ISPI : 5 Jul 2023 Ondrej Ditrych Vilnius and Beyond: Containing Russia and the Future “Putinic Wars”

 5 Jul 2023

Ondrej Ditrych

Vilnius and Beyond: Containing Russia and the Future “Putinic Wars”

What does NATO need to develop a political strategy to reduce and manage the threat of Russian imperialism in Europe?

COMMENTARY EUROPE AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE · TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS

NATO needs a political strategy to reduce and manage the threat of Russia’s imperialism in Europe. It cannot eliminate it, so it must prevent future rounds of ‘Putinic Wars’. The Madrid Summit delivered a revision of what allied deterrence and defence should look like in the future. In that crucial compartment, Vilnius will be about implementation through new force model, next generation of military plans and kickstarting defence production. Broader strategic issues should not be neglected, however – with the long durée perspective and the big picture in mind.

This means a political strategy toward long-term peace rather than military strategy based on a theory of victory. Kennan’s containment doctrine is the paradigm of such political strategy, even as it remained to some extent a theoretical construct throughout the Cold War. After Russia stole Crimea, I suggested – incidentally, in an Italian journal – that Moscow should be contained again. My updated proposition for the ‘new containment’ is as follows. 

Building blocks

First, Russia State’s capacity to wage major wars should be constantly degraded. Second, a common defence system should be conceived that includes Ukraine as the bulwark against Russia’s expansionist tendencies. Third, further down the road, strategic regional stability talks based on a common interest in avoiding unintentional escalation, limited reciprocity, and (needless to say) a good memory of Moscow’s past stratagems – covering everything, from past flawed and dishonest proposals of security treaties to actions in direct contravention of the OSCE’s ‘decalogue’ of founding principles and all the various manifestations of Moscow’s ‘political warfare’ – should be launched. 

The primary devices for degrading Russia’s war-making capacities are sanctions combined with military support to Ukraine. The sort-term challenge, irrespective of the outcome of Kyiv’s current counteroffensive, will be to reframe that support from arming Ukraine in order to defeat the invading force and restore control over territory to holding fast through deterrence by both denial and punishment (‘porcupine’), possibly through the QME (qualitative military advantage) model inspired by Israel, in what is bound to be a long low-intensity conflict. The will to earnestly engage in diplomatic negotiations by Russia will be limited as the Kremlin bets that the Western lifeline to Ukraine will not be maintained long-term. Even in the scenario of possible regime weakening and repressive consolidation that could backfire with the elites and undermine the war effort – a scenario made more plausible by Yevgeny Prigozhin mutiny – the Kremlin would likely seek respite but hardly abandon its revisionist agenda. 

Securing Ukraine

The thrust of the debates ahead of Vilnius concerns a second point: how Ukraine can be integrated in a system to protect it against Moscow’s expansionism. Kyiv will probably not be invited to join NATO right away. Even most advocates of full membership defer the prospective accession until ‘after the war’. However, short of wild card scenarios, the war is poised to continue for a very long time because peace (as not mere temporary absence of fighting) is conditioned on Russia’s surrendering revisionist ambitions and on a fundamental restructuring of Russia’s leadership – and even that would be only a necessary, not a sufficient condition. 

Ukraine’s membership should not be ruled out forever – and it will not. At the moment, however, it would not be the most likely way to deter Moscow’s future aggression since it would instead increase the risk that Russia might be tempted to test the credibility of Article 5. This should make the Central European supporters of Ukraine’s accession think twice. Is exposing the Alliance to such hard test in the near future something in their core interest? 

Needless to say, credibility remains an issue for whatever other solution, including the possible outcome of the Vilnius summit. It will likely feature a combination of 1) a stronger political declaration than the Bucharest summit (2008) Communiqué, but falling short of providing a clear and detailed roadmap; 2) elevation of the bilateral relationship between Ukraine and NATO, but without alliance guarantees; and 3) something like a ‘security compact’, a mini-lateral formalised but fundamentally political commitment by the U.S., UK, France and Germany to continue to support Ukraine but without legal force. That, however, should not be mistaken for security guarantees. It is rather assurances that relate to the first pillar of the ‘new containment’ rather than the second – and would therefore not do much, indeed not enough, in terms of Ukraine’s integration.

In terms of real security guarantees, the desired design ought to be multilateral, with a distributed commitment to ensure sustainability and mitigate risks of dependence on resolve or capacities of the limited number of guarantor states. A way to achieve that could be a new multilateral security agreement similar to the Brussels Pact (1948). While later overshadowed and superseded by NATO, the resulting Western Union demonstrated to the somewhat reluctant U.S. (who took part in its defence planning) after WW2 that Europeans were willing to take some responsibility for their own security. 

The new pact would constitute a collective agreement – by no means competing with NATO – protecting its members specifically against the threat of Russian imperialism. Like the Brussels Pact, it would include a commitment to provide mutual aid and assistance among its members for “maintaining peace and security and resisting policy of aggression”. It could be negotiated among parties that are either NATO or EU member states, or have a history of security and defence cooperation with them – possibly including Georgia and Moldova (should the later waive its neutrality). Credible mechanisms would need to be created to sustain this commitment, i.a. extending the notion of the ‘single set of forces’ for members of both NATO and the EU. 

Preparing the future 

Nothing can realistically be done regarding the third pillar (strategic stability) as long as Russia is in the midst of overt aggression and breach of the security arrangements dating back to Helsinki and the post-Cold war era. For the foreseeable future, regional stability can only be precariously maintained through a balance of power. NATO can, however, already engage in foresight and closed door debates about how to pursue, under more favourable conditions, restoration of elements of security management in terms of rules and practices of risk reduction to complement deterrence. Indeed, this is not about peace, as Russia will likely remain a diminished but undefeated revisionist actor. It is also not about appeasement, as limiting the sovereignty of any member of the continental security system must be a non-starter. It is rather about basic norms of cohabitation premised on accepting some mutual constraints.

NATO is proving once again that it can adapt to new security realities. The main outcome of the Vilnius summit – by no means insignificant – will be to confirm such adaptation course. There is no simple solution to restoring peace in Europe. In this imperfect world, ‘new containment’ is the next best thing.