Iran Update, July 18, 2025 Key Takeaways: The E3 urged Iran to deliver “concrete results” or the E3 would trigger the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism,

 Iran Update, July 18, 2025

Key Takeaways:

The E3 urged Iran to deliver “concrete results” or the E3 would trigger the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism, but more time is unlikely to result in changes to Iranian policy. Iran has set a de facto precondition to negotiations that would require the United States to guarantee Iran’s right to enrich before the resumption of any negotiations.

Senior Iranian commanders are discussing air defense modernization as they assess force readiness after the Israel-Iran War. The emphasis on modernization follows Iran’s ineffective defense against Israeli strikes between June 12 and June 24, using a domestically produced system.

Israel reversed its previous demand that Syrian transitional government forces refrain from intervening in Suwayda Province, southern Syria. Syrian transitional government forces are reportedly stationed on the outskirts of Suwayda Province. It is very unlikely that the Syrian transitional government will be able to re-secure and establish lasting stability in Suwayda Province within the Israeli-dictated 48-hour window.

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Israel reversed its previous demand that Syrian transitional government forces refrain from intervening in Suwayda Province, southern Syria. An unspecified Israeli official reported on July 18 that Israel will “allow” a limited number of Syrian transitional government forces to enter Suwayda for the next 48 hours to restore stability.[i] Syrian transitional government forces withdrew from Suwayda Province on July 17 after Israeli airstrikes conducted "to protect” the Druze inflicted heavy losses on transitional government forces.[ii] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said on July 16 that Israel would continue to enforce its demand for a demilitarized Syria south of Damascus.[iii] Bedouin clans across Syria exploited the security vacuum created in the withdrawal of government forces and deployed to Suwayda to fight Druze militias that are conducting retaliatory killings against Bedouins.[iv] These killings by Druze militias are retaliation for the atrocities committed against the Druze in Suwayda by predominantly Sunni militias over the last week. Fighting between factions and attacks on civilians have intensified across Suwayda Province since the government forces withdrew on July 17.

Syrian transitional government forces are reportedly stationed on the outskirts of Suwayda Province.[v] It is unclear if Syrian government forces have entered Suwayda at this time. Syrian media reported on July 17 that Syrian government forces are present near Soura al Kabira on the Damascus-Suwayda Highway and have reportedly allowed non-government fighters to pass through government checkpoints to enter Suwayda.[vi] Syrian media reported on July 18 that Syrian General Security Service (GSS) convoys reached the northern countryside of Suwayda but have not advanced beyond the city of Liwa, northeast of Suwayda Province.[vii] An unspecified security source told Reuters on July 18 that Syrian government forces ”were awaiting a final green light to enter Suwayda.”[viii] Suwaydawi media reported on July 18 that some Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Ministry of Interior (MoI) fighters have removed their uniforms and begun supporting Bedouin fighters.[ix] CTP-ISW is unable to verify these claims. The existence of these claims in the information space, combined with atrocities committed by government forces against the Druze over the last week, will have extremely deleterious effects on the government’s ability to present itself as a neutral security guarantor and restore order in Suwayda Province.

It is very unlikely that the Syrian transitional government will be able to re-secure and establish lasting stability in Suwayda Province within the Israeli-dictated 48-hour window. Government forces initially deployed to Suwayda on June 14 to quell intercommunal violence between Druze and Bedouin communities.[x] Unsanctioned violence and abuses committed by government forces between June 14 and June 16 deepened existing distrust between the government and the Druze.[xi] Violence in Suwayda Province has intensified as Sunni Bedouin fighters have flooded Suwayda in the wake of the government forces’ withdrawal. These tribal fighters have seized large swaths of Suwayda’s territory. Government forces returning to Suwayda to quell the violence will need to successfully position themselves so that they can adequately protect both Druze and Sunni Bedouin populations in Suwayda before setting up lasting security mechanisms to suppress violence over the long term. This would likely require a ceasefire among the many armed groups involved in the violence, along with a well-disciplined stay-behind force that could protect both the Druze and Sunni Bedouins equally without resorting to the abuses that government forces have been involved in over the last week. A plan that relies on undisciplined government forces or local, communal-based militias is likely to drive additional violence because these forces would continue to conduct retaliatory killings, contribute to a cycle of violence, and fail to protect the local populations.

The E3 (the United Kingdom, Germany, and France) urged Iran to deliver “concrete results” or the E3 would trigger the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism, but more time is unlikely to result in changes to Iranian policy.[xii] The E3 foreign ministers held a teleconference with Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi on July 17 to urge Iran to resume nuclear negotiations and cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to avoid snapback sanctions.[xiii] An unspecified French diplomatic source stated the E3 seeks a “verifiable and lasting” deal and reiterated their readiness to reimpose UN sanctions if Iran fails to produce results by the end of August.[xiv] The E3 would have to initiate the process to impose snapback sanctions by September 3 to complete the 45–65-day process before the measure expires in October 2025.[xv] A Wall Street Journal reporter noted that the E3 foreign ministers and European Union Foreign Policy Chief Kaja Kallas also suggested extending the snapback deadline during the call.[xvi] He added that such an extension would reportedly require agreement from Iran and its UN Security Council allies, Russia and China, to amend the timeline.[xvii] There is no provision in the JCPOA to extend the snapback clause, however.[xviii] It is unclear how the UN Security Council could amend the snapback timeline, given that the JCPOA is a political agreement among its participants and not a legally binding UN treaty.[xix]

Iran has set a de facto precondition to negotiations that would require the United States to guarantee Iran’s right to enrich before the resumption of any negotiations. Iran has repeatedly reiterated its unwillingness to concede on its right to enrich, though there is an ongoing debate in Iran over resuming negotiations, and this policy could change. Iranian officials have maintained their position on retaining uranium enrichment capabilities despite pressure from the US and European countries. The delay of snapback sanctions is unlikely to change Iran’s position on nuclear enrichment because a delay does not incentivize Iran to change its position. The Iranian Supreme Leader’s International Affairs Adviser, Ali Akbar Velayati, stated on July 14 that Iran would not oppose negotiations without “preconditions” if the US guarantees Iran’s right to enrichment.[xx] The recognition of this right is itself a precondition, however. US officials repeatedly rejected the demand and insisted on “zero enrichment.”[xxi] Senior Supreme Leader adviser Ali Larijani separately stated on July 17 that “no talks are underway” and argued that Iran should not rush into negotiations, leaving it to Khamenei to decide when to proceed.[xxii]

Senior Iranian commanders are discussing air defense modernization as they assess force readiness after the Israel-Iran War. Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi inspected Iran’s air defense headquarters on July 18 to assess postwar readiness.[xxiii] Mousavi highlighted the need for updated air defense systems, creative tactics, and operational agility to counter “future threats.”[xxiv] Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters Commander Brigadier General Alireza Sabahi Fard also presented a report during Mousavi’s visit on recent efforts to strengthen Iran’s air defense capabilities.[xxv] The emphasis on modernization follows Iran’s ineffective defense against Israeli strikes between June 12 and June 24, using domestically produced systems.[xxvi] Iranian officials may seek to acquire advanced systems from partners like China after domestically produced systems failed.[xxvii]

The Iran Update aims to inform national security policy by providing timely, relevant, and independent open-source analysis of developments pertaining to Iran and its Axis of Resistance. This update covers political, military, and economic events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. It also provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. The American Enterprise Institute's Critical Threats Project and the Institute for the Study of War will provide regular updates, including daily updates, as the crisis warrants.