( Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft düşünce kuruluşu, "Esad sonrası Suriyesi'nde ABD - Türkiye İlişkileri konusunda kapsamlı bir çalışma belgesi hazırlamıştır. 12 Ağustos 2025 tarihinde yayınlanan bu belgenin özeti, giriş ve sonuç bölümleri blog hesabımda sunulmaktadır. Hayli uzun olan bu çalışma kağıdının tam metni, isteyen değerli arkadaşlarımın e-mail adreslerine ayrıca iletilecektir. Saygılarımla.)
QUINCY INSTİTUTE FOR RESPONSIBLE STATECRAFT
QUİNCY Brief 82
The Fading of Old Irritants: U.S.–Türkiye Relations in a Post–Assad Landscape
Adam Weinstein and Steven Simon
Posted on August 12, 2025
Executive Summary
The U.S.–Türkiye relationship today is a fraught partnership marked by discord and strategic misalignment — particularly within the context of the Syrian Civil War but long before it as well. With the fading of old irritants in a post–Assad Syrian political landscape, a more stable and cooperative U.S.–Türkiye relationship is possible — an opportunity the Trump administration should seize.
The United States and Türkiye, though NATO allies, have historically lacked the shared values that make the transactionalism inherent in alliance frameworks easier to manage. As such, tensions have arisen when the strategic interests of each country or domestic politics have diverged. The Syrian Civil War, particularly since the emergence of the ISIS caliphate in 2014, illustrated this division starkly.
While initially supportive of the mission to defeat ISIS in Syria, Türkiye became disillusioned with the military campaign once the United States partnered with the Kurdish–led People’s Protection Units, or YPG. To Türkiye, the YPG is an extension of the Kurdistan Workers Party, or PKK, a militant Kurdish group that the country has fought since the early 1980s and views as an existential challenge. This misalignment of primary objectives in Syria created a fraught dynamic between the U.S. and Türkiye.
In December 2024, Bashar al–Assad’s regime fell following a successful military campaign by Hay`at Tahrir al–Sham, or HTS, a Sunni Islamist group with close ties to Türkiye. While HTS’s rule moving forward is precarious, the United States and Türkiye share a common interest in preventing renewed civil strife in Syria. A resumed war could create another wave of asylum migration to Türkiye and beyond, stimulate deeper Israeli involvement, renew Iranian attempts to influence developments, and run counter to a broadly shared international interest in a unitary Syrian state.
President Trump has expressed a desire to withdraw American troops from Syria and a willingness to permit greater Turkish influence in northern Syria.
To advance a more cooperative U.S.–Türkiye relationship, this brief recommends the following:
The Trump administration should establish a formal working group with Türkiye on Syria, bringing together intelligence, military, diplomatic, and economic channels.
Türkiye and Kurdish groups should engage in backchannel diplomacy to promote Kurdish integration into a functioning Syrian state and protect the Kurds against human rights abuses.
The United States and Türkiye should rebuild strategic trust through targeted defense cooperation, resuming U.S. arms sales to Türkiye contingent on its cooperation in Syria and Iraq, and expanding U.S.–Türkiye joint training and NATO exercises.
Türkiye and Israel should engage in stabilization dialogue to mitigate tensions over their respective zones of influence in Syria and to coordinate on eastern Mediterranean energy development.
Introduction
During the Cold War, U.S.–Türkiye relations were anchored in their shared NATO alliance and mutual distrust of the Soviet Union. Today, headlines about tensions between Washington and Ankara often focus on Türkiye’s balancing act between the United States and Russia. In particular, Ankara maintains deep economic ties with Moscow, even as Washington has until recently remained committed to Russia’s military defeat in Ukraine. But the more consequential fractures in the relationship have emerged in the Middle East.
A major turning point came in 2003, when Türkiye’s parliament refused to allow U.S. troops to launch the Iraq invasion from Turkish soil. Still, Türkiye contributed noncombat forces to Afghanistan and was initially embraced by the Obama administration as a model of democratic Islamism for the region. However, the emergence of the Islamic State organization, or ISIS, exposed irreconcilable differences in priorities. The United States helped mobilize the Syrian Democratic Forces, or SDF — dominated by the People’s Protection Units, known by the Kurdish acronym YPG, a predominantly Kurdish Syrian militia — to defeat ISIS without deploying large numbers of American ground troops.
But for Türkiye, the YPG is inseparable from the Kurdistan Workers Party, known by the Kurdish acronym PKK, which is designated as a terrorist organization by both Ankara and Washington. The PKK occupies a similar place in Türkiye’s national security mindset as al–Qaeda does for the United States, except the former group has an even longer and bloodier history of attacks inside the country. Additionally, the PKK also engenders the added fear, from Ankara’s perspective, that it could eventually fracture the country through the secession of the Kurdish–majority southeast, a region that has seen intense urban warfare as recently as the past decade.
This brief examines how and why U.S. and Turkish interests have drifted apart, especially since ISIS emerged in 2014. It explores what the strategic costs of this misalignment have been for Washington and Ankara, whether they were justified, and whether recent shifts in the region might open the door to a more aligned, even if still transactional, relationship. Despite being a NATO member state, Türkiye has consistently charted its own course even when at odds with U.S. policies. Türkiye is, in many ways, a revisionist power in the Middle East, seeking to reclaim influence once held by the Ottoman Empire. Like Iran and Saudi Arabia, Türkiye views itself as a natural leader of the Muslim world — a view with some merit given Turkic cultural hegemony in Central Asia, influence in Syria and Iraq, and strong ties to countries like Pakistan.
While Türkiye’s relationship with Israel under Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has long been fraught, it had been warming prior to the current Gaza war. Despite Erdoğan’s sharp rhetoric and the partial suspension of economic ties, the two countries have continued to engage over redlines in Syria since the collapse of the regime of Bashar al–Assad in December 2024. This reflects Türkiye’s pragmatic posture — more strategic than ideological — and, from a traditional U.S. security standpoint, the fact that its influence in the region is still preferable to Iran’s. With Türkiye showing renewed interest in asserting itself across the Middle East — particularly in Syria and Iraq — and appearing willing to manage tensions with Israel, and with the Trump administration seemingly prepared to step back from northeast Syria militarily and delegate security to partners in the region while entertaining ties with Damascus’s new government, there is potential for improvement in U.S.–Türkiye relations.
Other factors are also helping to ease tensions in U.S.–Türkiye relations. These include the death of Erdoğan ally-turned-rival Fethullah Gülen, who was blamed for the 2016 coup attempt and whom many in Türkiye believe was protected by U.S. intelligence due to his exile having been in Pennsylvania; the exit of Senator Bob Menendez, a leading critic of Türkiye in Congress; and the positive personal rapport between Presidents Trump and Erdoğan.
Seizing this opportunity to build closer relations, however, will require Washington to recognize that Syria and northern Iraq are vital national interests for Ankara, far more so than the U.S. partnership with Kurdish forces. These territories border Türkiye directly, and Ankara cannot afford to disengage from them, unlike Washington, which retains the option to withdraw.
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Conclusion
Despite being NATO allies, the United States and Türkiye lack deep cultural, historical, or people-to-people ties. Their relationship is shaped by strategic and transactional considerations. In this realm, major barriers to cooperation have been removed. The death of Fethullah Gülen in Oct. 2024, the ongoing U.S. withdrawal from northeast Syria, and the pledged dissolution of the PKK have, by Türkiye’s own assessment, removed important national security threats. This shift has coincided with the departure of some vocal, critical members of Congress. The collapse of the Assad regime, however, carries ambiguous implications for Turkish interests.
The United States’ interests in its relationship with Türkiye in the Middle East are clear, even if they are not vital. From a strategic perspective, maintaining a workable relationship with Türkiye is essential for the United States to balance continued support for its Kurdish partners against Turkish anxieties about Kurdish aspirations for independence. A sound bilateral relationship allows Washington to manage Turkish concerns, de-escalate tensions, and promote Kurdish integration into a unified Syrian state and, in Iraq’s case, a functioning federal system. Preventing another wave of Syrian migration into Türkiye is also important, as it risks destabilizing not only the country itself but also European allies. Preventing open conflict between Türkiye and Israel in Syria also remains a key interest. Spiraling, potentially violent tensions between informal and formal allies would be a dangerous distraction from other diplomatic challenges, even as it presaged wider clashes and the disintegration of Syria.
Most of these goals can be advanced by recognizing that Turkish leaders view northern Iraq and Syria as vital to their country’s national security, clearly communicating U.S. redlines, and prioritizing areas of cooperation, such as counter–ISIS efforts in post–Assad Syria and Iraq.
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Specific recommendations include:
- Institutionalize a Syria Coordination Mechanism with Türkiye
Appointing U.S. Ambassador to Türkiye Thomas Barrack as special envoy to Syria was a key step toward acknowledging Türkiye’s role in Syria’s future and improving policy coordination. To build on this, the United States should establish a formal working group with Türkiye on Syria — bringing together intelligence, military, diplomatic, and economic channels. This would help repair strained ties, including those between Ankara and U.S. Central Command, which operates in areas of Turkish concern. Quietly supporting back-channel diplomacy between Turkish officials and SDF representatives should also continue.
- Rebuild Strategic Trust through Targeted Defense Cooperation
To re-anchor the alliance in mutual security goals, the United States should:
- resume limited arms sales or technology transfers, contingent on Turkish cooperation in Syria and Iraq;
- expand U.S.–Türkiye joint training and NATO exercises, particularly those focused on counterterrorism.
- Support Turkish–Israeli Stabilization Dialogue
- Facilitate Turkish–Israeli coordination on major issues, including deconfliction within Syria and eastern Mediterranean energy development.
- Recognize that harsh rhetoric deployed by Israel and Türkiye toward one another is often political but does not preclude practical cooperation.
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