Tuesday, March 22, 2016

Anomalies in Iran's Assembly Election

Anomalies in Iran's Assembly Election (Schmidt | PolicyWatch 2592) (No subject)
T
TWI Analysis on Iran
 
 
Tue 3/22/2016 7:15 PM
 
ANALYSIS OF NEAR EAST POLICY FROM THE SCHOLARS AND ASSOCIATES OF THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE

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ANOMALIES IN IRAN'S ASSEMBLY OF EXPERTS ELECTION

PolicyWatch 2592
March 22, 2016

By Patrick Schmidt

Read this article on our website:
http://washin.st/1ULkTvz

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Seemingly inflated vote totals and jumbled candidate lists raise questions about the transparency of the government's official election results and turnout estimates.

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Following the February 26 Assembly of Experts election, Iran's Interior Ministry released full results on its website, while national and local news agencies released their own, sometimes different data. In addition to the unusual nature of the election itself (see PolicyWatch 2571, "Iran's Election Procedures," http://washin.st/1TzIS0f), the reported results show some odd features.

ANOMALIES

On February 29, Interior Minister Abdolreza Rahmani Fazli announced a 62% nationwide participation rate on election day, declaring, "I thank God for gracing us with an additional opportunity to demonstrate the people's enthusiasm for religious democracy to the international community, especially those countries that claim to be democratic." Many Iranian officials associate electoral participation, especially above 60%, as conferring legitimacy upon the regime.

The ministry also cautioned Iranians not to rely on unofficial sources for election results. Yet such warnings are problematic because the ministry's own reportage of results has not been wholly transparent thus far. The assembly election data on the ministry's Persian website -- a major source of information for Iranians and state-run news agencies -- has quite a few anomalies. For example, it shows some candidates receiving more than 120% of the votes cast in their district, and in four provinces with a total population of 15 million, it shows 22 million ballots cast. Fars News, a semiofficial news agency, provides clearer data than that found on the ministry's website, which lacks a page summarizing assembly results for all thirty-one provinces.

(For a chart listing full election results, go to the web version of this PolicyWatch at http://washin.st/1ULkTvz)

Assembly races are divided by province, and voters may write in the names of as many candidates as there are seats in their province. Yet many of these races were predetermined by the Guardian Council, the powerful twelve-member body that decides who can compete in elections and verifies the results, among other things. This year, the council's ideological vetting process disqualified the majority of candidates who applied to run. As a result, six provinces originally featured the same number of candidates as seats available (though in some cases extra candidates were added later on), while eight other provinces had only one more candidate than seats available.

Normally, such factors would have further deflated voter turnout for the assembly election, which is historically Iran's least popular political race. Citizens rightly view the institution as a largely ceremonial body whose main role is to select the Supreme Leader's successor, meaning it has little relevance to their daily lives. Given Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's advanced age, however, many Iranians likely assume that his successor will be selected during the assembly's next eight-year term. Moreover, the regime postponed the assembly election by almost a year-and-a-half to coincide with the more popular parliamentary elections, essentially guaranteeing turnout even in those provinces with seemingly noncompetitive assembly races.

Even so, several provinces showed significant discrepancies between the number of ballots cast and the number of votes received by winning candidates. Some provinces reported separate figures for ballots cast and ballots permitted, subtracting ballots that were illegible or otherwise disqualified; for example, East Azerbaijan had 1,790,789 ballots cast with 207,450 not permitted, while Esfahan had 1,976,061 cast and 283,024 not permitted. Yet this would not fully explain discrepancies such as the following:

* West Azerbaijan had three approved candidates running for three seats, so voters could write one, two, or three names on their ballots (a fourth candidate emerged later under uncertain circumstances, see below). According to the Interior Ministry, 1,511,652 ballots were cast in the province, yet the total combined number of votes for all three candidates was only 1,466,674; the first-place candidate received 822,027 votes, the second-place candidate 397,407, and the third-place candidate 247,240. Even if every voter wrote only one name on their ballot -- an implausible scenario -- the numbers still would not add up, with nearly 45,000 fewer votes counted than ballots reportedly cast.

* East Azerbaijan had only six approved candidates for five seats and nearly 1.8 million ballots cast. Although the total number of votes to all candidates exceeded the number of ballots as would be expected, the first-place candidate received only 743,811 votes -- an oddly low figure given that voters could write in up to five names.

* Ilam had only two approved candidates for one seat, yet out of 323,811 ballots cast, the winner received only 136,919 votes -- less than half the number of ballots cast.

* In North Khorasan, only one candidate was approved for the one available seat, yet out of 448,355 ballots cast, the winner received only 176,136 votes.

In addition to the problematic vote totals, some winning candidates were named on the Interior Ministry's approved list for more than one province, while others were not listed at all:

* Sayyed Mohsen Saiidi Golpayegani was listed for both Ilam and Razavi Khorasan provinces, while Mohammad Bagher Bagheri was listed under both Tehran and Alborz. Golpayegani was elected to represent Ilam, and Bagheri was both the leading vote-getter in Alborz and the fourth runner-up in Tehran.

* Sayyed Mohammad Husseini Shahroudi, the Supreme Leader's representative in Kurdistan province, was not listed on the Interior Ministry's approved candidates list, yet after announcing his candidacy on February 20, he won the province's second assembly seat.

* Javad Mojtahed Shabestari was not on the ministry's original candidate list, but the Qom Teachers Association supported him for election in East Azerbaijan. On February 13, however, an Interior Ministry announcement stated that he was a candidate in West Azerbaijan, without referencing any previous registration in East Azerbaijan. In the end, he won the third seat in West Azerbaijan, in a race that originally featured three candidates for three seats. Meanwhile, his father, Mohsen Mojtahed, won reelection as an incumbent in East Azerbaijan.

The Interior Ministry and Guardian Council were responsible for vetting and distributing the official list of 161 approved candidates -- published on February 10, one day before the official campaign period began -- so it is unclear how and when Shahroudi and Shabestari  were approved to run.

INCUMBENTS OUTNUMBER NEW FACES

Incumbents were reelected in 49 of the assembly's 88 seats; the tally could have been even higher, but many members in the last assembly were quite elderly and may have decided against running for that reason alone. In addition, at least four incumbents won seats in different provinces than they represented last term. Bagher Bagheri and Mohsen Kazrunbarz previously represented Tehran but are now representing Alborz. Muhammad Ali Muvahedi Kermani and Sayyed Abul al-Fazl Mir Mohammadi previously represented Kerman and Markazi, respectively, but both were elected in Tehran province for this term.

Meanwhile, five Guardian Council members also ran for seats in the Experts Assembly. Four of them won: Mohammad Momen, representing Qom; Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi, representing Razavi Khorasan; Ahmad Jannati, who placed sixteenth out of sixteen winners in Tehran; and Mohsen Esmaili, also representing Tehran. The loser was Mohammad Reza Modarresi Yazdi, who chaired the previous assembly. His loss means the assembly will need to elect a new chairman, perhaps at its first meeting on May 25.

In addition to Mohammad Yazdi, at least four other assembly incumbents were unable to win reelection. Hassan Mamhoudi lost in Kermanshah, while Muhammad Taqi Mesbah Yazdi and Ali Mumen Pour lost in Tehran. Gholam Ali Naim Abadi, the Friday prayer leader in Bandar Abbas and the Supreme Leader's representative in Hormozgan province, lost his bid for reelection in that province to Sayyed Ruhollah Sadr al-Saadati. Saadati was originally an approved candidate in Yazd, but the Interior Ministry announced on February 13 that he had switched to Hormozgan. Previously, on February 9, Guardian Council spokesman Siamak Rahpeyk had reaffirmed the law stating that assembly candidates had until February 11 to change which province they were competing in.

Finally, it is interesting to compare the election results with the candidate lists put out by different individuals and organizations during the campaign. For example, the "List of Hope" -- which was strongly associated with former presidents Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohammad Khatami, as well as current president Hassan Rouhani -- endorsed sixteen candidates in Tehran, and fifteen of them won. The only Tehran winner who prevailed without its endorsement was Jannati, who came in last place. Moreover, eight winning candidates in Tehran were promoted on multiple lists: the previously mentioned Kermani and Mir Mohammadi, as well as Mohsen Qomi, Muhammad Kashani, Qorbanali Dorri Najaf Abadi, Mohammad Reishahri, Ebrahim Haj Amini Najaf Abadi, and Rouhani. These men appeared not only on the List of Hope, but also on lists published by Rouhani's office and the Qom Teachers Association, which is usually described as a very hardline organization.

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Patrick Schmidt is a research assistant at The Washington Institute.

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Yaşlılık -Prof.Dr.Vecdet Tezcan

Geriatri alanında tanınmış bir hekim olan Prof. Dr.Vecdet Tezcan, 20 Mart 2016 Pazar günü “Yaşlılık, dünü, bugünü, yarını” konulu bir söyleşide ilginç tesbitlerde ve önerilerde bulundu.
Prof.Dr. Vecdet Tezcan, yaşlanma belirtileri olarak şunları sıraladı:
- Görme ve işitme fonksiyonlarının zayıflaması,
- Zeka ve belleğin zayıflaması,
- Genel olarak organların fonksiyonlarında yavaşlama.
Ortalama ömrün uzadığına da işaret eden Prof.Dr. V. Tezcan, İsa peygamberin yaşadığı dönemde ortalama ömrün yaklaşık 25 yıl olduğunu, bugün ise bunun 72-74 yıl civarında hesaplandığını, erkeklerin kadınlardan daha az yaşadığını, ABD’nde yapılan bir araştırmaya göre, kocalarının ölümü nedeniyle dul kalan kadınların oranının % 72, aynı oranın erkeklerde ise % 30 olduğunu söyledi. Ortalama ömrün uzaması nedeniyle, genç ve orta yaş tanımının değiştiğini, bugün gelişmiş ülkelerde 65 – 74 yaş aralığının mutlu bir dönem , 75-84 yaş aralığının ise orta yaş olarak kabul edildiğini sözlerine ekledi.
Sağlıklı yaşlanmanın beslenme ile çok yakından ilgili olduğunun altını çizen Prof.Dr.Tezcan, Türkiye’de yapılan araştırmalarda, Ege bölgesinde yaşayan halkın daha sağlıklı ve uzun ömürlü olduğunun belirlendiğini , bunun yarı yarıya yaşam tarzı ve genetik faktörlerle bağlantılı olduğunu kaydetti. Yaşam tarzında Akdeniz türü beslenmenin önemli rol oynadığını anlatan Prof.Dr. Tezcan, Akdeniz türü mönü için şu tavsiyede bulundu:
- Zeytinyağlı salata
- Zeytinyağlı sebze
- Balık
- Az miktarda alkollü içki ( haftada 10-12 kadeh, tercihan şarap)
Mönüye, nohut, mercimek, kuru fasulya gibi kuru bakliyat da dahil edilebilir.
Sigara ve tütün ürünlerinin, şekerli içeceklerin ve saf şekerin kesinlikle “out”olması gerektiğini belirten Prof.Dr. Tezcan, beden ve ruh sağlığının birlikte korunması gerektiğini söyledi ve bu konuda şu önerilerde bulundu:
- Beden sağlığı için her gün 45 dakika sıkı yürüyüş, güneşlenme, yüzme, kasların geliştirilmesi için ufak ağırlıklarla çalışma.
- Ruh sağlığı için en önemli faktör, insanın kendinden memnun olmasıdır. Bunun için bir şeyler üretmek, dans öğrenmek gibi hobilerle meşgul olmak yararlıdır. Ayrıca, sıkıntıları dışa vurmaktan, gençlere sürekli öğüt vermekten kaçınmak,sorulduğu zaman konuşmak tercih edilmelidir.
- Kolonoskopi, prostat (erkeklerde) mamografi (kadınlarda) gibi sağlık kontrollar ihmal edilmemeli, D vitamini seviyesinin,tiroid bezinin ölçülmesi önemlidir.
- Önleyici tedavi yöntemlerine ağırlık verilmelidir.
- Vitamin kullanımı asgari düzeyde tutulmalı, vitaminlerin doğal beslenme yoluyla sağlanması tercih edilmelidir.
- Zayıflatıcı ürünlerde zararlı maddeler olabilir.
- Omega-3 konusunda tereddütlüyüm. Bunun yerine balık yemek (haftada üç öğün) daha uygun.
- Aspirin kullanmak yararlıdır. Grip aşısı her zaman gribi önlemiyor, ama zararı da yok.
- 65 yaş üzerinde zatürree aşısı yapılmalı.
Söyleşide tuttuğum bu notların eksikleri olmakla birlikte,yararlı olacağını düşünüyor , arkadaşlarıma sağlıklı yıllar diliyorum.

Kıvrıkoğlu paşaya suikast girişimi

Facebook'tan alıntıdır. ( 22 MART 2016)

BAŞIMIZA NE ÇORAPLAR ÖRÜLMÜŞ DE HABERİMİZ YOKMUŞ
Wolfowitz 'Kürt devletine izin vermeyiz' diyerek odasından kovan hangi paşa için 'derhal ortadan kaldırın' talimatı verdi?.
Wolfowitz, Kıvrıkoğlu'nun kendisini azarlamasını hiç unutamadı. Önce Süleymaniye'deki çuval olayını tezgahladı. Ardından Paşa için ölüm emri çıkarttı. Ancak metresinin düşük çenesini hesaba katmadı.
Öyle konular vardır ki sadece bir kere yazabilirsiniz. Zamanın ruhuna uymayıp ertelediğinizde ya da öne aldığınızda yazdığınızın bir anlamı olmaz. Ama doğru zamanda kaleme alındığında daTSUNAMİ etkisi gösterir. Genelkurmay eski Başkanı Hilmi Özkök, Ergenekon mahkemesine gidip ifade verinceye kadar birazdan yazacaklarımı paylaşmayı düşünmüyordum. Ancak Paşa salonda "ABD, Wolfowitz aracılığı ile bana 'Tezkerenin geçmesi için baskı yap' dedi. Ancak ben dinlemedim" diye konuşunca daha fazla bekleyemezdim. İşte size sadece filmlerde görebileceğimiz müthiş bir hikaye... Filmden tek farkı, buradaki her şey gerçek! Okuyun siz karar verin... Tarih 16 Temmuz 2002... Türkiye'yi ziyareti daha önce üç kez ertelenen ABD Savunma Bakan Yardımcısı
Paul Wolfowitz, resmi temaslarda bulunmak üzere gece geç saatlerde Ankara'ya indi.
Dönemin Cumhurbaşkanı A.Necdet Sezer, Başbakan'ı Ecevit, Genelkurmay Başkanı ise Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu'ydu. Gezi basında günler öncesinden köpürtüldü.
Ziyaretin hayati önem taşıdığı sayfa sayfa anlatıldı.
Uçaktan inen Wolfowitz'in canı sıkkındı. Görüşmek istediği tüm isimlerden randevu almış ancak biri kendisini kabul etmemişti.
Kara Kuvvetleri Komutanıyken Kıbrıs'taki çadırda suikasttan kurtulanKıvrıkoğlu bir türlü kendisini kabul etmiyordu. ABD Büyükelçiliği ve diğer makamlar araya girdiyse de Paşa,"Nuh" diyor, "Peygamber"demiyordu!
Çıkış yolu bulamayan Washington devreye girip Başbakan Ecevit'ten "aracı olmasını" rica etti. Kıvrıkoğlu Paşa, Ecevit'e de kibarca "Hayır" diyerek görüşmeye yanaşmadı. Kriz giderek büyüyünce rahmetli Ecevit tekrar telefona sarılarak "En azından iki-üç dakika görüşün bari"teklifini iletti. Paşa hiç de istemeyerek"Peki" cevabını verdi.
Randevu baskıyla alınmıştı. Paşa sinir küpüydü. Görüşme başlamış ama suratlar asıktı. Birkaç dakika içinde elektriklenme tüm odaya yayıldı. ABD'li konuk Irak işgalini masaya getirmişti.Peşpeşe akıl almaz istekler sıralıyordu. Silah arkadaşlarının "Hacı" diye andığı Paşa, Wolfowitz'in GENEL VALİ gibi konuşması üzerine çok sert tepki verdi. "Kerkük'ü de içine alan bir Kürt Devleti kurulması söz konusu olursa, doğrudan ve açıkça oraya, bölgeye gireceğimizi, müdahale edeceğimizi biliniz" diye çıkıştı.
Wolfowitz neye uğradığını şaşırdı.
Ne yapacağını bilemez hale gelen Wolfowitz "Ben, ABD Savunma Bakan Yardımcısıyım, benimle böyle konuşamazsınız"dedi. Orgeneral Kıvrıkoğlu da "Ben de Türk ordusunun başıyım ve üstelik de Türkmen asıllıyım" diye karşılık verdi.
Şaşkına dönen ABD'li sinirli bir şekilde salonu terk etti. Görüşmek için can attığı toplantı kabusu olmuştu. Irak işgalini Ankara'ya en net anlatan ABD'li olan Wolfowitz ülkesine döndü. Kısa bir süre sonra Kıvrıkoğlu, çok sevdiği Hilmi Özkök'e yerini bıraktı.
Birkaç ay sonra da Türkiye'nin gündeminde 1 Mart Tezkeresi vardı. Herkes ne olacağını merakla bekliyordu.
Amerikalılar aradaki pürüzlere rağmen karardan emindiler.
Ancak sonuç öyle olmadı. Tezkere, Meclis'e takıldı.
Wolfowitz'e göre, "Türk Ordusu, siyasiler üzerinde gerekli baskıyı yapmamıştı.
Tezkere'nin geçmemesinin arkasında da Kıvrıkoğlu'nun parmağı vardı." Ankara'da kovulmaktan beter olan Wolfowitz, Pentagon'da sık sık "Türkler, ABD'ye kafa tutmanın ne demek olduğunu anlamalı" diyordu. Bunu hiç çekinmeden her yerde dile getiriyordu. Kini hiç bitmiyordu. Öfkesi hiç dinmiyordu. Bu aşağılanmanın faturasını ödetmek için çırpınıyordu. Aradığı fırsatı tam bir yıl sonra yakaladı... 4 Temmuz 2003 günü, Kuzey Irak'taki Türk Birliği basıldı. ABD askerleri ve çok sayıda Peşmerge karakolun etrafını sardı. Silahlarını kullanmayan 11 Türk askerinin başına çuval geçirildi. Operasyonun emrini Wolfowitzvermişti.
İntikamını geç de olsa almıştı!
Aradan iki hafta geçmişti... ABD'deki bir büyükelçilikteki kutlamaya seçkin isimler katılmıştı.Dönemin ABD Genelkurmay Başkanı Richard Myers da bunlardan biriydi. Orada olan 4 kişilik TÜRK EKİBİ harekete geçmek için fırsat kolluyordu. Sivil ama önemli Türk o anın geldiğini anlayınca arkadaşlarına dönerek "Ben şimdi Myers'a yaklaşacağım, siz bizi perdeleyin, kimseyi yaklaştırmayın, rahat rahat görüşeyim" dedi.
Diğer üç Türk görevlerini kusursuzca yaptı.
Kimse oraya yaklaşamadı...
O Türk, Myers'ın yanına giderek derhal Çuval olayını açtı ve "Bu işin arkasında Wolfowitz'in olduğunu biliyoruz" dedi.
Myers şaşkına dönmüştü; "Bunu siz nereden biliyorsunuz" diye kısık sesle sordu.
Sivil Türk "Sayın Başkan inanın başka şeyleri de biliyoruz" cevabını verdi ve başladı sırlamaya.
Wolfowitz, küçük özel bir ekiple bir takım örtülü operasyonlar hazırlığındaydı. Myers, duyduklarına inanmıyordu, "Hayır, bunlar olamaz" diye karşı çıkıyordu. Konuyu daha fazla uzatmak istemeyen sivil Türk elini ceketinin cebine atarak ilgili belgeleri çıkardı.
Myers'ın gözleri büyümüştü.
Sivil Türk "Sayın Başkan, ordunuzun içindeki küçük bir klik, iki ülke arasında kriz çıkarmak istiyor, buna müsaade etmeyin" dedi.
Myers biraz düşündü "Size samimiyetimle söylüyorum ki, bunlardan (Siyonistleri kastediyor) Dışişleri'nde bolca bulunur, ama Pentagon'a giremezlerdi. Ancak son yıllarda bir kaçı orduya sızmayı başardı. Fakat ben gereğini yapacağım" diyerek garanti verdi. Sivil Türk, teşekkür edip giderken Myers öylece kalakalmıştı! Kıvrıkoğlu ne kadar canını yakmışsaWolfowitz o günü bir türlü unutamıyordu.
Evinde Erhan Göksel ve Cengiz Çandar gibi isimleri ağırlayacak kadar Türkler'le arası iyi olan Amerikalı'nın acısı büyüktü. Elindeki gücü kullanarak son kararını verdi: Kıvrıkoğlu'nu ortadan kaldırın! Wolfowitz'in verdiği emir Türkiye'ye kadar gelmişti.
Hazırlıklar başlamıştı. Sinsi plan alttan alta işlerken çılgın Amerikalı'nın o dönem ki METRESİçok sevdiği bir arkadaşıyla İtalyanlar'ın işlettiği bir lokantaya gitti. Masaya gelen garson İtalyanca selam verip isteklerini almaya başladı. Hanımefendi İtalyan garsonu tehlike görmemiş olacak ki yanındaki okul arkadaşına ŞİFRELİ olarak planı anlatıyordu.ODTÜ'den mezun olan genç hiç bozuntuya vermeden siparişleri alıp İtalyanca selam verip uzaklaştı! Birkaç dakika sonra masaya siparişler geliyor ancak garson görünmüyordu! Lokantayı terk eden genç Ankara'ya mesaj geçiyordu: "SanırımHüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu ile ilgili kötü bir gelişme olacak. Koruma altına alırsanız iyi olur!" Wolfowitz'in ekibi Ankara'daki dostlarına "düğmeye basın" talimatı verdi. Ancak Kıbrıs'ta kurşunun sıyırdığı Kıvrıkoğlu'na kimse yanaşamıyordu. Etten duvar örülmüştü.Kimse nerede ne yapacağını kestiremiyordu. Bir süre sonra oluşturulan güvenlik halkasıTEHLİKEYİ fark etti. İki şüpheli sınırdışı edildi. Yakalanan yerli işbirlikçilere ne olduğu ise hiç bilinmedi! (Ergün Diler)

Wednesday, March 16, 2016

Erdogan İ The savior turned destroyer of Turkish democracy

Published on March 16th, 2016 | by Derek Davison                 

Erdogan: The Savior-Turned-Destroyer of Turkish Democracy

by Derek Davison
Turkey’s political landscape wasn’t supposed to look like this.
When Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) won almost two-thirds of the seats in Turkey’s Grand National Assembly in 2002, it looked like a positive sign for the state of Turkish democracy. The AKP grew out of the remnants of the religiously conservative Welfare Party (RP), which led the Turkish government for one year, from June 1996 through June 1997, before its leaders were forced to resign under threat of a military coup to remove them from office. The RP was then disbanded in 1998 by Turkey’s Constitutional Court for allegedly violating the constitutional requirement that all Turkish political parties adhere to a policy of secularism.
The RP’s ouster in 1997, often referred to as a “post-modern coup,” was one in a long string of military and/or judicial interventions into Turkish politics since Mustafa Kemal Ataturk founded the Republic of Turkey following World War I. The Turkish military establishment and the republic’s constitutional court—which together make up part of Turkey’s so-called “deep state”—has traditionally viewed themselves as the republic’s last line of defense against any perceived threat to Turkey’s secular order. One or the other has intervened in civilian politics to shut down Islamist political parties on multiple occasions, undermining elected governments that had, by the deep state’s standards, moved too far away from strict Kemalist ideology. But every time the military or the court eliminated an Islamist party, a new one arose to take its place.
A democratic republic whose military and high court take it upon themselves to overturn election results for ideological reasons may struggle to maintain its democracy. The election of the AKP, formed from among the Islamist Welfare Party’s remnants and led by Erdogan, a former RP member, was a new test of the Turkish political system and its ability to withstand the interference of the deep state. And, for a while at least, everybody seemed to pass the test. The AKP shifted from outright Islamism to a broader conservative platform, which made it less threatening to the deep-state establishment. Under new Prime Minister Erdogan’s leadership, it strengthened the Turkish economy, improved social welfare programs, and began to make peace with Turkey’s Kurdish minority after decades of armed conflict. On the occasions when the deep state made moves to counter the AKP’s growing power, the party was able to face down those threats largely by virtue of its considerable popular support. Finally it appeared that Turkey’s political system had grown to accept all points of view, free from ideological suppression.
Erdogan’s Pivot
But a funny thing happened: Tayyip Erdogan saved Turkish democracy from the deep state only to destroy it on his own terms. The turn toward a harder-edged authoritarian style of governance by Erdogan and the AKP began after Turkey’s 2011 parliamentary elections, when the AKP won its third straight majority. Two developments coincided with those elections that seem to have contributed to Erdogan’s shifting politics. First, Erdogan had a falling out with former ally Fethullah Gulen, a spiritual leader whose popular Hizmet movement had fueled the AKP’s rise to power. This confrontation, allegedly engineered by prosecutors with ties to Gulen’s movement, reached its apex in a 2013 corruption investigation that targeted several of Erdogan’s closest supporters within the AKP. The suspicion with which Erdogan had treated the deep state grew into something approaching paranoia once he had reason to believe that his former compatriot Gulen was also working against him.
Second, Erdogan found himself facing the AKP’s internally imposed three-term limit on legislators. Rather than buck his party’s rules, Erdogan opted to run for president in 2014 in Turkey’s first popular presidential election, and he won. Turkey’s presidency is largely ceremonial, however. So, as early as 2012, Erdogan began working to transition Turkey from a parliamentary system to a presidential one, in which the president would wield considerably more power. So Erdogan’s efforts have failed to sway enough legislators to change Turkey’s constitution (though he continues to pursue constitutional change), but the president has already surpassed his office’s constitutional limitations simply due to his personal authority within the AKP and the looming shadow he casts over all of Turkish politics.
Simmering tensions inside Turkey over Erdogan’s growing authoritarianism erupted into violence in 2013 during the Gezi Park protests. Thousands of Turks took to the streets of Istanbul, ostensibly over Erdogan’s plans to develop a small park in the city’s Taksim Square. But their grievances reflected fears that Erdogan was even then trying to govern Turkey as a dictator. Erdogan’s security forces responded to the protests with brutal violence, and the display of popular anger seems to have further deepened Erdogan’s paranoia. He took steps to stifle press freedoms, assume direct control over the Turkish judiciary, and suppress the use of social media by the Turkish public.
Erdogan’s increasingly dictatorial style of governance claimed another victim. On March 4, supported by a ruling from Erdogan’s courts, Turkish authorities forcibly seized the offices of Zaman, Turkey’s largest daily newspaper, and then attacked those protesting the seizure with tear gas. Zaman had ties with Gulen’s Hizmet movement and was often critical of Erdogan and the AKP—it has now been reopened as a thoroughly pro-government outlet. It is hard to see the Zaman seizure as anything other than the final end of any semblance of press freedom in Turkey, the act of a government that will no longer tolerate dissent.
Erdogan may have felt emboldened to take action against Zaman by the political events of the past year. After the AKP lost its parliamentary majority in elections last June, it failed to reach agreement with any of Turkey’s other political parties on forming a coalition, which meant that new elections had to be held in November. In that do-over, Turkish voters—likely concerned over the growing threat of Islamic State and Kurdish terrorism—resoundingly returned the AKP to the majority. Certainly, Erdogan and his defenders would point to these elections as a sign that Turkish democracy is alive and well and that the AKP, and Erdogan, remain popular throughout Turkey. But a government that doesn’t recognize basic press freedoms, reacts violently to peaceful protests, and prevents its citizens from accessing social media in times of crisis is not a government that can claim to be “democratic” in any real sense, regardless of its participation in elections.
Foreign Policy Transformed
This suppression of internal criticism has implications that go beyond the damage it does to Turkey’s democratic roots. Since civil war broke out in neighboring Syria in 2011, Erdogan has been focused on doing whatever he could to prevent the formation of an autonomous Kurdish enclave in northern Syria—at one point, during the siege of Kobani in 2014, Turkish security forces took actions that, intentionally or not, materially aided the Islamic State as it attempted to wrest the city from the Kurdish YPG forces who were defending it. Ankara’s repeated attacks on Kurdish positions in northern Syria have angered the United States, which sees Syria’s Kurds as one of the few military forces in Syria that is both capable of defeating IS and willing to act as an American proxy force in the war against the insurgent/terrorist group. Erdogan, for his part, has been angry at Washington’s refusal to consider stronger measures in Syria designed to oust Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and to stifle the Kurds’ ambitions for autonomy.
Turkey has also seen its relationship with Russia collapse over Syria, partly over the Kurdish situation but primarily in the aftermath of November’s downing, by Turkish F-16s, of a Russian aircraft that Ankara claimed had violated Turkish airspace. The European Union has maintained good relations with Turkey despite Ankara’s violence toward Syrian Kurds, or Erdogan’s attacks on free speech and freedom of the press, for one simple reason: the EU is counting on Turkey to continue absorbing Syrian refugees and to take additional steps to prevent them from flowing into Europe.
Erdogan’s opposition to Syria’s Kurds has reignited the war between the Turkish government and its own Kurdish population, led by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which Erdogan had previously done so much to bring to a peaceful resolution. The escalation of that conflict, which—intentionally or not—has undoubtedly served Erdogan’s political ends, has brought violence back to the streets of Turkey’s largest cities, as Sunday’s car bombing in Ankara, which killed at least 37 people and which the Turkish government claims was perpetrated by the PKK, made all too clear. Entire cities in the Kurdish region of southwest Turkey lie in ruins, amid accusations that Turkish forces are killing PKK fighters and civilians indiscriminately. In short, Erdogan’s Kurdish policy, which has become the most important issue in Turkish politics, has been disastrous for Turkey’s international relations and its internal stability, but there’s now almost no independent media left in Turkey willing to criticize him for it.

About the Author

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Derek Davison is a Washington-based researcher and writer on international affairs and American politics. He has Master's degrees in Middle East Studies from the University of Chicago, where he specialized in Iranian history and policy, and in Public Policy and Management from Carnegie Mellon University, where he studied American foreign policy and Russian/Cold War history. He previously worked in the Persian Gulf for The RAND Corporation.

Tuesday, March 15, 2016

Were the Armenians "uber-Jews" by Pat Walsh

Pat Walsh

Were the Armenians ‘über-Jews’?

In his Irish Times (20/2/16) book review of ‘Justifying Genocide: Germany and the Armenians from Bismarck to Hitler’ by Stefan Ihrig,  Lawrence Douglas states:
“Ihrig brilliantly lays bare the ‘confluence’ between German anti-Semitic and anti-Armenian stereotypes. Jews and Armenians were treated as ‘Semitic cousins’, with the latter playing the role of ‘quasi-‘ or even ‘über-Jews’.”
The Nazi extermination of the Jews is the ultimate analogy drawn to demonise Ottoman Turkey in relation to the Armenians. The comparison is historically absurd and no historian worthy of the name would make such an analogy. But academia these days is heavily populated by those who substitute feeling and effect for truth and fact. So we are forced to ask the question: were the Armenians really what Stefan Ihrig calls ‘über-Jews’ in Nazi Germany?

Luckily we have a book by an Armenian about a very famous Armenian freedom fighter which helps us answer the question. The book in question is “‘Dro’ Drastamat Kanayan: Armenia’s First Defence Minister of the Modern Era” by Antranig Chalabian. Not only does it reveal that Ihrig’s “brilliant” work is utter nonsense but it also highlights the one actual and irrefutable link between the Armenians and Nazi Germany – and it is not Turkish. The book is published by the Indo-European Publishing House of Los Angeles (the significance of whose name will become apparent).
I first came across ‘Dro’ when writing a book ‘The Armenian Insurrection and the Great War’ which includes reprints of the celebrated Insurrectionary, Garegin Pasdermadjian’s writings in which ‘Dro’ features both in text as well as pictured, at the start of the Insurrection of 1914. Along with the famous General Andranik, ‘Armen Garo’ (Dr. Pasdermadjian) and ‘Dro’ were the most famous Armenian guerrilla leaders. I introduced ‘Dro’ with the initial  information I had learnt about him:
“Another character prominently featured in Pasdermadjian’s 1918 book, was General ‘Dro’ or Drastamat Kanajian. ‘Dro’ (who is pictured with Pasdermadjian on the book cover) went on to head the Armenian Nazi Legion of 22,000 in World War 2, with a large complement of SS in tow. ‘Dro’ apparently put his special skills of massacre learnt in the Armenian Insurrection at the Fuhrer’s disposal, whom he met on a number of occasions. It is said Hitler consulted him on a number of occasions and his nickname was ‘the Jew hunter’. When World War II ended the surviving Nazi Armenian soldiers along with their commander were admitted to the U.S, despite being wanted by the Russians for mass murder. ‘Dro’ lived out the rest of his life there, before dying in Massachusetts in 1956. His body was returned to the Soviet Republic of Armenia and he was given a State funeral.”
The bulk of this character sketch is confirmed in the Armenian biography of ‘Dro’. And there is much more.
Antranig Chalabian writes of ‘Dro’ in his biography of the Armenian Insurectionary:
“World War II changed the course of Dro’s life regardless of his will or intention, linking him to the Russian-German struggle as ‘a collaborator with Nazism’… It is not possible to accuse Dro of sympathising with the Nazi ideology… He was guided solely by the supreme interests of the Armenia and the Armenian nation.” (‘Dro’ Drastamat Kanayan: Armenia’s First Defence Minister of the Modern Era.p. 219)
‘Dro’ went round the German Prisoner of War camps and recruited the captured Armenians who had been drafted into the Red Army  into the Nazi Armenian Legion.  The Armenian 812th Battalion was created in December 1941 growing from 8,000 to 20,000 men. Christopher Walker argues that Dro’s intention was that the Nazi forces should fight for Hitler, culminating in an entrance into Yerevan to finally deal with the Turks.
Chalabian notes that the Armenian National Council published Nazi propaganda from a weekly newspaper, ‘Armenien’ and a radio station in Berlin from 1942. ‘Dro’s’ biographer asks:
“… Why did he collaborate with the Nazis? Simply because he and his comrades perceived the Armenian prisoners of war, the Armenians in the occupied territories, as well as the survival of the Armenians in their homeland to be in grave jeopardy.” (p.221). “Dro and his comrades saved the lives of around 40,000 Armenian prisoners of war by enlisting them in the German army.”(p.227)
Dro’s collaboration is a difficult issue for Armenians and it is a tricky job to write a sympathetic biography of the national hero without attempting to excuse his actions. The Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnaks) considered establishing a distance from Dro from his Nazi collaboration but decided against it. Chalabian indeed notes that the Nazi collaborators from Armenia, the Ukraine, and Byelorussia would have been many more “… if Hitler had behaved a little differently… they could have shaken the anti-populist regime of the Kremlin’s dictator and his sycophants from its foundations… They hoped to advance side by side with the Wehrmacht… Toward Moscow, and to topple Stalin’s hated regime.” (p.222)
The Armenian recruits did not just come from captured Red Army soldiers of the Yerevan Republic but also from the large Armenian communities in the Balkans and Ukraine.
Dro and his Dashnak comrades went to Berlin for discussions with the Nazi high command as the invasion of Russia got underway. Chalabian notes:
“They were impressed with everything in the city; law and order was notable everywhere. Berlin was peaceful and life was as if normal.” (P. 243)
From there Dro was taken to Warsaw and then the Crimea. Dro visited the POW camps recruiting Armenians for the German army there. Whilst in the Crimea he witnessed the disposal of the bodies of hundreds of Jews in trenches the SS had had dug by locals. Although “people were not allowed to go anywhere near these trenches” Dro’s group was treaty specially by the Nazis and permitted access, according to Chalabian. (p.245)
However, Hitler never reached Yerevan to deal with the Turks and Dro fled west as the Red Army closed in on Berlin. He was captured in Heidelberg by the Americans. At first the Americans decided to send him back to the Soviets as a collaborator but then “they sent him to Mannheim, to a retention centre for high-ranking German commanders who were not considered Nazis. The retention centre was a former palace/estate, and the accomodation was very comfortable.” (P. 254) US Intelligence had use for him it seems.
It is most probably true that Dro was never an ideological Nazi. However, Armenians did work with the Nazis and attempt to secure a place for the Armenians in the new Hitlerite racial order. According to Simon Vratsian (Along Life’s Pathways), an influential wing of the Nazi Party wanted to classify Armenians as not “Indo-European”, but “listed among the Asiatic peoples, which meant a race unworthy of living. Dro and his comrades were able to recognise the danger… They put forth proofs that Armenians are of Indo-European origin and belong to the Arian race.” (p.224)
Apparently Armenian/Nazi connections had begun a generation before the Final Solution. The German-Armenian Union, formed in 1914, and predating the Nazis, included Artashes Abeghian, Professor of Eastern Studies at the University of Berlin who “conducted propaganda about the Aryan origin of the Armenians.” It was these people, including German academics, who later contacted Dro and decided to collaborate with the Reich from 1940, according to Chalabian (p.232). The German-Armenian Union “was formed by Johannes Lepsius” who is often cited as a “good German” speaking out against Ottoman treatment of the Armenians.
Chalabian also reveals that Dr Paul Rohrbach and Artashes Abeghian published a book in 1934 called ‘Armenian-Aryan’ in collaboration with Nazi intellectuals which “strove to prove that Armenians belong to the Aryan race and the Armenian language to the Indo-European family of languages.” (p.234) The year before, in 1933, “Goebbels had formally declared that the Armenians were Aryan.” (p.248)
These pieces of information revealed by Chalabian were probably only the tip of the iceberg. The author would have no interest in publicising any more details that he had found out about Armenian/Nazi links in his Armenian sources and it is surprising he revealed even these.
To return to the point of this article: How can it be asserted by Stefan Inrig and Lawrence Douglas that the Armenians represented “the role of ‘quasi-‘ or even ‘über-Jews’” in Nazi Germany when Dro and his Legion were welcomed into the ranks of the Third Reich and aspired to be and were accepted as a good racial type by prominent Nazi intellectuals. Could we imagine a Nazi Jewish Legion being accepted by Hitler or the Jews pressing for high racial status and being spoken for by Goebbels?
So what is all this nonsense about the Armenians being ‘über-Jews’? What idiots could write such rubbish if they had bothered to read anything beyond their ideological horizons.
Let us be fairer to the Armenians than Inrig and Douglas are to the Turks. Let us accept that the Armenians who collaborated with Hitler did so from the motivation of self-preservation rather than any ideological affinity with the Nazi philosophy. Let us leave aside the fact that this would have strengthened the Nazi war machine and have fatal consequences for the many minorities that the Nazis chose to exterminate and make them accessories to Genocide through such collaboration. Let us accept Chalabian’s argument that Dro and the Armenian Legion did such things because of their love for one section of humanity over all others and their desire to preserve their people/race, even if it meant legitimising the Nazi racial policy by acquiescence to it and engagement with it.
Let us, however, also take on board the understandings of another Armenian writer, Dr. Manuel Sarkisyanz, given as lectures in Heidelburg University to its South Asia Institute. In these lectures Dr. Sarkisyanz explains that Nazism did not come out of a vacuum. It indeed had substantial ideological forebears in its ant-semitism, expansionism and its Genocide and the practices to demonstrate such statecraft. And no where in the Armenian’s lectures do we read mention of the Ottomans as his inspiration for the Nazi regime. Manuel Sarkisyanz’s lectures have been published in book form by Athol Books. It is called ‘Hitler’s English Inspirers’.

The three faces of Turkey by W.Robert Pearson

interesting article worth reading

By W. Robert Pearson - The Middle East Institute Jan 06, 2016
Washington and Ankara are in yet another difficult phase in a relationship cycle that runs from very good to very bad. American public opinion about another country forms slowly, but persists through time once set. As Turkey changes, we keep trying to fit new evidence into the old paradigm. At some point, the contradictions are too obvious to explain away, and the new narrative emerges. Right now, Americans are caught in that dilemma regarding Turkey. Unless we have a better idea of which Turkey we are dealing with, we are certain to make bad choices.
The first Turkey—conservative, constitutional, westward facing—is the one that belongs to NATO. Western oriented, highly educated Turks were heirs to the Ataturk revolution and the Turkey that rose from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire. Many Americans, especially those in the armed forces during the Cold War and up to 2003 were proud of their ally in a tough neighborhood. This Turkey anchored the West in volatile geography and risked nuclear retaliation to defend Europe. The image of this Turkey has led the United States more than once to embrace a false consensus theory and presume that Ankara would follow U.S. lead on important issues. The Incirlik air base has been the metaphor for this view of Turkey. The United States has invested heavily into this base, risking an over reliance on it and Turkey as a critical component of U.S. policy in the Middle East.
The second Turkey—liberal, pro-EU, aspiring to be democratic—began to emerge after the Cold War, but only fully flowered in the early 2000s as the pro-Islamist AKP captured power. This is the Turkey that led the Gezi Park demonstrations in 2013 for greater democracy and the Turkey that formed the rainbow coalition in 2015, allowing the left-leaning, pro-Kurdish HDP to enter parliament for the first time. This is the Turkey that, in the June 2015 elections, briefly obstructed President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s ambitions to expand his power.
The third Turkey—authoritarian, populist, religious and ideological—rests on a political philosophy largely unseen or ignored by Western observers of Turkey. That approach draws on the tenets of the Muslim Brotherhood: distrust of Western institutions, and belief in the power of the community of supporters to make decisions for society. Constitutional divisions of power, protection of individual rights against the state, and freedom of press all are subject to majoritarian choice. In other words, popular election results trump all such restraints.
Thus, the AKP has steadily ignored or marginalized Turkey’s western-inspired institutions—judicial, media, education, military—in order to consolidate power domestically and to project an image of Islamic Sunni religious leadership and political prominence regionally. Many believe that Erdogan always had these goals in mind; others believe he moved to more extreme positions in recent years in reaction to his growing election majorities and resistance by Turkish institutions to his rule. Even as his actions continue to polarize the country and his foreign policy mistakes mount, there are still no indications that he will change course or that the opposition will weaken his power.
These three faces of Turkey complicate the issue of dealing with the country. The traditional American coalition that supported Turkey—U.S. military and veterans groups, defense companies, Congress, and Jewish groups—is losing cohesion. The American Turkish Council, long a bastion for strong Turkish-American ties, no longer wields its accustomed clout. Those who saw a liberalizing Turkey have postponed their hopes in the wake of the November 2015 election landslide for the AKP. An illiberal authoritarian Turkey has not completely eliminated these older realities, but it is increasingly apparent that American policy makers cannot rely on those historic perceptions in dealing with Turkey.
Events of recent years only add to the challenge. Since the Arab Spring, Turkey has weakened its ability to control events as its pro-Muslim Brotherhood and pro-Sunni sectarian approach has led it into political cul-de-sacs. It sacrificed its leverage with Israel by championing the Palestinian cause instead of acting as a mediator. It continued to back Mohamed Morsi in Egypt even as the Morsi government drafted an Islamic constitution with dictatorial powers. Repeated intelligence reports indicate that Turkey for an extended period did little to prevent ISIS recruits from entering Syria from Turkey. On the Syrian border, when Kurdish forces emerged as one of the few effective forces fighting ISIS, Turkey refused to help in any substantive way.
Turkey exploited the August 2015 agreement between the United States and Turkey for increased use of the Incirlik air base to mount massive raids against the PKK and very few against ISIS. In the November shoot down of a Russian fighter jet, Ankara did not even know the rules of engagement for its pilots, precipitating a long-term economic and political setback in relations with Moscow and complicating its aims in Syria. When Turkey overplayed its hand in northern Iraq by sending additional forces, it was forced in December under Iraqi and American pressure to withdraw. Domestically, the AKP government’s steadily rising violence against the PKK is raising fears of a civil war and the spread of attacks by the PKK into western Turkey.
How might the United States best approach Turkey at this point? First, Washington should not regard Turkey as an indispensable player in every circumstance. Ankara is much more interested in tactical gains—supporting its chosen factions in Syria and preventing the rise of Kurdish power and influence. Defeating ISIS is not a Turkish priority. Second, as a logical flow on, the United States should focus its strategic attention elsewhere and enhance cooperation with Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states and Egypt. Turkey will have little influence on these countries regarding Syria.
If 2015 was a year that saw Washington and Ankara drift further apart, 2016 might be the year the United States shapes its view of the Middle East with less reliance on Turkey. Without a better acceptance of what Turkey has become at present, the United States will continue to encounter frustration and disappointment in its dealings with Ankara
Amiral Cem Gürdeniz: Sovyetler Birliği'nin Türk milli mücadelesine yardımı

Değil sivil okullarımız, askeri okullarımızda bile Kurtuluş Savaşı anlatılırken silah ve cephane ile akaryakıtın Sovyetlerden tedarik edildiği bizlere öğretilmedi. Zira Marshall Yardım Planı ve Truman Doktrini gereğince Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Ruslara düşman olmalıydı. Onlar komünist idi. Nasıl olurdu komünistlerin yardımıyla Türkiye Cumhuriyeti kurulmuş olabilirdi? Halbuki gerçek tam da buydu. Sovyet devrimi ile Türk Kurtuluş savaşı, tarihin o safhasında emperyalizmin boğmak istediği iki kader arkadaşı idi. Atatürk ve Lenin ya birlikte yok olacak ya da birlikte savaşacaklardı. Birlikte savaştılar.
 
TÜRK-SOVYET YARDIM ANTLAŞMASI
 
24 Ağustos 1920 günü Bekir Sami Bey Başkanlığında Moskova’ya giden ilk TBMM Heyeti ile Sovyetler arasında imzalanan yardım antlaşması gereğince askeri yardımın deniz yolu ile yapılmasına karar verildi. Bölgede bulunan, 5 ton üzeri büyüklükte 28 geminin toplam taşıma kapasitelerinin takriben 7800 ton olmasına karşılık, Sovyetler Birliğinin Batum, Tuapse ve Novorosysky limanları üzerinden, Ağustos 1922’ye kadar 200 irili ufaklı deniz vasıtası ile İnebolu, Trabzon ve Samsun limanlarına 46 ayda toplam 300,000 ton harp malzemesi taşındı ve Kurtuluş Savaşı destanı yazılabildi.Alemdar ve Gazal römorkörleri ile Şahin Vapuru, Rusumat-4 Gümrük Motoru vediğer tekneler Anadolu’nun Karadeniz’deki can damarını oluşturdular. Özellikle I. İnönü savaşında elde edilen askeri başarıdan sonra artarak devam eden Rus lojistik desteği, Kurtuluş Savaşının kaderini belirleyen ana eksen oldu.

KİMDİ BU MALZEMEYİ TAŞIYANLAR

Kurtuluş Savaşının denizler üzerindeki bu lojistik cephesinde İstanbul’dan Anadolu’ya kaçan bir avuç deniz subayı ve o dönemde silah altına çağrılan Karadenizli takacılar görev aldı. 1919-1922 arasında Bahriye Mektebi mezunu 159 güverte, 68 makine ve bir inşaiye subayı ile beş denizci doktor Anadolu’ya kaçtı ve işgalcilerle işbirliği içindeki Osmanlı Donanmasını terk ederek namus cephesine katıldılar. Toplam 233 denizci Kurtuluş savaşının kaderini değiştirdi. O dönem muvazzaf olan kabaca 1500 subay içinde, sadece 233 kişi. Diğerlerinin çoğu Haliç’teki kıçtankara gemilerini ve İstanbul’daki sıcak yuvalarını terk etmedi.

KARADENİZ MUCİZESİ

Türk denizcisinin sayesinde Atatürk, “gözüm Sakarya’da, kulağım İnebolu’da” diyebilmişti. Kurtuluş Savaşı’nda ikmal teşkilatının başında bulunan Korgeneral Muzaffer Ergüder’in, 1925 yılında bu başarı için sarf ettiği “Kurtuluş Savaşı’nda bir avuç deniz subayımız olmasaydı, ne İnönü’ler, ne Sakarya ve ne de Dumlupınar ve de dolayısıyla Kurtuluş Savaşı olmazdı” sözlerine ne eklenebilir ki? Cem Karaca ‘’Kavga’’ isimli şarkısında işte bu denizcileri anlatır. (Üç kardeş emaneti aldılar bir dereden/İlyas, Temel, Süreyya kürekler siya siya/Emanet makinalı, tüfekler hoçkis marka..)

UÇAK GEMİSİ: BÜYÜK TAARRUZUN MEÇHULDENİZCİLERİ

Tarihçi yazar Mehmet Perinçek, geçen haftalarda Kırmızıkedi yayınevinden çıkardığı yeni kitabı ‘’Uçak Gemisi Büyük Taarruzun Meçhul Denizcileri’’ ile işte bu kahramanları anlatıyor. (Kitabın tanıtım filmi, youtube’da ‘’Uçak gemisi tanıtım filmi’’ yazıldığında kolayca çıkıyor.) Akışı ve kurgusu film tadında olması için senaryo ve çizgi roman formatında Kurtuluş Savaşı Donanmasının kahramanlarını anlatan bu kitabın,birsinema filmi olarak karşımıza çıkması en büyük dileğimdir. Halkımız o zaman gerçek ‘’Survivor’’ların kim olduğunu görecektir! Büyüktaarruzun kaderinde etkili olan, Almanya’dan alınıp Rus limanı Novorosysky üzerinden Şahin Vapuru ile Trabzon’a taşınan uçakların macerasına dayanan senaryoda, denizcilerin değişik gemilerde ve karada yaşadığı tarihe geçmiş pek çok kahramanlık öyküsü de okuyucuya keyifle aktarılıyor. Okurken zaman zaman heyecan ve endişe duyuyor, bazen acı çekiyor ama sonunda kitabın kapağını gururla kapıyorsunuz. Bugüne kadar egemenlerin öksüz bıraktığı isimsiz kahramanları 100 yıl sonra hatırlayan Mehmet Perinçek, Yıldırım Örer ve Alper Pala’ya takdirlerimi sunuyorum. Mehmet Perinçek, bu eser haricinde Atatürk dönemindeki Atatürk ve Lenin’in kurduğu Türk-Rus dostluğunun güçlü temellerini de Rus arşivlerine girerek ortaya çıkarmış bir bilim adamıdır. Bu belgeler sayesinde bugüne kadar bilinmeyen pek çok gerçek satha çıkmıştır. Örneğin bu dönemde Ankara Hükümeti ile Ruslar arasında Sivastopol-İnebolu ekseninde gerek diplomatik heyetleri gerekse kuryeleri taşımak üzere, AG-23, AG-24 ve AG-25 isimli denizaltıların görev yaptığı onun kitapları sayesinde öğrenilmiştir. Uçak Gemisi isimli bu yeni kitap, günümüzün karmaşasında Türk-Rus düşmanlığını körüklemeye çalışan hem içimizdeki hem Rusya’daki maceracılara iyi bir ikazdır.
 
E.Amiral Cem Gürdeniz
 
Odatv.com