ISPI: 5 Jul 2023 Towards Vilnius: Framing NATO’s Success in a New World Julian Lindley-French I

 

5 Jul 2023

Towards Vilnius: Framing NATO’s Success in a New World

Julian Lindley-French 

Despite the very important issues that will be discussed in Vilnius, the NATO Summit is likely to be another one of those summits where "success" is defined by allies remaining quite aligned.

COMMENTARY TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS

NATO’s world

In an ideal NATO world, the Vilnius Summit would see a rapturous outbreak of consensus amongst the Allies.  NATO Agenda 2030 would be well on its way to fulfilment a year on from Madrid, 2% GDP expenditure on defence, of which 20% would be spent on new equipment annually, would be accepted by all as a floor rather than a ceiling of defence-strategic ambition; the Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) would be doing precisely that – accelerating; Turkey would welcome Sweden into the Alliance with open arms; Europeans would really understand that transatlantic burden-sharing means helping to keep America strong where she needs to be strong (China); and Ukraine would be offered a clear, updated and accelerated road to full Alliance membership as part of a process of dynamic alignment with the Alliance.  

Nor is there any further justification for continuing to abide by the security assurances in the NATO-Russia Founding Act, particularly regarding no permanent stationing of substantial combat forces on the territory of NATO members admitted after 1997. NATO must now move quickly to deploy conventional Allied forces, resources and infrastructure anywhere in its area of responsibility in support of Forward Defence. Any such commitment must also includeFinlandandSweden – Turkey or no Turkey. 

Vilnius on hold

Unfortunately, the most that one can expect from Vilnius is likely to be yet another of those holding summit where ‘success’ will be again defined by the Allies not completely falling out and in which the agreeing ‘language’ for the Communique will be deemed as victory. NATO Agenda 2030 will be alluded to as a work in progress, but few specifics of said progress will be offered.  DIANA is already mired in NATO bureaucratic politics and has yet to develop the impetus it needs. A newly elected President Erdogan says Turkey will not accept Swedish membership of the Alliance unless Stockholm stops anti-Turkish protests, which is difficult in a real democracy. Despite the cleverly crafted new German National Security Strategy and the operationalisation of Zeitenwende it implies Germans remain ambivalent at best about military power as evidenced by the complicated wording about nuclear policy. 

There is also little evidence therein that the Germans understand that for all Poland’s efforts to increase defence expenditure American over-stretch means the responsibility for leading the future land deterrence of NATO’s eastern flank will fall on Berlin. The French are still lost in their Macro-Gaullist wet-dream about ”l’autonomie strategique“, i.e.  getting the German taxpayer to fund the French defence industry.  Paris also wants to both punish the British for AUKUS/Brexit whilst courting the British for the European Political Community. The British, for their part, seemed to have achieved the impossible: spending ever more on defence whilst British forces get ever smaller and weaker. The rest? They by and large choose not to matter.

It’s Ukraine, stupid

For all the above Ukraine will and must be the litmus test for the Summit and the Alliance’s level of cohesion simply because there is a major war underway in Europe. Vilnius is only 589 kilometres from Kyiv and both Lithuania and Ukraine border nuclear-armed Belarus and Russia. Ukraine is clearly not going to be offered immediate NATO membership but there must be a clear commitment to dynamic alignment of Ukraine with the Alliance.  Dynamic alignment allied to dynamic support. However, far too much future support of Ukraine seems to be linked to the current counter-offensive which will probably be one of several before Kyiv is able to negotiate from a position of some strength. 

The Alphen Group’s just published Ukraine Strategy 2023 calls for what should be the minimum requirement of the Summit. “A Mutual Commitment to Security, Defence and Sovereignty should also be established. Under the Commitment, the allies would commit themselves over the medium-to-longer-term to do all they can to assist Ukraine to defend itself, dissuade Russia from launching further aggression, and thus increase Kyiv’s leverage in any eventual political settlement to the war. The Commitment would also build on the ongoing provision of military equipment and training and be tailored to enhance Ukraine’s resilience against cyber-attacks, disinformation, economic warfare, and political subversion over the long term. The Commitment would also reinforce a function-driven form of partnership for Ukraine with NATO, making it a formal Alliance responsibility tohelptrainandequipUkrainian armed forces, and to facilitate their acquisition of modern defensive weapons, backed by common funding”.

For Ukraine’s counter-offensive to make the real gains many in the West want it must also enjoy five further conditions which depend on the Alliance. First, Allied unity of effort and purpose. Never forget the power of the will in warfare. Second, sufficient military capability in sufficient capacity, allied to deployed force protection. Third, the absolute certainty that the NATO Allies and other Partners have Ukraine’s back.  Fourth, that before Ukraine gets NATO membership (no specifics will be extended at Vilnius) Kyiv is at least offered a Defence and Deterrence Partnership (DDP) with NATO.  Fifth, the Allies understand collectively that they are Ukraine’s strategic depth, and that depth depends on the Alliance also fully realising its own New Force Model. 

If these conditions are met at Vilnius, then the summit will succeed. If not…