Estonia and Latvia Break With China Forum

 Estonia and Latvia Break With China Forum

Estonia and Latvia have both pulled out of China’s diplomatic and trade forum in Central and Eastern Europe—a group once known as the 17+1 that is now down to 14 countries and Beijing, furthering a slide into irrelevance. The latest move follows Lithuania’s departure last year, leaving all three Baltic states out of the group. Other countries may follow suit, including Slovakia, which in recent years has become a fierce China critic.

The withdrawal shows how deeply China’s diplomacy has felt the impact of Russia’s war in Ukraine. Beijing’s failure to condemn Moscow’s invasion, along with its casting blame on NATO and making excuses for Russian President Vladimir Putin, have not gone down well in Eastern Europe, which previously suffered under Russian imperialism and faces new threats from Russian state media. Unsurprisingly, China’s biggest supporter left in Europe is Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, a Putin ally.

These issues are particularly salient in the Baltic states, which the Soviet Union violently annexed in 1940; they may see a certain shared identity with Taiwan, a democratic state threatened by a far larger neighbor. China’s bullying of Lithuania last year after a dispute over Taiwan’s diplomatic status in the country sharpened anti-China sentiment; Beijing ultimately cut trade ties with Vilnius and sought to force other countries to do the same.

The 17+1 group began as the 16+1 in 2012, with Greece added in 2019. Chinese analysts saw it a major milestone for China in Europe—while concerned Europeans saw a potential way for Beijing to undermine unity on the continent. China made big pledges for investment and infrastructure as part of the grand Belt and Road Initiative narrative, oversold in both Beijing and Washington as a masterpiece of diplomatic and economic strategy. But the initiative has fallen short of being a global Marshall Plan, with broken promises and blowback from perceived debt traps for developing countries.

The 17+1 is no exception: Even before Lithuania pulled out, the body had become practically irrelevant. A signature rail line between Belgrade, Serbia, and Budapest, Hungary, is far over schedule and over budget; independent Hungarian media have estimated it may take 130 years for the route to turn a profit. Construction on power plants hasn’t even started. By 2019, several leaders had started dropping the Chinese-European grouping’s events from their schedules.

Central and Eastern European countries aren’t the only ones turning against China; its image is now damaged throughout the continent. A major trade deal between China and the European Union has been dead in the water since March 2021, when Beijing sanctioned European politicians for calling out its human rights record. China’s biggest remaining asset is Germany, where leaders have consistently prioritized business interests, but public opinion there is shifting. Meanwhile, European firms in China are increasingly thinking about leaving the country.

Furthermore, Chinese President Xi Jinping’s own unwillingness to travel overseas since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic has created a persistent problem for high-level diplomacy. Xi hasn’t left China since January 2020, although it’s hard to tell if that stems from concerns about COVID-19 or about losing control at home in his absence. Recently, there have been conflicting reports about upcoming travels. Saudi sources say Xi will visit Riyadh soon, and Chinese sources report he plans to visit Southeast Asia in November, where he could meet U.S. President Joe Biden.

The Southeast Asia trip seems more likely, not least because it would likely come after the crucial National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in November. Xi’s power within the party appears to be nailed down, but the president taking off for the Middle East at a time of political uncertainty would still be a bold move. Even with Xi back in play, the relentlessly aggressive tone of Chinese diplomacy is proving a permanent turnoff for the developed world.

---