U.S. Leadership on Ukraine Is Increasing European Dependence Liana Fix Feb 6, 2023February 10, 2023

 U.S. Leadership on Ukraine Is Increasing European Dependence

Liana Fix

Feb 6, 2023February 10, 2023

U.S. Leadership on Ukraine Is Increasing European Dependence

U.S. President Joe Biden speaks as he arrives for an EU summit in Brussels, Belgium, March 24, 2022 (AP photo by Geert Vanden Wijngaert).

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Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine last year, the U.S. has made alliance-management its top priority in Europe. The Biden administration had already devoted significant time and effort since taking office to repair the damage of the Trump years and bring the U.S. back as the leader of the West. The war in Ukraine has underscored the degree to which those efforts have paid off.

Yet after one year of war, U.S. leadership has encountered a paradox: It is too successful for its own good. It produces remarkable results for Ukraine and the NATO alliance. But it incentivizes Europeans to lean into U.S. efforts instead of assuming their own leadership role. There is a “Western” policy toward the war, but there is no European policy.

There is little doubt that strong U.S. leadership was necessary at the beginning of the war, when few believed that Russian President Vladimir Putin would actually embark on his delusional neo-imperial campaign. But after one year, alliance-management remains a heavy, time-consuming burden for the Biden administration. The “hundreds of hours” that Secretary of State Antony Blinken has logged to keep the coalition intact must appear to U.S. officials as the diplomatic equivalent of “helicopter parenting.” And despite the best of intentions, Europeans have little incentive or necessity to change this status quo.

The debate over whether or not to deliver heavy tanks to Ukraine was a case in point. In response to appeals to deliver German-made Leopard tanks and allow its European partners that possess them to do the same, Berlin insisted that it would not go it alone on what it feared was a potentially escalatory step. But when the U.K. went ahead to supply Kyiv with its Challenger II tanks, hoping to provide the kind of European leadership that would unlock the German tanks, it was ignored. The U.K. was not enough of a “wingman” to provide the political cover Germany desired. Berlin needed Washington to step in and resolve the impasse, which it did when the U.S. finally announced that it, too, would deliver its own Abrams tanks to Ukraine. It was a depressing episode for European ambitions to demonstrate leadership. Instead of relying on each other, Europeans relied on Washington.

Unwillingly and unintentionally, the Biden administration’s alliance-management and successful leadership make Europeans more dependent, not less, on the United States. This also extends to European defense. The war has strengthened NATO, but not European Union defense efforts, the dormant nucleus that could actually lead to Europeans assuming more responsibility for their own security. Although President Joe Biden has expressed his support for a stronger and more capable EU defense, complementary to NATO, the war has resulted in further fragmentation and  greater dependence on Washington.

A contributing factor is the growing mistrust among Europeans. Central Europeans are disappointed by German and French efforts since the war began. They now see Berlin and Paris as unreliable partners when push comes to shove, and they are relying on the U.S. more than ever before. Poland even seems to be decoupling from Germany on defense ties, signing an arms deal with South Korea for big-ticket platforms, like battle tanks, that it previously purchased from Berlin. Berlin’s initial hesitation to issue export licenses to allow its European partners that possess German-made tanks to deliver them to Ukraine adds to this skepticism.

As for France’s conception of European strategic autonomy, Central Europeans see it as a dangerous attempt to minimize what they consider the far more dependable security role of the United States in Europe—and to establish French hegemony over Europe. French President Emmanuel Macron famously called NATO brain-dead in a 2019 interview with The Economist, but for Central Europeans, it is his oft-repeated calls for European strategic autonomy that are actually brain-dead.

Unwillingly and unintentionally, the Biden administration’s leadership makes Europeans more dependent, not less, on the United States.

But France and Germany have lost trust in their Central European partners, too, particularly when it comes to what they see as a disregard for escalation risks that could put the security of the entire alliance at risk. France and Germany want the U.S. to restrain Poland and the Baltic states, in particular, which in turn would like Washington to pressure Berlin and Paris to do more. U.S. leadership has so far managed to paper over the differences and steer a middle course. This creates a comfort zone for Europeans, as they do not have to come to terms with their differences but can instead rely on Washington to jump in as the arbiter.

This is not only an immediate problem, but also one with major implications for the future. U.S. leadership creates a path dependency: If Europe’s and Ukraine’s security are assured right now on the basis of a dominant U.S. role, any postwar European security order will likely rest on a similarly strong U.S. role. And that commitment will be necessary for the foreseeable future. The parallel to 1941 comes to mind, when the U.S. entered World War II to win the fight, but with little sense of the huge global leadership responsibilities that would be required to keep the peace.

The debate over U.S. strategic priorities and resources will also be back in the domestic spotlight in the runup to the U.S. elections in 2024. Republicans, especially those aligned with former President Donald Trump, are already criticizing what they see as European freeriding on the provision of military and financial support for Ukraine. This does not reflect reality, as Europe has provided substantial support for Ukraine. But this narrative will influence decision-making in Congress on whether or not to extend support for Ukraine, especially if coupled with the idea that U.S. resources are finite and should be prioritized to address China.

There is no easy way out of this conundrum. The U.S. has been right to lead a Europe unable to lead itself in responding to the war in Ukraine, as not doing so would have unfairly punished Kyiv. And as the recent debacle over sending tanks demonstrated, Washington cannot simply withdraw from its leadership role with the hope that Europeans will step in, at least not without risking a collapse of the current war efforts.

Meanwhile, the coordination mechanisms in place after one year, such as the Ramstein Ukraine Defense Contact Group, which brings together 51 nations to coordinate their military support to Ukraine, depend on U.S. leadership. And the situation in Ukraine is too serious for experimenting with new and untested mechanisms that would rely on European leadership. A historic example is the Normandy format between France, Germany, Russia and Ukraine, established after Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the onset of the war in Donbas in 2014, which failed to bring about lasting peace in Ukraine. But at the same time, the efforts to defend and stabilize Ukraine, both now and after the war is over, cannot rely on U.S. leadership alone.

What the U.S. can do is to recognize the problem: Europe is leaderless and perceives itself as such, and it lacks the incentive to assume a leading role. And the Biden administration can draw clear red lines regarding how much of the burden the U.S. is willing to shoulder. For example, the ball should be in Europe’s court when it comes to the reconstruction of Ukraine. The G-7 announced a multi-donor reconstruction platform in December, and the European Commission, together with Ukraine, will provide the secretariat. The leadership of these efforts should stay in European hands, in order to align reconstruction with Ukraine’s EU accession process. This is not an area where U.S. leadership, in the form of a U.S.-led new Marshall Plan for Ukraine is necessarily needed—Europe has the political will, and economic and financial might, to manage this part alone.

Europe also needs to invest in its defense-industrial base to ensure the long-term armament of Ukraine, which will have to continue beyond any armistice or cease-fire, as well as to undergird its own defense capabilities. But if U.S. leadership simply allows Europe to backslide into Cold War dependency, it will have become the victim of its own success.

Liana Fix is a fellow for Europe at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington.

WPR