The New York Times -The World - December 19, 2025 - NYT'ın Berlin Büro şefi Jim Tankersley ile NYT eski Büro şefi ve şimdiki NYT The World yazarı Katrin Bennhold arasındaki kısa görüşmeyi ilginç bulacağınzı düşünüyorum.

 

December 19, 2025

	By Katrin Bennhold

Guten Morgen, Welt! I’m in Berlin for a few days on my way to visit family. It’s a homecoming in more ways than one. Until a couple of years ago, I was The New York Times’s Berlin bureau chief, covering the tail end of Angela Merkel’s long chancellorship and the short-lived government of Olaf Scholz.

I wanted to talk with my successor, Jim Tankersley, because he just sat down with Germany’s new chancellor, Friedrich Merz. That doesn’t happen very often, so I wanted to hear more about what he learned in his conversation.

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Kenny Holston/The New York Times

The German chancellor betting on America

Whenever I come back to Germany, I am struck by how much it has changed over the past decade. It has set aside its deep postwar aversion to military leadership and is investing many billions in rearmament. It has set aside its equally deep aversion to debt, recently abandoning once-untouchable borrowing limits. It is also increasingly setting aside any qualms over voting for a far-right party: The A.F.D. is now the second biggest force in parliament.

Another thing that’s changed: German chancellors are talking to The New York Times now! Angela Merkel never gave me or my predecessor an interview; all the places on her plane were reserved for the German press. I wondered if that might reflect something about Germany’s changing position in a world where the U.S. is both crucial to Europe’s future and an increasingly erratic partner. As Jim discovered, Merz still has an abiding faith in the American people.

You can read Jim’s profile of Merz here. Our conversation is below.

Katrin: Germany is Europe’s biggest and richest country, and as a result, it has this sort of implicit leadership role. Or, at least, Angela Merkel did during my time. Would you say that’s still true for Friedrich Merz?

Jim: I would say it is true, by a kind of process of elimination. Look at the other big countries. In Britain, Keir Starmer is really struggling at home. His government’s under a lot of pressure. In France, the same is true for Emmanuel Macron. He’s sort of a lame duck.

So Merz, just by virtue of being German chancellor, has this outsize role. But he’s also really tried to fill it. One of the most striking things about the first half-year of Merz’s tenure is just how much he has leaned into foreign policy — and particularly into this idea of trying to be the big man in Europe.

It hasn’t always worked. He, too, is pretty unpopular at home. And he’s also confronting a rising far-right party. But on balance he’s still better positioned than other potential leaders on the continent, especially in terms of the money he can spend. And I think he’s trying to leverage that, especially when it comes to Ukraine.

Do Merz and the other Europeans have a strategy on Ukraine? For a long time, it seemed as if it was just, we’ll support Ukraine whatever it takes, for however long it takes. But I think everybody’s aware that time’s running out on that commitment. What are they thinking now?

When you talk to people close to these talks, they’re all very aware of the cycle they’ve been in for months. The Ukrainians and the Americans come together, and they talk and reach an agreement. The Americans go back and take it to the Russians. The Russians say no, and then they get America’s ear, and a totally different agreement comes out, which is much less favorable to Ukraine. Then Merz and his fellow European leaders go back to work on Trump to try to pull him away. It’s basically like this elliptical orbit where Trump gets closer to Putin and then comes back closer to Europe and then closer to Putin and back. And the real challenge is to break out of that orbit.

Still, Merz believes the strategy has to be: keeping America engaged and trying to persuade Donald Trump that it’s in his interest to side with Ukraine. You can criticize that strategy, you can applaud that strategy, but that’s what they’re betting on.

I met Merz before he was chancellor, and he always gave me 1990s vibes. You know, Bonn republic vibes? You recently accompanied him on his airplane. What kind of a guy is he?

Yes, he struck me as a bit of a throwback. In particular, he has this very deep admiration of America that is reminiscent of another era. He spent a lot of time in America. He talked very fondly about his trips to America. He particularly likes Arizona!

I think that all the time he spent there has given him what we might consider a 1990s idealistic view of the country. He’s betting that America will, in the end, come in and side with the angels when it comes to Ukraine. I found that interesting, though I’m not sure it’s true.

Another thing I noticed: I’m used to American politicians, whether it’s Trump or Joe Biden, who have a certain type of presidential charm they turn on with journalists. And I didn’t really get the sense that Merz was trying to charm me. Maybe that’s a cultural difference, but it didn’t seem like he was playing the politician. He just wanted to talk about economics and Ukraine.

So, Jim, before you came to Germany, you covered politics and the global economy from Washington, D.C. What surprised you the most when you first arrived?

The thing that surprised me most was how much covering Germany has actually been very similar to my old job. Trump’s shadow is everywhere. The German economy is much more dependent on the whims of Trump’s trade policy than I expected coming in. And certainly, Merz’s chancellorship has been more dominated by his responses to Trump than by migration or economics or a bunch of the other domestic issues that I was really gearing up for. Donald Trump looms very, very large here.