early as 2021 and will expire almost in full by 2026–31. Thus, while the deal arguably buys time for Iran’s adver-saries, it also does so for Iran—affording the Islamic Republic a period to develop its centrifuge and missile capabilities while shielded from the harshest international sanctions. As a result, when Iran eventually resumes the expansion of its enrichment- and reprocessing-related activi-ties, its “breakout time” could be dangerously low and its ability to field a usable nuclear missile could be dangerously advanced. To guard against this eventuality, the United States should seek allied support for a threefold response: (1) declaring as a matter of policy that the United States and others will not passively accept the further expansion of Iran’s nuclear activities when the JCPOA lapses; (2) seeking to negotiate the extension and expansion of the JCPOA’s re-strictions on Iran’s nuclear activities; and (3) seeking to bolster the global nuclear nonprolifera-tion regime to comprehensively restrict states’ fuel-cycle activities and limit Iran’s options when the JCPOA expires.

PILLAR 2: COUNTERING IRAN’S REGIONAL AND GLOBAL ACTIVITIES

While the United States has focused its Iran policy on the nuclear issue, American allies in the Middle East have been far more concerned about what they see as Tehran’s mounting efforts to project power in the region. While Iran continues to operate mainly through proxies such as Lebanese Hezbollah and Shiite militias in Iraq and elsewhere, its regional activities are increasingly direct and overt. Iranian offi-cials, especially those affiliated with the IRGC, make no attempt to hide the purpose of these activities—to project Iranian power to the Mediterranean Sea, deter the United States, and weaken and otherwise

preoccupy its adversaries. Among Iran’s goals is undercutting the monopoly of force and national loyalty in target states by creating alternate security, political, and religious institutions beholden to Tehran. This pursuit not only amplifies Iran’s power, it also undermines already fragile state institutions and fuels sectarianism. For various reasons, Iran relies on asymmetric and strategic power rather than con-ventional power, and it will likely continue to do so even if relaxed sanctions create opportunities for Iran to rebuild its conventional capabilities.

Nevertheless, the United States should avoid the temptation to reflexively oppose every Iranian action in the region—instead, the focus should be on deterring Iran where it clearly challenges U.S. interests and strategy. And because most U.S. allies outside the Middle East do not share the U.S. threat percep-tion with respect to Iran (e.g., on its missile program or support for terrorism) and are leery of reopening the nuclear issue, any effort to push back on the Islamic Republic should emphasize the Iranian role in issues such as instability in Syria and Yemen or human rights violations, which are more likely to garner these allies’ interest and support. In addition, successful deterrence requires that the United States and its allies be prepared to ease off these punitive measures if Iran moderates its policies; otherwise, Tehran will have no incentive to do so.

Syria, Iraq, and Yemen

• In Syria, the United States should seek to magnify differences between Russia and Iran by con-tinuing to emphasize the need for President Bashar al-Assad to step down as part of a political transition, a development Moscow may ultimately find more acceptable than would Tehran.

• Washington must insist, as part of any contacts with Russia regarding Syria, on the withdrawal of Iranian forces and Iran-backed foreign militias—including Hezbollah and Shiite militants from Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan—and assert that the United States and its allies reserve the right to take direct action against these militias if they remain.

• Any discussion of combating terrorist groups in Syria should cover not only Sunni groups but also Iranian proxies such as Hezbollah, which is designated as a terrorist group in the United States and elsewhere.

• Sanctions on the Assad regime and any Iranian or Iran-backed individuals and entities support-ing it should be strictly enforced and, if necessary, enhanced; further, Iran should be sanctioned for the provision of arms and other military support to Syria—and to militias elsewhere in the region—in violation of UNSC Resolution 2231 and other measures.

• Extend the international coalition’s mission in Iraq by at least two years, in order to demon-strate our ongoing (albeit limited) commitment to Baghdad.

• Extend funding to continue building and training the Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service and Ira-qi security forces.

• Push Baghdad to resist undue Iranian influence (e.g., the institutionalization of Iran-backed mi-litias) and to abide by UN resolutions on Iran (e.g., against arms transfers from the Islamic Re-public) and assist it in doing so.

• With respect to Arab states, particularly those of the GCC, Washington should press for great-er outreach to and coordination with Iraq.

• In Yemen, efforts should be intensified to interdict arms, funding, and other forms of support for the Houthis; Washington should likewise increase regional intelligence sharing toward that end.

• The U.S. leadership must rally international partners to respond forcefully to Iranian-backed threats to shipping through the Bab al-Mandab Strait, using patrols, interdictions, and direct action against any personnel threatening freedom of navigation with missiles, mines, or other weapons.

• Finally, Washington should publicize the role that Iran-backed militias play in human rights violations across the region and seek to impose international and unilateral sanctions on them wherever Washington and the UN have not already done so.

Countering Iranian Provocations and Proxy Networks

Review U.S. Navy procedures for responding to unsafe and provocative conduct by Iranian na-val forces to ensure that Iran is deterred and the risk of inadvertent clashes is minimized.



• Maintain and, if needed, broaden freedom-of-navigation operations to challenge excessive Ira-nian maritime claims in the Gulf.

• Deepen intelligence sharing among U.S. regional allies on Iranian arms shipments and provi-sion of other support for proxies, and interdict such support in concert with allies when intelli-gence merits doing so.

• Engage in discreet discussions with Israel and Arab allies regarding new ways of countering Iran-backed militias, and where this threat might spread next.

• Press the UN to act in response to Iranian violation of the prohibition on arms shipments to groups such as Hezbollah and the Houthis.

• Make clear to Tehran that attacks on U.S. forces or allies by Iranian or Iran-backed forces will merit a firm and direct response against Iranian interests; consider direct action targeting Irani-an proxies where U.S. interests are directly threatened (e.g., safety of shipping through the Bab al-Mandab, safety of U.S. vessels in the Gulf).

• Publicly expose Iranian support for regional proxies through declassification of intelligence and diplomatic and media briefings; likewise, debunk exaggerated Iranian military claims when ap-propriate.

Sanctions

• Bearing in mind that sanctions are an important tool (even if not a silver bullet), recognize that sanctions diplomacy—i.e., gaining the agreement of other countries to act in concert with the United States to both amplify pressure on Iran and ensure its compliance with existing measures—is just as important as Washington’s own adoption and enforcement of sanctions. Strictly enforce existing sanctions on Iran—especially on the IRGC and its proxies and affili-ates—and add to them as needed.2



• Publish more extensive “watch lists” of IRGC-owned or affiliated entities and front companies to help the international private sector avoid doing business inadvertently with the IRGC. Sig-nificantly expand the number of IRGC-related designations and consider lowering the thresh-old of IRGC ownership/control required for designation.

• Conduct a review of Iran Air and other Iranian commercial airlines to ensure that any aircraft sales to them satisfy the JCPOA requirement of strictly civilian end-use.

• Increase sanctions focus on less-traditional areas, such as corruption, money laundering, and human rights, in order to widen international support. Seek international condemnation of Iran for its threats against Israel.

• Press regional states to ensure compliance with sanctions on Iran by boosting intelligence gath-ering, inspection of shipments, and security of maritime and land borders (e.g., the Oman-Yemen border); where needed, bolster their ability to do so.

• Press states outside the region to not only commit to compliance with Iran sanctions but to strengthen their compliance through intelligence collection and steps to ensure that domestic laws support sanctions enforcement.

• Continue actively to educate the international private sector regarding its sanctions compliance obligations with respect to Iran.

Other Arenas

• Step up intelligence gathering and international cooperation aimed at the terrorism- and prolif-eration-related and criminal activities of Iran and its proxies, especially Hezbollah, outside the Middle East.

• Given Iran’s possession of nuclear materials and knowledge, and the spread of nuclear fuel-cycle activities elsewhere in the world, reinvigorate nuclear security efforts in the United States and strengthen the global nonproliferation regime.

• In accordance with any new U.S. “cyber doctrine,” warn Iran against malign cyber activities di-rected at the United States and its allies, and impose costs when Iran engages in such activities.

PILLAR 3: STRENGTHENING U.S. REGIONAL ALLIANCES

While the credibility of punitive measures is important for effective deterrence, a strong defense is argu-ably even more crucial. To that end, bolstering U.S. allies in the Middle East should be a key element of American policy toward Iran. Such an effort should be guided by two principles. First, it should address the actual threats these allies face. These are largely asymmetric in nature; Iran does not challenge U.S. allies conventionally but rather through terrorism, proxy warfare, political warfare, and subversion, simi-lar to the “hybrid” or “gray zone” warfare waged by Russia in Europe. Iran also wields a formidable mis-sile force, putting a premium on theater missile defense in response. Second, to the extent possible, the U.S. goal should be to build a multilateral alliance system in the Middle East, not a series of strong but disconnected bilateral alliances. The Middle East—especially the Gulf—is crowded geographically, mak-ing coordination and interoperability among forces an imperative. A multilateral alliance—even if the region is decades removed from a “Middle East NATO”—could also provide a platform for U.S. allies to solve regional problems with minimal external intervention, a balance that would be welcomed both in the region and in the United States.

Regional Coordination

• As suggested earlier, revive the George W. Bush–era Gulf Security Dialogue, expanded to in-clude Jordan, Egypt, and Morocco. The GSD had six pillars, all of which remain relevant: (1) GCC defensive capabilities and interoperability; (2) regional security issues; (3) counterprolif-eration; (4) counterterrorism and internal security; (5) critical infrastructure protection—to which cyberdefense should now be added; and (6) support for Iraq. Other external powers, such as the European Union, Russia, and China, should be invited to observe and contribute exper-tise.

• Through the GSD+3: (1) Bolster intelligence sharing and intelligence fusion, with a particular focus on Iran and terrorist groups. (2) Foster a dialogue on the coordination of military pro-curement and training, and on increasing the effectiveness of internal and external security in-stitutions—as opposed to merely the acquisition of larger and more powerful arsenals. (3) Fos-ter a dialogue on countering the particular threats posed by Iran—to include antiaccess/area denial, terrorism, cyberattack, missiles, and subversion and political warfare—drawing upon les-sons learned in the European theater.

• Look for opportunities to use the GSD+3 to engage with Israel, particularly on issues of region-al security, counterproliferation, counterterrorism, critical infrastructure protection, and strate-gic planning, with the aim of discerning and preventing future regional threats.

• Increase investments in regional ballistic missile defense.

• Plan for the contingency of greater Russian and/or Chinese cooperation with Iran and the strengthening of Iranian antiaccess/area-denial capabilities that restrict the freedom of action of U.S. and allied forces, drawing upon lessons from the European and Asia-Pacific theaters.3



Bilateral Efforts

• Initiate bilateral dialogue with each U.S. ally in the region to determine its key vulnerabilities, shortfalls in effectiveness, and equipment needs, drawing upon lessons from recent conflicts such as Yemen.

• Urge allies to make political, security, and economic institutions more effective, responsive, and accountable to guard against popular discontent and ensure resilience in the face of subversion by Iran or extremist groups.

• Initiate a high-level dialogue with Israel on regional threats, including Iran and Syria, that con-sists largely of military and intelligence officials but led by the White House and Prime Minis-ter’s Office. Establish a trusted backchannel between the White House and the PMO.

• Work with Israel to prepare a plan for responding to a Hezbollah missile attack on Israel, em-phasizing deterrence not only of Hezbollah but also of Iran.

• Reinvigorate efforts to strengthen the Lebanese government and loosen Hezbollah’s grip on Lebanon, focusing especially on reducing Hezbollah’s arsenal and freedom of action.

Engagement with Iran

• Maintain existing channels of diplomatic engagement with Iran. However, when engaging Iran, do so multilaterally with regional allies whenever possible.

• Encourage U.S. allies to engage with Iran, but ensure they are doing so from a position of strength, with U.S. support.

• Expand the Iranian people’s contact with the United States through increased people-to-people exchanges and visa issuance. Express support for human rights in Iran.

• Avoid transactional engagement with Iran (e.g., on counternarcotics and Afghanistan) that benefits the regime without prompting improvements in Iranian policies on matters of core importance to the United States and its allies.

• Engagement should be seen as just another tool in the policy toolkit, not as absolutely good or bad on its own merits; it should be used as conditions and strategy dictate.

NOTES

1. For a full treatment of this topic, see David Albright and Andrea Stricker, “The Iran Nuclear Deal’s Procurement Channel: Overcoming Post-Implementation Day Issues,” Institute for Sci-ence and International Security, April 21, 2016, http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-re-ports/documents/JCPOA_Procurement_Channel_Post_Implementation_Day_21April2016_Final1_1.pdf.

2. For a full treatment of this issue, see Katherine Bauer, Patrick Clawson, and Matthew Levitt, Reinforcing the Role of Sanctions in Restraining Iran (The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, February 2017), http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/reinforcing-the-role-of-sanctions-in-restraining-iran.

3. For a full treatment of this issue, see Mark Gunzinger with Chris Dougherty, Outside-In: Op-erating from Range to Defeat Iran’s Anti-Access and Area-Denial Threats (Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, posted January 17, 2012), http://csbaonline.org/research/publications/outside-in-operating-from-range-to-defeat-irans-anti-access-and-area-denial.


Sunday, March 26, 2017

İngiltere Avam Kamarası Dışişleri Komitesi'nin Türkiye ile ilişkiler raporu (tam metin)

Birleşik Krallık Avam Kamarası Dışişleri Komitesi'nin "Birleşik Krallık'ın Türkiye ile İlişkileri"Raporunun Sonuç ve Öneriler Bölümü (23 Mart 2017)

Report of the House of Commons' Foreign Affairs Committee on " the UK's Relations with Turkey"

Conclusions and recommendations

An “understanding” relationship, during a crucial period for Turkey and the UK

1.We welcome the UK’s strong condemnation of the 15 July 2016 coup attempt. This was an attack on Turkey’s democracy. We condemn it, and have expressed our condolences for the loss of life. Through its prompt displays of solidarity, the FCO ensured that the UK was seen by Turkey’s leadership as a friend and close ally of the Turkish people. However, the anti-Western rhetoric that is prevalent in the popular discourse in Turkey, and historic suspicions around British policy, still influence perceptions of the UK in Turkey. (Paragraph 13)
2.Turkey is a deeply divided country. The degree of political interaction between its competing social, cultural, and religious interpretations appears limited, and their fear of one another is great. Control of the state, and its power, is highly coveted in this context, because each side has sought to protect its supporters by empowering itself while excluding its opponents. The relationship that the FCO establishes with Turkey must not just be with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, or with the Justice and Development Party alone. Indeed, it must not just be with the state apparatus, or with whichever party or person currently controls it. The UK should seek a deeper and therefore more durable connection. The UK should support programmes that seek engagement with the Turkish people, whichever background they hold, while working to uphold the values of human rights and democracy that benefit them all. (Paragraph 19)
3.Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has made himself as central to 21st century Turkey as Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was in the 20th century. The choices that he makes now will determine whether his overall legacy will largely be positive, for Turkey and more widely. The wrong choices have the potential to deliver catastrophe well beyond Turkey’s borders. The right choices would cement Turkey’s position as a liberal, democratic state which provides a philosophical and ideological bridge between West and East. (Paragraph 22)
4.On 16 April 2017, the Turkish people are due to vote in a referendum on whether to amend Turkey’s constitution to significantly expand the powers of the President. The choice is theirs, and the UK Government must not support one side or the other. (Paragraph 27)
5.The proposed changes would constitutionally entrench the centralisation of power in the presidency beyond the current incumbent. However, it could be argued, from a UK perspective, that an approval of the proposed changes would make no de-facto difference to governance in Turkey or to Turkish policy in the short term, because it will make de jure the current situation. But there are concerns over the timing of the referendum, coming as it does at a point where freedom of expression and assembly has deteriorated in Turkey. It is difficult to foresee a fair, free and credible referendum when media, opposition MPs and civic organisations critical of the government have been closed down or silenced. The current period of Emergency Rule has also significantly expanded the power of the executive while simultaneously restricting certain rights and freedoms. Both the deep divisions that we have observed within Turkish society and the intensity of the competition to control the state are likely to be worsened by the referendum campaign whatever its outcome. (Paragraph 28)
6.The settling of this constitutional question should leave President Erdoğan with strategic choices where there is a clear UK interest in supporting constructive policies. These include the Kurdish question, the healing of Turkish politics after the coup attempt of 15 July 2016, the advancement of judicial independence and the rule of law alongside other human and political rights, the sustaining of a successful economy, and other central challenges to Turkey that we address later in this Report. Shaping a positive legacy for the commanding figure of 21st century Turkish politics is in the interest of the UK’s economy, security, and values whatever the outcome of the referendum. Now is a profound moment of choice for Turkey’s future, in terms of whether it will be a repressive or a recovering country. (Paragraph 29)
7.A central challenge that Turkey will face is the need to strengthen its public and state institutions. These have been weakened as a result of the acrimony in the country’s politics over the past decade, and were further weakened by the coup attempt and the government’s response. When facing its future challenges, Turkey will need an effective military, independent economic and judicial institutions, as well as a free and vibrant media, among other institutions. The UK should assist Turkey in developing both the capacity and independence of these institutions. (Paragraph 30)

A “strategic” relationship, and its implications for Turkey and the UK

8.We are concerned that the loss of influence of the UK’s international allies in Turkey might have a detrimental effect on the possible leverage that the UK might have on Turkey as well. The FCO should use its close relations with the Turkish establishment to mediate as required between Turkey and the US and EU states. (Paragraph 32)
9.A totally free trade agreement with Turkey may not be possible due to the current relationship that Turkey has with the EU and the EU Customs Union. Given Turkey’s Customs Union with the EU, the FCO should clarify what trade arrangements it is currently able to negotiate with Turkey, when and how that might change, and when they will be implemented. The FCO should work with the Department for International Trade in exploring and delivering new trade and investment opportunities with Turkey, now and following Brexit, and in negotiating revised trading arrangements with Turkey once the UK leaves the EU. (Paragraph 38)
10.Turkey is an essential partner facing a volatile period. It needs and deserves our support. We support the construction of a ‘strategic’ relationship between the UK and Turkey. Both the UK and Turkish governments emphasise to us their aim to enhance their trade ties, and their defence and security co-operation. Successful engagement would serve the prosperity and security of both countries, though a successful Turkey will be one that respects democratic norms. (Paragraph 40)
11.The complexity of modern Turkey, and the nature of its internal divisions, means that the process of constructing this relationship must be managed by the FCO with adequate capability and subtlety. We were impressed by the leadership and effectiveness of Her Majesty’s Ambassador to Turkey Richard Moore, and by the knowledge of his staff. The FCO is running a large operation in Turkey, and it is important that the FCO is given the resources to sustain this operation and manage the complex and important relationship with Turkey going forward. (Paragraph 41)
12.We welcome the agreements reached over the ‘TF–X’ combat aircraft development programme, as a key component and symbol of the strategic co-operation between the UK and Turkey. This programme should last for decades; it needs to reflect the long–term interests of both countries and survive the inevitable short–term ups and downs in their bilateral relations. The strategic partnership implied by this deal should be reinforced by the Government making clear what restrictions there are on the use or transfer by Turkey or the UK of sensitive technology and intellectual property contained within the programme, both during the aircraft’s construction and after its completion. (Paragraph 47)
13.The Government should also clarify what safeguards are in place to ensure that the aircraft will be used in compliance with international humanitarian law. The UK is subject to safeguards in this respect, and we expect the FCO to explain how these safeguards will apply to TF–X. (Paragraph 48)
14.ISIL is a shared enemy of the UK and Turkey, and Turkey has suffered greatly from terrorism by these extremists. Turkey is a vital military partner in the fight against ISIL, reinforced by the context of its NATO membership. The UK, as a strategic partner of Turkey, and within the framework of both NATO and the Global Coalition against ISIL, must continue to engage Turkey fully in the fight against ISIL as a shared priority and ensure that Turkey is not distracted from focusing on this military objective, in light of concerns set out in Chapter 5. (Paragraph 50)
15.Turkey hosts a larger number of refugees than any other state, and the third largest number per capita. This contribution should not be underestimated and a debt of gratitude is owed to Turkey from the entire international community. It plays a vital role in limiting or preventing the flow of migrants and refugees into the EU, within the framework of an agreement that it has reached with the bloc. The EU wants Turkey to continue to host and hold refugees, but the amount of money delivered to Turkey by way of assistance in this objective has so far been too small, and it has been provided too slowly. To support Turkey though the refugee challenge, and the costs to Turkey that it entails, the UK should press the EU swiftly to give Turkey the funds for this purpose that have been promised but not yet delivered. While the terms of the agreement between Turkey and the EU are not being fully met by either side, it is the non-delivery of promised EU resources to relieve the actual suffering of refugees which is reinforcing an anti-EU narrative from the Turkish government. (Paragraph 57)
16.The UK has distinguished itself as a friend in the eyes of the Turkish government, and both sides are seeking to cement a strategic relationship. But, as the UK does so, it must not be seen as disregarding—or even excusing—allegations of serious human rights violations and the erosion of democracy in Turkey. It is vital that the UK’s criticism both privately and publicly is not withheld when grounds for criticism exist. (Paragraph 64)
17.In order to have an effective impact on human rights, the FCO must also cultivate the UK’s influence and interdependence with Turkey to ensure that its voice is heard in Ankara. As the enhancement of its international trade ties has been a foreign policy priority for Turkey, strong trade ties between the UK and Turkey are likely to provide the UK with added leverage on a range of other policy areas, including human rights. However, we believe Sir Alan Duncan’s statement that “it is probably only when we do have good trade that we can speak strongly about human rights” must be qualified to the extent that the UK should always raise serious human rights concerns whenever they occur; the UK’s promotion of fundamental values cannot be predicated on “good trade”, or any other precondition. The enhancement of its international trade ties has been a foreign policy priority for Turkey. There are examples, such as Turkey’s relationship with Russia, to indicate that strong trade ties do indeed provide Turkey with incentive to compromise with countries that it disagrees with in other policy areas. (Paragraph 69)
18.We support the expanding of trade and defence ties between the UK and Turkey, not only because of their security and prosperity implications but also because of the strong voice that these ties should give the UK in Ankara. It is a voice that we expect the UK to use, not least so that its human rights concerns are heard. (Paragraph 70)
19.The UK should therefore seek to both defend human rights and secure trade. These two concerns have complementary—not contradictory—interests. The protection of human rights in Turkey, and the success of UK trade there, both require the rule of law and an impartial judiciary, an end to the purges that have followed the coup attempt, an end to internal conflict and terrorism, and a UK Government that is listened to in Ankara. (Paragraph 71)

The coup attempt, and the ‘Gülenists

20.The AK Party and the Gülenists were once allied. They are both movements with Islamist influences, and they made common cause in challenging the Kemalist establishment and military leadership. This past alliance is a fact that AK Party officials now prefer not to mention, and this reinforces our concern that purges of perceived Gülenist sympathisers will be undertaken with the added bitterness of a fratricidal conflict. (Paragraph 84)
21.Given the brutality of the events of 15 July, the severity of the charges made against the Gülenists, and the scale of the purges of perceived Gülenists that has been justified on this basis, there is a relative lack of hard, publicly–available evidence to prove that the Gülenists as an organisation were responsible for the coup attempt in Turkey. While there is evidence to indicate that some individual Gülenists were involved, it is mostly anecdotal or circumstantial, sometimes premised on information from confessions or informants, and is—so far—inconclusive in relation to the organisation as a whole or its leadership. As we publish this report, nine months after the coup attempt, neither the UK nor Turkish governments can point us to one person who has been found guilty by a court of involvement in the coup attempt, let alone anyone being found guilty with evidence of involvement with Gülenist motives. We also note that, despite Turkey purportedly submitting 80 boxes of ‘evidence’ to the US to achieve the extradition of Fethullah Gülen on the basis that he masterminded the coup attempt, the US judiciary has not yet moved to deport him. (Paragraph 97)
22.But the explanations provided to us by the Gülenists did not resolve our uncertainties about the fundamental nature and motives of their movement. The belief that Gülenists were responsible for the coup attempt, as well as for numerous other manipulations of the state through abuse of public positions that they held in Turkey, is manifest across the political spectrum in Turkey. A lack of transparency pervades some of the core activities of the Gülenists, making it impossible for us to confirm that all of these activities are purely philanthropic. (Paragraph 98)
23.Gülenists are unlikely to have been the only elements involved in the coup attempt. Kemalist elements within the military, those who opposed the AK Party, or those who simply wished to preserve their own positions, are also likely to have been involved. Some, especially in the lower ranks of the military, appeared to have taken part, at least initially, without realising that they were involved in a coup attempt. (Paragraph 99)
24.Since around 2013, individuals associated with the Gülenists have adopted a political agenda opposed to the AK Party government of Turkey, and have possessed the means, motive, and opportunity to support the coup attempt, but their culpability has yet to be definitively proved. The FCO told us that it did not have evidence to justify the designation of the Gülenists as a terrorist organisation by the UK, and we agree with this assessment. (Paragraph 100)
25.The FCO seems willing to accept the Turkish government’s account of the coup attempt and the Gülenists broadly at face value. While some of the individuals involved in the coup may have been Gülenists, given the large number of Gülenist supporters and organisations in Turkey, it does not necessarily follow that the Gülenists were responsible for the coup or that their leadership directed the coup. However, the FCO seems unable to cite much evidence to prove that it is true. Despite its claim to possess an almost unique understanding of the threat that Turkey faces, the FCO strikes us as knowing too little for itself about either the Gülenists or their role in the coup attempt. The Government’s support for the Turkish government in the wake of the coup attempt would have been more convincing had it been able to present an independent analysis to support its position. We recommend again that the Government ensures that sufficient funding is available to the FCO, to repair the hollowed-out state of the FCO’s analytical and research capabilities. (Paragraph 105)

The Turkish government’s response to the threat from the coup attempt

26.Terrorism and coup attempts are a denial of the most basic of human rights and freedoms, as well as of the values of democracy. It would be naïve to assume that any country would go through a coup such as the one Turkey went through and not see significant changes made in order to protect its democracy and the rule of law. The UK is right to support Turkey’s defence of itself against future threats from coups and terrorism. However, Turkey must demonstrate its commitment to upholding its international legal obligations during its response to these threats, and the UK has an important role to play in ensuring Turkey’s compliance. (Paragraph 111)
27.The State of Emergency in Turkey significantly expands the power of the executive, while also curtailing some of the rights and freedoms of the citizen. While the implementation of the State of Emergency is understandable given the events of the July coup attempt, the Turkish government needs to provide the international community with a clear indication that it is seeking a path to normalise the security situation. States of Emergency should be self-correcting, as the powers that they allow should address the threat that permits them. The threat to which they apply should be specific. Although permissible under, and guided by, the provisions of Article 15 of the European Convention in Human Rights (ECHR), a broad and vague application of the State of Emergency in Turkey, in a way that extends far beyond addressing the causes of the coup attempt, risks a prolonged period of Emergency rule, and that raises the risk of people’s rights being abused. (Paragraph 112)
28.The FCO should press Turkey to ensure that
a)the provisions of Turkey’s State of Emergency, and the actions taken under them, are proportionate to the exigencies of the circumstances that triggered the Emergency’s declaration, and that these exigencies are given as narrow a definition as possible
b)the State of Emergency is temporary, not prolonged, and is lifted as soon as possible
c)That Turkey complies fully with its ECHR obligations. (Paragraph 113)
29.Almost 100,000 people were permanently dismissed from their employment in Turkey following the coup attempt, while between 30,000 and 40,000 were temporarily suspended. The Turkish government itself seems uncertain about the latest figure, but the number is likely to have risen since these numbers were published in January 2017. Most appear to have lost their jobs, and been subjected to a range of other punishments, on the basis of executive decrees that are permitted by Turkey’s State of Emergency. They do not face criminal charges, and were not tried by a court before their punishment. (Paragraph 121)
30.Given the anecdotal and circumstantial nature of the evidence that has been used to link the Gülenists with the coup attempt, we question the evidential basis upon which these individuals—including the majority who held positions in the education sector or civil service, rather than the military branch of the state—were designated by the state as terrorists, or connected to the coup attempt, under Turkey’s State of Emergency. The coup attempt has also been used as an opportunity to dismiss large numbers of non-military government employees that were opposed to or critical of the government and President, as well as those suspected of links to the Gülen movement. (Paragraph 122)
31.The Turkish government told us that avenues for appeal and redress existed for those dismissed, and that 31,000 civil servants had been restored to their employment by the beginning of March 2017. The number marked a significant jump from the previous figure of 20,000 that the Committee was given by the FCO one month previously. We hope that it is accurate, but worry that it is not, given the stories of those affected that we heard in Turkey, the small number of public bodies authorised to hear appeals in Turkey, and the large number of appeals that these bodies have been tasked with hearing. If it is accurate, then we regret that it still represents 31,000 people who were punished without good reason, and who are likely to bear consequences of their punishment. (Paragraph 126)
32.Despite the security threats represented by the coup attempt and by terrorism in Turkey, the scale of the current purges—and the number of sectors that they affect—means that we cannot conclude that they are a necessary and proportionate response. The FCO needs to clarify whether it supports the extent of the purges as being justified by the scale of the threat that Turkey is facing. (Paragraph 127)
33.This purge carries significant negative implications for Turkey, and not just for the individuals affected and their families. It risks undermining Turkey’s reputation, its economy, the ability of the UK to trade there, and the capabilities of the Turkish military in the fight against enemies like ISIL. We were encouraged by the nascent language of restraint and reconciliation that we heard at the highest political level when we visited Turkey. The FCO must work to see that this trajectory is pursued in practice, by pressing the Turkish government to ensure that
a)All of those detained or dismissed can access a substantive means of appeal, and that this means of appeal is both fair and prompt. We are concerned that the existing means are too often inaccessible, and too slow in hearing the large number of cases.
b)That these individuals must have access to the evidence against them and to their lawyers.
c)That the structures established to determine their innocence or guilt are sufficiently independent of the executive. There currently remains a risk that they are appointed to a large extent by the institutions whose use of powers they are intended scrutinise.
d)That those who have not yet been reinstated know the avenues of appeal and redress. (Paragraph 128)

The Turkish government’s response to the threat from the PKK

34.In July 2015, the ceasefire between the Turkish government and the PKK collapsed primarily due to a complex and mutual rise in tensions between them, rooted largely in developments in Syria. This conclusion represents a correction to our Third Report of Session 2015–16, in which we were too unequivocal in placing the primary responsibility on the Turkish government for the end of the ceasefire. (Paragraph 135)
35.The FCO must both support Turkey in its fight against the terrorist threat from the PKK and encourage both sides to re-engage with the peace process. The ceasefire between the PKK and the state between 2013 and 2015 allowed an unprecedented de-facto improvement in Kurdish rights, but the FCO must press the Turkish government to enshrine them into law. (Paragraph 136)
36.The resumption of the conflict since 2015 has deeply damaging implications for Turkey. Ultimately, there is no military solution to this conflict. The FCO should explain how it is working with the Turkish government to secure a path towards both a ceasefire with the PKK, and a wider process of reconciliation to address the causes of the conflict. Turkey may be able to benefit from the FCO sharing the example of the UK’s experience in Northern Ireland. (Paragraph 137)
37.While the conflict in Turkey’s southeast continues, we recommend that the FCO presses the Turkish government to ensure:
 
a)that the operations undertaken by the Turkish security forces to counter PKK terrorism are legal, necessary and proportionate. There is significant evidence to indicate that they are not. In particular, the FCO should press for the use of open-ended and wide-reaching curfews to be ended, and damage to civilian infrastructure to be both minimised as a matter of policy and repaired as a matter of urgency.
b)that allegations of the killing of civilians and the use of torture by the Turkish security forces, and allegations of a culture of impunity within these forces, are properly investigated.
c)that independent observers are given access to the conflict–affected areas. (Paragraph 146)
38.The Turkish forces have, in part through the direct participation in the fighting of its armed forces and in part by supporting anti-regime Syrian militias, created and held an enclave of territory in northern Syria. They have done so in part to create what they call a ‘terror-free zone’ in which refugees can live safely, in part to confront ISIL, and in part to confront the Kurdish YPG militia, which Turkey says is tied to the PKK terrorist group Turkey’s policies in northern Syria pose important questions for the UK, and the FCO should:
 
a)Explain whether the UK supports the creation of a safe-zone by Turkish forces and their allies in northern Syria, and provide an assessment of the implications that the creation of such a zone carries for Syria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and any peace process, as well as for the safety and security of those within such a zone.
b)Explain whether the UK supports the settlement of Syrian refugees within territory controlled by Turkish-backed Syrian opposition groups in Syria.
c)Explain whether it shares our assessment that the YPG, rather than ISIL, are now the primary target of Turkey’s Operation Euphrates Shield
d)Explain whether it agrees with Turkey’s assertion that the YPG are linked with the PKK to such an extent that they should share the latter’s designation as terrorists. This is of immediate importance, given that the YPG are the predominant Kurdish group in northern Syria, have significantly expanded their territory there, and are the main component of the SDF coalition which both the UK and US support against ISIL. (Paragraph 156)
39.Conflict between the YPG and Turkey is not in the interest of the UK or the wider international community, and the FCO must explain how it is going to work to end the fighting between two forces that have been the primary armies fighting ISIL on the ground in Syria. (Paragraph 157)
40.We recommend a determined effort by the FCO to persuade Turkey to recommence the peace process with the PKK. This should include support for Turkish recognition and enablement of Kurdish cultural identity, and discussion of sustainable local autonomy as the basis for the wider reconciliation of Turkish, Kurdish, and international interests. (Paragraph 158)

The status of democracy in Turkey

41.We share the concern of the US and the EU about the arrests and continuing detention of elected Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) parliamentarians. (Paragraph 174)
42.The democratic institutions and culture of Turkey have significantly weakened in recent years. Freedom of expression is one aspect that has notably deteriorated. There is a fundamental intolerance of alternative narratives in Turkey, with the government broadly suppressing, discrediting, or punishing those who contradict its authorised accounts of sensitive events. The powers afforded by the State of Emergency—combined with a vaguely-framed definition of terrorism, a pliant media, and a politicised judiciary—have allowed the government to silence a broad spectrum of critics by labelling them as “Gülenists” or “terrorists” on the basis of light evidence or broad interpretations. The FCO should press Turkey to adopt a narrow and focused definition of “terrorism”, and to ensure that it—or other procedural methods—are not applied in the politically-motivated sense of silencing the government’s critics. (Paragraph 176)
43.The origins of the deterioration in Turkey’s human rights preceded the coup attempt. However, actions justified in the name of the coup attempt or counter-terrorism—and framed as being temporary, short-term, and necessary—are further undermining the fundamentals of the democratic culture that they are justified as protecting. These actions carry implications that may outlast the causes of the coup itself, and the current threat that Turkey faces from terrorism. (Paragraph 177)
44.When defending human rights, the UK must be both seen and heard. Discretion is sometimes necessary for impact, and private behind–the–scenes meetings will also play an important role in the UK’s influence on human rights in Turkey, but the FCO must be prepared to raise its concerns about Turkey with the Turks publicly. Currently, by giving human rights insufficient prominence in its dialogue with Turkey, the UK risks being perceived as de–prioritising its human rights values. If that impression is sustained, then it would damage the UK’s international reputation and not serve the protection of human rights in Turkey. (Paragraph 178)
45.We recommend that the FCO designate Turkey as a Human Rights Priority Country in its next Human Rights and Democracy Report. (Paragraph 179)