Europe’s Shifting Geopolitical Landscape
April 30, 2026
On February 24, 2022, Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine. The West condemned the invasion and began to support Ukraine. Four months later, at their summit in Madrid on June 29, NATO allies adopted the “NATO 2022 Strategic Concept.”[i]
The document says that Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine shattered peace and gravely altered the European security environment. It names Russia as the most significant and direct threat to allies’ security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. It states that the Russian Federation is modernizing its nuclear forces and expanding its novel and disruptive dual-capable delivery systems. Among Russia’s threats, the Strategic Concept cites hybrid operations against allies that could prompt the North Atlantic Council to invoke Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.
While making it clear that the allies can no longer consider the Russian Federation a partner, the Strategic Concept says, nonetheless, that they remain willing to keep open channels of communication with Moscow to manage and mitigate risks, prevent escalation, and increase transparency; that they seek stability and predictability in the Euro-Atlantic area and between NATO and the Russian Federation. However, that was only four months after the invasion, when an end to the war did not appear so far as today.
On December 5, 2022, ten months after Russia invaded Ukraine, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz published an essay in Foreign Affairs titled, “The Global Zeitenwende: How to Avoid a New Cold War in a Multipolar Era.”[ii]
He argued that the world is facing a “Zeitenwende”—an epochal tectonic shift—and that Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has ended an era that began with the fall of the Iron Curtain. He noted that President Putin failed to view the peaceful overthrow of communist rule as an opportunity for greater freedom and democracy, instead calling it “the biggest geopolitical catastrophe of the twentieth century.” However, he also recognized that the economic and political turmoil in parts of the post-Soviet space in the 1990s only exacerbated the sense of loss and anguish many Russian citizens felt at the end of the Soviet Union.
The Chancellor stated that Germany’s crucial role at the moment is to step up as one of the main providers of security in Europe by strengthening its military presence on NATO’s eastern flank and training and equipping Ukraine’s armed forces. He argued that a balanced and resilient transatlantic partnership also requires Germany and Europe to play active roles. He stated:
“Russia’s war has not only unified the EU, NATO, and the G-7 in opposition to its aggression; it has also catalyzed changes in economic and energy policy that will hurt Russia in the long run—and give a boost to the vital transition to clean energy that was already underway.”
Chancellor Scholz’s admission, in his essay, of Germany’s responsibility for the two world wars was noteworthy. His emphasis on the need for a more balanced transatlantic defense cooperation was wise and timely. And no one could blame him for his failure to foresee what lay in store for transatlantic relations with Trump’s return to the White House in January 2025.
Following the path Chancellor Scholz defined in his Foreign Affairs essay, on April 22, 2026, Germany unveiled its first-ever “Military Strategy and Plan for the Armed Forces’ Responsibility for Europe.”[iii]
The Federal Minister of Defense, Boris Pistorius, states in his Foreword that Russia is likely to remain the greatest threat to European security and concludes with the following:
“For us Europeans, it is therefore all the more important to ensure our own security. Germany, in particular, is in great demand within NATO and the EU in this respect. We will systematically take on more conventional strategic responsibility for Europe. This increases Germany’s strategic weight for our Allies.”
In his Foreword, the Chief of Defense, General Carsten Breuer, says:
“The Military Strategy reflects the idea that, as the largest economy in Europe and in view of an increasingly complex and intense threat situation, Germany must and will assume a leading role within NATO – also at the military level.” (emphasis added)
The Military Strategy, most of which remains confidential, states that Russia’s openly revisionist policy aims to reverse the European security order and considers war a legitimate means to achieve this; consequently, today’s Russia will remain the largest immediate threat to peace and security in Germany and the Euro-Atlantic area.
After mentioning that Moscow seeks to weaken cohesion within the Alliance and achieve the strategic decoupling of the United States from Europe—ultimately leading to the failure of NATO—the Military Strategy says, “This would, from Russia’s perspective, establish the basis for expanding its sphere of influence into Europe. This would affect not only the Baltic states but also the former member states of the Warsaw Pact – who are present-day NATO Allies.”
The Military Strategy envisages three phases, at the end of which the Bundeswehr will become the strongest conventional army in Europe, consolidating its European leadership role, and increasing its importance in the European security architecture.
To sum up, Germany’s Military Strategy, like the NATO Strategic Concept 2022, is a statement reflecting Germany’s perception of the Russian threat to German, European, and NATO security. It elevates Chancellor Scholz’s Foreign Affairs essay to a more formal level. It is a significant step toward improved transatlantic burden-sharing for common defense. There is no doubt that transatlantic relations will improve after the Trump presidency; however, Washington’s insistence on fair burden-sharing is unlikely to change.
The German Military Strategy’s principal objective is to improve conventional defense. Yet, Russia is a nuclear power. NATO’s Strategic Concept 2022 says that the nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the US, are the supreme guarantee of the security of the Alliance, and that the independent strategic nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France have a deterrent role of their own and contribute significantly to the overall security of the Alliance.
Would the two nations and Germany be able to agree on a “European Military Strategy” that also covers nuclear issues? Looking at Macron’s recent statements, this seems more likely than before, but it will take time.
UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, speaking on Monday at the opening of the 11th Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), warned that the world is slipping into a dangerous complacency over nuclear weapons.[iv]
President Putin’s initial plan was to invade the entirety of Ukraine in a blitzkrieg or, at the very least, cut it off from the Black Sea. The project failed. A conventional war of attrition, with some novelties, has been going on for four years. Does this represent a victory for Ukraine? In terms of resilience against aggression, “definitely yes,” but at a great cost.
Regardless of their strong anti-Russian public discourse and accompanying sanctions, deep down, European countries would prefer peace in Ukraine over continued confrontation with Moscow. This is why Macron and Meloni have, on occasion, called for the resumption of dialogue with Russia, to which the Kremlin has responded positively. However, there has been no follow-up.
Thus, the question is if, and when, Europe and Russia will resume their dialogue. After all, the Trump administration has discussed the war in Ukraine with Russia on more than one occasion, but Europe was never at the table. After the Alaska summit, European leaders were only briefed at the White House. The West and Russia do not need another world war to reinvent détente.
The shifts in the geopolitical landscape also present new challenges for Türkiye. On the home front, our democracy remains in steep decline. Unfortunately, when looking at Türkiye’s options for adapting to these shifts, our departure from the democratic path is now a “given” that will not change—at least not anytime soon.
We are in dire economic straits. Our relations with the West remain troubled. Talk of a “strong relationship” with Washington is unconvincing. Today, we are more than ever a part of the Middle East, yet our relations with regional countries lack genuine partnership. Our relations with Israel are at their lowest point ever.
Our relations with the EU have not moved an inch. The EU accession process is effectively dead and buried. But why is there no progress in reviewing and updating the customs union? Why are EU-Türkiye relations becoming increasingly hostile? Was Ursula von der Leyen putting Türkiye in the same basket as Russia and China merely a slip of the tongue? No.
Once, Türkiye was regarded as a regional power and a country striving for democracy, setting an example for the Middle East. Should we be happy today when Türkiye is mentioned only in the context of European or Middle Eastern security? No.
With the East-West détente, Türkiye also enjoyed a well-defined, transparent, and mutually advantageous relationship with Russia. At present, however, there are signals that this relationship is also facing challenges.
In brief, today we are not seen as a regional power whose partnership is sought, but as one to be put up with for narrow interests. We face fundamental questions in our foreign and security policy, yet given our current trajectory, there are no easy answers.
[i] https://www.nato.int/content/dam/nato/webready/documents/publications-and-reports/strategic-concepts/2022/290622-strategic-concept.pdf
[ii] https://www.foreignaffairs.com/germany/olaf-scholz-global-zeitenwende-how-avoid-new-cold-war?check_logged_in=1
[iii] https://www.bmvg.de/resource/blob/6093998/678875025812878cfa657f9801f62ffc/dl-gesamtkonzeption-der-verteidigung-eng-data.pdf
[iv] https://disarmament.unoda.org/en/our-work/weapons-mass-destruction/nuclear-weapons/treaty-non-proliferation-nuclear-weapons
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