Chatham House : What to make of Yevgeny Prigozhin? June 8, 2023

 

This is a monthly update from the Russia and Eurasia Programme on the developments inside Russia. Preamble and questions are by Ben Noble, responses by Nikolai Petrov. This note is intended for your private use and will not appear on the institute's website or in any other published form.

What to make of Yevgeny Prigozhin?            Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the visibility of Yevgeny Prigozhin – known to many by the moniker ‘Putin’s chef’ – has increased sharply. What was Prigozhin’s role in Russian politics before the full-scale invasion? Yevgeny Prigozhin is a man with a criminal past who became the owner of several fashionable restaurants in St Petersburg. He has hosted Putin and his foreign guests, and, beyond the restaurant business, became famous for reportedly providing illicit and semi-legal services to the Kremlin, whether that be a troll factory in St Petersburg or the Wagner private military company (PMC). Prigozhin has increasingly been in the news because of his sharp criticism of senior Russian officials. His profanity-laden videos claim Russia’s military leadership is not providing sufficient support for Wagner forces operating in Ukraine. These statements have resulted in wildly divergent analyses. Some argue this is a sign of elite factionalism that poses an existential threat to Vladimir Putin’s position as leader. But others say that Prigozhin is useful to Putin by keeping the military in check. What’s your take? Wagner forces have provided an important service to Putin. Against the background of autumn 2022 failures of the Russian military, Wagner fighters not only paralysed significant forces of the Ukrainian military but also ensured the capture of several former population centres, including, most recently, Bakhmut. This has resulted in enormous casualties for the PMC. But the ranks of mercenaries have been filled and replenished with criminals recruited from prison colonies with the offer of a full pardon after six months of service. For these sacrifices, Putin awarded Prigozhin the ‘Hero of Russia’ title. Although Prigozhin’s relations with the Russian military leadership have been strained for a while, the relationship has sunk even lower in recent weeks. He has been swearing almost daily at the defence minister, Sergei Shoigu, and the chief of the general staff, Valery Gerasimov, accusing them of being unable to wage war, not giving Wagner the necessary weapons and ammunition, and of betrayal. Prigozhin also scolds just as harshly most of the political and business elite of Russia, claiming they are not ready to sacrifice their interests for the sake of their country.

‘‘Prigozhin's scandalous publicity is provided by his own media resources – but without Putin's tacit permission, his outrageous statements would not be possible.’’

And I think Putin needs Prigozhin for two reasons – as a counterweight to military generals who are less than capable of delivering on the battlefield, and as a frontman for those who are pushing for war to the bitter end. Prigozhin publicly represents hawkish views that Putin could share. He is, in other words, the dark side of Putin’s dark side – a kind of Mr Hyde of Mr Hyde. Who are Prigozhin’s foes and allies within Russia? It’s important to recognize that his current enemies and the objects of his attacks are erstwhile allies, including Shoigu, Alexander Beglov, the governor of St Petersburg, and Sergei Kirienko, the first deputy chief of staff of the Presidential Administration, responsible for domestic policy. There has also recently been a war of words with Chechnya’s leader, Ramzan Kadyrov, despite his own previous criticism of the Russian military command.   Prigozhin’s ideological enemies are the ‘unfinished liberals’, including quietly anti-war technocrats, and those who advocate negotiations to end the war. His situational allies are those who support escalation, as well as those who, like him, accuse the military leadership of indecision and incompetence. These are generals from the special services – the Federal Security Service (FSB) and the Federal Protective Service (FSO) – as well as the National Guard and those parts of the Ministry of Defence that are critical of their own organization’s handling of the war. Those directly aligned with Prigozhin, or who are referred to positively by him, include Alexei Dyumin, governor of Tula Oblast, former commander of special operations forces, and Putin’s lieutenant; Colonel Generals Mikhail Mizintsev and Sergei Surovikin; Dmitry Peskov, Putin’s press secretary; and Sergei Mironov, chairman of the political party Just Russia – For Truth. Does Prigozhin have broader political ambitions? Definitely. Prigozhin is a skilled and increasingly popular populist at a time when anti-elite sentiments are in high demand. He is sometimes compared to General Alexander Lebed, who came third in the 1996 presidential election in Russia. The comparison relates to their shared brutal appearance, coupled with an ability to speak in understandable language. In contrast to Lebed, Prigozhin has large military, financial, and media resources of his own, making him largely self-sufficient. That being said, Prigozhin does not appear to have clear presidential ambitions himself at the moment. Although he is currently touring Russia’s regions, this should not be seen as the start of a presidential campaign. Rather, he is trying to recruit new Wagner fighters and drum up support for escalation in the war. After the long-awaited Ukrainian counter-offensive and regardless of its results, the question will arise about what to do next: move to negotiations with Kyiv or escalate and settle into a long-term, large-scale war? The ‘party of escalation’, as it could be called, is fronted by Prigozhin and is focused on inclining Putin to the second option, as well as preparing public opinion for it. How much is known about other initiatives to create private military companies or private security forces in Russia? And what does this say about people’s confidence in the durability of the Putin regime?   PMCs are still prohibited by Russian law, but a special government decision recently allowed Gazprom to create its own private security forces, of which there are already several structures. A number of other state and private companies, such as Russian Railways, Rosneft, Transneft, and Rosatom, have also created armed units. And many regions are being forced to participate in the war and maintain their own volunteer battalions.

‘‘This all means that the state's monopoly on legal violence is being decentralized.’’

I don’t think these paramilitary formations could be directly used in a future struggle for power, but under Putin – or in the event of his departure – they constitute an important resource strengthening the position of the elite players controlling them.