Every President Has a Foreign Policy. Trump Has Five.
February 03, 2025
President Donald Trump has come out firing, with a fusillade of policy actions and executive orders meant to reshape America’s approach to the world. In doing so, Trump has also made clear that this is his administration: No “axis of adults” will thwart his plans this time around.
But if loyalty is the watchword of Trump’s second administration, there are still profound intellectual debates within the government and political movement he leads. Trump’s foreign policy will be shaped by how he adjudicates a contest of ideas — and some brutal bureaucratic combat —among five key schools of thought.
Every presidency is an intellectual mélange, because every administration brings a range of perspectives to bear. Policy is ultimately made by the president. But internal debates matter because they shape the options that are presented, and because the often reflect the ambiguities within a leader’s own worldview.
The fights within Trump’s administration will, if anything, be more important than usual, because this president is so often influenced by the last person he sees — and because the gaps between contending factions are so profound.
First, there are the global hawks. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and National Security Adviser Mike Waltz have moderated on key issues, namely Ukraine, to stay in step with Trump. But they would have been equally at home working for Presidents George W. Bush and Ronald Reagan, or Trump’s main opponent in the Republican primaries, Nikki Haley.
This group believes in the stabilizing qualities of US primacy. It favors aggressively containing countries — Iran, Russia, China, North Korea — that are destabilizing vital regions of Eurasia. These advisers value US alliances, even if they are now charged with renegotiating them. And they seek to consolidate the hemispheric base for US global engagement by pursuing what Waltz calls “Monroe Doctrine 2.0” — a reinvigorated effort to combat Chinese influence and other threats in the Americas.
Then there are the Asia Firsters. Elbridge Colby, who occupies a crucial position as the undersecretary of defense for policy, and his allies believe that the risk of war with China is rising, so Washington must deprioritize commitments in Europe and the Middle East. So do key Trump allies, such as Senator Josh Hawley.
This group demands more self-reliance from allies in Europe and greater contributions to the collective defense from friends in the Asia-Pacific. They tend to see China primarily as a military problem, so they focus more on shoring up the balance in the Western Pacific than on battling Beijing for economic and technological primacy around the globe.
Asia Firsters have some overlap with the “Come Home, America” cohort. This group sees US policy through the prism of the lengthy wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Its main goal is to avoid new Middle Eastern quagmires by slashing US involvement there.
This faction is also skeptical of aid to Ukraine, because of the risk of escalation with Russia; some advisers think the US should slash its defense budget and get out of the business of running the world. Vice President JD Vance and Tulsi Gabbard, Trump’s nominee to head the intelligence community, have often aired such views — which also resonate with midlevel officials shaping policy at the Pentagon.
A fourth group, the economic nationalists, see foreign policy primarily as a matter of commerce. Trump’s Treasury secretary, Scott Bessent, and his nominee for commerce secretary, Howard Lutnick, have argued that making America great again requires ruthlessly wielding tariffs as tools for bringing in foreign investment and combating unfair trade practices.
The economic nationalists also support Trump’s push for “AI dominance” and “energy dominance.” They see the US-China competition as primarily an economic contest — and they are willing to get just as tough with America’s traditional friends, such as Canada and Mexico, as with its traditional enemies in Moscow and Beijing.
Finally, we have the MAGA hard-liners. This group, including deputy chief of staff Stephen Miller, channels the Trumpist elements of Trump’s agenda, such as his hostility to foreign aid and advocacy of outright land grabs. They treat foreign policy as an extension of domestic policy, and put issues like illegal immigration at the forefront of relations with America’s southern neighbors. This approach is as much an attitude — “We’re America, bitch,” as one aide commented in Trump’s first term — as a strategy. Its influence comes from its proximity to the rawest instincts of Trump himself.
The range of potential outcomes in Trump’s presidency is so extreme because the range of views is so broad. Mapping this terrain is helpful because it reveals the tactical alliances that may emerge and the internal fights that may erupt.
Asia Firsters and Come Home types both want to get out of the Middle East, but they part company on how much risk the US should accept to protect a democratic Taiwan. Global hawks and economic nationalists can agree to slap more tariffs and export controls on China, but they diverge on how harshly to treat allies.
Hawks and MAGA hard-liners are keen to revive the Monroe Doctrine, but have different views of whether that means wielding coercion against Panama or Greenland — and whether Monroe 2.0 is a way of bolstering or replacing America’s larger role in the world. What unites these groups is that they all claim to represent Trump’s true agenda, because currying his favor is essential to winning the internal fights.
Make no mistake: These aren’t trivial bureaucratic disputes. A Trump administration that uses leverage and tough love to strengthen the North Atlantic Treaty Organization will be far more internationally stabilizing than one that simply walks away from it. There is a huge difference between an administration that uses tariffs and export controls to contain dangerous rivals and one that uses them more promiscuously, in ways that divide the democratic world. Across a range of issues — Iran, Ukraine, Taiwan, and many others — the divergences within Trump’s team can be severe. The next four years will see a running battle for Trump’s approval, which will also be a battle to shape the larger world.
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